Page images

Servus, ut placet Chrysippo, perpetuus mercenarius estf.-Servis imperare moderate, laus est : et in mancipio cogitandum est, non quantum illud impune pati possit, sed quantum tibi permittat æqui bonique natura : quæ parcere etiam captivis et pretio paratis jubet.. quum in servum omnia liceant, est aliquid, quod in hominem licere commune jus animantium vetet: quia ejusdem naturæ est, cujus tu8.

The wise author of the Book of Ecclesiasticus, was an advocate for strictness in the management of a slave or servant, without cruelty or inhumanityh.

“ Fodder, a wand, and burdens, are for the ass; “ and bread, correction, and work, for a servant.

“ A yoke and a collar do bow the neck : so are “ tortures and torments for an evil servant.

“ Set him to work, as is fit for him : if he be not obedient, put on more heavy fetters.

“ But be not excessive toward any; and without “ discretion do nothing.

“ If thou have a servant, let him be unto thee as thyself, because thou hast bought him with a price.

“ If thou have a servant, entreat him as a bro“ ther: for thou hast need of him, as of thine own “ soul; if thou entreat him evil, and he run from “ thee, which way wilt thou go to seek him ?"

To conclude. According to Aristotle, an oiría

Cf. Diodor. Sic. Frag. lib. xxxiv. Operr. x. 101. 114, 115.—Hor. Serm. i. iii. 80–83: Epp. i. xvi. 46–48.—Ovid. Amor. i. vi. 19, 20.-Juvenal, xii. 115–118.–Statius, Silv. iv, vii. 13–16. -Dio Chrys. Orat. xiv. xv: De Servitute, 436—457.-Claudian, in Eutropium, ii. 542—545, &c. f Seneca, De Beneficiis, iii. xxi. 1. g De Clementia, 18. 1, 2. h Ch. xxxiii. 24. 26. 28–31.


teneia, or family as such—must be made up of freemen and slavesi He contends that there are among men φύσει δούλοι, and φύσει ελεύθεροι, who differ as much from each other, as body from soul, or the like; that the latter have a right to be masters, the former, to be slaves ; and that it is for the mutual good of both that they should stand in this relation to each otherk. He defines a slave at one time, , κτημά τι έμψυχον, and oίoν όργανον προ οργάνων ; and conpares him to the fabled automatons of Dædalus or Vulcan?: at another, čuluxov čpravov, and the opgavcv, äluxos dcūros m. He denies, therefore, that there can be any friendship or sympathy between the master and the slave, as such, any more than between the artist and his tools; or the soul and the body. He denies that the master as such, can injure the slave as such; or the master as such, wish the good of the slave as such, and the like; but that whatsoever he does to him, or for him, in his proper capacity, is to be considered as done to, or for the sake of himself. He admits, however, that there may be something like friendship between them, as beings partaking of a common nature; that is, as between man and man: and while he will scarcely allow the slave, as such, the capacity of any proper virtue, like temperance, courage, justice, napà tàs ópyavikas kai Slakonskàs (xpelas "); he yet admits that he wants, and consequently may be considered capable of some slight degree of it, for the sake of his proper utility as an organ Or instrument itself: όπως μήτε δι' ακολασίαν, μήτε δια δειλίαν, ελλείψη των έργων.

i Politica, i. ii. 1. m Ethica, viii. xi. 6–8.

k Ibid. 13-15. 1 Ibid. 3-5. n Politica, i. v. 3—10.





NOTWITHSTANDING the prejudice which naturally rises in the mind of a pious and orthodox believer, upon the mention of apocryphal or heretical productions—against the admission of their testimony, on questions of controversy ; a little consideration must satisfy an impartial person, that as witnesses merely to the truth of a fact, that such and such doctrines were actually current in the times of their authors, the evidence even of apocryphal works, however objectionable in other respects, may be appealed to with as little scruple as that of the soundest ecclesiastical writings.

It is generally the case with all error, in some way or other to be based upon truth; that nothing absurd or false is proposed, or obtains a reception, but as possessing the appearance, at least, of reason or probability. Some things there are too, so extraordinary in their own nature, that in whatsoever shape they may be afterwards proposed, the first idea of them could scarcely have suggested itself spontaneously to the authors of such representations. Of this number we have seen, that the doctrine and expectation of a millennium in particular,

are one.

We should not have met with the vestiges of a doctrine like this, even in heretical or apocryphal productions, had not the conception of it been previously in existence, as derived, in all probability, from inspiration, or from some infallible authority which first communicated it, and gave it a right to general reception and implicit belief. The forniation of such an expectation as that of the millennium, without any light or intimation from without—and as a mere creature of the human imagination—we may venture to say was impossible; and even could it have been so conceived, yet if proposed as a serious truth—as an anticipation some time to be fulfilled by the event—were there no foundation for the assurance of the fact, beyond the mere conception of the thing itself—to assent to it would exceed the bounds of credulity in the weakest, and to expect it, the utmost measure of infatuation, in the most foolish of mankind. Besides which, whatever be the particular character which the millenary doctrines assume in the hands of such and such persons; however monstrous, perverted, and consequently unscriptural, they may become in their inode of representing them; yet in the mere fact of the expectation, in the circumstance of believing and teaching the futurity of such an event as the millennium in general, there is nothing heretical or apocryphal even in the opinions of heretics and apocryphal writers: or if there be, the charge of heresy must be brought against many orthodox writers of the same period, who expected and taught the same thing.

For example; the first nominally Christian writer, who perverted the doctrine of the millennium, and while he recognised the fact of it in general, clothed it with so objectionable a dress in particular, as to make it necessarily offensive and disgusting to sober and religious minds—was Cerinthus, the founder of a sect of Gnostics, called after his name. Yet Cerinthus was contemporary with Papias, Polycarp, Justin Martyr—if he was not even older than they; at a time when the doctrine of the millennium, as set forth in the simple, evangelical plainness of its origin, was not only believed by these persons, but the general persuasion of the church. We need not hesitate, then, to claim even Cerinthus as a credible witness to the fact of the prevalence, at least, of such a doctrine, in his own time; while, as to the nature and explanation of the doctrine, we repudiate and reject his testimony as unscriptural and unsound; as simply his own, and to be dealt with as such ; not as that of the church in his time, nor as entitled to any portion of the authority which it might have derived from the concurrence of ecclesiastical antiquity in its favour.

The doctrine of Cerinthus, relating to the millennium, is represented by Eusebius as follows, in an extract from the works of the Roman presbyter Caius, who flourished in the reign of Severus, about A. D. 200, and had occasion to notice the opinions in question, in a work of his against the Montanistsa. 'Αλλά και Κήρινθος, και δι' αποκαλύψεων ως υπό αποστόλου μεγάλου γεγραμμένων, τερατολογίας ημίν ως δι' αγγέλων αυτώ δεδειγμένας ψευδόμενος, επεισάγει λέγων, μετά την ανάστασιν

a E. H. iii. xxviii. 100. A. Cf. Hieron. iv. pars ii. 117. De SS. Eccles. 59.

« PreviousContinue »