400,000 when I retired, and more than that afterward, without losing its individual characteristics. It was the same Marine Corps. It was not different in any respect. I think my friend, Senator Douglas, will tell you that is true.

Senator SALTONSTALL. General, General Marshall and General Bradley and others came before us and said that a force of 3,462,205 men, which they planned to build up to, was a rounded-out force.

Now, that rounded-out force consisted of 1,416,000 in the Army, 810,000 in the Navy, 175,205 in the Marine Corps, and 1,061,000 in the Air Force. Now, that is their theory of a rounded-out force as of June 30, 1952.

On the theory, on the practice, of what you say, and your opinion as a former commandant of the Marine Corps, and as an expert in the armed services in the defense of our country, where would you change that proportion? Would you cut down the Army and build up the Marine Corps or would you cut down the Air Force or the Navy to build up the Marine Corps, or what change would you make in that figure of the total?

General HOLCOMB. Well, Senator, I hesitate

Senator SALTONSTALL. We want to get all the information we can. General HOLCOMB. I hesitate to express an opinion on a matter which General Marshall has ruled on because he knows

Senator SALTONSTALL. What are you testifying to us now is as an individual and as a former commandant, who believes that the Marine Corps should be built up, and I am not saying I do not, but what I want to do is to get the best record I can.

You have expressed it that it is the duty to build up the Marine Corps.

General HOLCOMB. Now, here you have a Navy of 810,000, a Marine Corps of 175,000. That looks to me as if the strength of the Marine Corps was arrived at by dividing the Navy strength by 5, which is the old rule of thumb we had. We found out by long experience that that usually worked out quite well.

Well, I do not know anything about what that figure should be. That is something for the Navy to decide. But with the Marine Corps at present--who can tell me what it is? Is it about 180,000? I am informed it is 196,000 as of today. Then, General Marshall would cut it 21,000.

Senator SALTONSTALL. Those are the figures that have been given to the committee.

Mr. CHAMBERS. That is correct, sir. The Marine Corps at the present time is approximately 195,000. It is supposed to go to 203,000 by the end of the fiscal year, and during fiscal year 1952, decreased to 175,000, plus a few marines.

General HOLCOMв. Well, I do not hesitate to say I do not think that is a patriotic way to proceed because the Marine Corps can expand over its present strength and give $106 back for every dollar this Congress gives them.

Senator SALTONSTALL. In other words, then, General, you believe, we will say, that the Marine Corps should be built up even if the Army figures should be brought down, so to speak?

General HOLCOMB. I have no opinion on or knowledge of what the Army figures should be. I simply say that if this country is to expand its Armed Services, the Marine Corps should increase in the face of

war, and not be cut down, and I defy any reasonable person to deny that.

Senator KEFAUVER. Are there other questions, Senator Saltonstall? Senator SALTONSTALL. No other questions.

Senator KEFAUVER. What do you think about this 400,000 provision on page 2 of the bill, "shall be maintained at not more than 400,000"?

General HOLCOMB. I hold no brief for any number, Senator.

Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Douglas, do you want to ask General Holcomb any questions?

Senator DOUGLAS. I would merely like to ask General Holcomb this question: I wonder if the general would express his opinion as to whether it might have been better if the Commandant of the Marine Corps had been consulted by the Joint Chiefs of Staff prior to and immediately following Korea?

General HOLCOMB. With what?

Senator DOUGLAS. Whether he should have been consulted about— General HOLCOMB. About the operation?

Senator DOUGLAS (continuing). About the operations in Korea and the Inchon landings.

General HOLCOMB. Well, I think the forces in the field did consult the Marine Corps. I know that General Shepherd, who commands the Fleet Marine Force, was out there a number of times, and was in consultation and, I think, with General Walker.

Senator DOUGLAS. Consulted in the field, but was the Marine Corps consulted at home by the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General HOLCOMB. That I do not know, sir.

Senator KEFAUVER. During the 7 years you were Commandant of the Marine Corps, how many joint meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did you attend?

General HOLCOMB. Oh, as I say, only——

Senator KEFAUVER. I mean formal meetings.

General HOLCOMB. No, I never attended any formal meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Senator KEFAUVER. The meetings you had were social meetings or occasional meetings?

General HOLCOMB. Informal meetings, except those

Senator KEFAUVER. But you were never called in formally before the Joint Chiefs, and said, "Now, Mr. Commandant, what is your opinion?"

General HOLCOMB. Actually, as I said, I attended the meetings of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and other officers who were considering the invasion of Africa after Mr. Churchill's arrival here.

Senator KEFAUVER. That was not a Joint Chiefs' meeting; that

was

General HOLCOMB. That was the origin of the Joint Chiefs; that was the origin of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, but that was meeting with the British. General HOLCOMB. I never attended any meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff after they were organized.

Senator SALTONSTALL. You made your requests, you gave your advice, gave your opinions, through the Chief of Naval Operations of the Navy?

General HOLCOMB. Through the Chief of Naval Operations, and direct to the Secretary of the Navy. You see, the Commandant of the Marine Corps has direct access to the Secretary of Navy always, and I went to the Secretary of the Navy about anything I chose to, any matter.

Senator KEFAUVER. Do you agree with Senator Douglas that the Marine Corps would be, I will not say superior, but would have more fire power for its size even if it just took the average run of the American lad who went into the service, without relying largely upon volunteers?

General HOLCOMB. Well, Senator, the Marine Corps always wanted to keep away from the draft. They did in the other World War, and actually they did in World War I when the draft was imposed on them; but the war ended just before they got any people.

Very early in this war it became obvious that we must go along with the draft and it was right that we should, there is no doubt about that. The Navy did not want to go into it and we did not because we got everybody we needed without it. However, it was quite right that we should, but they still kept that provision, that a young man called up before any draft board, if the Navy or the Marine Corps had a call in which that board was filling, the people put in the Navy or the Marine Corps were those who asked for it, and I believe it is an actual fact that while I was Commandant-I am sure for the rest of the war— that nobody was put in the Marine Corps who did not want to go into it, and so it worked out very much the same way; and, after all, that is the democratic process it seems to me.

Senator KEFAUVER. Do you think the fact that chaps got into the Marine Corps because they wanted to go into it is responsible or is it the spirit of the marines, perhaps, their more strenuous training-what is it that makes the Marines as a unit maybe a little more powerful? General HOLCOMB. Different; let us say different.

Senator KEFAUVER. Different.

General HOLCOMB. Well, I have thought about that a great deal. It is true they are different. Something happens to them, there is no doubt about it. I think it happens largely at our recruit training depots.

We have standardized recruit training in the Marine Corps, just two stations that we coordinated carefully, and it is the most careful work we do.

The Navy had a number of stations, and the Army used to have recruit training in a division. I do not know what they do now, but in all events, all our people went through either Parris Island or San Diego, and there is no doubt about it, something happened to them, something always happens to them, in those places, and they come out quite different from anything they were before.

You may say that is true of the men going in the Army and the Navy. It is doubtless true, but I do not think the change is as radical, and I do not know they are as thoroughly indoctrinated and as thoroughly sold on their services as those who go through Parris Island and San Diego.

Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Stennis, do you have any questions? Senator STENNIS. It has been covered, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, may I ask one more question off the record?

(Discussion off the record.)

Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Douglas?

Senator DOUGLAS. No questions.

Senator KEFAUVER. Colonel Chambers, do you have some questions? Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes.

General Holcomb, prior to 1941 was there actually in existence an organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General HOLCOMB. No.

Mr. CHAMBERS. That came into being after this combined meeting of the British and Americans?

General HOLCOMB. Yes.

Mr. CHAMBERS. What would you set as the approximate time that we began to have a formal Chiefs of Staff?

General HOLCOMB. Well, I think it occurred-and this is subject to correction-shortly after the meetings that I have been telling you about when Mr. Churchill came over. I think it occurred after that. You know, it was very funny, things happen to you and you do not know exactly what has happened; but after those meetings we all had lots and lots of mimeographed sheets telling all about this African invasion and all sorts of things; and I was guarding my copies very carefully, and an officer came around and said, "We are taking all these in and issuing a new lot," and that was my last connection with the Chiefs of Staff. They took in everything and I never heard anything more about it.

Probably the others dropped out at the same time, I do not know; but these things happen and you do not know just when they happen or why, or that they actually did happen.

Mr. Chambers. Then as Commandant of the Marine Corps you were not called in, for instance, to advise on or discuss ways and means of any of the amphibious operations, either in the Pacific or

General HOLCOMB. Oh, yes; with the Chief of Naval Operations. Mr. CHAMBERS. Yes; but with the Joint Chiefs of Staff?

General HOLCOMB. No. After all, the Chief of Naval Operations worked mostly at his own desk and in his own office, and these meetings, the business he transacted with the others, I imagine was a few hours a week.

Mr. CHAMBERS. If there had been formal meetings, General Holcomb, at which the question came up of the matter of deployment of marine divisions, you would not, excepting through the Chief of Naval Operations, have had a chance to advise the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as an entity on it?

General HOLCOMB. No.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Well, now, General, do you feel that the Commandant of the Marine Corps has a continuing interest in such matters, for instance, as manpower, training of troops, budget, and so on, as they pertain to our national military establishment as a whole?

General HOLCOMB. I do.

Mr. CHAMBERS. Do you think that when these matters were being resolved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, that the Commandant should be present in order to at least represent the Marine Corps' position on these matters?

General HOLCOMB. Yes; and to make such contributions as he could with his judgment.

Mr. CHAMBERS. I have no further questions.

Senator KEFAUVER. All right. Thank you very much, General Holcomb. We appreciate your appearance here and your counsel.

Senator STENNIS. It was very helpful and I want to congratulate you on your promotion to being a farmer.

General HOLCOMB. Thank you, Senator. It is a grand occupation. Senator KEFAUVER. All right, Senator Douglas.

STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL H. DOUGLAS Resumed

Senator DOUGLAS. Mr. Chairman, I would like to begin this afternoon by making a comment about the extraordinary letter which was sent over here by General Marshall yesterday afternoon.

Senator KEFAUVER. Has that letter been put in the record?

Senator STENNIS. I think so.

Senator DOUGLAS. I haev not had a chance to analyze it in some detail, but I want to make certain comments about the statements on page 1 of the letter, and then later this afternoon I am going to make some comments about the position of the Marine Corps as a separate military service.

In the third paragraph of General Marshall's letter he states that he is opposed to this measure because the strength of the Marine Corps should be left flexible in order that its strength may be governed by the needs of naval and related operations.

Thus in the third paragraph what he discusses is the need for flexibility. In the fourth paragraph, however, and in the fifth paragraph, General Marshall says that what we should have is a continuation of the previous practice of the strength of the Marine Corps being tied in a fixed percentage, namely, 20 percent to the strength of the Navy, so that, on the one hand, he says the strength should be flexible and then, on the other hand, he says that the strength should be an inflexible percentage of naval strength.

There is contradiction between those two paragraphs. I would like to comment that while in the beginning the Marine Corps may have been tied to the Navy in the days of sailing ships as marksmen in the masts and as members of boarding parties and as naval police, as a distinguished leader of our Government once stated, therefore, perhaps the size of the Marine Corps then bore a more or less fixed relationship to the size of the Navy. The amphibious operations of the Marine Corps have, however, assumed a larger and larger part and the crocodile has come up on land, so to speak, as well as in the water, and operates to a larger and larger degree independently of the Navy and that the idea that the strength of the Marine Corps should be tied to the strength of the Navy is therefore itself antiquated and is not applicable to the present situation.

One might consider a percentage of the total Armed Forces, that is debatable, but certainly not a percentage of the Navy. Now, that is the first comment I want to make on this ratio.

Senator KEFAUVER. Senator Douglas, have you stated-and if not, I wish you would-how many men the criteria set forth in this bill would require?

Senator DOUGLAS. Well, the four divisions would require approximately 300,000 men; perhaps a few thousand over 300,000-4 divisions. Senator KEFAUVER. That is four full-strength divisions?

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