armaments (naval armaments were to some extent ignored), whereas France demanded security in the shape of those military guarantees which the British delegation disliked.

On Sept. 7, however, a compromise was reached whereby the Assembly resolved that the Third Commission (disarmament) should examine the documents concerning security and the reduction of armaments, especially the remarks of the Governments on the Draft Treaty and the other schemes subsequently submitted to the Secretary-General of the League, that the First Commission (legal) should study the eventual amendments of the articles of the Covenant concerning the settlement of disputes and the possibility of defining the terms of paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of The Hague Court so as to facilitate the acceptance of this clause. The two commissions set to work, and, on Sept. 27, their joint report, a Protocol for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, and a resolution recommending the Governments to give careful consideration to the Protocol, were submitted to the Assembly and voted on Oct. 2, together with another resolution for the summoning of a new conference for the reduction of armaments.

The Protocol contained certain modifications of the Covenant and also some extensions of its principles. The great obstacle to a solution of the problem of replacing war by a judicial or arbitral decision lay in the fact that the sovereignty of the individual States had to be preserved. In the Covenant arbitration and judicial decisions were entrusted to organs whose authority was not superior to that of any single State; whereas the Protocol provided for the obligation of applying sanctions as a direct consequence of a decision of the Council of the League, eliminated the faculty of doing nothing, and set forth the obligation of each State, in order to resist acts of aggression, to collaborate loyally and effectively in the application of sanctions according to its geographical situation and the special conditions of its armaments. It further declared that there could not be a pact of disarmament unless it be accompanied by a pact of mutual assistance in case of aggression, and that aggression must be defined by a formula. The formula was as follows: a State which refuses to submit a dispute

in which it is concerned to arbitration, or, having so submitted it, refuses to abide by the award, is deemed to be the aggressor. Although the Protocol was voted by the Assembly and hailed as a heaven-sent decision calculated to put an end to all wars, the British Government (Mr Stanley Baldwin having succeeded Mr MacDonald) refused to ratify it, thereby condemning it, like the Draft Treaty, to oblivion, to the satisfaction of nearly all those who had devoted serious attention to the problem.

League activities for disarmament, however, did not by any means cease. The unwieldy T.M.C. was dissolved; but a new body, the Preparatory Committee, was set up to draft the programme for a new conference on disarmament to be held at a very early date, and both the United States and Russia were invited to send delegates to it. The United States accepted. The Committee appointed a military and an economic sub-committee (known as Sub-Committees A and B) to collect the necessary data for the plenary Committee as to the subjects to be dealt with by the future conference. The two sub-committees sat from May to November 1926, and presented their reports. These, when the plenary Committee met in March last, were taken as read, and the British delegate presented a draft convention for the programme of the conference. French delegate thereupon presented another draft, and the two schemes were examined and discussed in thirtynine lengthy sittings. The divergences in the various points of view appeared very considerable, and the result was that a scheme of convention was drawn up in which a very small number of clauses were accepted unanimously, while many others were included as proposals of one or more delegations, with reservations or counterproposals on the part of others. This achievement was defined the first reading' of the convention; but the various delegations retained full liberty to go back on all their proposals, or on the consent they may have accorded to those of others, when the second reading takes place at the next session in November.

The

The outcome of these protracted debates was only to make the divergences between the various points of view clearer than ever, even in this purely theoretical

preliminary stage. Although Viscount Cecil, on the adjournment of the session, expressed his full satisfaction at the result achieved, which, he declared, had proved that disarmament was a perfectly practical policy, his optimism was not shared by less enthusiastic observers. In the meanwhile the draft convention was submitted to the Council of the League in June and transmitted by it to the Governments. In all probability there will be direct negotiations between the principal Governments as to the armaments to be assigned to each Power when the question of fixing the definite limitations comes up for discussion at the Conference proper (in the text of the draft convention all figures are omitted).* If agreement is reached in these negotiations it will be possible to resume the work of the Preparatory Committee in November according to plan and eventually reach the final stage of the Disarmament Conference. Otherwise the November meeting and consequently the Conference itself may never take place.

Thus after seven years of discussions the problem has only reached the stage of debating as to the subjects to be submitted to a Conference. The cause of disarmament, so far as the League is concerned, has not advanced one step since January 1920; indeed, in one respect it may be said to have gone back, as back, as the enormous difficulties in the way are now so fully realised as to shake the faith even of the most optimistic. This does not mean that most States are more warlike than they were seven years ago-on the contrary, there is less of the bellicose spirit abroad; but it is doubtful whether the methods followed by disarmament zealots are best calculated to establish the maintenance of peace.

An attempt to achieve a partial reduction of armaments independently of the League of Nations was made at the Washington Conference on Naval Disarmament in 1921-22. Apparently it was more successful than other attempts, because it is practically easier to reduce naval armaments than those on land, and if a reduction in naval strength is effected in time of peace, it is im

Mr Wilson Harris, in an article on 'Disarmament Progress' ('Contemporary Review,' June 1927), writes that once these figures are fixed, limitation (of armaments) will ipso facto have been achieved. But that is just the most insuperable difficulty-the fixing of the figures.

possible to improvise or greatly increase it on the outbreak of war, or to make naval preparations on a large scale in secrecy. Also the cost of naval construction, even in peace time, is to-day so enormous as to make all nations hesitate when there is no pressing need. But even at Washington agreement was only reached with regard to capital ships and aircraft carriers and limited to five Powers. Moreover, by basing the limitations on the principle of the status quo, it is largely responsible for the high level of armaments now existing in Europe, as many States fear that a future disarmament conference will fix their armaments on the basis of those they may possess at the time. The principle itself is essentially to the advantage of the Powers with the largest fleets and armies. The Conference of 1924 for the extension of the Washington agreements to non-signatory Powers led to no result, and President Coolidge's invitation to another conference to extend the Washington principles to all classes of ships has not met with enthusiastic response, and only Britain, the United States, and Japan have accepted it and are participating in it.

There are many reasons for the failure of these attempts at reducing armaments by treaty. One is the difficulty of comparing the real fighting strength of the various Powers, and of determining the amount of armaments to which any one of them should be legitimately entitled in view of its particular conditions and necessities. A proposal advocated by the French delegate, M. de Jouvenel, was that of returning to and not exceeding the pre-war budgets. It is obvious that such a scheme, if effected, would leave those Powers who in 1913 were preparing for a war of aggression in a stronger position than those inspired by peaceful intentions. According to another plan armaments should be based on the extension of the frontiers of each State; but this would entitle Russia, the one really aggressive country to-day, to armaments far in excess of those of any other Power, while no account would be taken of other strategic factors, such as natural obstacles. Other schemes are equally unpractical. Indeed, if we examine all the various proposals we find that their advocates are talking a language which the World War has to a large extent rendered obsolete. The problem is apt to be considered

on the basis of peace-time effectives, and most of the disarmament schemes, if put into practice, would leave the various countries with standing armies similar to those of fifty to one hundred years ago, i.e. of an age when wars were more frequent than they are to-day. There is no guarantee that with a return to the standards of 1830 or 1870 war would be made more difficult. Even

in those days armies in war time were of course much larger than in peace time; but the disproportion was much smaller than it is to-day, because the organisation and machinery for indefinite expansion were lacking, so that the larger a country's peace effectives the greater was its advantage over others on the outbreak of war. In the World War, on the contrary, the number of men engaged in all armies was infinitely larger than the peace effectives-the latter, indeed, represented but a tiny fraction of the former. There is every reason to believe that in a future war the disproportion will be even greater. It may be said in a general way that peace effectives represent the defensive forces of each country; its powers of aggression are based almost wholly on the forces which it is capable of raising in war time. It is, therefore, of little use trying to reduce peace effectives unless some means are devised for reducing, or at least equalising, the probable war strength. The possibility of expanding an army in war time is proportionate to the industrial development and organisation of each country. A highly industrialised country can convert its plants from peace production to war purposes almost at a moment's notice, and is, therefore, in a stronger military position than another country with a larger standing army but a less highly developed industry. In the past armies consisted almost exclusively of professional soldiers; owing to the primitive character of the weapons employed, the human element was absolutely predominant, and it took years to train a soldier efficiently. If a country were forced to reduce its standing army, as often occurred as the result of a defeat, it would find it very difficult, if not impossible, to improvise a new force. This is no longer the case to-day.

Nor should geographical conditions, easily defensible frontiers, facility of communications and an efficient railway system, the possession of coal, iron, and other