2. (a) United States Army in World War II, the Army Ground Forces, the Organization of Ground Combat Troops by the Historical Division, Department of the Army.

Page 88, paragraph 2: "The First Joint Training Force, disbanded after the Carib exercise except for the joint staff, was in effect reconstituted as the Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, comprising the First Division and the First Marine Division with supporting units, and was again put under the command of General Smith of the Marine Corps. Unity of command was vested in the Navy.

Page 82, paragraph 2: "The Army is giving whole-hearted, complete and generous support to the amphibious forces, both Atlantic and Pacific. The Third and Ninth Divisions have been turned over to the Navy for tactical control and training. Action is in process to determine and provide essential nondivisional elements.

(b) The Eighty-first Infantry Wildcat Division in World War II by the Eighty-first Wildcat Division Historical Committee.

Page 36, paragraph 4: "Marine Corps instruction under Brig. Gen. Harry K. Pickett, many of them recently back from battles in the Pacific and now on the staff of the Pacific Fleet Amphibious Training Command, taught the methods which had been bringing victory in the Pacific campaign.

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(c) The Deadeyes, the Story of the Ninety-sixth Infantry Division, published by the Infantry Journal Press.

Page 9, paragraph 8: "Immediately the training period veered off on a completely new track. Amphibious warfare is a highly specialized science which must be superimposed on ground training, and from California came a detachment of Marine Corps experts-veterans of Pacific action-to coach the foot soldiers of the Ninety-sixth."

Senator DOUGLAS. I would also like to point out that the Marine Corps has specialized in the close air support of ground troops, otherwise known as tactical aviation. It has done this over the opposition of the Air Force, which threw its emphasis primarily upon strategic bombing behind the lines of enemy combat troops. The pioneer work and the practice of the Marine Corps in this direction has paid off in Korea, where the testimony is abundant that part of the success of the First Marine Division has been due to the fact that they have had an air wing with three groups and that the coordination between the ground forces and air forces has been close. They don't have to wait too long to get an air strike, and the air support can be handled out of divisional headquarters, so that they don't have to go up to Air or Army headquarters. With a greater air component for tactical air, that is, three compared to one, the position of the United States on land has been greatly improved.

I now understand that the Air Force, which had previously slighted the development of tactical aviation, is now taking over some of the principles which the Marine Corps developed. So pioneering by the Marine Corps is again paying dividends to our country.

Mr. Chairman, that is the affirmative case which I want to develop for a strong Marine Corps.

Now the question remains: Why should we do this by legislation? Why should we not let it be done by administrative acts of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whom we greatly respect?

Senator LONG. Before we get into that question, I would like to ask this: Do you believe that you would be able to get the volunteers to expand the Marine Corps to the point you have in mind?

Senator DOUGLAS. I do.

Senator LONG. Do you have any indication to back that up or any evidence to indicate that you could get enough volunteers?

Senator DOUGLAS. I think the Marine Corps makes an appeal to Americans who want to live a life of hardship and danger in the serv

ice of their country and who do not want a life of ease. There are enough Americans, both young Americans and middle-aged Americans, to fill the ranks.

Senator STENNIS. You think you can keep the esprit de corps up to the high level with that many?

Senator DOUGLAS. The Marine Corps expanded from 18,000 in 1939 to I believe 70,000 in 1941 to 486,000 in 1944 and put 6 divisions in the field.

So far as I know, there was no deterioration in quality. It was my privilege to be on Okinawa when we had the Sixth Marine Division, the last of the divisions, on our right; and that Sixth Division was as magnificent a division as any of them. They were the late comers with the exception of one regiment. They were just as good as any other division. Our division was entirely a different division from that which fought on Guadalcanal and the newcomers did splendidly. Senator LONG. The large number of volunteers that you get when you have a world war going on might not be the same number of volunteers as those when you have just a police action or a smaller war going on.

Senator DOUGLAS. I would like to state this: The quality of the Marine Corps does not depend in major part upon the quality of the men as they enter the Marine Corps. I think the average man who enters the Marine Corps is about the same as the average man who enters the other branches of our services, but we do pride ourselves in giving training in conditions of hardship and expecting self-sacrifice, and expecting men to suffer casualties. That makes a tremendous appeal to people. It is the best morale builder that there is. It is far better than providing him with PX's and Red Crosses and USO's, and so forth.

I think what the Marine Corps does to men happens after they come in the Corps.

Senator STENNIS. You think you can extend that over to this large number?

Senator DOUGLAS. We did it in World War II to 486,000 men, and all we are asking this time is four divisions and about 300,000 men, and the possibility of expanding to 400,000 if a more serious emergency should develop.

Senator LONG. Suppose contrary to your expectation you do not get the volunteers that you would expect. Would you prefer that the Marine Corps be kept in limits to which men would volunteer?

Senator DOUGLAS. In this last war we had a sort of shotgun system of volunteering. That is, after December 1942, men were drafted and then were given the choice for a brief period of time of the service they wanted. That was a sort of shotgun merge of the draftee and the Marine Corps, and there were a great many officers in the Corps who thought that the spirit and efficiency of the Corps would go down. I think in the beginning there was a slackening at the training bases. The platoons which came in in the first part of 1943 were not up to the platoons that came in the first part of 1942, but those men who came in somewhat reluctantly in the early part of 1943 went out into the combat units in 1944 and 1945 and did as well as the men who had gone in completely voluntarily in 1941 and 1942.

What I feel very strongly-and I hope you won't think me boasting about this-I think the Marine Corps does something to people after

they come in, and it does this on the basis of holding out a life of hardship and sacrifice and danger. Men do not want ease and safety. They want a life of service, hardships, and danger.

Senator LONG. Something happens to almost any man after he has been in combat the first time.

Senator DOUGLAS. These boys did well the first time.

Senator LONG. There are a lot of them, however, who are better fighting men when they have been in combat than when they go in for the first time.

Senator DOUGLAS. Certainly.

Senator LONG. It does occur to me the Army could reasonably object if you permitted a man who was being drafted for the Army to volunteer for the Marine Corps after the Army had him, on the ground that you might be taking the cream of the crop, the men they need for their noncommissioned officers, in the Marine Corps as pri

vates.

Senator DOUGLAS. You have put your finger on a very important point. I am not authorized to speak for the Marine Corps. I say as a citizen I would be perfectly ready, if necessary, to have the Marine Corps take an average cross section slice of the United States, and not to have any so-called elite at all at the entrance, but to depend upon Marine Corps training to develop these men after they were once in. Senator LONG. If necessary to reach the number you have in mind, you do feel that they should take some of the drafted men if necessary in order to get them?

Senator DOUGLAS. Certainly.

Senator LONG. Of course, the Army also would like to have the right, I am sure, to have themselves an elite corps within the Army. I recall that overseas I had occasion to serve with the Special Service Forces and I do think those were the most efficient troops I have ever served with. I have never served with the Marine Corps, I am frank to say, but the spirit of those troops and the efficiency of them was higher than any group I observed myself actually in combat.

You would not deny the Army the right to have itself an elite corps within the Army if it wanted to?

Senator DOUGLAS. As a matter of fact, what I term "elite" is a somewhat snobbish and supercilious term anyway. I don't want to discuss the Marine Corps as an elite corps. I say personally I would guarantee, even if we took an average cross section of the American peopleand we are not so far from taking it now-that the Marine Corps training will produce men worthy of those who have served in the Marine Corps in the past.

Senator STENNIS. Is that opinion shared by others in the Marine Corps that you deal with?

Senator DOUGLAS. I am not now a member of the Corps. They will have to speak for themselves.

Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Douglas, during the war did the draft boards or whoever makes the assignment of men to the branches of the service did they assign any to the Marine Corps or were they all either volunteers directly or came into the Marine Corps after being given a choice?

Senator DOUGLAS. They were volunteers up until about December 1942, although even there many of them were just a jump or two ahead of the draft board.

After December 1942 and until I went overseas in May 1943, the only period of which I can speak-during that period men would be summoned by the draft boards and given a short period of time to enlist in the Marine Corps and the Navy before they were sent into the Army. I may say I have no desire to have that condition continue. It may be that the Commandant of the Marine Corps would, but so far as I am concerned, I would be willing to take my chances on the average American entering the Marine Corps and then depend on the training to make something more of him afterward.

Senator KEFAUVER. Before you get to the next subject, we did have this agreement about a full committee meeting at 11:15; so we will have to recess the hearing of the subcommittee until 2 o'clock this afternoon.

(Whereupon, at 11: 15 a. m. the subcommittee recessed, to reconvene at 2 p. m.)

AFTERNOON SESSION

Present: Senators Kefauver, Stennis, Long, and Saltonstall.

Senator STENNIS (presiding). I have been requested by Senator Kefauver that we proceed with these hearings and, as I understand, by consent of Senator Douglas, we now call Gen. Thomas Holcomb. Have a seat, sir. We are glad to have you here, General.

Senator KEFAUVER (presiding). As our first witness, we have Gen. Thomas Holcomb of the United States Marine Corps, former Commandant of the Marines.

General Holcomb, when were you Commandant of the Marines?

STATEMENT OF GEN. THOMAS HOLCOMB, UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS (Retired)

General HOLCOMB. I was the Commandant of the Marine Corps. from December 1, 1936, until December 31, 1943.

Senator KEFAUVER. And you have been retired since 1943?
General HOLCOMB. I was retired then.

Senator KEFAUVER. All right, General Holcomb; do you have a statement which you wish to make?

General HOLCOMB. I have not prepared any statement, Mr. Chairman. I understood that the committee wanted to know something about the relation between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Chief of Staff of the Army; in other words, to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while I was Commandant. Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, sir. If you would tell us about that, it would be very helpful.

General HOLCOMB. In the very easy-going and happy days after I was appointed until World War II started, relations, of course, were rather informal, and very friendly.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps has always been very close to the Chief of Naval Operations. I was in and out of his office all the time.

Senator KEFAUVER. Who was the Chief of Naval Operations?

General HOLCOMB. Admiral Standley, for a month after I was Commandant; and a very old and dear friend of mine, Admiral Leahy, and then a very close friend, Admiral Stark, and then Admiral King, whom I have known since we were both youngsters.

There was very little formal intercourse between the Chief of Staff of the Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps. We met constantly, often at social functions, and sometimes officially, but the first time that I ever participated in really formal discussions involving them all was shortly after Pearl Harbor, when Mr. Churchill came to Washington, accompanied by his staff, the First Sea Lord, and the other members of his staff.

When conferences were held, during which the invasion of Africa was planned, I think, at Admiral Stark's instigation, I was called in on these conferences and sat as a member of that group until the departure of Mr. Churchill; that is, from about early December until sometime after Christmas.

Then, a formal organization occurred in which I was not included. However, because of my intercourse with Admiral Stark, I was in on nearly all of the discussions that took place.

Then, there was a conference that met regularly at the White House. I cannot remember what it was called, but the Secretary of the Navy, the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the State, the Secretary of the Treasury participated, and Harry Hopkins.

Senator KEFAUVER. Would that be the National Security Council? General HOLCOMB. It might have been that; and the Chief of Staff and the Chief of Naval Operations. Admiral Stark got me in on that, and I was in there for a while.

Now, that was about all the formal relations that I had with respect to discussions of the military situation on that level, until the summer of 1943, when an incident occurred, which bears on the general subject.

I was about to become 64, which is the retiring age; but, being a lieutenant general, I was not subject to the retirement law.

At that time officers of the Navy and the Marine Corps above the rank of major general and rear admiral did not retire at 65.

Well, I had been commandant for 7 years, and I had never permitted any Marine officer above 64 to remain on active duty; so, to be consistent, I had to apply for retirement, and I thought it was the right thing to do. So, I did apply for retirement, and recommended the appointment of General Vandegrift as my successor.

Shortly after this occurred, I was dining at the White House. It was July 1943, and at a general dinner given for General Giroux. After dinner Admiral Leahy came to me the President always sat on the sofa in the room next to the dining room, and the rest of the people wandered around-Admiral Leahy said that the President wanted to see me.

So, I went in there, sat down beside him, and he discussed my retirement, and said that he would appoint General Vandegrift, and would approve reluctantly my retirement, but that I must stay on duty until July 1; that there was not anything in this 64 idea business, as he put it.

I would like to explain that the President always, in conversation with me, associated himself with the Marine Corps. When he was Assistant Secretary he had specific charge of the Marine Corps and always referred to the association as "we marines." So he said, "You know, the first thing you know we are going to be left out of things. We are not represented on the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

I said, "No, sir."