LOYALTY OF ALLIES Senator WATKINS. In considering plans for conduct of a defensive war in Europe, of course you have to take into consideration many elements, including probably the loyalty of your allies who may be fighting along with you, with our divisions. How do you feel about the situation for instance, in France and Italy, where it is said that every fourth Italian or every fourth Frenchman is a Communist? I do not want to ask too pointed a question, but I wonder if you could throw any light on what risks we would be taking in rearming those two nations, or helping to rearm them, and what we can count on if we get into a fight? General BRADLEY. Of course any country which tries to fight a war with any considerable percentage of her people disloyal, is working under a handicap. However, I do not believe that any percentage of people considered disloyal now can be taken as anywhere near accurate of the percentage that will be disloyal in the event of war. A lot of people talk one way until the test comes, and then you find that they are loyal and patriotic citizens. I might cite as an example, a few years ago we had in this country a movement by the Veterans of Future Wars in which a lot of youngsters said they would not fight, yet when I got to Africa I found one of the ringleaders of that group on my staff, and he was decorated several times for bravery. It may be that a lot of these people included in the 25 percent that we talk about now would be loyal to the country when the test came. Senator WATKINS. However, at the present moment they indicate, if you can judge by the expressions of some of their leaders, that they would not fight on the side of the United States in the event of war. General BRADLEY. Undoubtedly there would be some such people. Senator WATKINS. At least they would not fight with their own countries to in any way assist the United States. General BRADLEY. If that percentage caused too much trouble. I would guess that the country concerned would have to take a realistic view of the matter and take such steps as may be necessary to cope with it. Senator WATKINS. Can Italy be of any real assistance to us in a future war? CONTRIBUTION OF ITALY GENERAL BRADLEY. I would like to answer that, in general, I think they can. Specifically, I would not want to answer it here. Senator WATKINS. I wondered in view of the past record whether or not they would be of any particular good, particularly in view of the treaty which was entered into between Italy, the United States, and the Soviet Republics, as we have limited their armament very materially, and to what is now very obsolete armament. That is one thing that prompted my question. Do you know any way whereby we could rearm them and keep within the law? General BRADLEY. I would rather not go into that. If I might answer it in a general way, in my opinion, even under those treaty restrictions, they can contribute something to the Atlantic Pact. However, the inclusion or exclusion of any particular country does not fall in the province of the military. That was decided on a very high government level, and the State Department decided for our Government that it was proper that they be included. Militarily I think that they are in general an asset. Senator WATKINS. You could not anwser it one way without violating security? General BRADLEY. I would rather not answer it here, sir. SENDING OF UNITED STATES TROOPS ABROAD Senator WATKINS. I have noticed from time to time statements by some people who are more or less responsible, that a part of our program contemplates the sending of considerable detachments to members of the Atlantic Pact not only for the purpose of instruction but also to bolster their forces. What can you say about that, General? General BRADLEY. If any decision has been made as to sending any particular size group and for any purpose to these nations, I do not know about it. Senator WATKINS. It is not contemplated at the present time? Senator WATKINS. I mean as far as you have been advised. General BRADLEY. Certainly we have not been in any planning for sending any particular groups. Certainly if you furnish arms aid then somebody has got to go over and see that they are properly received and distributed. But that does not come into this particular thing. Senator WATKINS. I think, General, that this concludes most of the questions that I want to ask you. There are some that I do not know if I will be permitted to ask at someplace where you can answer, that involve security. But I want to thank you for the very gracious way you have answered my questions. I appreciate your cooperation. I want to assure you that I was trying to get information that would help me, as one Senator, to make up his mind. General BRADLEY. Thank you. The CHAIRMAN. General Bradley, the committee thanks you for your presence here and for your very able and clear statement of the issues involved in the treaty. On the questions that are outside of the treaty at the moment, on arms and so forth, we think you have made a very comprehensive and able statement. We very greatly appreciate it. You have gone directly to the point at issue, with a great degree of clarity, and perspicacity. You have enlightened the committee, and I hope have enlightened those who are here by our courtesy. This committee will adjourn until 10 o'clock tomorrow morning. At that time Mr. John Foster Dulles will be the first witness. (Thereupon, at 1:20 p. m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 10 a. m., May 4, 1949.) 90614-49 pt. 1—22 APPENDIX Production data showing industrial capacity of the North Atlantic Pact powers1 The question has been raised whether the North Atlantic Treaty, since it envisages the use of armed force as a last resort for the suppression of acts of aggression, is a military alliance. Throughout the course of history there have been military alliances of every conceivable type. Some have been high-minded in intent; others have been cynical steps toward aggrandizement. Some have been purely defensive in motive; others have been offensive. Some have been automatic; others have depended on the judgment of the parties. All traditional military alliances, in the accepted sense of the word, were designed to advance the respective nationalistic interests of the parties, and provided for joint military action if one of the parties in pursuit of such objectives became involved in war. Most traditional alliances of the past, while piously denying aggressive or expansionist intentions, nevertheless made it clearly evident that the parties anticipated military action in contingencies other than defense against armed attack. Sometimes the parties to such arrangements were in a position themselves to provoke the anticipated crisis, or casus belli, if it did not otherwise arise. Typical among such treaties are the following: 1. The Act of the Holy Alliance (September 26, 1815) This act provided that the parties "will, on all occasions and in all places, lend each other aid and assistance." 2. The Triple Alliance (Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy) May 20, 1882 "Article 4: In case a Great Power nonsignatory to the present Treaty should threaten the security of the states of one of the High Contracting Parties, and the threatened Party should find itself forced on that account to make war against it, the two others bind themselves to observe towards their Ally a benevolent neutrality. Each of them reserves to itself, in this case, the right to take part in the war, if it should see fit, to make common cause with its Ally." [Italics added.] 334 The terms of article 4 envisaged the possibility that one of the allies might precipitate a war under the terms of the treaty if it felt its security threatened. The obligations of the other allies in such a case were not to include entry into a war brought about in this way, but the possibility of their entry to assist an aggressive ally was specifically provided for. The text of this treaty was not published until 1920. 3. The German-Italian Treaty of February 20, 1887 "Article 3: If it were to happen that France should make a move to extend her occupation, or even her protectorate or her sovereignty, under any form whatsoever, in the North African territories, whether of the Vialayet of Tripoli or of the Moroccan Empire, and that in consequence thereof Italy, in order to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean, should feel that she must herself undertake action in the said North African territories, or even have recourse to extreme measures in French territory in Europe, the state of war which would thereby ensue between Italy and France would constitute ipso facto, on the demand of Italy and at the common charge of the two Allies, the casus foederis with all the effects foreseen by Articles II and V of the aforesaid Treaty of May 20, 1882 [the Triple Alliance], as if such an eventuality were expressly contemplated therein. "Article 4: If the fortunes of any war undertaken in common against France should lead Italy to seek for territorial guaranties with respect to France for the security of the frontiers of the Kingdom and of her maritime position, as well as with a view to the stability of peace, Germany will present no obstacle thereto; and, if need be, and a measure compatible with circumstances, will apply herself to facilitating the means of attaining such a purpose." [Italics added.] The terms of this treaty contemplated the possibility that Italy, in view of certain French measures in north Africa, might attack French forces in Africa or even France itself, in which case Germany would enter the war against France. German support was also promised for contemplated Italian claims for French territory along the Franco-Italian frontier. The German-Italian Treaty of 1887 was by its own terms to be kept secret and was not published until 1920. 4. The Austro-Italian Treaty of February 20, 1887 "Article 1: * * * However, if, in the course of events, the maintenance of the status quo in the regions of the Balkans or of the Ottoman coasts and islands in the Adriatic and in the Aegean Sea should become impossible, and if, whether in consequence of the action of a third Power or otherwise, Austria-Hungary or Italy should find themselves under the necessity of modifying it by a temporary or permanent occupation on their part, this occupation shall take place only after a previous agreement between the two Powers aforesaid, based upon the prin ciple of a reciprocal compensation for every advantage, territorial or other, which each of them might obtain beyond the present status quo, and giving satisfaction to the interests and well founded claims of the two Parties.” [Italics added.] This treaty clearly envisaged the possibility of territorial changes in the Balkans and in the Adriatic and Aegean regions either by the action of nonsignatory powers or "otherwise," i. e., by the aggressive action of Austria-Hungary or Italy, if either of those powers should find itself "under the necessity of modifying" the status quo. In this case there was to be previous consultation between the two allies with a view to assuring both of them "reciprocal compensation" in territory or otherwise for the gains of either of them. The Austro-Italian Treaty of 1887 was by its own terms to be kept secret and was not published until 1920. 5. The Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 30, 1902 "Article 1: The High Contracting Parties, having mutually recognized the independence of China and Korea, declare themselves to be entirely uninfluenced by any aggressive tendencies in either country. Having in view, however, their special interests of which those of Great Britain relate principally to China, while Japan, in addition to the interests which she possesses in China, is interested in a peculiar degree politically as well as commercially and industrially in Korea, the High Contracting Parties recognize that it will be admissible for either of them to take such measures as may be indispensable in order to safeguard those interests if threatened either by the aggressive action of any other Power, or by disturbances arising in China or Korea, and necessitating the intervention of either of the High Contracting Parties for the protection of the lives and property of its subjects. "Article 2: If either Great Britain or Japan, in the defense of their respective interests as above described, should become involved in war with another Power, the other High Contracting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, and use its efforts to prevent other Powers from joining in hostilities against its ally. "Article 3: If, in the above event, any other Power or Powers should join in hostilities against that ally, the other High Contracting Party will come to its assistance, and will conduct the war in common, and make peace in mutual agreement with it." [Italics added.] This alliance envisaged the possibility of the necessity for taking "measures" which might involve one of the parties in war. Japan found its position sufficiently strengthened by the terms to the alliance to precipitate the RussoJapanese War in 1904. 6. The Russo-Japanese Convention of June 20/July 3, 1916 "Article 1: The two High Contracting Parties, recognizing that their vital interests demand that China should not fall under the political domination of any third Power hostile to Russia or Japan, will frankly and loyally enter into communication whenever circumstances may demand, and will agree upon the measures to be taken to prevent such a situation being brought about. "Article 2: In the event that, in consequence of the measures taken by mutual agreement as provided in the preceding article, war should be declared between one of the Contracting Parties and one of the third Powers contemplated by the preceding article, the other Contracting Party will, upon the demand of its ally, come to its aid, and in that case each of the High Contracting Parties undertakes not to make peace without a previous agreement with the other Contracting Party." [Italics added.] This secret convention envisaged the possibility that Russia or Japan might take "measures," based upon mutual agreement, which would lead to war with another power-probably the United States-over their interests in China. In this case, providing that sufficient cooperation was forthcoming from other allies, the other party to the convention would enter the war. The terms of the treaty did not require that either of the parties be attacked, the key article having been drafted in such a way that the measures precipitating the war might very well be aggressive measures. 7. The Soviet-German Treaty of Nonaggression of August 23, 1939 "Article 1: Both High Contracting Parties obligate themselves to desist from any act of violence, any aggressive action, and any attack on each other, either individually or jointly with other powers. "Article 2: Should one of the High Contracting Parties become the object of belligerent action by a third power, the other High Contracting Party shall in no manner lend its support to this third power." Secret Additional Protocol of August 23, 1939 "1. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement in the areas belonging to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern boundary of Lithuania shall represent the boundary of the spheres of influence of Germany and the U. S. S. R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilna area is recognized by each Party. "2. In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state the spheres of influence of Germany and the U. S. S. R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narew, Vistula, and San. "The question of whether the interests of both parties make desirable the maintenance of an independent Polish state and how such a state should be bounded can only be definitely determined in the course of further political developments.” [Italics added.] The published articles of this treaty provided merely that neither party would attack the other or lend its support to any power with which the other party might be at war. The secret additional protocol, however, envisaged major territorial "rearrangements" in eastern Europe which could take place only through Soviet or German aggressive action. These agreements led directly to the German and Soviet attacks on Poland in September 1939. The North Atlantic Pact differs from the traditional military alliances of the past both in letter and in spirit. When one examines the terms of the North Atlantic Pact, there can be no doubt as to the character of the commitments undertaken. Specifically, the Pact forbids "the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the UN," and authorizes the use of force, |