States Marine Corps, and to make the Commandant of the Marine Corps a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As you know, our membership consists of Reserve officers of all the military services. Our association is officially on record as endorsing both the principle that the Commandant of the Marine Corps be a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as well as the proposal that Marine Corps strength be fixed at 400,000.

We in the Reserve feel strongly that there is a great need within our total military organization for a combatant Marine Corps of a size sufficient to permit it to function effectively in our Nation's wars. We do not believe that our national defense can afford to dissipate the talents and capabilities of a combatant Marine Corps of adequate size. As shock troops, as specialists in amphibious warfare, and as ready troops to serve either with the Army or Navy, they are without peer in the world.

The Reserves of all the services are extremely anxious that our military structure be maintained at its maximum efficiency. We feel that one of the best ways this can be accomplished would be the assurance that there will be four Marine divisions and four Marine air wings, along with supporting ground troops. We also feel that, in order to avoid the charge that a second land army is being created, it is quite proper that Senator Douglas is amending his bill to limit the Marine Corps to a total personnel ceiling of 400,000. It is our understanding that the bill as introduced contained an error which would make it appear that the 400,000 was a floor and not a ceiling. In this we could not concur. We do concur if the bill is amended as above.

We also believe that our military councils would be greatly strengthened by the addition of the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Accordingly, we solicit your support and trust that you will make our position known in such manner as you deem best.

Sincerely yours,

E. A. EVANS, Executive Director.

Senator KEFAUVER. At our last hearing there was considerable discussion concerning Public Law 432. Testimony which had been introduced into the record by the Chief of Naval Operations apparently created a belief on the part of some that the Commandant of the Marine Corps had been placed under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations by the passage of Public Law 432. Senator Douglas, while examining the Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Matthews, referred to certain correspondence between the then Secretary of the Navy-that was Mr. Sullivan who signed the correspondence, but it was on behalf of Mr. Forrestal-the then Chief of Naval Operations and the then Commandant of the Marine Corps which would clear up this point in question. The Navy was requested to supply this information for the record, and we are in receipt of a letter from the Secretary of the Navy, dated April 19, 1951, enclosing a copy of the desired correspondence. Because of its importance on this particular point, I am going to request that Colonel Chambers read the correspondence and the letter of the Secretary of the Navy. I think, Colonel Chambers, if you could state the correspondence and let it be put in the record without reading it in detail, it would be better.

It would appear that this correspondence and the Secretary's letter show clearly that the Commandant is not under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations. Now, just state the correspondence and place it in the record at this point.

Mr. CHAMBERS. We have a letter dated April 19 from Secretary Matthews transmitting the correspondence, and enclosing copies of correspondence between General Vandegrift, Admiral Nimitz, and in response to the correspondence of General Vandegrift a letter from the Secretary of the Navy to Mr. John L. Sullivan who was acting for Mr. Forrestal in this instance.

The sum and substance of this whole correspondence is contained in the second paragraph of Mr. Sullivan's letter that:

The Navy Department interprets neither Executive Order 9635 nor H. R. 3432

which was the bill which became Public Law 432

as interposing the Chief of Naval Operations in the administrative chain of responsibility between the Secretary and the Commandant, or as otherwise modifying the historical relationship between the Secretary and the Commandant.

Senator KEFAUVER. Those letters will be incorporated in the record at this point.

(The letters above referred to follow :)

HON. ESTES KEFAUVER,

United States Senate, Washington, D. C.

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY,
Washington, April 19, 1951.

DEAR SENATOR KEFAUVER: During hearings on April 17 on the bill S. 677 before your subcommittee, it was requested that the Navy Department furnish a copy of correspondence exchanged between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Secretary of the Navy during the pendency before the Eightieth Congress of the bill H. R. 3432 which was later enacted as Public Law 432. A copy of this correspondence is enclosed.

As Admiral Sherman and I attempted to make clear to the subcommittee, and to Senator Douglas, during our testimony on April 17, the laws passed and the general orders issued since World War II do not interpose the Chief of Naval Operations in the administrative chain of responsibility between the Secretary and the Commandant, nor do they modify the historical relationship between the Secretary and the Commandant.

The so-called naval command of the Chief of Naval Operations over the Naval Establishment is exercised only in his capacity as my principal naval executive, and only as necessary to obtain essential coordination of matters which must be coordinated by professional military officers (Navy and Marine Corps). It does not in any way alter the Commandant's direct responsibility to the Secretary of the Navy for the administration and efficiency of the Marine Corps.

Public Law 432 was a statutory enactment of the organization which was in effect prior to its approval under an Executive order issued pursuant to the First War Powers Act. Public Law 432 made no change in the then existing status of the Marine Corps. It was unnecessary to change general orders then in effect, such as General Order No. 5, because Public Law 432 brought about no organizational change.

As a matter of actual practice, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps work directly and effectively under and with the Secretary of the Navy, the Under Secretary of the Navy and the Assistant Secretaries of the Navy in an informal atmosphere of cooperation. The coordination and direction of the efforts of the bureaus and offices of the Navy Department are accomplished primarily by leadership and cooperation. It is requested that this letter be made a part of the record.

Very sincerely,

FRANCIS P. MATTHEWS.

DECEMBER 17, 1947.

From: Secretary of the Navy.

To: Commandant of the Marine Corps.
Via: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: H. R. 3432, Eightieth Congress.

Reference: (a) Commandant Marine Corps letter, serial MC-961945 dated December 11, 1947, and Chief of Naval Operations endorsement thereto, serial 3984P21.

1. In reply to reference (a) the Commandant of the Marine Corps is informed that it is not the intent of the Navy Department, in seeking enactment of H. R. 3432, to alter the Commandant's direct responsibility to the Secretary of the Navy for the administration and efficiency of the Marine Corps.

2. The Navy Department interprets neither Executive Order 9635 nor H. R. 3432 as imposing the Chief of Naval Operations in the administrative chain of responsibility between the Secretary and the Commandant, or as otherwise modifying the historical relationship between the Secretary and the Commandant.

Orig: Capt. J. G. Crawford-Op-21.
December 11, 1947-K. Lane.

JOHN L. SULLIVAN.

NAVY DEPARTMENT,

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
Washington, D. C., December 15, 1947.

On Commandant, Marine Corps, Serial MC-961945 dated December 11, 1947.
From: Chief of Naval Operations.

To: Secretary of the Navy.

Subject: H. R. 3432, Eightieth Congress.

1. Forwarded.

2. In the opinon of the Chief of Naval Operations, neither Executive Order 9635 nor H. R. 3432 can be interpreted as interposing the Chief of Naval Operations in the administrative chain of responsibility between the Secretary of the Navy and the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

3. To eliminate any uncertainty in this regard, it is considered desirable that the Secretary of the Navy disclaim any such intent on the part of the Navy Department in seeking the enactment of H. R. 3432. To this end, it is recommended that you sign the attached proposed letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps.

C. W. NIMITZ.

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS,
Washington, December 11, 1947.

From: Commandant of the Marine Corps.
To: Secretary of the Navy.

Via: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: H. R. 3432, Eightieth Congress.

1. Throughout the years in which the Marine Corps has existed as an integral part of the Naval Establishment, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has been directly responsible to the Secretary of the Navy for the administration and efficiency of the corps. This excellent relationship was not altered by the issuance of Executive Order 9635 under the temporary authority of the First War Powers Act. Although it is possible to interpret that order as interposing the Chief of Naval Operations in the administrative chain of responsibility between the Secretary and the Commandant, to my knowledge such an interpretation has never been sought. The possibility that it might some day be sought has been a source of concern to me, however, and my concern has been relieved only by recognition of the temporary nature of the order.

2. Already apprehensive of the possible effects of Executive Order 9635, I was grealy disturbed to find that H. R. 3432 is drafted in such terms that it also can be interpreted as modifying the old direct relationship between the Secretary and the Commandant. In the light of my personal experience and association with the Secretary and the Chief of Naval Operations I am confident that H. R. 3432 was not drafted with any such intention. Nevertheless, if the bill is enacted in its present form, and such an intention is not negated as a matter of record, the interpretation of which I am apprehensive may eventually be sought and applied. It is my sincere belief that such an eventuality would react to the detriment of the naval service.

3. If H. R. 3432 were not already nearing the end of the legislative process, I would feel constrained to recommend that it be amended in such a way as to reaffirm the Commandant's direct responsibility to the Secretary for the administration and efficiency of the corps. Since the most favorable opportunity for such action has passed, I recommend instead that the Secretary, in reply to this letter, make it a matter of record that it is not the intent of the Navy Department, in seeking the enactment of H. R. 3432, to alter the old relationship.

arguments, and I am, therefore, not in a position to make any helpful comments on them.

However, it seems to me that at least the following is clear:

Under the National Security Act, the Congress constituted the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the principal strategic planning body. It designated as members representatives of the three Military Departments, which were organized by the Congress, quite properly, on the basis of the predominant spheres of Military operations-namely, the land, the sea, and the air. In other words, the Congress believed that strategic plans would be formulated best by a body constituted to reflect directly the influence of the medium in which we would have to fight. The Congress knew that within the three Military Departments various combinations of land, sea, and air existed and were possible, but it did not mean to provide proportionate representation for these many combinations. It recognized that direct representation of the three natural elements in which Military operations must take place would provide appropriate representation for any combination that might become necessary.

Further, it did not attempt to provide representation for various specialized modes of warfare, nor did it try to provide representation for important functions, one of which, as you gentlemen know— logistics-is basic to the strategic feasibility of all military plans, whether they are to be carried out on the land, on the sea, or in the air.

The Marine Corps is a combat group, highly trained in specialized modes of warfare. Its primary role is best stated by the National Security Act:

The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign.

While it is true that they are separately organized within the Department of the Navy and within the Naval Establishment, they are by no means the only group in the Armed Forces that is specially trained. There are other groups of highly trained personnel which specialize in certain modes of warfare. I have in mind such groups as paratroopers, rangers, et cetera. In the Department of the Air Force, for instance, there is special training for the strategic air arm and for the air defense function. I think the Congress was wise in not trying to provide on the top planning group-the Joint Chiefs of Staffindividual representation for these specially-trained groups. The capability, for instance, of the strategic air arm of the Air Force is, naturally enough, a very important consideration in the preparation of strategic plans. Yet, I am satisfied that the Chief of Staff of the Air Force should represent strategic air as well as the air defense role and that there should not be individual representatives.

As I mentioned before, the construction of strategic plans and their successful execution depends on an analysis of their logistic feasibility. Logistics are common to all military operations, on land, or sea, or air, and to all plans. Logistics must always be considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but I think Congress was wise in not trying to give individual representation to the experts in that field.