I am concerned with whether it will be $1,000,000,000 in 1952, $2,000,000,000 in 1953, and those matters.

I do not know that you are prepared to answer those questions this morning, and perhaps they should be presented in some different way than the answer to my questions might suggest, but it is a matter that greatly troubles me, because I think I am obligated to take a look at this thing over the next 20 years if we are going to sign a contract that lasts that long.

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I started on an attempt to throw some light on this question when somehow or other we got entangled with the foreign-exchange problem.

LIMITATIONS ON MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

What I think I want to throw out is some things I said earlier, and I think you were not in the room at the time, that there are certain clearly self-liquidating factors to the military assistance program. The first one comes out of the fact that recovery is a prior necessity, therefore the size of the European forces must be such that they do not interfere with recovery. And it looks as though it will continue to be quite small for some time. Therefore, the size of the forces will not, as many people erroneously assume, mushroom into vast numbers of troops. That is one limiting factor.

The second limiting factor is that as recovery takes place, the European countries can take over more and more of this increment which we are helping them with, so that they will increasingly be in a position where they can carry their own expenditures. That is another limting factor.

The third limiting factor is that the help which we are giving them, as I pointed out a moment ago, is in terms of durable equipment. It is not shoes and uniforms and ammunition which disappears; it is equipment which is durable in peacetime and will last for many years. Therefore you do not have to replace that equipment annually, and the only necessity for adding to it comes when you have any increment in the forces. That increment, as we pointed out a moment ago, cannot take place until recovery is more nearly achieved, and when it does take place the Europeans are in better shape to provide all the equipment themselves. So it is not, in my judgment, a program where I look forward to years of the same or of increasing help. I look for a comparatively short time of help and then it is no longer necessary.

RECOVERY OF MATERIALS FURNISHED UNDER MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM IN THE EVENT OF A COMMUNIST COUP

Senator HICKENLOOPER. With reference to a question that was asked you a while ago by some member of the committee-and incidentally I did hear you generally refer to that subject awhile ago because I was here when we started the meeting-some member of the committee asked you a moment ago what the situation would be in the event of an internal coup or taking over by forces that were not sympathetic or cooperative to the general pact consideration.

Have you given consideration to the possibility that capital goods which we might mutually cooperate to provide to such a country that

later got out of this pact, or repudiated, or disassociated itself with the pact, could be returned to us under safeguard for the return of capital assistance that we have put up?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, Senator, that has had a lot of consideration. I think it would be less than candid on my part to leave you with the impression that if there were a coup, and if one of these countries had such a change in government, that we would have any large chance of getting back any large amount of what we had transferred. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I thoroughly agree with that.

Secretary ACHESON. In my judgment the possibility of such a coup is remote. It is made more remote by the program, because as you give a sense of will to resist and the possibilities that that will be successful, you get further and further away from the sort of disintegration which leads to an increase in Communist strength.

TYPE OF MATERIAL TO BE FURNISHED UNDER MILITARY ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. That would lead to another group of questions, or an area of questions, that have been asked me by members of the Senate and which may be more properly answerable by the military people than by the State Department. I do not know. But those questions would go to the type and kind and purposes of capital equipment. In other words, we could put permanent long-range capital equipment of great value into certain countries which might be later subject to seizure by internal revolution, or something of that sort, which would not necessarily call up the obligations under the pact; that is, the mutual obligations for resistance to aggression. But that may be a military matter rather than a diplomatic matter.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that either in these hearings or in the hearings on the military-assistance program the military authorities will completely satisfy you on that. That is one of the criteria that they have been considering in the screening work which has been done. Senator HICKENLOOPER. For instance, we hear the statement that it is a military-assistance question of whether or not we are going to send and permanently stable B-36's in Europe.

Secretary ACHESON. I think they can remove any worries from your mind on that.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I may not be necessarily personally worried, but I think in many of these questions the areas should be explored, and there should be some answers to them.

Secretary ACHESON. I highly agree.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. On some of them I certainly cannot give the answers unless I have the benefit of better knowledge than mine. Secretary ACHESON. I think you can be and should be fully informed on it.

FUTURE COMMITMENTS UNDER MILITARY-ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do you think that we will have the opportunity, or that there will be available any more reliable or understandable detailed pictures of what we may reasonably expect over the next few years by way of our share of the mutual contribution and by way of some concrete evidence of the contribution of other nations to

this pact, before these hearings are over? In other words, at this moment I am not at all content with the very nebulous program of the next few years. I don't know what we are going to do. And I certainly hope that before we come to final action we can have a little more concrete understanding of what we are expected to do in the foreseeable future, and what other nations are expected to contribute to this well-knit unity of purpose for resistance to aggression. In other words, perhaps some of those things might be discussed in executive session or some other place, but certainly I do not have the answers yet, and I do hope to get myself much more satisfied on those obligations.

Secretary ACHESON. I think that can be done, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think at this time, Mr. Chairman, I have nothing else.

The CHAIRMAN. All right. We will recess until 2: 30.

(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., the committee adjourned, to reconvene at 2:30 p. m. of the same day.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

(The committee reconvened at 2:30 p. m. at the expiration of the recess.)

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. Senator Wiley, we will be glad to have you proceed.

Senator WILEY. Mr. Chairman, I have only a few questions I want to direct to the Secretary. I feel that the questioning up to the present time has elicited a lot of the information that the public should have, and most of us had before. I just want to ask a few simple questions.

INABILITY OF UNITED NATIONS TO ACT

This North Atlantic Pact, Mr. Secretary, is the result, is it not, of, first, because under the United Nations, which is a good mechanism in itself, there has been the inability to get the results due in large measure to the fact that Russia constantly exercised its veto? Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

Senator WILEY. In other words, there has been that lack of international cooperation which we hoped and prayed would come into being after the United Nations was born in San Francisco.

If the United Nations had functioned, if the nations had played ball together, there would not have been that fear that brought about what we think is another mechanism that will have beneficial results; is that right?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. If everybody in good faith had lived up to their obligations under the Charter, then there would have been no fear of aggression, because the clear obligation is that you shall not use force or the threat of force in settling any international question.

Senator WILEY. But it is because of that very condition the European nations and the rest of the world, sensing a threat to the independence of the nations, that we are now trying this new mechanism, The North Atlantic Pact!

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir.

DETERRENT EFFECT OF TREATY

Senator WILEY. Again you face the question that if there is this unity, and if this great Nation becomes a part of this unified action, it is the hope that it will operate to repress or stop any aggression. That is the theory of it; is it not?

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, Senator Wiley.

Senator WILEY. Whether or not military assistance will become necessary will depend upon whether or not there are any beneficial results following the mere execution and the ratifying of the pact. In other words, if the pact itself would open the eyes of the would-be aggressors there would not be any need to carry out any military assistance; is that true?

Secretary ACHESON. If you mean that the mere ratification of the pact would do away with any fear of aggression, that would be true; but that is not the case, Senator.

Senator WILEY. The fact is, as you so dynamically outlined, that we got into two previous wars because, first, the Kaiser was informed and thought that we would not get into the First World War, and it is generally said that if he and his armed crew had thought that America would get in, he would have hesitated a long time.

And in this Second World War it has been said that if Hitler and the Japs had thought that we could do what we did do in the short time that we did do it, they would have hesitated.

In other words, Hitler did not think that it was possible. Now we are saying in this pact, "Do not tread on me," or "Do not tread on my co-pact-makers." That is the substance of it.

Would that not have the same effect that we think it might have had in the previous cases, had we at that time informed the world that if certain things happen, like aggression or an attack, we would stop the aggressor?

Secretary ACHESON. We hope and believe, Senator, that the unity of all the signatories of the pact on the theary that an attack against one is an attack against all, will have a profound effect in discouraging any attack whatever.

NEED FOR IMPLEMENTING THE PACT

Senator WILEY. I get then, from the general concept of the socalled military assistance program that has been evolved, and which you pictured for us today, that there is still the fear that, unless there is some unified action on the part of nations involved as co-pactmakers in the matter of getting better prepared, the situation will not be bettered much by merely signing the pact.

Secretary ACHESON. I say that these two things are complementary; they are both directed to bringing about the same purpose. If we ratify the pact, what we in effect say to the 12 nations signing it is that we will join together, if one of them is attacked, in resisting this attack and restoring peace.

In the present situation some of the signatories of the pact have very inadequate armament, very inadequate equipment for the troops that they have. These nations are anxious to join with us. They say the signing of this pact means that we are all together. They say as we look at the actual situation, if there were a really serious, all-out

attack, we know that in the long run, probably, the great strength of the United States would end in the defeat of the aggressor.

But in the meantime, they say, "we would be overrun. Most of us,” they say, "would be dead; our countries would be destroyed; our civilization would be pretty well destroyed." The final outcome would be that the United States would be liberating a corpse.

"Now," they say, "we want a chance to fight with you; we want a chance to protect ourselves: we want to join in this effort. If you will help us in bringing the equipment of our admittedly small forces to a more competent level, then the will of those forces to fight will be great; the will of the countries to resist will be great; and any wouldbe aggressor will know that he will be faced with immediate resistance, not only ultimate defeat, but immediate resistance, so that he cannot accomplish his results by some kind of a coup or some kind of a push which is all over before he starts."

He has got to move into this with full-scale mobilization and a fullscale, aggressive, warlike purpose. They say we want to be able to help in meeting that and help in protecting ourselves. If we do not respond to that desire we do not get the full impact of the pact, which is that all of these countries will join in resistance with determination and with effectiveness.

Senator WILEY. Then we reach the conclusion, which I think is apparent to every reasonable person, that the condition as it exists in the world today, after 2 or 3 years since the so-called war ceased, we find ourselves in the position where we, with our co-pact-makers, feel that two thinks are necessary: First, an announcement to the world that we will stand in unity against any aggressor; and, second, that we will back up that announcement by getting ready as far as we can foresee to meet any aggressor.

Secretary ACHESON. Yes, sir. That is right, Senator Wiley.

ANGLO-RUSSIAN AND FRANCO-RUSSIAN TREATY AND THE PACT

Senator WILEY. And perhaps you can throw some light on the subject if you will turn to article 8 of the pact, which reads:

Each party declares that none of the international engagements now in force between it and any other of the parties or any third state is in conflict with the provisions of this Treaty, and undertakes not to enter into any international engagement in conflict with this Treaty.

As I say, it has developed that both France and England entered into certain treaties with Russia. I think they preceded the Second World War; and some, I think, were entered into during the war.

You are in a position to explain those treaties. In case there is a breach of the peace or an aggression on the part of Russia against any of the co-pact-makers, those so-called agreements or treaties between Russia and France or England would not have any application, would they? I think that is important for the public to know, because there has been considerable talk on that subject.

Secretary ACHESON. Senator, I think we touched on that this morning. I pointed out that the article which you have just read from the treaty is a declaration by the signatory that it has no treaty which is inconsistent with this treaty. That is an unequivocal statement by the British Government and by the French Government that no treaty