Senator DOUGLAS. It says "Naval Establishment." Senator DOUGLAS. It includes the Navy as a whole. The Marine Corps, and in time of war when the President so directs, the Coast Guard are parts of the Naval Establishment. This whole section of 432, which General Marshall quotes to indicate the subordinate position of the Marine Corps, really bears out its coordinate position; and I may say that if you go all through 432 you find no reference, I think, to the Marine Corps, except in that first paragraph; possibly a minor reference later. I have made a hasty study of the legislative history of this act, and I see no evidence that Congress ever thought that it was putting the Marine Corps under the Chief of Naval Operations and subordinate to the Chief of Naval Operations. I think this is a tortured interpretation of the law and I am startled at General Marshall's citing of General Orders 5 and 9 because after a hasty examination I find that those general orders were not issued after this law was passed, but before this law was passed and, therefore, cannot derive any authority from the act. I may say that I have been handicapped, because the letter did not arrive until late yesterday, so these remarks of mine are on points which immediately come to my own mind, without the benefit of the time necessary to study the issue in detail, and I would like the privilege, if I may, later of making a more detailed examination of this extraordinary letter. Senator KEFAUVER. Yes, we will be glad to have any further analysis or discussion of it that you wish to make. In the National Security Act of 1947, in section 206 (a) the term "Department of the Navy" is used, and in Public Law 432 of the Eightieth Congress, section 1 (a) the term "Naval Establishment" is used. Do you know whether in practice or definition they have been declared and considered to be the same terms, that is, as covering the same thing, the words "Naval Establishment" and the words "Department of the Navy"? Senator DOUGLAS. Well, I am not an expert on that. Senator SALTONSTALL. Mr. Chairman, I think, although I hesitate to answer that, that question has come up, and I think that the distinction is that it is the distinction between the headquarters of the Navy in Washington and the Naval Establishment throughout the world. I am not quite sure of that and which way it is. I am not quite sure, but I think that is the basis. Mr. CHAMBERS. Mr. Chairman, that looks like it is probably correct. Senator KEFAUVER. That is probably correct? Mr. CHAMBERS. That is correct, sir. The Department of the Navy and the Naval Establishment are literally synonymous. The Naval Establishment means the operating forces of the Navy, and logistical support. There are a great many laws that have spelled that out, and there have been decisions. Senator SALTONSTALL. That is why the two words were not used interchangeably, because of the basis of other acts and the decisions over the years. Mr. CHAMBERS. That is correct, sir. Senator KEFAUVER. In subsection 1 (b) of 432 we find the term "Navy Department" means the executive part of the establishment at the seat of the government. That would seem to refer to the same thing as the Department of the Navy. All right, Senator Douglas. Senator DOUGLAS. Well, Mr. Chairman, when we adjourned this morning I raised the question as to why we should fix the strength of the Marine Corps by legislation rather than entrust the issue to the Department of Defense, with the advice of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I now want to make what I believe is a truthful statement, but I do not want it to be misunderstood. I believe the Army General Staff is composed of sincere men. I happen to have deep respect and admiration for General Bradley, General Eisenhower, and General Marshall. This is a deep fundamental and sincere feeling. They are all capable, highly patriotic and, I believe, noble men. In spite of all that, I want to make this statement, and I think it is an accurate historical statement, and is true of present as well as past tendencies. I make it with the full knowledge of its meaning, namely, that the Army General Staff, as a whole, does not want a strong fighting Marine Corps, and the Navy Department is not an adequate protector or representative of the Marine Corps. I would like to back up that statement from past history, and in the present situation. I don't want to rake up the past too much, but you will remember that in 1917-18 the Army was opposed to the Marine Corps fighting as a combat unit in France, and was successful in holding down the representation of the Marine Corps as a combat unit to regiments, as I remember it, and it prevented a good deal of Marine artillery getting overseas. You will remember that in 1930-31 the then Chief of the General Staff of the Army attempted to abolish the Marine Corps outright. Then came World War II, during which I had thought, and I believe the public believed, that the Marine Corps and the Marines had conducted themselves with credit; and after World War II there came an extraordinary series of papers known as the "1478" papers, and I have excerpts from those papers which I am going to circulate, and ask to have placed in the record, and ask to have carefully studied. Senator KEFAUVER. This document will be placed in the record, entitled "The Threat to the Marine Corps." (The document referred to follows:) THE THREAT TO THE MARINE CORPS (Presented to the subcommittee on S. 677, Committee on the Armed Services, U. S. Senate, April 13, 1951, by Senator Paul H. Douglas) From House Report No. 961 on H. R. 4214, Eightieth Congress, first session, on the National Security Act of 1947, submitted by Congressman Hoffman, July 16, 1947, pages 12-14. MARINE CORPS Examination of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 1,478 papers convinced the committee that a specific statement of Marine Corps functions was imperative if the Marine Corps was to be protected from being eliminated as an effective combat element, which, according to the testimony of Fleet Admiral Nimitz, was the intention of the Army. The hearings had not progressed far before it became evident that, not only in the Marine Corps but throughout the country, there was a fear that an effort had been made and was being made not only to reduce the size and limit the functions of the Marine Corps but a possibility that it might be reduced to the status of a police force. The existence of any justifiable basis for such a fear was denied by some witnesses who held the highest ranks. That there was justifiable ground for this apprehension is apparent if one reads the memorandum by the Chief of Staff, United States Army (General Eisenhower), under date of May 16, 1946, and the reply of Admiral Nimitz (hearings, National Security Act of 1947, p. 640). In the memorandum forwarded by General Eisenhower, then Chief of Staff, United States Army, among other things we find this: "The conduct of land warfare is a responsibility of the Army. Operationally, the Navy does not belong on the land; it belongs on the sea. It should have only technical and administrative functions on land in connection with its headquarters, bases, or other naval installations. The emergency development of the marine forces during this war should not be viewed as assigning to the Navy a normal function of land warfare, fundamentally the primary role of the Army. There is a real need or one service to be charged with the responsibility for initially bridging the gap between the sailor on the ship and the soldier on land. This seems to me properly a function of the Marine Corps. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should give serious consideration to such a concept. The need of a force within the fleet to provide small readily available and lightly armed units to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries is recognized. These functions, together with that of interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments, comprise the fundamental role of the Marine Corps. When naval forces are involved in operations requiring land forces of combined arms, the task becomes a joint land-sea and usually Air Force mission. Once marine units attain such a size as to require the combining of arms to accomplish their missions, they are assuming and duplicating the functions of the Army and we have in effect two land armies. I, therefore, recommend that the above concept be accepted as stating the role of the Marine Corps and that marine units not exceed the regiment in size, and that the size of the Marine Corps be made consistent with the foregoing principles." To that view, Admiral Nimitz, under date of March 30, 1946, replied: "The basic and major issues considered in J. S. C. 1478/10 and J. C. S. 1478/11 comprise a proposal on the part of the Army (a) to eliminate the Marine Corps as an effective combat element, reducing it to the status of a naval police unit with possible certain ancillary service functions in respect to amphibious operations, and (b) to abolish an essential component of naval aviation which operates from coastal and island shore bases. To those ends these papers propose to discard agreements on these matters which have been arrived at between the Army and the Navy from time to time over a period of more than 20 years, and which have resulted in a responsibility for functions proven highly effective in World War II. "In matters so vital both to the Marine Corps and to naval aviation, I consider it appropriate and desirable that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have the benefit of the views of General Vandegrift, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, and of Vice Admiral Radford, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Air. Their comments are attached as enclosures A and B, respectively. "I agree with the Chief of Staff, United States Army, that further exchange of papers on the subject of the missions of the land, naval, and air forces will serve no useful purpose. It is further apparent that the question is part of the larger one of the merger of the War and Navy Departments, which proposal was, at the Army's insistence, referred to the President and which is now before the Congress. Thus, the matter now under consideration has already reached levels higher than the Joint Chiefs of Staff." General Spaatz, commanding general, Army Air Forces, wrote: "I recommend therefore that the size of the Marine Corps be limited to small, readily available and lightly armed units, no larger than a regiment, to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries and to provide interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments." General Eisenhower, Chief of Staff, United States Army, also wrote: "The following is proposed for consideration: * ** * "(1) That the Marine Corps is maintained solely as an adjunct of the fleet and participates only in minor shore combat operations in which the Navy alone is interested. "(2) That it be recognized that the land aspect of major amphibious operations in the future will be undertaken by the Army and consequently the marine forces will not be appreciably expanded in time of war. "(3) That it be agreed that the Navy will not develop a land Army or a socalled amphibious army; marine units to be limited in size to the equivalent of the regiment, and the total size of the Marine Corps therefore limited to some 50,000 or 60,000 men." Report by Army members of Joint Staff planners (proposal): "Provide landing parties with the fleet to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries in operations short of war, and in time of war to conduct raids and small-scale amphibious demonstrations. Perform necessary functions aboard ship, at naval installations, and in the ship-to-shore phase of amphibious operations." Neither the original bill nor S. 758 contains positive protection for the marines. H. R. 4214 seeks to give the needed protection. Senator DOUGLAS. I have not had access to these papers and have not sought access to the papers because I understood they had been given very high classification and stamped "Top secret" and sealed them off from public inspection. But the House Committee on Executive Expenditures of the Eightieth Congress got hold of them and published them in its report, and you will find them on pages 12 to 14 of their report, so they are no longer classified, and I think it is very important to take some of these. At the time of these papers General Eisenhower was Chief of Staff, and Admiral Nimitz was Chief of Naval Operations; General Spaatz was commanding general of the Army Air Forces, and I would like to take the middle of the first paragraph of General Eisenhower's statement in one of those "1478 papers" as follows. Let me read the whole statement: The conduct of land warfare is a responsibility of the Army. Operationally, the Navy does not belong on the land; it belongs on the sea. It should have only technical and administrative functions on land in connection with its headquarters, bases, or other naval installations. The emergency development of the marine forces during this war should not be viewed as assigning to the Navy a normal function of land warfare, fundamentally the primary role of the Army. There is a real need for one service to be charged with the responsibility for intially bridging the gap between the sailor on the ship and the soldier on land. This seems to me properly a function of the Marine Corps. I believe the Joint Chiefs of Staff should give serious consideration to such a concept. The need of a force within the fleet to provide small readily available and lightly armed units to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries is recognized. These functions, together with that of interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments, comprise the fundamental role of the Marine Corps. When naval forces are involved in operations requiring land forces of combined arms, the task becomes a joint land-sea, and usually Air Force, mission. Once marine units attain such a size as to require the combining of arms to accomplish their missions, they are assuming and duplicating the functions of the Army and we have in effect two land armies. I therefore recommend that the above concept be accepted as stating the role of the Marine Corps and that marine units not exceed the regiment in size, and that the size of the Marine Corps be made consistent with the foregoing principles. Now, Admiral Nimitz took violent exception to that proposal, and said that there would have to be an agreement reached on a higher level. General Spaatz made a more concise but substantially similar recommendation to that of General Eisenhower when he said: I recommend, therefore, that the size of the Marine Corps be limited to small, readily available, and lightly armed units, no larger than a regiment, to protect the United States interests ashore in foreign countries and to provide interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments. In another of these "1478 papers," General Eisenhower also wrote as follows: The following is proposed for consideration: "(1) That the Marine Corps is maintained solely as an adjunct of the fleet and participates only in minor shore combat operations in which the Navy alone is interested. “(2) That it be recognized that the land aspect of major amphibious operations in the future will be undertaken by the Army and consequently the marine forces will not be appreciably expanded in time of war. "(3) That it be agreed that the Navy will not develop a land army or a socalled amphibious army; marine units to be limited in size to the equivalent of the regiment, and the total size of the Marine Corps therefore limited to some 50,000 or 60,000 men." As another part of these papers there was a proposal, apparently by the Joint Staff or the Deputy Chiefs, that the Marine Corps should, and I quote: Provide landing parties with the fleet to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries in operations short of war, and in time of war to conduct raids and small-scale amphibious demonstrations. Now, here is definite proof that the purpose of the Army and the Air Force at that time was to take away the combat functions of the Marine Corps, to restrict the Marine Corps to guard duty, to police duty, plus the convoying of troops to shore, and the organization of shore parties; to run the small boats and amphibian tractors to get the men to shore, and once there, set up working parties, not combat parties, but working parties, to move supplies and personnel into the Army, which was to do all the fighting. Their opinion was that the Marine Corps should not be above fifty to sixty thousand men; that there should be no expansion in time of war; that it should never fight again as a division, no unit larger than a regiment. Now, that was the purpose of the "1478 papers," and I think that tipped their hand as to what they wanted to do. Senator KEFAUVER. What happened to these papers? Senator DOUGLAS. I would suggest, if I may, that this committee. subpena these papers. Senator KEFAUVER. We do not want the papers. We want to know what action was taken. Senator DOUGLAS. All right. Now, you have the Unification Act of 1947 which turned down the proposal made by the Army General Staff, by assigning functions to the Marine Corps, by assigning combat functions, to the Marine Corps, and again I invite your attention to 206 (g) which states: The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air componentsthe Air Force was trying to take away the aviation from the Marine Corps at the same time together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. It was also to develop amphibious training. Then, finally, there is the provision: And shall perform such other duties as the President may direct |