Page Line j. 2 56 Because of our anarchy and because

we have sources of aid in the east.
k. 2 58 (2) Attack from the west from the

Maginot line: I consider this im-
possible.

1. 2 59 Another possibility is the violation

of Dutch, Belgium, and Swiss neu-
trality. I have no doubts that all
these states as well as Scandinavia
will defend their neutrality by all

available means.
m. 2 61 England and France will not violate

the neutrality of these countries.

152 18 Here one had to consider what it would

mean for the French soldier who had
been brought up with the idea to defend
the Maginot line, to come out of this de-
fense line and attack the German West-
wall to lose perhaps a quarter of a mil-
lion men without any definite guarantee
of success. Because the German nation
who had heroically defended shellholes
before would certainly hold the present

Westwall.
152 26 The Western Powers might perhaps try to

advance against Germany through neu-
tral territory, and here the Fuehrer be-
gan to review the neutrals. All of them
had the honest desire to remain neutral:

the Nordic states unconditionally.
153

7. It would, however, be impossible for Eng

land and France to violate the neutrality

of this country against her will.
153 10 Perhaps the declarations of neutrality by

these countries were given at the insti-
gation of England in order to give Eng-
land a reason for her drawing back at

n. 2 62 Actually England cannot help Po

153 17 Now many say: "England is prepared for

a long war". The Fuehrer believes this

opinion to be wrong. No.

Page Line t. 3 9 I was convinced that Stalin would

never accept the England offer.

Page Line 154 8 But only a blind optimist could believe that

Stalin would be so crazy as not to see

through England's intentions. No.

154

u. 3 10 Russia has no interest in maintaining

Poland. v. 3 10 And Stalin knows that it is the end

of his regime no matter whether his soldiers come out of a war vic

torious or beaten. W. 3 12 Litvinov's replacement was decisive.

16 Stalin furthermore has to be afraid just as

much of a victorious army as of a beaten
one.

x. 3 12 I brought about the change toward

Russia gradually.

154 17 The dismissal of Litvinov as Foreign Min

ister affected the Fuehrer like a gun shot.
154 19 A careful change in the political attitude

took place, beginning with the fact that
the Fuehrer treated the Russian ambas-
sador at a reception just as politely as

the other diplomats.
154 23 Further discussions in the economic sphere

resulted which led to commercial
agreement. Finally a proposition came
from the Russians:

(1) For a nonaggression pact.
(2) For intervention between

Russia and Japan.
(3) For a solution of the questions of

the Baltic provinces.

y. 3 13 In connection with the commercial

treaty we got into political conver-
sation. Proposal of a nonaggression
pact. Then came a general proposal
from Russia. Four days ago I took
a special step which brought it
about that Russia answered yes-
terday that she is ready to sign.
The personal contact with Stalin
is established.

155

aa. 3 17 The day after tomorrow von Ribben

trop will conclude the treaty. bb. 3 18 3 18 Now Poland is in the position in

155

4 The nonaggression pact was to be signed on

23 August. 7 Now we have the possibility to strike at the

heart of Poland, the military road, to the

best of our knowledge, is free.
No.

We need not be afraid of a blockade.

The East will supply us with grain,
cattle, coal, lead, and zinc. It is a
big arm which demands great ef-
forts. I am only afraid that at the
last minute some Schweinehund
will make a proposal for mediation.
The political arm is set farther. A
beginning has been made for the
destruction of England's hegem-
ony. The way is open for the sol-
dier, after I have made the political
preparations. Today's publication
of the nonaggression pact with
Russia hit like a shell. The conse-
quences cannot be overlooked.
Stalin also said that this course
will be of benefit to both countries.
The effect on Poland will be tre-
mendous. Goering answers with
thanks to the Fuehrer and the as-
surance that the armed forces will
do their duty.

[Cover page]

Top secret
The Reichsfuehrer SS
Statistic-scientific Institute

10 copies, 6th copy. The Strength

of the SS
on the 30 June 1944.

[in pencil:] 81 (page 1]

Total strength of the SS on 30. 6. 1944 Allgemeine SS excluding members of the SS who are at present

serving as reservists in the Waffen SS. Not called up

64,614 Called up into the Wehrmacht..

115,908 Called up into R.A.D. (labor service)

722 Called up for other employment.

19,254 Total

200,498 Waffen SS (serving with the colors and reservists)........ 594,443 SS total

794,941

(page 24]

Total strength of the Waffen SS
Field units
New formations and reinforcements.
Training and reserve units.....
Training schools
Other units and offices directly

subordinate to the Operational HQ

of the SS High Command.... Waffen SS personnel at the Head Offices.

Total

368,654

21,365 127,643 10,822

26,544 39,415 594,443

(page 28]

Members of the Waffen SS in the Head Offices (Excluding the Operational HQ of the SS High Command) SS Head Office......

9,349 Racial and Settlement Head Office of the SS...

2.689 SS Economic and Administrative Head Office (WVHA).... 24,091 Personal Staff of the Reichsfuehrer SS.....

673 SS Personnel Head Office

170 Head Office, SS Court of Justice.....

599 Bureau of SS Obergruppenfuehrer Heissmeyer.

553