NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY MONDAY, MAY 2, 1949 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D. C. The committe met, pursuant to adjournment on April 29, 1949, in room 318, Senate Office Building, at 10:30 a. m., Senator Tom Connally, chairman of the committee, presiding. Present: Senators Connally, George, Thomas of Utah, Green, McMahon, Fulbright, Vandenberg, Hickenlooper, and Lodge. Also present: Senators Donnell and Watkins. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will please come to order. This is the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, holding hearings on the North Atlantic Pact. We are fortunate this morning in having present Mr. Lovett, former Under Secretary of State, whom we wish to interrogate. Mr. Lovett is familiar, I assume I assume it is a sound assumption-with the North Atlantic Pact, and is reputed to have been one of the early people who had contact with its formation, and so forth. We will be very glad to hear you on the matter, Mr. Lovett, and we shall try to accommodate ourselves as much as possible to your convenience. Mr. LOVETT. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I have a short prepared statement here, copies of which are on the way up to the committee now, and if it meets with the wishes of the committee I will read from this as an initial statement. The CHAIRMAN. That is very good, and we will interrogate you afterward. STATEMENT OF ROBERT A. LOVETT, FORMER UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE Mr. LOVETT. Mr. Chairman, I am glad to have the opportunity to appear before this committee in support of the North Atlantic Pact with which I was directly associated in its origin and early develop ment. I shall not take the time of the committee by discussing the importance of this treaty in relation to our foreign policy or the interpretation of the actual text. These and many other points dealing with the treaty have been authoritatively and fully covered in the statements and testimony of the Secretary of State and other witnesses who have appeared before you. I shall likewise try to keep my preliminary statement brief and will then be at the disposal of the committee for any questions concerning the particular aspects of the treaty with which I was intimately and directly associated. It is important, I believe, that there should be a full understanding as to how this treaty was conceived, the need which gave birth to its concept, and the manner in which the executive branch of the United States Government came to the decision that United States association in a measure of collective defense of this nature was necessary in the interests of its own security and that of world peace. INSECURITY IN WESTERN EUROPE Even while the European recovery program was still in a state of formulation, it became obvious that the problem of security in western Europe could not be ignored in connection with the general problem of European recovery. The policies and practices pursued by the Soviet Government and the Communist Parties subservient to it since the end of hostilities had created a sense of insecurity in the free countries of western Europe who had joined together to promote, with American assistance, the reconstruction and recovery of their community. COMMUNIST ACTIONS AGAINST ERP This general sense of insecurity had been intensified by the savage réaction of the Soviet Government to the program of cooperative undertaking between the United States and the nations of western Europe then known as the Marshall plan for the reconstruction and revival of the European community. The organization by the Soviet Government of the Cominform and the announced purpose of the Soviet Government of its intention to use every method at its disposal to sabotage and defeat the return of health and stability to the European community and the subsequent implementation of that intention had raised immediately and directly the problem of security for the nations of western Europe. They knew from experience and from the open announcement of the Soviet Government that they could expect neither help nor mercy from the Soviet Union and the Communist Parties which operate under the direction of the Kremlin. NEED TO ASSIST RECOVERY BY INCREASING SECURITY It became obvious to the European countries and to the executive branch of this Government that recovery would not be fully achieved unless some method could be devised to enhance the sense of security of the participating nations and restore, insofar as possible, confidence that the fruits of the constructive enterprise in which we were jointly engaged would not be destroyed by external aggression. With the encouragement of this Government, five European governments joined together in the Brussels Pact as a first step in dealing with this problem of security for the European community. 'It was, however, obvious to them, as it was to us, that these European countries-no matter how far they progressed along the program which they had set for themselves of coordinating and integrating their defense capabilities-were not able by their efforts alone to deal with the situation. The problem then arose in our minds as to whether or not it was in the interest of the United States to associate ourselves with certain European nations in order to create those conditions of security and confidence essential for recovery and to make a contribution for the preservation of peace in an area so vital to the national security of the United States. The support given to the European recovery program, which during this period was before the Congress of the United States, had already made it plain that a primary objective of the foreign policy of this country was the survival, revival, and recovery of the free community of western European nations. It seemed hardly logical to us to make the effort required under this program and to ignore the possibility that if this great enterprise was not given the protection that it needed, its whole aim could be defeated. Then all the consequences which the European recovery program was designed to avert might be upon us. EARLY CONSULTATIONS WITH FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE The President of the United States, in his address to the joint session of the two Houses of Congress on March 17, 1948, made clear our interest and intentions in regard to this problem of security. However, the executive branch did not wish to take even the first step in so important a matter without obtaining the views of this committee. Accordingly, under the instructions of the President, Secretary Marshall and I began a series of consultations with the Committee on Foreign Relations. I shall not go into any detail as to the nature of these consultations, since they were done with this committee and they are familiar to many of its members. I would like to say here that while the State Department placed at the disposal of the members of this committee the information which we had concerning the situation abroad, and discussed with them our opinion as to where the interests of the United States lay, the Senate Resolution 239, which was reported out unanimously by this committee and subsequently adopted by the Senate on June 11, 1948, was not drafted in the Department of State. It was-as this committee knows the product of this committee after many consultations with us. The contents of this resolution, with which you are all familiar, became our guide in the discussions and subsequent negotiations which led to the conclusion of the North Atlantic Pact. EXPLORATORY CONVERSATIONS WITH BRUSSELS PACT COUNTRIES From July to September 1948, as Under Secretary of State, I conducted a series of conversations with the representatives of the Governments of Canada and the five countries forming the Brussels Pact— Great Britain, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg. These conversations were in the true sense of the word exploratory, and were specifically without commitment on the participants. We did not attempt to draw up any text or draft of a treaty. We wished to ascertain whether or not all the countries then involved were in sufficient accord as to the problems we were dealing with and the measures suitable to deal with them before we would embark on any more formal course. We wished above all to be certain that the European nations understood clearly the point of view of the United States Government and the sense of the Senate as set forth in Resolution 239. I do not wish to burden the committee with any details concerning these conversations in my statement, but I hope in my testimony I will 90614-49-pt. 1—16 be able to clear up any questions on this point that the committee may have. In September these exploratory talks came to an end and the results were reported back to the governments for their consideration. They were not resumed until December. BEGINNING OF NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE TREATY Through diplomatic channels, at the end of October, the governments which had participated in the exploratory talks in the summer had made known their views that a treaty of this nature was considered most necessary by all of them, and in December the discussions in Washington were resumed for the purpose of drafting the type of instrument that would give expression to the common purpose we had in mind. An outline of the subject matter which such a treaty should contain had been agreed upon in the exploratory talks during the summer and subsequently approved by the respective governments. This outline was developed into a series of preliminary draft articles during negotiations which started in December. No draft of the treaty as a whole was introduced by any government at any time. The drafting was a collective effort. The drafting had not been completed when I left Government service on January 20. INTERESTS OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS IN THE TREATY It was during the last week of December and early January that certain other governments whose participation in the treaty would be welcomed if they so desired, were informed of the general nature of the treaty in contemplation. I would like to say here that this information was conveyed to these governments at their request and no government at this, or as far as I know any other, time was ever subjected to any pressure in regard to joining the North Atlantic Pact. The participants did not wish even to place any government in the awkward position of receiving an invitation unless it had previously indicated its desire to be invited. We had very firmly in mind that this association of nations for collective self-defense must be entirely voluntary on the part of any of its members or it would fail of its purpose. SUBMISSION OF PRELIMINARY DRAFT TO PARTICIPATING GOVERNMENTS A preliminary draft of certain articles of the treaty was completed late in December and on the 24th of that month was submitted to the participating governments for their consideration. I think it is important to emphasize that although the representatives who had met in Washington had worked out this preliminary draft, it was clearly understood that it was without commitment on the part of the governments they represented; it was, in effect, a working paper which all realized would be subject to probable change before it became anything approaching a final text. We made abundantly clear our intention to regard this draft as a working paper and as a basis for consultation with the Foreign Relations Committee of the Senate. This was clearly understood by all participants. Shortly after this, as you know, I relinquished my duties as Under Secretary of State, and Secretary Acheson took over the conduct of these negotiations. He has appeared before this committee and has testified concerning this period. ADVANTAGES OF THE TREATY It is, I hope, superfluous to tell the committee how warmly I welcomed the signature of the North Atlantic Pact on April 4 in Washington. We would not have embarked on this venture had not the President, General Marshall, and those of us in the State Department associated with him, as well as the National Security Council and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, felt strongly that an association of this nature was essential to the national security of the United States and for the furtherance of peace and security, which has been and remains the great goal of our foreign policy. Nothing that has occurred since I left office has changed my own strong convictions upon this point. On the contrary, I believe that the signature of this treaty has in itself enhanced the chances of successfully achieving these goals. There has, in fact, already been concrete evidence of this. Within few-days of the signature of the treaty, comprehensive agreements on Germany, agreements I may say which we had been trying unsuccessfully for more than a year to reach, were concluded with the United Kingdom and France. Without the new sense of confidence provided by association contemplated by the treaty I doubt whether it would have been possible to reach such satisfactory agreements. Recent events have only deepened my conviction that this treaty reflects the basic interests of the United States. I feel confident that fluctuations in our relations with any foreign power will not succeed in diverting our attention from these basic interests. I firmly believe that this treaty gives accurate expression to the determination of the American people to play their full part in the maintenance of peace and security. I earnestly hope, and I am confident, that the Senate will make that determination unmistakably clear in its action upon the treaty. The CHAIRMAN. Is that all, Mr. Lovett? SOVIET ATTITUDE TOWARD ECA The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Lovett, you made reference to the ECA having been under consideration during a certain period. With regard to the Soviet Government's attitude respecting the ECA, I want to ask you some questions about my own views. Am I correct in the assumption that one of the chief motives of the opposition of the Soviet Union to the ECA is their fear that the operation of the ECA will strengthen the weaker countries, the smaller countries, like Denmark, Holland, and others of western Europe, and thereby damage the opportunities of the Soviet Union to infiltrate and aggress against them, and probably incorporate them into the system that we know as the satellites? Am I correct in that view? Mr. LOVETT. I think, Mr. Chairman, that is generally correct, sir. They have found that communism spreads in a period of great distress |