As I have said, the concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been based on representation of the fundamental and natural elements of land, sea, and air. However, we find just as we find in the Marine Corps-combinations of land, sea, and air operations in the other Departments. If representation is to be given to these combinations, then it would seem appropriate that the Navy have at least two members-aside from the Marine Corps-one who would represent its sea operations, and one who would represent its air operations. The same could be said for the combinations which exist or are possible in the other Departments.

A further problem that would be created by this bill concerns the relationship of the Commandant of the Marine Corps to the Chief of Naval Operations. As I said, I am not familiar with the refinements of the legal controversy which appears to exist, but it would seem perfectly clear to me that there is an intimate relationship between the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant in terms of executive authority and command control, whatever its areas and dimensions. In view of this relationship, I have a certain apprehension that placing the Commandant on the Joint Chiefs of Staff would give rise to an actual confusion, which would be most unfortunate. To avoid that, I am afraid you would have to spell out in this bill the responsibilities of the Commandant in great detail, both in terms of the Chief of Naval Operations and in relationship to the Chiefs of Staff or the Army and the Air Force.

Unless the Congress desires to make the Marine Corps an additional Military Department-which the Department of Defense does not favor and unless they favor giving individual representation to the combinations of land, sea, and air which are found in the three Military Departments, and unless they favor giving representation to groups which are specially trained in certain modes of warfare, I do not believe a change in the basic concept of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as it was originally provided by the Congress in the National Security Act, is warranted.

The other provision of the bill concerns authorization of the size of the Marine Corps, and the Department of Defense opposes it as well. This is not felt to be desirable. The principal objection is that it would establish the size of the Marine Corps without reference to the size of the Navy, which provides a large amount of housekeeping and logistical support. I understand that it is contended that this position is inconsistent with the notion that the Marine Corps be maintained at a percentage of the strength of the Navy. I do not feel it is inconsistent since the strength of the Navy is a flexible number which changes as conditions warrant.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to read into the record a telegram I have received on the bill before you. I asked Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, who was Chairman of the Hoover Committee Task Force on National Security, if he had considered this proposal. His telegraphic reply is as follows:

Hon. ROBERT A. LOVETT,

Deputy Secretary of Defense:

NEW YORK, April 19, 1951.

Replying to your inquiry as to my views on bill S. 677, particularly so far as it relates to membership on the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while I yield to no one in my admiration for the Marine Corps and in my conviction that any measures which would impair the morale or effectiveness of the Marine Corps would constitute

a serious injury to our national security, nevertheless I doubt the advisability of including the Commandant of the Marine Corps as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The distinguished Commandants of the Marine Corps could, of course, make substantial contributions to the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, so could many others in the Department of Defense, but it is obviously impossible for this reason alone to place all such on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This matter was not overlooked when the National Security Act of 1947 was drafted, nor did our Task Force on National Security of the Hoover Commission fail to give it consideration. In both instances, however, it was felt that the Chief of Naval Operations would adequately represent the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Unless and until such representation proves inadequate it would seem to me to be a mistake to add the Commandant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This course involves not only undesirable possibilities for the structure as it now stands but it might be followed by a claim for a fourth or Marine Establishment in the Department of Defense or on the other hand for a transfer of the Marine Corps to the Army, both of which also seem to me very undesirable eventualities. I communicated my views on bill S. 677 more fully to Senator Douglas. While I do not feel at liberty to send you a copy of that letter without the Senator's permission I am sure he would be pleased to show it to you if you care to see it. Warm regards.

FERD EBERSTADT.

May I say, Mr. Chairman, that Senator Douglas was courteous enough to show me the letter which covered matters in addition to the aspect that I referred to here.

Senator KEFAUVER. You mean Mr. Eberstadt's letter?

Mr. LOVETT. Mr. Eberstadt's letter.

Senator KEFAUVER. Do you want to make his letter a part of the record?

Senator DOUGLAS. Mr. Chairman, could it be made a part of the record?

Senator KEFAUVER. It will be made a part of the record following that telegram.

(The letter above referred to is as follows:)

Hon. PAUL H. DOUGLAS,

F. EBERSTADT & CO., INC., New York, N. Y., March 22, 1951.

The United States Senate, Washington, D. C. DEAR SENATOR DOUGLAS: I have received your letter of March 20 with the enclosures referred to therein. I would greatly appreciate being excused from testifying.

I have had no close and direct contact with the Defense Department or any of its units since completing my work for the Armed Services Committees of Congress in connection with title IV of the National Security Act of 1947. That was in May and June, 1949. A good deal of water has gone over the dam since then and before I would feel competent to testify I should have to spend some time in Washington getting up to date. This would be very difficult for me to do just now. I know you appreciate the difficulties under which business is laboring at the moment, especially in the financial field.

So far as bill S. 677 is concerned, I favor the objective of statutory protection of the Marine Corps and its functions. I know of no unit in our military organization from which the American citizens get more value in defense and security for each dollar expended, than from the Marine Corps. It is flexible, economical, and efficient. Over the years the great military leaders have emphasized the relative importance in military matters of morale and spirit versus numbers of men and equipment. Napoleon set the ratio at 10 to 1.

In morale and spirit, the Marine Corps is second to no organization in our own or any other military establishment. To seriously injure this morale would be to strike a very damaging blow at our national security. Thus it seems to me, as I said above, Congress must be alert and solicitous to see that nothing of this sort occurs.

There are those who would unduly restrict the functions and activities of the Marine Corps. Some would like to abolish it. Their motives and aspirations are varied. Their arguments have a certain logical and organizational

plausibility, but it is my observation that fighting spirit is not primarily the result of a neat organization chart nor of a logical organizational set-up. The former should never be sacrificed to the latter.

The Marines have always had an important place in our Military Establishment. They have always acquitted themselves creditably. In the present technology of warfare, their amphibious functions are absolutely essential. They have built up an effective, hard-hitting, closely knit military outfit, associated with the Navy but of equal service to both the Navy and the Army. In a certain sense, to put them into the Army would be as incongruous as to leave them in the Navy but since their historical associations are with the Navy, it would seem to me for that reason alone, a great mistake to move them. They have been particularly outstanding in tying in their tactical air support with their ground forces, the importance of which has long been emphasized by many in words, but, unhappily, was proven in blood in Korea. If the Marine Corps were to be transferred to the Army, it would probably involve a separation of Marine air from the Marine ground forces. This would be disastrous.

So much for maintaining the corps where it is and as it is.

With respect to its size, it seems to me that it should not be permitted to expand unduly, because in doing so it would lose its present great value as a comparatively small, compact, flexible auxiliary force. I would not undertake to say exactly what its size should be, but I feel sure that in present circumstances it should not exceed 400,000 men. On the other hand, it should not be substantially less than that.

I cannot concur in that provision of the bill which contemplates permanent membership of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Section 211 of the National Security Act sets forth the duties of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which, generally speaking, are of an over-all strategic and logistic planning nature. Undoubtedly the distinguished Commandants of the Marine Corps could contribute substantially to the considerations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but so could many other elements of the Department of Defense. It is obviously not possible to pull into the Joint Chiefs of Staff all or even most of those who could make such contributions.

The most desirable provision, in my opinion, would be one that assured the presence of the Commandant of the Marine Corps when matters directly affecting the Marine Corps were under consideration. But this is very difficult to define in words, and even more difficult to carry out in practice.

The Chief of Naval Operations is assumed to represent the interests of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff and it seems to me that unless there are clear instances of his failure to do so, this should be adequate.

In summary, I would say that the Marine Corps is subject to some jeopardy not only by those who are hostile to it, but also by those friendly to the corps who may be overambitious for its expansion and for increasing the position of the corps beyond what is reasonable. It seems to me that the real security of the corps lies in the recognition by our people and by Congress of the essentiality of the Marine Corps and its functions. So long as this realization exists, the present organizational position of the Marine Corps is adequate, whereas I am sure that if the corps expands unduly or seeks position in the Defense Department inconsistent with its functions and proper relationships, the ultimate results to the corps, and thus to our national security, will be hurtful.

I hope the expressions of these views, which it is possible, but unlikely, that more intimate study would change, will be adequate without the necessity of my coming down and testifying.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

F. EBERSTADT.

Mr. LOVETT. That concludes my statement, Mr. Chairman. Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Stennis, do you have some questions to ask Secretary Lovett?

Senator STENNIS. I believe not. The Secretary has made a very clear statement here and I have no questions.

Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Long?

Senator LONG. Not at this time.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Lovett, I would like to ask you this question. On the face of it, the arguments you make that in the other

services you have specialists such as paratroopers, rangers, et cetera, which is contained on the top of page 4 of your statement, does the fact that in the National Security Act no specific function under the law is given to these specialists, whereas there are specific functions under the Security Act given to the Marine Corps, alter the situation, in your judgment?

Mr. LOVETT. I would think not, Mr. Chairman, for the reason that the specified responsibilities in the National Security Act are servicewide in general. The formation of the strategic air command, for example, the tactical command and the air defense groups is a matter of internal organization to perform the statutory requirement, and I would not think that that would alter the situation.

Senator KEFAUVER. Well, at this point, so that the record will be coherent, let us state again that section 206 (a) and (b) refer to the Department of the Navy and the United States Navy.

Section 206 (c) specifically refers to the organization and the duties of the Marine Corps.

The second question, Mr. Secretary

Mr. LOVETT. Mr. Chairman, may I interrupt you a moment?
Senator KEFAUVER, Yes.

Mr. LOVETT. To try to be more fully responsive to your question, in 206 (a) I believe naval aviation also is specifically mentioned.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, it is mentioned, and tells how it should be constituted. Go ahead, Mr. Secretary.

Mr. LOVETT. That is all, Senator. I merely wanted to point that out. Senator KEFAUVER. The distinction would seem to be, from looking at the law, that while naval aviation is mentioned as a part of the Navy, it does not spell out exactly what the duties of naval aviation are as is contained in section (c) with reference to the Marine Corps. I bring that up so it can be considered in considering the testimony at this point.

The second question, Mr. Secretary, is this. Argument has been presented to the committee that the Commandant of the Marine Corps would be a very useful member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the reason that each of the three members of the present Joint Chiefs is a specialist in his line of work.

Admiral Sherman is a deep-sea man, and General Vandenberg, while he has had Army training, his specialty is, of course, the Air Force, and that General Collins is an Army man, and that there is a tendency under those circumstances for each fellow to become a specialist in his particular line and more or less leave the problems affecting the other branch of service to the man who is a specialist in his field, and that it would be a very good thng to have somebody, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, who has information and interest in all three of the branches of service and three activities, that he would be a catalyst or anyway an influence that would tend to bring them together into a more unified operation. What do you say about that?

Mr. LOVETT. Mr. Chairman, I have heard over a period of years of association with the military services those suggestions made. I believe that it is a matter at the Joint Chiefs level, of the Chief of Staff of a service relying on competent advice of his specialists within his own organizations, and then representing on a broad strategic platform the combined views of the service.

I think Admiral Sherman pointed out the consultation with the Marine Corps specialists, and also that they constituted a proportion of the Joint Staff operating under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

I would feel, sir, that the most useful contributions which are made by the specialists are made in the stages of staff work, that the decisions on top are necessarily based on expert judgment, and that in the present form of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that is obtainable.

Senator KEFAUVER. The third question, sir, is that since the time the Marine Corps was originally created without regard to the technical argument and legal refinements, the obligation defensewise of the United States has undergone a change, that in our present position we need to have a large unified force with greater mobility which can quickly be placed in case drastic trouble comes about in any part of the world, to be there with land, sea, and air force immediately.

This could be done more quickly with more mobility by the Marines than it could with any other branch of the service, getting the proportions of the other branches of the service in a particular spot at a particular time. What do you think about that?

Mr. LOVETT. As to the necessity for very much greater state of readiness at all times, Mr. Chairman, I am in full accord. As to the suggestion that the Marine Corps as a unit is the principal ready force, I would not agree with that, sir.

I think the fleet element in the eastern Mediterranean, the combat vessels there, are in just as good a state of readiness as Marine divisions would be at any time. I think the same is true, perhaps, even in a greater sense, speaking purely from the point of view of passage of time, between alert and combat of the air-defense units and the strategic air command.

I also believe that the competence of a paratrooper group such as the Eighty-second Airborne would be as high in readiness as a Marine Corps division. In the latter case I cannot be sure. In the case of the Air Force and the combat Navy vessels, I feel that I do have sound knowledge.

I believe, to expand the reply a little bit, Mr. Chairman, that all forces ought to be improved in their state of readiness, in their state of mobility. I think that is one of the purposes of our present activities. In trying to be fully responsive to you, I am in no sense suggesting that the adequacy of the Marine Corps readiness is not everything that we should want. I am only suggesting that other services have an equal requirement for readiness, and in two cases in particular have that state of readiness now.

Senator KEFAUVER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Senator DOUGLAS. Do you have any questions?

Senator LONG. Might I ask a question before Senator Douglas takes over. I think he is going to have quite a few to ask unless I miss my guess.

I was somewhat alarmed by the figures that it takes such a substantial number of men in order to maintain a fighting unit at the front. Do you recall what those figures, what the break-down is with regard to the number of men it takes to keep one man at the front?

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, may I interpose right there? We have gotten up since Senator Long was here, some new figure on that, and they will be submitted to the committee, I understand, just as