ATTITUDE OF J. REUBEN CLARK, JR.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to ask Judge Gerard who the objector was, and what did he say? Who was the one who objected?

Mr. GERARD. The one who objected was Mr. J. Reuben Clark, Jr., who, I think, at one time was in Mexico, and comes from Utah. The CHAIRMAN. He was at one time Under Secretary of State; was he not?

Mr. GERARD. I am not sure.

The CHAIRMAN. Then he was Ambassador to Mexico during the Republican administration.

Mr. GERARD. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Donnell?

Senator DONNELL. I am glad the Senator mentioned the Republican administration.

I just wanted to ask Judge Gerard if he has at hand the observation made by Mr. Clark. Do you have that, Judge, and would you be kind enough just to read that one into the record, and let us hear what he says?

Mr. GERARD. He is much longer than any of them.

"Are you in favor of the North Atlantic Pact?" That was the question put to him. He answered:

No. At best, it is "just another," but with this added situation, that if the language of the pact is interpreted to mean what it might be interpreted to mean, any little country in the central European Balkan area could involve us in a global war by thumbing its nose at Russia over some little bit of policy or action which would have no effect whatever on the rest of the world and of which the rest of the world might really not even know till it was all over.

**

The situation of the Atlantic Pact versus the United Nations reminds me in one way of the remark of Canning on the Congress of Verona, who is quoted as saying: "The issue of Verona has split the one and indivisible alliance into three parts as distinct as the constitutions of England, France, and Muscovy. ** Villele is a minister of 30 years ago-no revolutionary scoundrel; but constitutionally hating England, as Choiseul and Vergennes used to hate usand so things are getting back to a wholesome state again. Every nation for itself and God for us all." To which may be added the old dictum, "and the Devil may take the hindmost."

Senator DONNELL. May I ask, Judge, do you know where Mr. Clark lives now?

Mr. GERARD. He is living in Utah at the present time.

Senator DONNELL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Judge.

Senator Watkins?

Senator WATKINS. I just came in, so I have not heard anything and I could not very well ask any questions.

Since he mentioned Mr. Clark of my State, I just heard the last two or three sentences. Was that a letter?

The CHAIRMAN. Judge Gerard wrote 21 or 22 ex-ambassadors, and asked them their views, and Mr. Clark was the only one who said "No," so he read his statement and we are putting it into the record.

Senator WATKINS. May I state, then, if it is not already in the record, that Mr. Clark was not only an Ambassador to Mexico, but he was also Solicitor to the State Department at one time, and also Under Secretary of State.

The CHAIRMAN. I stated that, except that I did not mention his having been Solicitor. I mentioned his having been Under Secretary of State and Ambassador to Mexico.

Senator DONNELL. Mr. Gerard, would you be kind enough, if it is agreeable to the committee, to insert into the record also the letter which he sent to these various gentlemen?

The CHAIRMAN. Insert a copy of your letter to them along with the list of responses.

(Communication from the witness to the ambassadors previously identified appears in the record, as follows:)

NEW YORK 22, N. Y., April 1, 1949.

To the Members of the Council of Ex-Ambassadors:

Robert P. Skinner, long in the diplomatic service and for 5 years Ambassador to Greece, has made the following suggestion:

"The news from Greece is unsatisfactory. We have spent large amounts of money upon limited projects such as reconstruction, rehabilitation, and public health leading to nothing in particular, in spite of which, as the Department of State admits, 'the number of indigents and refugees continues to increase.' The military measures have not succeeded in terminating the guerilla war, the Greek Government is feeble, and it is high time to adopt a program giving at least some promise of pacifying the country.

"The guerilla army is Communist-led but only in small part composed of Communists. Recruits are impressed into the rebel troops and terrorized after being put under arms. The whole country is disorganized, and we cannot get out until order is restored. It is believed that many if not most of the guerillas would like to give up but they fear punitive measures from the Government.

"The suggestion I have put before the Secretary of State is that until work, wages, bread, and security are offered to the rebels the present situation will probably continue. It will cost far less to provide these things than to try to shoot them. There are vast areas in Greece that need drainage, irrigation, and so on. Why not set up an organization under American management and control and boldly offer work and wages for a period of 5 years, an offer which would bring the rebels out of the mountains, first in a trickle and soon in a steady stream. In less than 5 years' time these same men would have their minds turned to other than their present political thoughts, and would become the cultivators of the areas prepared by themselves. In the long run the project would yield some return upon its cost.

"I have suggested, as one capable of directing such a movement as described, Mr. Charles House, now the head of the American Farm School at Salonika. Through the years he has acquired the confidence of all classes of the Greek people. Technical advisers we can offer in plenty.

"The present attitude in Washington is that economic recovery will not be possible 'until the guerilla menace has been overcome.' But the guerilla menace cannot be overcome except with economic assistance. This is a vicious circle through which we must break."

I. What do you think of this proposition?

II. Are you in favor of the North Atlantic Pact? The Council of Ex-Ambassadors can exercise great influence but not unless the members answer promptly questions sent to them.

Please answer immediately your opinion on the two questions above to

JAMES W. GERARD.

Mr. GERARD. The letter included a question about the handling of Greece, submitted by Mr. Skinner, and as all the ambassadors were doubtful and said they did not know enough about it, I have not made any reference to it here, because this is only the Atlantic Pact, and these gentlemen to whom I sent this request are all of the ex-ambassadors of the United States, and I give the responses of all who answered-25 out of about 35. The others, some of them, are away, abroad, or someplace else, and of the ones who answered me who are all ex-ambassadors there was only one who was against the Atlantic Pact, namely Mr. Reuben Clark, who, as you correctly said a moment ago, was Ambassador to Mexico, and also Assistant Secretary of State. The CHAIRMAN. Under Secretary of State.

FAILURE TO RATIFY

Senator DONNELL. May I ask you just one further question: As I understood you, you mentioned at the outset the thought that the failure to ratify the Atlantic Pact and to arm Europe would mean war?

Mr. GERARD. I said it would mean war. If we retreat now, after this Atlantic Pact has been signed by all the nations, that is an announcement to the world that we are retreating before Russia, and it will mean that they will continue an aggression so fierce and distinct that we will be driven into war.

Senator DONNELL. Do you not think, Judge, that when the treaty was signed on April 4, here, with all these gentlemen present, it cer tainly ought to have been known that that was only the signing, and that the Senate's ratification was just as necessary to the effectiveness of the treaty as the signatures-the fact that the treaty cannot be made effective until the Senate ratifies?

Mr. GERARD. That is, you might say in international law, a technicality. If we have signed this treaty, even if it requires the consent. of the Senate, and retreat from that position, we will be in a war within a year as sure as anything.

OBLIGATION TO RATIFY

Senator DONNELL. Judge, do you think that is good public policy, for a plan to be carried out under which the ratification by the Senate is made virtually obligatory upon it? Is that not bad public policy, and is it not tending away from the very thing the Constitution had in mind, namely, that the Senate should have the right to ratify or not to ratify as it deems proper?

Mr. GERARD. Well, of course, any treaty has to be ratified by the Senate.

Senator DONNELL. That is, it may or may not be ratified, is what

you mean.

Mr. GERARD. That is known all over the world.

Senator DONNELL. And every Senator has the absolute right in his own conscience and judgment to refuse to vote for this ratification, just as much as he has the right to vote in favor of it. That is right, is it not?

Mr. GERARD. Certainly every Senator has the right, but any Senator that exercises that right and votes against it will be helping to send the young men of our country into certain war.

Senator DONNELL. Judge, when this treaty was ratified, or when it was signed, I should say, do you not think that those present, and who signed it on behalf of the other countries, fully understood that the Senate had a right to refuse to ratify as well as to ratify?

Mr. GERARD. I do not know what the other people thought. But I think that Europe and the other countries of the world, since the affair of the League of Nations and the failure to ratify that, understand thoroughly that the Senate is the final judge.

Senator DONNELL. And it should be the final judge and is the final judge under the Constitution of the United States?

Mr. GERARD. Absolutely.

Senator DONNELL. And should not be precluded by the fact that the executive department has caused the treaty to be signed. That is correct, is it not?

Mr. GERARD. Of course, the Senate is the final judge.

Senator DONNELL. Do you know, judge, that Senator Watkins, who sits here on my left and who is a Senator from Utah, called attention by letter to the President of the United States to the very fact that you are now mentioning, namely, that after it is signed, that then the whole argument will be made that because it is signed, we must go ahead with it? And do you know that Senator Watkins suggested that the President give 60 days in which to study this treaty before it was signed? Did you hear that?

Mr. GERARD. I don't know what the Senator said at the time.

Senator DONNELL. Do you not think, judge, that it is a very unwise course to put a compulsion on the United States Senate by getting the treaty signed, with all the pomp and pageantry of it, and then saying to the Senate that because it has been signed, "You have got to approve it"? Don't you think that is very poor public policy?

Mr. GERARD. No; I think it is excellent, for the good of the country. Senator DONNELL. And do you think, therefore, that the Executive, by having the power to get the treaty signed in advance, has the right, and do you think it is excellent policy that it should have, to virtually compel the Senate to approve the document? Is that right?

Mr. GERARD. The Executive has the right to manage our foreign policy up to the point of signing the treaty, and then the Senate must come in.

Senator DONNELL. And as I understand it, you say that now that the treaty has been signed, the very fact of its signature would make it a grave mistake for the Senate to refuse to ratify it. Is that your thought?

Mr. GERARD. That is my point, yes.

Senator DONNELL. Very well.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your attendance.

We have the pleasure of having with us this morning Mr. Charles P. Taft, of Cincinnati, a very distinguished American who has rendered splendid public service in several capacities.

Mr. Taft.

STATEMENT OF CHARLES P. TAFT, FORMER PRESIDENT, FEDERAL COUNCIL OF CHURCHES, CINCINNATI, OHIO

Mr. TAFT. Thank you, Senator.

Mr. Chairman and gentlemen of the committee, I am appearing to urge a favorable vote of this committee and of the Senate upon the ratification of the Atlantic Pact. I believe this step is and has been essential for the preservation of peace, but at this stage a failure to ratify would be the greatest encouragement to ultimate war. Idealists who now withhold support of the pact do great disservice to the cause of peace which they serve.

90614-49-pt. 2-11

DANGERS IN THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

With support of the Atlantic Pact I would give vigorous warning of the dangers still involved in its implementation. Its success depends entirely upon the effective continuance of well-considered group decisions on foreign policy in the National Security Council, under the leadership of the Secretary of State, with the withholding from such consideration of no important policy which touches our security in relation to the Soviet Union.

The ideology and the methods of the Soviet Politburo have made the Atlantic Pact inevitable. It has not been a question simply of the Red Army and the reestablishment of the boundaries of the Czars, which was the thesis of Mr. Lippmann some years ago. The accomplishment of that military fact is not what has frightened all of western civilization. It is the infallible dogma of a fanatical religion whose high priests have carried Machiavelli's prince to a point which neither Machiavelli nor his prince, I think, would have considered seemlyor effective. The Soviets as the exponents of a state socialist system of economics proved through 20 years quite able to live with us in peace; they were far less upsetting to international trade than the Nazis.

INTERNAL WEAKNESS OF RUSSIA

It is the development of internal political weaknesses which has in part driven the Politburo to such extremes. The sudden discovery by the Soviet Army of the standard of living of what they called "decadent" western capitalist countries, even such relatively backward countries economically as Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Hungary, upset much internal political balance in Russia, and 6,000,000 heroes of the Soviet Union, who won the war with no help from the West, as they were told, could not be pushed around quite so easily. The absence of any real understanding of human nature in successful organization has further undermined administration and shaken the confidence of the dictators. That produces more repression, more suspicion, and a tougher exterior to those with whom they deal abroad.

But it is the missionary spirit of this religious fanaticism that has produced an unscrupulous dual system of agents abroad on a worldwide scale, dealing in violence wherever it is considered safe, and in infiltration propaganda and incitement elsewhere.

Are they really seeking to undermine and destroy the western world? Many people of good will think not. I can only say to them that they have not read the record. That record as compiled by Historicus in Foreign Affairs for January 1949 from the most popularly distributed words of Stalin in Russia over the 30 years since the revolution, is no mouthing even of a ranting German corporal after an unsuccessful putsch, and that turned out to be dangerous enough. It is the religious canon of a most successful revolution, from its greatest leader, based upon an ethic which sees in deception of its cnemies its most accepted tool. We are up against an organization for world revolution.

It seems to be foolish, in the face of such a threat, to close one's eyes and vote for universal simultaneous reduction of armaments, for the United Nations plan for the control of atomic energy, although I am in favor of both of those, or even for world federation. There is