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P. 1 27 The second personal factor is the
Duce. His existence is also decisive.
If something happens to him Ita-
ly's loyalty to the Alliance will no
longer be certain. The basic atti-
tude of the Italian Court is against
the Duce. Above all, the Court sees
in the expansion of the empire a
burden. The Duce is the man with
the strongest nerves in Italy.
Q. 1 32 The third factor favorable for us is
France. We can ask only benevo-
lent neutrality from Spain but this
depends upon Franco's personality.
He guarantees a certain uniform-
ity and steadiness of the present
system in Spain. We must take
into account the fact that Spain
does not as yet have a Fascist
Party of our internal unity.
R. 1 37 On the other side a negative picture,
as far as decisive personalities are
concerned. There is no outstanding
personality in England or in
1 (b) A similar case can be made for Mus-
solini. Not the pact with Italy are
decisive but personalities. Mussolini
is decisive for adherance to the Pact.
The Court was against everything it
considered adventurous, would like
it best to be satisfied with what they
got. Mussolini was a man "without
nerves". Proof was the Abyssinia
8 The personality of France was also of con-
sequence. The Fuehrer never expected
more than friendly neutrality from
Spain. She continued to be under the
political influence of several parties.
Only Franco was the guarantee of uni-
formity and a certain continuity in
S. 1 39 For us it is easy to make a decision. We have nothing to lose and can only gain. Our economic situation is such because of our restrictions, that we cannot hold out more than
V. 1 46 Besides the personal factor, the political situation is favorable for us. In the Mediterranean rivalry among Italy, France, and England in the Orient tension, which leads to the alarming of the Mohammedan world. The English Empire did not emerge from the last war
146 15 It is hard to make a decision which must lead to bloodshed. It is difficult but comparatively easy for us because we have only one choice. Get it over with or lose out. We might be able to stand the present condition economically and by exercising all our strength for about 10 to 15 years, not longer.
146 20 Therefore we are forced to come to a decision. Such decisions are much more difficult for our adversary. He would gain nothing. His stake is much greater, enormously great. The personalities on opponents side are, however, without exception below the average of what is expected from a statesman, they are no men of action.
1 There are a number of tension spheres for England. In the Mediterranean the strained relation with Italy, in Asia with Japan, in the Near East England has alarmed the Mohammedans. When the expression "Pyrrhic" victory ever applied to a nation, it was the victory of 1918 to England. On the Seven Seas
Y. 1 53 A British statesman can look in the future only with concern.
Z. 1 54 France's position also deteriorated, particularly in the Mediterranean.
she lost her predominance and shares it with America. Her Empire was shaken, Ireland became independent, the Union of South Africa aspires to the same, the appetite for it is growing in India.
13 Because of the armament all countries have created their own industries. It has become difficult for England to find markets. The old order is disturbed. No.
17 France too is in a bad state, above all be-
cause of the decrease of her conscription
19 Facts favorable for us are furthermore the
occupation of Albania, which, in the
hands of Italy, neutralizes Yugoslavia.
But this too is weaker than the Serbia of
1914, as the Croates are causing a split-
ting of the country, Rumania is weaker
than before, and Hungary and Bulgaria
are arming and marching at her border.
Turkey has lost her only great man, At-
taturk, the men now in power are little
ruled by small minds, unsteady
weak men. All these fortunate cir-
cumstances will no longer prevail
in two or three years.
BB. 2 2 No one knows how long I shall live.
Therefore conflict better now.
CC. 2 4 The creation of Greater Germany
was a great achievement politically
but militarily it was questionable
since it was achieved through a
bluff of the political leaders. It is
necessary to test the military. If
at all possible not by general settle-
ment but by solving individual
minds or are under the influence of the
sterling. Taking everything in consider-
ation, there are a number of favorable
circumstances which might not exist any
more in three years from now.
4 The psychological side has also to be con-
sidered. The last three great events re-
garding the "Ostmark" (Austria), Su-
deten Land and Czecho Slovakia are
doubtless an excellent political accom-
plishment. It would, however, be ex-
tremely dangerous for a nation, and
especially for her armed forces, to regard
to the matter solely as an instrument of
bluffing for political purposes without the
intention of using them in earnest. From
the viewpoint of a later, large and final
settlement in the West which believed
unavoidable, it appears advisable from a
military point of view to test the armed
forces in a single task. The question
arises now: Is there any likelihood that
this task can be carried out isolated and
without bringing about other catastro-
The relation to Poland has become unbearable.
8 My Polish policy hitherto was in con-
trast to the ideas of the people.
FF. 2 9 My propositions to Poland (Danzig
and Corridor) were disturbed by
England's intervention. Poland
changed her tone toward us. State
of tension intolerable in the long
The initiative cannot be allowed to
pass to others. This moment is
more favorable than in two or
HH. 2 12 An attempt on my life or Mussolini's
could change the situation to our
disadvantage. One cannot eternally
stand beside one another with
II. 2 14 A suggested compromise would have
demanded that we change our con-
victions and make agreeable ges-
18 It is obvious that the political situation of Poland, such as it exists today, is unbearable in the long run.
148 19 Therefore the proposal of the Fuehrer
about the cession of Danzig and the cre-
ation of a connecting line through the
corridor. This attempt for a settlement
was disturbed by England, which worked
herself in a frenzy and incited Poland to
impertinent note and military measures.
The relation between Germany and Po-
land must be tolerable or an unbearable
tension will be created.
1 In that way, however, the initiative is no
longer in our hands. From this point of
view also it would be better to act now
rather than later.
5 Bad compromises must be refused and the
demand for "nice gestures" that lan-
guage of Versailles, which already can be