show the true relationship within the Naval Establishment by this organizational chart. The United States Navy and the United States Marine Corps are the two operating services within the Navy Department. The Marine Corps is a part of the Department of Navy, but not a part of the Navy.

By the way, the Secretary of the Navy was asked to submit the correspondence between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the then Secretary of the Navy at the time 432 was passed, and also to submit a covering letter. The passages of the correspondence in 1948 were mentioned, but I believe the covering letter of the Secretary of the Navy has not been read.

Senator KEFAUVER. The chairman of the subcommittee has the covering letter, and I thought it was stated that it would be treated as read into the record. Anyway, it will be put in.

Senator DOUGLAS. Might I look at it a minute?

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes. That will be put in the record prior to the inclusion in the record of the other correspondence. Mr. CHAMBERS. It is in the record already, sir.

Senator DOUGLAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to call the attention of this committee and all who read the record to the fifth paragraph, in which it is stated:

The Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps work directly and effectively under and with the Secretary of the Navythen I omit the Under Secretary

in an informal atmosphere of cooperation.

I would like to submit that that is a confirmation of the argument which Mr. Hanson and I have been making throughout these hearings: That the position of the Commandant of the Marine Corps is not under the Chief of Naval Operations but under the Secretary of the Navy, and I ask that these organization charts which now seem to be confirmed by the letter of the present Secretary of the Navy confirming the letter of the then Secretary of the Navy in 1948 about Public Law 432, be made a part of the record.

Senator KEFAUVER. It will be made a part of the record as part of your testimony.

(The charts above referred to follow :)

BASIC ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

Senator DOUGLAS. (5) From time to time the Marine units are assigned to duty with the operating forces of the Navy. When this is done they come under the command of the Chief of Naval Operations, but similar units of the Marine Corps are assigned for duty with other Departments. Units of the Marine Corps in the past have served under the direction of the State Department, and if my memory serves me correctly, twice under the direction of the Post Office. For example, Marines are fighting in Korea today as a part of the Army. The Chief of Naval Operations does not have control over these forces, and as was pointed out in the testimony in the cross examination of Mr. Lovett, the President may assign additional functions to the Marine Corps above and beyond and in addition to those specific functions described in section 206 (c) of the Unification Act.

(6) The Chief of Naval Operations has brought out clearly that the Navy has opposed this legislation primarily because it is afraid that if the Marine Corps is expanded, that it might adversely affect the appropriations made to the Navy, since the Marine Corps appropriations are included within the total appropriations for the Department of the Navy.

However, he himself testified that he thought-I think you will find this on page 141 of the hearings-that the Marine Corps presently should have over three divisions in being. Furthermore, while he used percentages of increase in personnel in an endeavor to show that the Marine Corps was being well treated, he neglected to point out that the Marine Corps' increase of 246 percent was based on 67,000, while the Army's 222 percent was on approximately 635,000. A comparison of the organizations in total strength would have been been more illuminating.

(7) The Chief of Naval Operations also has opposed making the Commandant a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He stated that he represented the Marine Corps because he was responsible for naval command. That is at page 161.

He also stated that he takes the Commandant to the Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings when matters are to be discussed of importance to

the Marine Corps. It has been developed this morning, he said that he had taken the Commandant to meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approximately six times, but it will be noted that these dates. which thus far have been furnished are all for a period since April 6, 1950, and do not cover the period between the passage of the Unifica'n Act on July 26, 1947, and April 6, 1950.

As Congressman Mansfield and I have suggested, there may be a connection between the fact that 1 month after the bill introduced by the Congressman from Georgia was placed in the hopper in the House, then the Commandant was invited on these occasions.

Senator LONG. Of course at this stage we are not certain that the Commandant was not invited prior to 1950.

Senator DOUGLAS. That is true, but I would like to point out that if it should develop—and I believe it will be developed that the Commandant was not invited prior to April 1950-it should be remembered that during this period of time the Joint Chiefs of Staff discussed such matters as the military budget, manpower allocations, organizational structures of the various services, lowering physical and mental standards for admission to service and many other problems.

All of these matters certainly are of importance to the Marine Corps, and I think it should be emphasized the Marine Corps is not merely interested in the strategic questions concerning their immediate employment. They are also interested in the general over-all problems of the Department of Defense as they affect the Marine Corps as one of the four constituent services.

Now, Mr. Chairman, I have no desire and no intention to argue this point further. I know that there may be doubt in the minds of some as to whether or not the Commandant should be made a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, I would like to point out that Congress created the Joint Chiefs of Staff within the past few years, and within the last 2 years Congress has given them a nonvoting chair

man.

Since there are four military services today, and this is accepted by all, including the Navy, I feel that there is no reason why the head of the fourth service should not be a coequal partner in our military planning. To argue that it is too small a service is similar to arguing that small States should not be permitted representation in the United States Senate.

I happen to come from a large State, but I am very glad to have Nevada and Delaware also as members of the Union and to have Senators from those States.

To argue that to put the Commandant in the Joint Chiefs of Staff would produce an imbalance or would weight the scales in favor of naval thinking overlooks the existing imbalance or lack of balance of the present arrangement in favor of nonnaval thinking. I pointed out that we have not merely the Army on the General Staff, and the Air Force, its commanding general having originally been trained in the Army, but the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is also an Army man and the Secretary of Defense is also an Army man. May I say I think these men are all magnificent Americans and noble men, but nevertheless it is certainly true that by experience and train

ing they are Army men. It is a great tribute to the Army that they should have developed such fine characters.

Certainly no possible harm could come from such an arrangement, namely, putting the Commandant on the Chiefs of Staff and I believe a tremendous amount of good can result if this section of the bill is enacted.

(8) While there is some dispute as to the degree to which the country gets more competent service for its money out of the Marine Corps than out of the other services, the record is crystal-clear that the ratio of total Marines to the number of combatant organizations is far less than in the only other comparable service, which is the Army. I believe that at the direction of the acting chairman, Senator Stennis, the committee staff has secured data on this point and I sumbit, Mr. Chairman-I want to make this prediction that an analysis of this data will show that so far as the additions to the forces are concerned, it will be found that it will take nearly twice as many men in the Army in service and noncombatant capacities for each man in combatant service as the comparable number of noncombatant servicemen in the Marine Corps; that if it takes, for instance, two-thirds of a man in the Marine Corps to support one combatant soldier-and I believe that is not far from the facts-that it will take approximately one and a third men in the Army.

I am now referring to increments, not to the average.

Senator LONG. You feel certain, do you, that these figures when thoroughly analyzed will show that for every man on the front fighting in a Marine unit, there is one man left behind the lines. supporting him?

Senator DOUGLAS. There are far fewer men in the Marine Corps supporting the combat man than in the Army even when you take all these other factors into consideration. In fact one reason for this may be that the Marine Corps has always had to fight, as Governor McMath has said, for the right of fighting. Its position has not been established.

It has always been threatened and therefore it has always had to economize in order to live. It is a tribute really to the system of free enterprise and competition. Therefore, if we are to have ready forces in being, it is clear, I believe, that the taxpayer will get more in quantity for each dollar by using marines for this purpose.

(9) Tying in closely to this matter of economy is the fact that we not only get more in the way of combat divisions out of the Marine Corps for our money, but within the division the Marine Corps carries far more fire power than the corresponding unit in the Army. For this comparison we have utilized the figures submitted by the Departments themselves so that in addition to buying proportionately more combat divisions with our money, out of a total manpower strength we are getting divisions which within themselves have a great deal more fire power.

(10) Throughout the testimony of the Chief of Naval Operations it was very interesting to see the effort being made to establish the Chief of Naval Operations as being in command of the Marine Corps. For example, on page 150 of the hearings, the Chief of Naval Operations testified:

The Marine Corps, a part of the Naval Establishment, is therefore, under the "Naval Command" of the Chief of Naval Operations and he is a part of the

force which the Chief of Operations represents when he sits as a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

This entire testimony of Admiral Sherman was thoroughly contradicted by Secretary Matthews on pages 199 and 200 of the same record, the most pertinent quote being on page 199 where in response to the following question by myself which I addressed to him, and I quote:

And when in the Naval Establishment, it is subordinate to the Chief of Naval Operations

I should explain here, gentlemen, the "it" referred to was the Marine Corps-Secretary Matthews replied:

No, not unless it is specifically assigned to the operating forces of the Navy or unless authority over the Naval Establishment is specifically assigned to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Since the Secretary himself is the head of the Department of the Navy, or as it is sometimes called, the Naval Establishment, there is no question as to the reasoning of the Chief of Naval Operations. He is just wrong on this point.

The Chief of Naval Operations was relying on Public Law 432 in his abortive effort to write himself into a position where he could say he commands the Marine Corps. This was consistent with a letter submitted to the full committee by the Secretary of Defense on April 12 opposing this legislation. I referred to that letter earlier as an astounding document when it advanced the claim that Public Law 432 had subordinated the Marine Corps to the Chief of Naval Operations.

Fortunately Secretary Matthews' testimony repudiated that concept. A complete repudiation of this concept of the law was made by Mr. Arthur Hanson who prepared and presented to the subcommittee a legal brief on the subject which to my mind is very clear. It shows clearly that there was nothing in the law or in any expression of congressional intent which indicated that Public Law 432 had altered the relationship of the Commandant with the Secretary of the Navy to whom he directly reports.

This legal brief was interesting but it was much more interesting to hear the reading of the correspondence asked for by the committee between the Commandant of the Marine Corps, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy at the time 432 was being considered by Congress.

(There was discussion off the record.)

Senator DOUGLAS. This correspondence which I believe is being introduced in the record today completely repudiates and refutes the position taken by Admiral Sherman and the Secretary of Defense in claiming that the C. N. O. exercised naval command over the Marine Corps. Secretary Matthews, in the covering letter which I have just examined, made it clear-and I believe I correctly quoted it and I read from the third paragraph:

The so-called "Naval Command" of the Chief of Naval Operations over the Naval Establishment is exercised only in his capacity as my principal naval executive, and only as necessary to obtain essential coordination of matters which must be coordinated by professional military officers (Navy and Marine Corps).