Under all of the circumstances, and for the reasons outlined above, I strongly recommend against the enactment of S. 677.

If this proposed legislation is reviewed in a cold, clear, realistic light, there can be only one or two explanations of the Department of Defense's opposition to the legislation.

First, the old argument which the Congress of the United States has repeatedly and I am sure will always knock down, namely, that the United States Marine Corps should be done away with as being a useless duplication of services supplied by the Army, Navy, and Air Force.

Senator DOUGLAS. May I ask a question here?

Senator STENNIS. Yes.

Senator DOUGLAS. Should the country fear not so much the danger that the Marine Corps will be completely abolished as the danger that the General Staff will confine its functions to police duties within the Navy and to ship-to-shore movements of amphibious tractors and small boats and working parties, and so forth—that will be the danger, that it will cease to be a combatant force; is that right?

Mr. HANSON. To this writer that would mean the destruction of the Marine Corps and would be the same as placing them in the category of the British Marine Corps, where they wait on officers' tables and are attendants, and so forth.

Senator DOUGLAS. Is it your feeling that, if that were to be the function of the Marine Corps, the Marine Corps should then ask to be dissolved?

Mr. HANSON. Sir, I would seek a commission in another branch of the service.

Senator DOUGLAS. It is my feeling that if that were the function of the Marine Corps, that the Marine Corps should then be disbanded. Mr. HANSON. Second, there may perhaps be some cloudy thinking as to whether or not this bill is attempting to do for the United States Marine Corps what the Air Force was successful in doing; that is, create another military department. All you have to do is to read the provisions of S. 677 to see that the act clearly provides that this is an authorization within the Department of the Navy. There has not been, there is not now, and we trust that there will not be any attempt to change the status of the United States Marine Corps which has been maintained within the Department of the Navy since 1798. There can be perhaps one other argument against the passage of the bill and that is the selfish argument that, if the United States Marine Corps is granted this authorization, it may deprive others of funds that they might otherwise obtain from Congress. The proponents of this bill are willing to let Congress settle the issue as to what organizations shall have what authorizations for purposes of the defense of the United States.

Senator STENNIS. Appendix A and appendix B of your statement will be placed in the record at this point.

(Appendix A and appendix B to Mr. Hanson's statement are as follows:)

APPENDIX A TO MEMORANDUM IN ANSWER TO THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE'S LETTER OF APRIL 12, 1951, IN OPPOSITION TO S. 677 ANALYSIS OF ARGUMENTS ADVANCED IN OPPOSITION TO SECTION 1, H. R. 7580, ON AN ITEM-BY-ITEM BASIS

This analysis of the arguments against section 1, H. R. 7580, is made because the same line is being followed in opposing S. 677.

ITEM I

The Marine Corps, like any major subdivision of the military services, should be represented by the chief of service concerned. Adequate and proportionate representation exists on the Joint Staff level from appropriate branches of the three services. Further, if the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it desirable to seek the advice of the Commandant on any subject under consideration, he can be called before them.

This first item implies, as do most of the items, that the Marine Corps is not a service. This will be considered under item II.

It also implies that the Marine Corps is enjoying adequate and proportionate representation on the Joint Staff. It is interesting to contemplate just what the word "adequate" means here. The Marine Corps has no direct representation in top policy levels, none on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In other agencies Marine Corps representation is insignificant. The reason for this is that Marines are invariably placed so far down in the organizational structure as to have no voice in the actual determination of plans and policies. Quantitative representation means little. What might be termed qualitative representation determines he degree of influence exercised in directional matters. At present the Marine Corps does not have an adequate voice in matters of vital concern to itself. The third point made under this item concerns itself with the willingness of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to seek advice from other sources than the responsible Chief or the Joint Staff. It is a matter of record that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, prior to the introduction of H. R. 7580, was not once invited to attend a meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Apparently it was not their desire to secure the advice of the Commandant, even on matters vital to the Marine Corps. And yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff have considered many items of direct and crucial importance to the Marine Corps. An unbiased view of this situation would hardly cause one to conclude that the presence and views of the Commandant on these critical matters, from the standpoint of proper, balanced judgment, were undesirable. Rather, it would lead to the conclusion of patent, practiced exclusion; a device which has been most effectively used on stifling Marine Corps ideas. Exclusion from the Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberations is all the less understandable when it is realized that the Marine Corps is charged by Congress with a definite, important mission in the National Security Act of 1947, the discharge of which requires Marine Corps representation at the Joint Chiefs of Staff level.

When Congress statutorily charged the Marine Corps with the responsibility for landing-force development in the field of amphibious warfare, it must have intended that it be capable of exercising directive influence in the discharge of its congressional mandates. Under the presently constituted hierarchy of defense this is extremely difficult, if not impossible. The solution to this untenable situation is to permit the Marine Corps authoritative voice in the discharge of its statutory responsibilities.

ITEM II

The status of the Marine Corps as a subdivision within the Department of the Navy is, both by law and custom, such that the Chief of Naval Operations should represent it, along with other elements of the Naval Establishment, on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The status of the Marine Corps as a separate armed service of the United States has been a subject of misunderstanding since the initiation of postwar security legislation. There have been consistent attempts to subordinate the Marine Corps position with reference to that of the United States Navy. Marine Corps does not deny that it is included within the Department of the Navy and subject to the authority of the Secretary of the Navy, but it maintains, with reason, that the United States Navy occupies a similar, not a superior,

The

position. The Department of the Navy consists of two separate military services, the United States Marine Corps and the United States Navy.

Much of the controversy centers about the definition of the Department of the Navy and the Naval Establishment. The opponents of H. R. 7580 have at times quoted excerpts from the law with the specific intent of disputing the Marine Corps' status as a separate service. But comprehensive examination of the most recent (as of the earliest) legislation will cast a different light upon this matter.

It should only be necessary to quote from the National Security Act to establish the fact that Congress does consider and has legislated to the effect that the Marine Corps is a separate military service. Section 202 (c) (1) of this act states: "Notwithstanding any other provision of this act, the combatant functions assigned to the military services by sections 205 (e), 206 (b), 206 (c), and 208 (f) hereof shall not be transferred, reassigned, abolished, or consolidated."

*

Section 206 (b) states: "In general, the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall *"; section 206 (c): "The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall These passages show unmistakably that the Congress does recognize the Marine Corps as a separate military service (within the Department of the Navy) just as the United States Navy proper is similarly recognized. Nothing can obscure this obvious show of intent by Congress with respect to the posture of the Marine Corps.

The status of the Marine Corps within the Department of the Navy is comparable, therefore, to the status of the United States Navy within that same Department. The difference in size does not alter the similarity of status. Because of this lesser size the Marine Corps might be termed a junior partner, but the fact that it is a partner, not a subordinate, cannot be logically or legally denied.

From the time of its creation by act of Congress on July 11, 1798, the Marine Corps has had legal recognition of its status as a separate branch of the Nation's Armed Forces. However, by its wording, this act gave rise to frequent administrative difficulties in relation to pay, allowances, trials, and orders. To rectify this situation, Congress, in 1834, enacted "An act for the better organization of the United States Marine Corps" placing the corps, as a separate service coequal with the United States Navy, within the Naval Establishment and subject to the laws and regulations thereof except when detached, at the direction of the President, for duty with the Army.

Law and custom do not constitute the only reasons why the Chief of Naval Operations does not and cannot represent the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. More importantly, the Chief of Naval Operations, an officer of the United States Navy, is not qualified, either by knowledge or experience, to represent the Marine Corps on the highest military staff of this Nation. His knowledge and experience in handling and directing troops in the land phases of military operations are nil.

While the operating forces of the Marine Corps are employed under fleet commanders in the prosecution of naval campaigns, there is no similarity between the duties performed by the naval forces and those performed by the landing forces. The difference existing is manifest in organization, tactics, techniquesthe very mode of warfare itself-and the background and training of the officers and men. Keep in mind the type of operation which it is the Marine Corps' primary duty to perform, and remember the charges and the countercharges hurled during the House Armed Services Committee hearings on "unification and strategy" to the effect that naval officers are not capable of understanding land warfare and that Army and Air Force officers are incapable of understanding sea power; how is it then possible to consider that anyone, except the Commandant of the Marine Corps, is capable of suitably representing, on the top defense level, the interests of a service which bridges the gap between the sea and the land, including some of each and much of neither?

Until far greater advances are made in cross-education and joint experience, a point made by the Armed Services Committee of the House of Representatives, there will be a lack of appreciation on the part of one service for another. Why then is it vehemently maintained that the Chief of Naval Operations is capable of and does adequately represent the Marine Corps? The reason for this lies partially in the already mentioned lack of cross-education and joint operational experience no one, now a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, is sufficiently qualified to undertake the task of representing the Marine Corps. But, con

versely, there are many senior Marine officers fully qualified to represent the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and who, by virtue of their varied service, cross-education, and joint experience, would be of great value in the deliberations of that body.

The very name, Marine Corps, may give rise to the many attempts to relegate it to the subordinate position occupied by the United States Army Corps of Engineers, Signal, etc. The Marine Corps, as an armed service, uses many arms and services similar to those possessed by the Army and in addition— unlike the Army-employs its own marine tactical aviation. Over and above artillery, infantry, signal, quartermaster, armored, engineer, and other units required, the Marine Corps maintains those special organizations required for the successful accomplishment of the amphibious mission. If the Chief of Naval Operations does not, in the words of General Bradley himself, have a suitable grasp of the principles of land warfare, how is he to satisfactorily represent the Marine Corps which is of necessity a force of combined arms required for the prosecution of the land phase of a naval campaign?

The Chief of Naval Operations is not in fact or in law responsible for the Marine Corps.

The Chief of Naval Operations does exercise operational control over the Fleet Marine Forces assigned to the fleets as type commands; but even here, administrative control is retained by the Commandant. The Commandant is responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for the administration and military efficiency of the Marine Corps; the Chief of Naval Operations is not interposed in this chain of command.

From an understanding of the Marine Corps' status as a military service of the United States, the mode of warfare engaged in by the corps, and its responsibility for landing force development under the law, it can be concluded that:

1. The Chief of Naval Operations, lacking adequate understanding of Marine warfare and problems does not possess the necessary qualifications to enable him to suitably and impartially represent the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff level.

2. The Commandant of the Marine Corps, as the head of a separate and distinct military service of the United States, should have the right to represent his service on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

ITEM III

The functions of the Marine Corps are so closely allied with the operations of the United States Navy and to the administration of the Department of the Navy that dual representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff is undesirable. In addition, such representation might result in a division of authority within the Naval Establishment and cause imbalance in the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In any joint operation (an operation involving two or more services) a close functional relationship necessarily exists between the participating services. In any war of the future, many operations will be joint in nature. The present composition of our National Military Establishment makes this true. Even in land warfare, the province of the Army, operations will be joint because of the necessity for tactical air support. This tactical air support must be furnished by the Air Force, or possibly by the Marine Corps. In this respect the functions of all services are closely interrelated.

The implication that Marine Corps' functions are so closely allied to those of the Navy as to exclude the Commandant from Joint Chiefs of Staff is erroneous. Both the Navy and the Marine Corps are engaged in amphibious operations, which are joint operations in the truest sense, but in an entirely different way. While the operation is naval in character the landing forces, as distinct from the naval forces, are furnished by the Marine Corps. In many instances in the past war these landing forces were provided by the Army. Can we thus presume that the Chief of Naval Operations could as effectively represent the Chief of Staff of the Army on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as he claims to speak for the Marine Corps?

Such a parallel, though fallacious, is applicable. It is equally applicable to the Army and the Air Force in an airborne undertaking. Two or more services are acting in concert for the attainment of the same objective, but each in its own field. In the amphibious operation, for example, the Navy furnishes the transports, protects by gunfire and carrier aircraft the activities of troops during

their assault of the beach, and engages in a number of purely naval operations. Marines ride to the objective in naval shipping, and, tactically disposed in amphibian vehicles and craft, strike the beach and attack From the moment the first marine sets foot on that beach, the concepts of land warfare begin to predominate. Anyone who has ever seen or participated in an amphibious operation knows this to be true. The Army has long supported this contention. Surely joint operations and close relationship of functions do not presuppose interchangeability of effort in the amphibious operation, with marines manning and operating the fleet, and the Navy furnishing landing forces and seizing the beach. This would be absurd, but no more absurd than it is to exclude the Commandant of the Marine Corps from membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the contention that his proper functions and those of the Chief of Naval Operations are too closely related.

Because the Marine Corps is a part of the Naval Establishment, its functions are closely related to the administration of the Department of the Navy, but this is not a valid argument, as proposed in item III, for denying the Commandant membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The administration of the Marine Corps is carried on by the Commandant and is divorced from the Chief of Naval Operations. Even the administrative control of the Fleet Marine Forces, the bulk of the Marine operating forces assigned to duties with the United States Navy, is retained by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. The same argument might be employed, and this may show the trend of thought now existent, to have the services blended into one because their functions are all closely allied with the administration of the Department of Defense and so they are.

Antagonists of the Vinson bill have repeatedly tried to show that the Chief of Naval Operations is in complete command of the Department of the Navy, but this is not so. He has operational control of the operating forces of the United States Navy, part of those operating forces are marines; it is not logical to assume that because of this fact the Chief of Naval Operations commands the Marine Corps.

It is illuminating to realize that, while the opponents of the Vinson bill are claiming over-all prerogatives for the Chief of Naval Operations within the entire Naval Establishment, he does not legally have these prerogatives within the narrower confines of the Navy itself. As a result of Public Law 432, Eightieth Congress, the Office of the Chief of Naval Material is independent of that of the Chief of Naval Operations. Briefly stated, these two officers are, by law, independent staff agencies of the Secretary of the Navy. Liaison and not command is the means employed to effectuate action between the two-the one being responsible for the military aspects, the other being responsible for the business or industrial aspects. But they are legally separate entities with a common superior, the Secretary of the Navy.

Another fallacy aimed at Mr. Vinson's bill is that dual representation for the Department of the Navy would be conducive of possible imbalance on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To restate this as a generalization: Dual representation for any department is bad and may cause imbalance in Joint Chiefs of Staff deliberations. History leaves this contention high and dry. We have only to examine the World War II membership of the Joint Chiefs. General Marshall, Army Chief of Staff, and General Arnold, Army Air Force Commanding General, were both members. General Marshall was the Army superior of the Army Air Forces commander. Was this dual representation bad? The Navy and the Marine Corps never said so and certainly the Army did not. Generals Eisenhower and Spaatz also sat together on this body, but General Spaatz was very definitely the Army subordinate of General Eisenhower. This too was dual representation but it certainly didn't hurt the Joint Chiefs.

As for producing imbalance within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, many believe that the Vinson bill would more likely introduce, in view of past performances, a much-needed balance.

But do the Joint Chiefs really vote? And if not does imbalance matter? Former Defense Secretary Johnson has stated: "The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not vote; neither do they decide." If no decision is made and no vote is taken, imbalance cannot exist.

Conversely, addition of the Commandant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff would make available to that body a new fund of knowledge based upon cross-education, varied service with the Navy and the Army, and perennial experience in joint operations.

Finally it is specious to assert that such representation would lead to a division of authority within the Naval Establishment. Relations between the