UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 10-17-52 CONTENTS Statements by- Page Backus, Mrs. Dana C., interim national chairman, Women's Action 624 Beggs, Mrs. Frederic, consultant to the international relations de- 497 Broy, Mrs. Cecil Norton‒‒‒‒. 713 Burr, Rev. Dudley H., chairman of the Peoples Party of Connecticut_ 708 758 413 Dennis, Eugene, general secretary of the Communist Party, U. S. A. Elliott, Dr. Phillips, Fellowship of Reconciliation_. 753 Ely, Robert B., III, attorney- 636 Fadler, William F., Jr., member, legislative committee, Young Demo- 635 Kline, Allan B., president of American Farm Bureau Federation__ McKee, Frederick C., national chairman, Committee on National Morford, Richard, executive director, National Council of American- 804 Ogg, W. R., director, department of international affairs, American 583 Patterson, Robert P., vice president, Atlantic Union Committee.. 608 526 479 Schwebel, Stephen M., national chairman, Collegiate Council for the 653 Warne, Prof. Colston E., the National Council of the Arts, Sciences, 794 NOTE. The index to part 2 will appear at the end of part 3. THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 1949 UNITED STATES SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, D. C. The committee met at 10 a. m., pursuant to adjournment on May 3, 1949, in room 318, Senate Office Building, Senator Tom Connally (chairman of the committee) presiding. Present: Senators Connally (chairman), George, Thomas of Utah, Tydings, Green, Fulbright, Vandenberg, Wiley, Hickenlooper, and Lodge. Also present: Senators Donnell and Watkins. The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. This is the Committee on Foreign Relations, sitting in hearings on the North Atlantic Pact. We have the pleasure to have Mr. John Foster Dulles with us, a very distinguished lawyer and great student of international affairs. Mr. Dulles has participated, I think, in all of the conferences including and following the United Nations at San Francisco. He has a very great scope of knowledge and a great reputation for his attainments. We will be glad to hear you, Mr. Dulles. STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN FOSTER DULLES, MEMBER OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NATIONS Mr. DULLES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very greatly this opportunity to appear before this committee to express some views I have about the Atlantic Pact. I should make clear that, although I am at the moment serving as a United States official representative to the General Assembly of the United Nations, the opinions which I here express are personal, and I do not purport in any way to speak for the administration. Mr. Chairman, I support the Atlantic Treaty as a great historic landmark. Of course, its words do not, of themselves, create new realities. But there come moments when words that formalize an existing situation also serve to dramatize it and bring a new awareness of responsibility and of opportunity. I believe that the Atlantic Pact has that quality, or at least that it can be given that quality, and for that reason I support it. UNITY OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC AREA The underlying reality is that the peoples who make up the Atlantic community, the so-called west, do form a natural grouping, having much in common. When in the west that community has been imperiled from without, its members have united their blood and their treasure in a common defense. Thus the Atlantic Pact does not attempt a new and artificial creation, nor is it a mere military expedient of the hour. It reflects a natural and oft-demonstrated unity. It may be asked, why is there occasion now to formalize unity if, in fact, it exists? There are, I think, good reasons. In the first place, the pact is needed to eliminate doubt that the Atlantic community will act quickly and unitedly for common defense. REMOVAL OF DOUBTS ABOUT UNITED STATES ACTIONS There are here at home some doubts or, more accurately, some hesitations. I think there are few who, in their heart of hearts, really doubt that we would react quickly and wholly against any war-intentioned armed attack within the North Atlantic area, for that would in reality be a war against us. But some would like to put off the day of decision. The European members of the Atlantic community have considerable doubt about our intentions, and there may be doubt in the minds of potential aggressors. Such doubts and hesitations increase the risk of war, and they need to be resolved for, as this committee said a year ago, last May, "the best deterrent to aggression is the certainty that immediate and effective countermeasures will be taken." The proposed treaty poses clearly the issue of certainty and immediacy. It says that an armed attack against one of the parties in the North Atlantic area "shall be considered an attack against them all.” That seems to me to be reasonably plain English. It means, I take it, that an armed attack upon Denmark, for example, is hereafter to be treated by the United States as an attack upon it. If there is an attack upon the United States, then something happens, and it happens surely and quickly. Of course, what happens is not necessarily war. There have been many armed incursions into United States territory and armed attacks on United States ships and planes which have been successfully countered, and security restored, by measures short of war. The Atlantic Treaty says that the countermeasures to restore the security shall be such as each party "deems necessary." Thus, each case depends on its own facts. The situation may be one that can be dealt with by Presidential action, or it may be that Congress would be called on to declare war or to declare that a state of war already existed. It is certainly not necessary that each attack should be met by counterattack of the same kind, at the same place and at the same time. Much depends on the design of the aggressor state and how, in fact, evil designs can best be parried. But, if an aggressor wants to make war, our Constitution cannot stop him. During the last 100 years, the United States has been at war with many countries. But the Spanish War is, I think, the only such war that came about through congressional declaration. In the others, .the Congress found that a hostile attack had already created a state of war. I repeat, any aggressor can make war. That choice lies with him, not with us. But this treaty, as I read it, takes away from him one choice, one tempting choice, that he used to have; that is, the choice of making war on the parties singly, one by one. If he chooses to fight one party to this pact, he must fight them all, and all at the same time. DETERRENT TO WAR The treaty, by saying that in words that no potential aggressor can misunderstand, greatly reduces the risk of armed attack on the North Atlantic area and thereby, in my opinion, makes a great contribution to future peace. PROBLEM OF GERMANY In the second place, the pact is needed to make it possible to solve the problem of Germany. There are still 70,000,000 Germans, possessed of great qualities of industriousness, discipline, and ambition, painfully compressed in a strategic area between the east and west. The Soviet Government is making determined efforts to enlist those Germans in its service. If the Soviet now lifts the Berlin blockade, that may be an act of conciliation toward the west. I hope it is. But until that is shown by other deeds it would be wise for us to look on it as a change of Soviet method, not a change of Soviet intention. Soviet leaders had hoped to win Germany by blockade measures that would drive the Western Allies out of Berlin and so damage their prestige that the Germans generally would accept the Soviet Union. as the dominant force in Europe. That method backfired, due to the magnificent resourcefulness of the Air Force. The Western Allies hold in Berlin, and the Soviet, by attempting to starve the Germans we were feeding, lost greatly in influence in Germany. It is understandable if Soviet leaders seek a different environment which might give them a better chance of success. Under the circumstances that exist, Germans will be strongly tempted to develop a bargaining position between east and west and they might even come into a temporary alliance with the Soviet. It has much to offer the Germans at the expense of Poland, and the Soviets and Germans, in partnership, could readily dominate the Continent. The statesmanlike course is to provide the Germans with a decent and hopeful future within the orbit of the west. But again the Germans would be too strong for the comfort and safety of our European allies, unless the west is strengthened by the adhesion of the United States. Germans can be brought into the west if that west includes the United States. They cannot safely be brought into the west if the west does not include the United States. The Atlantic Pact will superimpose upon the Brussels Pact another western unity that is bigger and stronger, so that it does not have to fear the inclusion of Germany. Unless the Council of Foreign Ministers can plan on that assumption, another meeting would have little chance of success. In that respect also the Atlantic Pact can make a vital contribution to peace. |