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It suggests moreover that possibly as the prospect of action by Congress might diminish, that these invitations might not be extended to the same degree in the future, and that if the presence of the Commandant has been helpful in this last year, that it would be desirable to continue this relationship by statute.

Mr. LOVETT. Senator, may I comment on that?

Senator DOUGLAS. Yes.

Mr. LOVETT. In hearing the matter that was just read by Colonel Chambers, it occurs to me that some confusion may have been created in Admiral Sherman's mind by the fact that I think the presiding chairman, Senator Stennis, apparently relates the question to General Cates.

Mr. CHAMBERS. General Cates, Mr. Secretary, had been Commandant for over 3 years.

Mr. LOVETT. Yes, but Admiral Sherman may be answering only as to his own period, I think, or rather I got that impression.

Senator DOUGLAS. I hope the record may be cleared on this point. Could we ask the Department of the Navy to submit, not only the dates at which General Cates appeared, but all the dates since the passage of the Unification Act, namely, July 26, 1947, all meetings of the Joint Chiefs which the Commandant of the Marine Corps attended, whether General Vandergrift or General Cates.

Mr. LOVETT. Yes; that ought to make it clear.

Senator KEFAUVER. Mr. Secretary, on that information could we make it the Department of Defense who will get out the information instead of the Navy? There seems to be some confusion about the matter.

Mr. LOVETT. I beg your pardon?

Senator KEFAUVER. We asked the Navy, Senator Stennis asked Admiral Sherman, when Admiral Sherman was before us, if he would submit for the record the times that General Cates had been at the Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings. It was said, "We could get that covered later. Could you supply us with it?" Apparently Admiral Sherman only gave the list of times during his tenure of office.

Senator STENNIS. Mr. Chairman, maybe I could clear that up a little. It was first suggested that a period of 4 years be covered. Someone said then that General Cates' tenure was approximately 4 years. Someone else suggested that the record might not reflect it, but that General Cates ought to be able to tell, so therefore I requested that the period covered be the tenure of General Cates as Commandant. That is the way the question was put.

The reply of the staff member with Admiral Sherman was that the record might not reflect all these appearances, but General Cates would doubtless have memoranda as to when he attended, so that is the way it was left.

Senator KEFAUVER. What they have submitted here begins on April 6, 1950, 1 year ago, and General Cates has been the Commandant 312 years, so I wonder if you would, Mr. Secretary-of course, Admiral Sherman has only been a member of the Chiefs of Staff for about a year-ask that we be given a full listing of the meetings attended by General Cates during the time of his tenure.

Mr. LOVETT. Of course.

Senator DOUGLAS. Mr. Chairman, if I may suggest, I think that should be broadened somewhat. The meetings attended by the Com

mandant of the Marine Corps since the passage of the Unification Act, July 26, 1947.

OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE,
Washington, D. O., April 24, 1951.

MEMORANDUM FOR SENATOR KEFAUVER

Pursuant to the request of your subcommittee, made during the hearing on S. 677, Saturday, April 21, 1951, the records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been reviewed in order to ascertain the occasions, since passage of the Unification Act, July 26, 1947, upon which the Commandant of the Marine Corps attended the meetings of the Joint Chiefs.

The records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff indicate that the Commandant of the Marine Corps met with the Joint Chiefs on the following dates: April 6, 1950; July 3, 1950; August 10, 1950; November 1, 1950; December 8, 1950; and February 2, 1951.

You will note that the foregoing list varies in one instance from that previously submitted to you by the Navy Department. The list supplied by the Navy Department indicated that the Commandant had attended a meeting on October 10, 1950. It appears that, although he was actually scheduled to attend this meeting, he had just returned from Korea the previous evening and was unable to attend this particular session.

Headquarters, United States Marines Corps advises that the foregoing list has been checked and found to agree with the records of the Office of the Commandant and, further, that General Vandegrift, General Cates' predecessor, has been contacted and has advised that he did not attend any meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during his tenure of office.

H. A. HOUSER,

Rear Admiral, United States Navy, Director, Office of Legislative Liaison. Senator KEFAUVER. If that is possible.

Mr. LOVETT. Very well.

Senator STENNIS. And I suggest that the request also go to General Cates, because it has been suggested that there has been no effort to keep an accurate record as to that point.

Senator KEFAUVER. I assume, Mr. Lovett, if the records are insufficient you would have someone check with General Cates to see if he has any additional records.

Mr. LOVETT. We will try to make it fully responsive.

Senator KEFAUVER. Are there any other questions of Secretary Lovett?

Senator LONG. It certainly would seem, would it not, Mr. Secretary, that wherever it was contemplated that action would be taken by the Joint Chiefs of Staff or action considered involving the Marine Corps, that the Commandant of the Marine Corps should be present? He should at least be present whether or not he voted.

Mr. LOVETT. I should think that would be reasonable.

Senator LONG. It would be difficult to see how the Joint Chiefs of Staff could best advise how the Marine Corps should be utilized unless they had actually had the Commandant of the Marine Corps present and consulted him.

Mr. LOVETT. It was my understanding from the reading of Admiral Sherman's testimony that the Marine Corps representation on the Joint Staff is permanent and that also in the CNO's office there are Marine Corps officers, some forty, as I remember.

Senator DOUGLAS. Is it not correct that on the so-called little chiefs, who are supposed to do the main work for the Joint Chiefs, that the Marine Corps has no representation? The Marine Corps is excluded not merely from the Joint Chiefs, but from the so-called little chiefs.

I suppose most deputies are a continuing body and perhaps the main planning group. I think that is true, sir.

Mr. LOVETT. I only have seen it under the title of Joint Chiefs.

Senator DOUGLAS. Down underneath that, down underneath the little chiefs, so to speak, we do have Marine officers, but the point that we make is that they are not in the planning or policy-deciding groups for the Defense Establishment. They are in the cellar, kept in the cellar except when the shooting starts.

Senator KEFAUVER. All right, Mr. Lovett. Are there any other questions? That is all, Mr. Secretary. We would be very happy to have you remain with us.

Mr. LOVETT. I had better go back to my own cellar, Mr. Chairman. Senator KEFAUVER. We appreciate your appearance, sir. Governor Sidney McMath, will you come around. Governor McMath, the committee is delighted to have you here. I know that you have made a great sacrifice to come, with the Arkansas Legislature being in session. I also know that the whole problem of our defense effort is one that you have been vitally interested in, inasmuch as you are not only the Governor of a great sovereign State, but you have had much experience in the armed services, being an officer in the Marine Corps with a splendid record in several operations.

I believe that you were operations officer of the Third Marines, and that you were decorated for gallantry in action, so that you are well qualified to discuss the matter that we have before us from your active experience and from the great interest you have had in the armed services, so we will be glad to hear from you at this time, Governor McMath.

STATEMENT OF HON. SIDNEY McMATH, GOVERNOR OF ARKANSAS

Governor McMATH. Thank you very much. Gentlemen, I appreciate the courtesy of this committee in permitting me to appear and express my opinion in favor of Senate bill 677, which would increase the strength of the Marine Corps to four combat divisions and four combat wings and give this branch of the service representation on the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

You can imagine how humble I feel testifying here following the testimony of military experts and taking issue with them on a matter involving military policy. It is comforting to know that in this country a citizen can entertain a difference of opinion with that of our generals on military policy. I understand that there is sometimes a division among the generals themselves on policies affecting the safety of our country and the conduct of the war.

I hasten to state, however, that I do not appear here purporting to be in any sense an authority on military affairs. I am here as a private citizen who has a natural interest in any measure that bears upon the security of this country and affects our ability to meet our commitments and responsibilities as a member of the United Nations. Naturally, having had the privilege of serving as a marine, I have a strong attachment to the Marine Corps and share that sense of loyalty to the organization that is generally characteristic of all

marines.

Senator KEFAUVER. Governor McMath, how long did you serve in the Marine Corps?

D. Governor MOMATH. I went in the Marine Corps in 1936 and served a year as a second lieutenant, and I resigned and took a Reserve commission and went to Hot Springs to practice law. I was called back into the service in August 1940 and served until February 1, 1946. I have had 7 years of active duty.

Senator KEFAUVER. What was your rank when you left the service?
Governor McMATH. Lieutenant colonel, sir.
Senator KEFAUVER. Very well.

review the glories Their battle perThe accomplish

Governor McMATH. It is not necessary for me to and triumphs and traditions of the Marine Corps. formance is known and respected by every citizen. ments of the Marine Corps on the battlefield in no way detract from the heroic deeds of the other services.

Historically the Marine Corps has had a mission in protecting the interests and defending the security of the United States. It has never failed in its assigned task. Frequently, however, its job has been made more difficult-unnecessarily difficult-by restrictive policies limiting the size and strength and organization of its combative force. The Marine Corps continuously, so it seems, has had to fight for the privilege of fighting. One would expect that some day it would be recognized by those who formulate military policy that the Marine Corps has a definite role in our military operations and that it would be strengthened accordingly. But this is not the case.

During the early 1930's, an effort was made to abolish the Marine Corps. This effort failed and the Marine Corps was able to continue its existence and by 1939 reached a strength of 17,000 officers and men. These officers and men were skilled, experienced, professional soldiers. It was from these officers and men that cadres were formed and the Marine Corps expanded to six hard-hitting and extremely effective divisions that performed so valiantly and skillfully and with such devastating results to the enemy during the Second World War.

I for one was confident that it had been established beyond any doubt that the Marines had a military function and purpose that justified a strength of at least five permanent divisions. They had six divisions during the last war and I thought that we would probably stay at four permanent divisions, but the shooting of the Second World War had hardly stopped until the movement to abolish the corps was revived with renewed determination and vigor.

The advocates of this policy denied that they wanted to destroy the Marine Corps but, had their decisions been carried to their natural conclusions, this would have been the result. To reduce the Marine Corps to a few battalions organized into landing teams would be to destroy the combative force of this branch of our fighting service. The natural and ultimate result of this action would be to reduce the Marine Corps to ships' detachments and shore patrols.

Those of our leaders who have advanced this policy are eminently qualified and honorable men. Some of them rank among the greatest military men of our history. In fact, history will rank some of them with such illustrious names as Stonewall Jackson and Robert E. Lee. Senator DOUGLAS. Would it be appropriate for a northerner to suggest U. S. Grant? [Laughter.]

Governor McMATH. But because of their training and background and experience, they have the traditional Army view of the Marine

Corps. They say, in so many words, that we do not need a second Army and that is very true. But what we do need-and it seems to me that this has been so clearly established that I even hesitate to mention it—what we do need is a combative force organized, trained, equipped, indoctrinated and steeled for amphibious operations, and for crushing comparatively small aggressive forces that if left undefeated would grow and expand their conquest.

The Marine Corps has traditionally been organized, trained and indoctrinated for the difficult and specialized task of executing amphibious operations. The history of the Pacific operations in the Second World War relates as to how in a number of instances the Marines attained skill and killing efficiency in this field. The NavyMarine amphibious team has been used effectively in the Korean campaign. I would suggest to this honorable committee that the views of Gen. Douglas MacArthur be obtained on this question. General MacArthur, more than any other Army officer, during the Second World War and in Korea, has had opportunities to use marines on the ground and in the air in landing operations. I dare say that General MacArthur would have welcomed even two Marine divisions supported by a corresponding number of air wings during the initial phases of the Korean conflict.

If the Marines had consisted of a ship's detachment and a corporal's guard, which they would have been reduced to had the opposition had their way, there would have been no Guadalcanal, Bougainville, Okinawa, or a Peleliu nor a number of other battles that brought our air arm within effective striking distance of Japan and provided advanced bases for the fleet.

On the other hand, if the Marine Corps had consisted in the beginning of the Second World War of four combat divisions supported by four air wings, the decision at Guadalcanal would never have been in doubt. The movement up the Solomons and through the Gilberts and other Pacific Islands would have been greatly accelerated.

If at the outbreak of the Korean conflict the Marine Corps had been a combat force of four divisions, with four air wings in support, the tactical situation would have no doubt been different from the very beginning. The Army would not have been placed in a position of having to send most of its trained personnel to fight a comparatively small war at the expense of its build-up for a possible major conflict. I dare say that today the trained officers and men in the Army now committed in Korea are still badly needed as cadres for expanding our Army ground forces to the size and strength required to meet the principal threat to our security which lies in the European theater. Amphibious operations, limited landing operations, acting as a police force for the UN, these should be the primary missions of the Marine Corps. Present world conditions, our obligations and commitments to check aggression and preserve the peace, compel us to prepare for the day when there may be other Guadalcanals, Bougainvilles, Pelelius, Okinawas, and Koreas. In such an event it would be most comforting if we had in the field ready for immediate action four Marine divisions supported by four air wings. This would be a combative force more equal to the mission that belongs to the Marines. At the same time, the Army ground force could, for the most part, at least, husband its strength in the build-up for the main event, should that come.

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