HUMAN RIGHTS IN BURMA: (PART II) THURSDAY, OCTOBER 2, 2003 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, The Subcommittees met, pursuant to call, at 8:30 p.m., in Room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Elton Gallegly [Chairof the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights] presiding. Mr. GALLEGLY. Call the Subcommittee on International Relations Nonproliferation and Human Rights to order. Today the Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation and Human Rights and the Subcommittee on Asia and Pacific are holding a second of two hearings on the human rights situation in Burma. During the first hearing, we heard from private witnesses including political opponents of the current military regime, members of oppressed ethnic groups and an expert on human rights in Burma. In the second hearing, we will hear the perspective of the State Department regarding what is happening in Burma. Yesterday we heard specific information on the nature of the military regime in Burma, including a firsthand account of the May 30 attack by government-backed group on Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters. The witnesses also discussed the target of ethnic minorities, the oppression of political opponents, the failure of the regime to address the growing HIV, AIDS problems, and the involvement of the regime in the illegal drug trade and human trafficking. This morning I look forward to exploring United States Government policy with respect to the horrendous human rights problems in Burma and how we can more effectively help the people in that country. I am especially eager to hear more from our government and how we can convince other nations in the region to join us in placing greater pressure on the Burmese military regime to respect basic human rights. It is my understanding that Mr. Sherman is en route and we will move on with the hearing. And we will allow Mr. Sherman an opening statement when he arrives. Did you have anything Mr. Pitts? [The prepared statement of Mr. Gallegly follows:] PREPARED STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ELTON GALLEGLY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, AND CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM, NONPROLIFERATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS OCTOBER 2, 2003 Today, the Subcommittee on International Terrorism, Nonproliferation and Human Rights and the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific are holding the second of two hearings on the human rights situation in Burma. During the first hearing, we heard from private witnesses, including political opponents of the current military regime, members of oppressed ethnic groups and an expert on human rights abuses in Burma. In this second hearing, we will hear the perspective of the State Department regarding what is happening in Burma. Yesterday, we heard specific information on the nature of the military regime in Burma, including a first-hand account of the May 30th attack by a governmentbacked group on Aung San Suu Kyi and her supporters. The witnesses also discussed the targeting of ethnic minorities, the repression of political opponents, the failure of the regime to address the growing HIV/AIDS problem and the involvement of the regime in the illegal drug trade and human trafficking. This morning, I look forward to exploring U.S. government policy with respect to the horrendous human rights problems in Burma and how we can more effectively help the people of that country. I am especially eager to hear what more our government can do to convince other nations in the region to join us in placing greater pressure on the Burmese military regime to respect basic human rights. Now, I would like to recognize Mr. Sherman for an opening statement. Mr. PITTS. Yes, briefly, Mr. Chairman. I have three statements from other ethnic groups I would like to enter to the record as a continuation of yesterday. Mr. GALLEGLY. Without objection, we will make them a part of the record of the hearing. Mr. PITTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for the hearing very much. We appreciate your leadership on this. And I would like to reiterate for the Administration officials my concerns about the lack of assistance to the IDPs of Burma. And I just received a report a couple weeks ago, 30 Karin families in the Pawn district fled to the Thai border as a result of an offensive carried out again by the military in Burma. And the plight of the IDP should be addressed I think at the highest levels of our government and other governments in the UN. And I want to commend our government support for programs assisting refugees and democracy groups. But I think we should do more for the plight of the IDPs. And welcome the witnesses from the Administration. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. GALLEGLY. I thank the gentleman and certainly want to reiterate the appreciation I have for his yeoman's job in addressing this issue bringing this significant issue to the attention of this Committee. Joe, you are truly to be commended and we appreciate your ongoing work. This morning, our first witness is Deputy Assistant Secretary Matt Daley. Mr. Daley has served the Bureau of East Asia and Pacific Affairs as Deputy Assistant Secretary since August 2001. After joining the U.S. Foreign Service in 1976, he was detailed to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and was involved in many arms control negotiations in Geneva, Switzerland. More recently, he served as special assistant to the Assistant Secretary for East Asia and Public Affairs, Director of the Office of the Philippines Affairs, and is Deputy Chief of Mission of the American Embassies in Bangkok, Thailand and also New Delhi, India. As a reminder, I know that it is difficult to try to get your comments in 5 minutes but we will try to do that and then we are going to have hopefully many questions. So Mr. Daley, welcome this morning. STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MATTHEW DALEY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE Mr. DALEY. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. I will try to get quickly through my remarks, although I was urged to drag them out so my colleague, Lorne Craner would have time to get here, but let me proceed as expeditiously if I can. And if I am taking too much time, I will hear from you. I begin by noting that we note the transfer of Aung San Suu Kyi to her residence. We were concerned about her health. The health questions have been answered for the moment, but many key questions remain unanswered. Will ordinary Burmese journalists, diplomats and others have free access to her? Is she going to be free to travel? Will her colleagues who were incarcerated after the May 30 attack on her motorcade be released? There are other questions that predate May 30. Will the SPDC allow a meaningful role to the National League of Democracy in shaping the political evolution of Burma? What approach will be taken to the emerging humanitarian crisis? Will the NLD be allowed to resume its activities and its offices reopened? We are not able to answer these questions today, Mr. Chairman. Our concern about a hunger strike, let me address very quickly. We had received information we thought credible that Aung San Suu Kyi was on a hunger strike. We acted upon it immediately and sounded the alarm. The ICRC subsequently was able to see her and reported that she was in good health. And on the day of her visit, she was not on a hunger strike, but then they noted they couldn't speak for either the past or the present. In this connection, the allegation was made that our raising the alarm was intended to divert attention from the road map that had been announced from Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. That simply is not correct. I will address the road map later in my remarks. The fundamental political problem is that Aung San Suu Kyi, her colleagues are under detention and there is no ability to for democracy to function in Burma today and to play the role that democracy can play in addressing these other problems. Mr. Chairman, we have been active on many fronts to deal with the empty promises that the SPDC has made in regard to the transition to democracy and improving human rights. On July 28, as you know, President Bush signed the Burmese Freedom and Democracy Act of 2003 and a companion Executive Order. Taken together, they impose measures that place a ban on the import of all Burmese products, a freeze on the assets of certain Burmese institutions and a ban on the export of financial services to Burma. These measures immediately disrupted the economy, particularly affecting industries that rely on exports to the United States. The garment sector was hardest hit and the junta has been unable or unwilling to assist affected businesses or their employees. The prohibition on financial services created instant difficulties for foreign Embassies, government agencies, NGOs and other institutions that are reliant on the U.S. financial system for trade facilitation and dollar remittent services. Among the many businesses that have been affected are the tourist industry. Travelers are unable to use traveler checks or credit cards that are denominated in dollars. As of August 1, the latest information the Treasury Department has provided to us, the asset freeze has captured $680,000. These measures were put in place to send a clear signal to the junta to release Aung San Suu Kyi and other political prisoners and to move down the path to de mocracy. We hoped, by reducing hard currency available to the regime, to exert pressure on them. This approach may be less successful if Burma succeeds in shifting its trade to other currencies. Unfortunately, the sanctions also affect ordinary Burmese. I note that some international NGOs have expressed concern about the destruction of the already troubled export sectors, especially the garment sector and their concern that it will lead to significant unemployment, a spike of economic migrants seeking illegal work inside of Burma or over the border in Thailand or China. Within the first months—within the first couple months, we estimate that 40,000 garment sector workers lost their jobs. In the long-term the garment sector will probably lose about 100,000 jobs. Noes have expressed the concern to us that some of these women are seeking employment in the flourishing illegal sex and entertainment industries in Burma and on the Thai-Burma border. These effects are most unfortunate, but Burma's greatest misfortune is the junta's misrule and suffering of the Burmese people. We also believe, Mr. Chairman, that the effect of these particular sanctions may be irreversible given that the garment industry in Burma was already under question because of the impending end of quotas under the WTO agreement. It is unlikely, we think, that even if we lift the sanctions that those factories and jobs will return to Burma. We persevere in our effort to have multilateral approaches to the SPDC. Secretary Powell is active in the ASEAN post-ministerial conference and ASEAN regional forum. We continue to call for lifting all the restrictions, all of our policy goals. We note that former Indonesian foreign minister Ali Alatas visited Rangoon as part of ASEAN's effort to deal with the circumstances in Burma. And we made clear to ASEAN that those circumstances as they exist today negatively affect international perceptions of Burma, international perceptions of ASEAN and the other individual ASEAN States. It has already complicated our efforts to make progress on a trade and investment framework agreement with ASEAN. ASEAN invited Burma to join it, in part, to encourage it to adopt international norms and Burma has failed to do that. The international community, Mr. Chairman, with a few exceptions, has voiced strong support for our goals. I have seen real movement toward improving the human rights situation in Burma and democracy. We work particularly closely with our counterparts, Japan, European Union and Canada and continue to work with them today. We have a dialogue with other countries in the region, including China and India, and we encourage to join the rest of the international community in articulating our goals and dealing with the regime. I note that a broad array of countries from Asia, including China, supported the release of Aung San Suu Kyi in the statement that was released in connection with the Asian Europe meeting in July. Mr. Chairman, interest was expressed in China's relationship with Burma. It has undergone a radical transformation in the past decade as previously Sinophobic Burma turned to China for arms, investment, assistance and trade. China, in turn, has gained important strategic access and influence in an area that in the past was largely inaccessible to it. Beyond its strategic access, China is active in economic development, investment and trade. Its counternarcotics efforts in law enforcement and development assistance in the opium-producing regions that are beyond the direct control of the direct SPDC far exceed our own modest support for the U.N. office of drugs and crime projects in Burma. But China's increased role could also be harnessed for change in Burma. We hope China will encourage reform, even as it differs sharply with us on tactics. It prefers a quiet behind-thescenes effort and it rejects sanctions. I would like to add a brief observation, Mr. Chairman, on Burma's relationship with North Korea. The DPRK, along with China, Russia and a few other countries, has a military supply relationship with Burma. We are mindful that North Korea has a proclivity for ignoring international norms and concerns about regional stability to sell arms including missile systems. An extra measure of concern thus attaches to transactions that involve Burma. Burma is fully aware of our concerns on this score. Our own relations with Burma are obviously under increasing strain. Nonetheless, we have received effective cooperation from the SPDC on issues that involve counterterrorism. Our request for enhanced security at our Embassy in Rangoon were addressed effectively and promptly. Rangoon is continuing to facilitate our efforts to account for the American servicemen who lost their lives in the Second World War and whose remains were not recovered. We remain in dialogue with Rangoon with regard to circumstances that would permit us to be more active in addressing the challenge of HIV, AIDS in Burma and in neighboring countries. At present our funding for HIV, AIDS assistance in Burma is limited to independent international Noes. We provide no funds directly or indirectly to the government itself. We obviously have some important policy differences on foreign policy and domestic policy in Burma. In those areas such as the treatment of Iraq and multi-lateral fora, Burma has expressed its views clearly, but it has not launched or taken the initiative to try and complicate our purposes. In recent decades, Burma, has generally kept a low profile in multi lateral meetings. The dimensions of the narcotics in the golden triangle have changed in important ways. The production of opium in Burma has declined significantly in the last 5 years. In 1998, it was estimated at 1,750 metric tons. This year, the estimates place opium production at only 484 metric tons. Surveys indicate that the heroin produced in Burmese opium is of comparatively small importance in the United States heroin market today. I mean, Burmese heroin appears to account for less than 10 percent of heroin sold in the United States. Trying to dredge up past statistics, 5 to 10 years ago, 12 years ago, my guess |