Page Line
P. 1 27 The second personal factor is the

Duce. His existence is also decisive.
If something happens to him Ita-
ly's loyalty to the Alliance will no
longer be certain. The basic atti-
tude of the Italian Court is against
the Duce. Above all, the Court sees
in the expansion of the empire a
burden. The Duce is the man with

the strongest nerves in Italy.
Q. 1 32 The third factor favorable for us is

France. We can ask only benevo-
lent neutrality from Spain but this
depends upon Franco's personality.
He guarantees a certain uniform-
ity and steadiness of the present
system in Spain. We must take
into account the fact that Spain
does not as yet have a Fascist

Party of our internal unity.
R. 1 37 On the other side a negative picture,

as far as decisive personalities are
concerned. There is no outstanding
personality in England or in
France.

Page Line
2 1 (b) A similar case can be made for Mus-

solini. Not the pact with Italy are
decisive but personalities. Mussolini
is decisive for adherance to the Pact.
The Court was against everything it
considered adventurous, would like
it best to be satisfied with what they
got. Mussolini was a man "without
nerves". Proof was the Abyssinia

conflict.
2 8 The personality of France was also of con-

sequence. The Fuehrer never expected
more than friendly neutrality from
Spain. She continued to be under the
political influence of several parties.
Only Franco was the guarantee of uni-
formity and a certain continuity in
politics.

744400-47-65

S. 1 39 For us it is easy to make a decision.

We have nothing to lose and can
only gain. Our economic situation
is such because of our restrictions,
that we cannot hold out more than
a few years.

146 15 It is hard to make a decision which must

lead to bloodshed. It is difficult but com-
paratively easy for us because we have
only one choice. Get it over with or lose
out. We might be able to stand the
present condition economically and by
exercising all our strength for about 10

to 15 years, not longer.

No.
146 20 Therefore we are forced to come to a de.

cision. Such decisions are much more
difficult for our adversary. He would
gain nothing. His stake is much greater,
enormously great. The personalities on
opponents side are, however, without ex-
ception below the average of what is ex-
pected from a statesman, they are no

men of action.
147 1 There are a number of tension spheres for

England. In the Mediterranean the
strained relation with Italy, in Asia with
Japan, in the Near East England has
alarmed the Mohammedans. When the
expression “Pyrrhic” victory ever ap-
plied to a nation, it was the victory of
1918 to England. On the Seven Seas

V. 1 46

Besides the personal factor, the po

litical situation is favorable for us.
In the Mediterranean rivalry
among Italy, France, and England
in the Orient tension, which leads
to the alarming of the Moham-
medan world. The English Empire
did not emerge from the last war

Y. 1 53 A British statesman can look in the

future only with concern. Z. 1 54 France's position also deteriorated,

particularly in the Mediterranean.

ruled by small minds, unsteady
weak men. All these fortunate cir-
cumstances will no longer prevail
in two or three years.

minds or are under the influence of the
sterling. Taking everything in consider-
ation, there are a number of favorable
circumstances which might not exist any

more in three years from now.
No.

148

BB. 2 2 No one knows how long I shall live.

Therefore conflict better now.
CC. 2 4 The creation of Greater Germany

was a great achievement politically
but militarily it was questionable
since it was achieved through a
bluff of the political leaders. It is
necessary to test the military. If
at all possible not by general settle-
ment but by solving individual
tasks.

4 The psychological side has also to be con

sidered. The last three great events re-
garding the "Ostmark" (Austria), Su-
deten Land and Czecho Slovakia are
doubtless an excellent political accom-
plishment. It would, however, be ex-
tremely dangerous for a nation, and
especially for her armed forces, to regard
to the matter solely as an instrument of
bluffing for political purposes without the
intention of using them in earnest. From
the viewpoint of a later, large and final
settlement in the West which believed
unavoidable, it appears advisable from a
military point of view to test the armed
forces in a single task. The question
arises now: Is there any likelihood that
this task can be carried out isolated and
without bringing about other catastro-
phes?

Page Lino DD. 2 8 The relation to Poland has become

Page Line 148 18 It is obvious that the political situation of

Poland, such as it exists today, is un

bearable in the long run.
No.

EE. 2 8 My Polish policy hitherto was in con

trast to the ideas of the people.
FF. 2 9 My propositions to Poland (Danzig

and Corridor) were disturbed by
England's intervention. Poland
changed her tone toward us. State
of tension intolerable in the long
run.

148 19 Therefore the proposal of the Fuehrer

about the cession of Danzig and the cre-
ation of a connecting line through the
corridor. This attempt for a settlement
was disturbed by England, which worked
herself in a frenzy and incited Poland to
impertinent note and military measures.
The relation between Germany and Po-
land must be tolerable or an unbearable

tension will be created.
149 1 In that way, however, the initiative is no

longer in our hands. From this point of
view also it would be better to act now

rather than later.
No.

GG. 2 11 The initiative cannot be allowed to

pass to others. This moment is
more favorable than in two

or
three years.
HH. 2 12 An attempt on my life or Mussolini's

could change the situation to our
disadvantage. One cannot eternally
stand beside one another with

5 Bad compromises must be refused and the

demand for “nice gestures” that language of Versailles, which already can be