Now, as a matter of record that has been something that fluctuated. We have been over, and we have been under. That has been the rule of thumb which has been followed.

Senator KEFAUVER. Now, will you read Senator Ives' statement, please.

Mr. CHAMBERS. We have a letter dated April 12, 1951, addressed to the subcommittee, Hon. Estes Kefauver, chairman:

MY DEAR SENATOR KEFAUVER: As a cosponsor of S. 677, a bill to fix the personnel strength of the Marine Corps and to make the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, it was my intention to appear before your subcommittee this morning to present my statement in support of this legislation. Circumstances have arisen, however, that will make it impossible for me to appear at the hearing. I would, therefore, appreciate it very much if you would have read for the record the following statement:

"It is my understanding that the presentation of detailed testimony with respect to this bill is in the hands of witnesses better qualified to speak than I, and, accordingly, I merely wish to add my voice to theirs in urging favorable consideration of this legislation, and the following comments will be of a general nature:

"There is no question in my mind that for a great many years in the future this country must have mobilized troops to function as a part of the United Nations police force. These troops will put down aggression whenever it occurs throughout the world. I have always viewed the Marine Corps as a force in being to be utilized for such actions. There is no better group of fighting men anywhere in the world than the Marine Corps. If it is maintained at a proper size it will provide a force which will act as a deterrent to small aggressors and contain major aggressions until our Army can organize for the major land effort which will be necessitated by large-scale aggression.

"This concept is particularly important, because if we enter a large-scale war the existing Army organizations must form the nucleus for the greatly expanded Army that would be needed. If this nucleus is engaged in all-out military effort, such as in Korea today, it would be unable to quickly expand to the larger strength required by the all-out effort. The only other solution would be to permit the United States Army to have two organizations—(1) the ready forces in being, and (2) sufficient troops in addition to permit the furnishing of the trained personnel around which the many additional divisions would be built. This solution is not only fraught with administrative difficulties, but would be impossible to accomplish for reasons of economy, morale, and efficiency.

"It is my understanding that the four marine divisions and air wings which are recommended by this bill can be supported by approximately 300,000 marines. From the cost standpoint this is a most compelling argument. I have noted in a recent recruiting advertisement for the United States Army in Collier's magazine the statement that in back of every man with a gun are 25 others in the Army. I recognize that this is probably an overstatement and is designed to encourage individuals to volunteer for enlistment in the Army. On the other hand, I have heard of other creditable statements which indicate that there are approximately five men in the Army to each man in a combatant organization.

"If the Marine Corps is organized on the basis provided by this bill, it would require only approximately three men in order to have two in a combatant organization. I am well aware of the fact that the Marine Corps relies on the Navy for its medical support, its supplies and other housekeeping functions. Even when these factors are added together, it is still clear that the Marine Corps operates much more economically. Furthermore, within the size allowed it, it is by far the more efficient fighting force.

"Therefore, I cannot see why there should be any disagreement with the thesis that the United States ready force should be a combatant Marine Corps of appropriate size. In common with the other sponsors of this legislation I believe that four divisions and four air wings, together with supporting ground forces, should be adequate for the job. I also believe that if we are to maintain the tremendous esprit of the Marine Corps, we cannot allow it to become too large. Accordingly, I think it should not exceed 400,000 officers and men, as prescribed in the legislation, as amended.

"It is my earnest recommendation that the subcommittee report this legislation favorably. I intend to support it as vigorously as possible on the floor." Sincerely yours,

IRVING M. IVES.

Senator STENNIS. Senator Douglas, are you ready to proceed? Senator DOUGLAS. Yes. Before doing so, however, may I have inserted in the record my press statement of April 6? Senator STENNIS. It will be inserted at this point.

STATEMENT BY SENATOR PAUL H. DOUGLAS, OF ILLINOIS, IN BEHALF OF S. 677

On January 25, 1951, in conjunction with 43 other Senators, I introduced a bill, S. 677, which was designed to provide (1) the existence of a United States Marine Corps of not less than four combatant divisions, four air wings along with the supporting forces, and, by an amendment dated March 21, 1951, a ceiling of 400,000 men on the over-all strength of the Marine Corps, and (2) that the membership of the Joint Chiefs of Staff be expanded to include the Commandant of the United States Marine Corps.

The text of this bill, as amended, is as follows:

"Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the first sentence of section 206 (c) of the National Security Act of 1947 is hereby amended to read as follows: "The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall include four full-strength combat divisions, four full-strength air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein, and the personnel strength of the Regular Marine Corps shall be maintained at not Inore than four hundred thousand.'

"SEC. 2. The Commandant of the Marine Corps shall be a permanent member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

The Members of the Senate who joined in introducing the bill are listed below. Many others have assured me of their support but for varying reasons did not want to join in its introduction: Mr. Douglas, Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Smathers, Mr. Case, Mr. Fulbright, Mr. Gillette, Mr. George, Mr. Johnson of Colorado, Mr. Robertson, Mr. Ferguson, Mr. Tobey, Mr. Ecton, Mr. Neely, Mr. Butler of Nebraska, Mr. Duff, Mr. Sparkman, Mr. Schoeppel, Mr. Lehman, Mr. Johnston of South Carolina, Mr. Ives, Mr. Murray, Mr. Chavez, Mr. Brewster, Mr. Morse, Mr. Hendrickson, Mr. Nixon, Mr. Thye, Mr. Aiken, Mr. Capehart, Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Kefauver, Mr. Watkins, Mr. Hickenlooper, Mr. Wiley, Mr. Flanders, Mr. Dirksen, Mr. Mundt, Mr. McCarran, Mr. Smith of New Jersey, Mr. Bricker, Mr. Maybank, Mr. Young, Mr. Magnuson, and Mr. Smith of North Carolina.

Congressman Mansfield, of Montana, and some 65 other Congressmen have introduced similar bills in the House of Representatives. I have been assured by my colleague, the distinguished junior Senator from Georgia, Mr. Russell, who is chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, that hearings will be started before his committee within the next few days. For this reason I am placing this detailed statement into the record so that each Member of the Senate can be aware of the facts which have moved us to introduce this legislation and some of the arguments in its behalf.

1. A most pertinent question has been asked by several people as to why it is necessary to enact legislation in a field which is usually left to administrative decision. The answer is not simple. It stems from a long record which is known to some of us but needs to be thoroughly understood by all of us. This is particularly true since basically it is a question of the adequacy of our national security and not just an effort to protect the Marine Corps. Events over the years show clearly that, notwithstanding the clear intent of Congress, this Nation have at its disposal an adequate combatant Marine Corps; there are nevertheless forces at work within the executive department which have attempted, with considerable success, to destroy the combat effectiveness of the Marine Corps. It would be excellent if this issue could be left to administrative action, but both the past and present experience has proven that this is inadequate if we are to carry out the intent of Congress insofar as the Marine Corps is concerned.

The reasons for this situation are obvious to all. While the Joint Chiefs of Staff are men of fine character and are sincere patriots, the majority of them are fundamentally Army-minded and are definitely opposed to the Marine Corps as a combatant organization. Notwithstanding their many expressions of good

will toward the Marine Corps they have nevertheless tried to destroy its capability to function on any appreciable scale in combat.

Of the three members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, one is General Collins, who is, of course, the direct representative of the Army and Chief of their General Staff. Of necessity he represents the Army point of view. A second member of the Joint Chiefs is General Vandenberg who, while now Chief of Staff of the AirForce was trained in the United States Army and naturally would tend to have the Army point of view on this particular problem. Moreover, he has a further motivation for his beliefs because of the firm conviction of the Air Force that all air power should be under one service and, therefore, he is as much opposed to Marine Corps possessing its own tactical air units as the Army is to the Marine Corps possessing appreciable combatant infantry forces. The third member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is the Chief of Naval Operations who, under their present theories, is presumed to represent the Marine Corps' position on the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chief of Naval Operations does not have a command responsibility over the Marine Corps. He does have a command responsibility for the Marines assigned to the operating forces of the Navy by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Of necessity his primary interest is the Navy.

This country is indeed fortunate in having the service of Gen. Omar Bradley as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. I have the deepest respect for General Bradley as a man and a great admiration for him as a leader of combat forces. I regard him as a noble American and a splendid soldier. But it is no reflection upon General Bradley to assume that in view of his lifetime of distinguished service in the Army it is only natural that he should hold to the Army point of view and not believe in the desirability of maintaining the Marine Corps as an effective combatant unit.

It is also appropriate to point out that the Secretary of Defense, General George Marshall, is also an Army man. I was proud to vote for his confirmation since I regard him as one of the noblest Americans of all time and a great and selfless patriot. I would indeed go so far as to call him a soldier-saint. But, here again, we have a man who by training and experience is a sincere believer in the doctrine that the Army should carry on all ground combatant activities.

It is, therefore, evident that the background of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and of the leaders in the Defense Department is one which will not by itself provide for an effective Marine Corps. When this is taken in conjunction with the known fact that the probable attitude of the Commander in Chief of our Armed Forces is fairly well known, it is clear why the Marine Corps is not being permitted to expand at the present time. Furthermore, it is quite clear that it is intended that they not be permitted to expand in the future to the size that our national security requires.

A brief scrutiny of the record of the past attitude of the Army General Staff toward the Marine Corps throws clarification on the question as to why Congress would legislate on this matter. This, of course, is extremely important since as shown above the thinking of the Army General Staff now dominates the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Defense Department.

Passing by such fairly recent history as the opposition of the Army to the Marine Corps serving in France during World War I and its attempt to abolish the corps in 1930-31, we can begin at no better point than the so-called "1478 papers" which among other things discussed in detail the future of the Marine Corps. The papers were a series of views expressed by the then Joint Chiefs of Staff. They were started in 1945. They have been, in part studied by various committees of Congress.

One of the most controversial sections of these papers involved the future of the Marine Corps. The Chief of Staff of the United States Army and the Chief of Staff of the then United States Air Corps took one position and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant of the Marine Corps took an opposite point of view. It is significant to note that at that time the views of the commandant were expressed before the Joint Chiefs of Saff. It is rarely that this happens at the present time. That part of the series which was most controversial was prepared from February 20, 1946, to May 23, 1946, while General Eisenhower was Chief of Staff of the Army. Incidentally, I happen to be a very strong admirer of General Eisenhower as a man, a soldier, and a statesman. In these papers he stated categorically that "The conduct of land warfare is a responsibility of the Army. There is real need for one service to be charged with the responsibility for initially bridging the gap between the sailor on the ship and the soldier on land. This seems to be properly the function of

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the Marine Corps. * * The need of a force within the fleet to provide small, readily available, and lightly armed units to protect United States interests ashore and in foreign countries is recognized. These functions, together with that of interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments, comprise the fundamental role of the Marine Corps. I, therefore, recommend the above concept be accepted as stating the role of the Marine Corps and that Marine units not exceed the regiment in size and the size of the Marine Corps be made consistent with the foregoing principles."

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The Chief of the Air Corps, General Spaatz, was much more violent in his aproach to the problem and said in substance that the Navy's development of the Marine Corps was "patently an incursion by one service into the normal roles of the other two services that the Marine Corps be limited to small readily available and lightly armed units no larger than a regiment, to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries and to provide interior guard of naval ships and naval shore establishments."

I have not seen the original memoranda in the series, which I believe originated with General Marshall, but I have seen General Vandegrift's summary of it before the House Committee on Executive Expenditures and his reply, which appears on page 252 of the hearings held by the Committee on Expenditures in Executive Departments during the Eightieth Congress. It is also interesting to not that General Eisenhower at that time recommended that the total size of the Marine Corps, therefore, be limited to some 50 to 60 thousand men. The degree to which he was able to implement this thinking was best evidenced by the 1951 budget which was prepared under his direction, in which the Marine Corps was being reduced to 67 thousand men. This will be discussed later in the statment.

The Army members of the Joint Staff planners have also made the following proposal which without any other statements shows the real intent of the Army and of its General Staff, namely, that the functions of the Marine Corps should be to "provide landing parties of the fleet to protect United States interests ashore in foreign countries in operations short of war and in time of war to conduct raids and small-scale amphibious demonstrations-perform necessary functions aboard ships at naval installations and in the ship-to-shore phases of amphibious operations.

So much for the thinking of the Army General Staff at that time except to point out that the Air Force and Army thinking was identical. It is quite clear that they were willing to completely obliterate as a combatant force an organization which had served its country as the Marine Corps had during the World War II and which had developed the amphibious doctrines and equipment used by the Army during its amphibious operations in Europe. The Congress, even though these views were know, rejected this concept in the Unification Act.

A more recent examination of the record as to the intent of the Military Establishment where the Marine Corps is concerned is found in the issuance of the defense budget for 1950-51.

Even while this budget was being prepared during the 1949 debate on the amendments to the unification bill the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee restated clearly the intent of Congress where the Marine Corps was concerned. On page 10550 of the Congressional Record for July 28, 1949, the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Mr. Tydings, stated in response to a question, "I may say to the Senator in answer to this question, I foresee not the slightest diminution in the glory, the traditions, and the future of the United States Marine Corps." Despite this, the budget makers in the Defense Department cut the strength of the Marine Corps from two divisions of four battalions each to six battalion landing teams, This budget was prepared under the supervision of General Eisenhower. This action would have destroyed the divisional structure of the Marine Corps and implemented the thinking of General Eisenhower as quoted above when he recommended that the Marine Corps be reduced to organizations of no larger than a regiment in size.

What made this action so particularly bad was the fact that the Commandant of the Marine Corps declared that even within the reduced appropriation and personnel being allowed the corps he could maintain the two divisions and eight

1 More recently General Spaatz, as a result of developments in Korea, seems to have changed his position as has been evidenced in an article in a recent issue of Newsweek.. He now advocates the existence of ready Marine divisions, located at strategic points around the world.

battalion landing teams. In other words, no financial savings to the country would have resulted from this destruction of the combat structure of the Marine Corps. The Defense Department was even willing to force an increase in the idle overhead of the corps in order to consummate their plan to destroy it as a combatant force.

The only verdict that could be passed upon this attempt was that, in their desire to prevent the Marine Corps from being a combat organization, the Army planners were willing to sacrifice an available part of the defense of our country. This, Mr. President, was carrying interservice jealousy and rivalries too far. Fortunately, the Senate and Congress acted so vigorously against this attempt that the Defense Department backed up and temporarily pulled in its horns. When we realize that this happened within a few months of the outbreak of the Korean situation I believe that we can all be thankful that this attempt by the Army and the General Staff failed. However, they are still trying.

The present record is even more alarming than that of the immediate past. The Joint Chiefs of Staff have decided that while the other services are expanding at a tremendous rate-as, for example, while the Army is increasing to the equivalent of 24 and possibly 26 divisions-the Marine Corps is not being permitted to increase its number of divisions and in fact has only been given authority to organize one additional regimental combat team.

It is also pertinent to note that the present plans of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is for the Marine Corps to start the fiscal year 1952 with a manpower strength of 203,000 and to end the year with only 175,000.

Mr. President, at present the facts speak for themselves. It is clear from both the past history and from present actions that those who direct the policies of the Defense Department do not intend to permit the Marine Corps to be a vigorous combat organization. They do not intend that it be enabled to fight aggressively and in full force for the defense of this country. One could use bitter words to characterize this position but I shall not do so.

We have in the past attempted to provide for this combatant Marine Corps by expressions of congressional intent. It is clear that expressions of intent are ineffective. We must have direct congressional action in the form of law. Only by specific legislation can we force the executive departments to carry out the intent of Congress in this important phase of our common defense.

Since the Congress is charged by the Constitution with providing for the defense of our country it seems clear that we must assume those responsibilities and take whatever steps are necessary to see that they are enforced. I do not have to point out that it is not unique for the Congress to spell out in detail what it wants the executive departments to do. We have done it in the past in many fields. This simply is a most pressing need in the military field.

I would like to point out also that, even after Congress has enacted S. 677 and it becomes law, it would be possible for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, or, for that matter, the Secretary of the Navy to endeavor to thwart the law by forcing changes in organization and functions upon the Marine Corps, and by decreasing the size of a Marine division and air wing. However, in the face of a law of this kind, it will be much more difficult for them to ignore it as they have in the past. Furthermore, we believe that the presence of the Commandant of the Marine Corps on the Joint Chiefs of Staff will have a very healthy effect on this particular situation.

2. Mr. President, I would now like to discuss some of the arguments why we believe that the Marine Corps should consist of four full-strength combatant divisions, four air wings, and appropriate supporting troops.

It is quite clear that in our country we have adopted a new and significant concept of our foreign policy. We are committed to the proposition that where aggression springs up throughout the world that the United States will, as a part of United Nations forces, contain such aggression and punish the aggressor. For this reason, it is clear that we need to have available a ready force which can promptly and effectively deal with police actions of all but the most major proportions. This force must be well trained, hard hitting, and capable of rapid mobility. Because of the nature of such police actions many of them will require troops trained in amphibious operations. For this reason we believe that the Marine Corps would be by far the most effective and economical force which our country could maintain as its ready force for such actions.

By way of negative argument we would like to point out that the United States Army has a vital mission which cannot be interfered with if the security of our country is to be maintained. If we fight a major power as distinct from the police actions we are discussing, we will need not 24 or 26 divisions but prob