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fact that the Italian Naval Command's demand for air attacks on the African supply ports is right, but that the stress lay on protecting supply, using small vessels as well and even the tiniest harbors. .He says that the Sea Transport Chief, Italy (Engelhardt) had already done good preparatory work in this direction. There follows a report by the Sea Transport Chief Italy, about transport requirements-200,000 tons per month for Sicily, 80,000 tons per month for Sardinia-and how they are to be covered, particularly by small vessels. C. in C. Navy stresses, and the Fuehrer agrees, that the Sea Transport Chief must be independent in the employment of shipping space and that intervention by the home staff Overseas, OKW, is harmful. The Fuehrer asks whether C. in C. Navy has the impression that the Duce is determined to hold out. The C. in C. Navy replies that he "assumes this to be certain but naturally does not know." The Italian's main weakness, he says is lack of initiative.

UK C. in C. Navy points out that "owing to the Mediterranean now being free the Anglo-Saxons are gaining 2 million gross registered tons of shipping space." The Fuehrer interrupts: "which the brave U-boats must sink again now." C. in C. Navy: And we are at present in the biggest crisis of the U-boat war because the enemy has for the first time made fighting impossible by new means of determining position and is inflicting heavy losses on us (15-17 U-boats per month). Fuehrer: "The losses are too high, we can't go on like that!"

C. in C. Navy goes on to say that the Bay of Biscay is also our only narrow exit, to get through which is extremely difficult and already takes 10 days. C. in C. Navy sees the best strategic solution in the occupation of Spain and Gibraltar. To this the Fuehrer says that this was still possible in 1940, carrying Spain along with us, but that our forces are not sufficient for this purpose now and against Spain's will: the question of supplies is therefore to be embarked upon as proposed by the Sea Transport Chief.


Report of the 23rd September 1944.

Kreis leadership making the report: TANN of the NSDAP or office

Subject: Foreigners

Polish youth in the Kali mining area, which has always shown an endeavor to stick particularly closely together, is being watched with especial care.


The Ortsgruppenleiter Wittelsheim reports that he noticed 13 young Poles who had left Buggingen without permission and who were in possession of medical certificates. He had 11 of these Poles arrested and taken to the Gestapo at Muelhausen for reexamination.

[rubber stamp]

The Kreisleiter of the Kreis Tann


[(4a) (1)]

Communal leader of the NSDAP



Erfurt, the 4th April 1938.

Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS.
Branch Office Erfurt.

Top Secret.

Special Order

Strictly Confidential

To all Heads of Sections (Referent) and Stuetzpunkleiter.

Stuetzpunkleiters are to report not later than 1800 hours on the 7th April 1938 all persons in their district about whom it is safe to assume (with 100% probability) that they will vote "No" at the impending plebiscite. (Don't forget the International Jehova's witnesses!).

Heads of Sections are to support the Stuetzpunkleiters locally as much as possible in this matter.

This matter is also to be carried out in closest collaboration with the Ortsgruppenleiters of the Party. The Ortsgruppenleiters will be instructed by the Aussenstellenleiter [Head of the Branch Office] personally after 1800 hours on the 5. 4. 1938.

The list of persons must contain the following details: Name, christian name, exact address, and a short explanation why the person concerned is expected to vote "No" and which members of these person's families who are entitled to a vote, share the same views.

The tremendous responsibility which the Stuetzpunkleiters have —in particular with regard to this report is stressed once more: the Stuetzpunkleiters must clearly understand the potential consequences for the persons contained in their report. It must be particularly strongly considered whether the persons who impart such information to the Stuetzpunkleiters and from whom the

Stuetzpunkleiters make their inquiries, are not motivated by personal reasons; even political leaders are not excepted from this. The confidential nature of this Order is again emphasized.

The order is to be minutely memorized and thereafter destroyed immediately. (Every Stuetzpunkleiter is personally responsible to me for the complete destruction of this Order!).

The Aussenstellenleiter (Head of the Branch Office) [signed] HELFER.

[(4a) (2)]

SS. Oberscharfuehrer.

Elections on 10. 4. 1938.

Increased attention is to be devoted to participation in and the results of the plebiscite on 10. 4. 1938, particularly in small towns and villages. It must, above all, be ascertained, whether the opponents are to be sought in Marxist ideological or opposition circles.

A. Marxism:

One must count on the possibility of Marxist circles organizing excursions in groups to smaller localities on the day of the plebiscite and voting there with voting forms. It is thereby intended to exercise a check as to whether the No-votes deposited in these places actually appear on the plebiscite result.

If any observations of this nature are made, they should be reported immediately.

B. Catholicism:

The attitude of the clergy deserves special attention.

1. What effects did the declaration of the German-Austrian bishops have on the clergy and the believers?

2. Was any attitude expressed during church services and similar meetings?

3. Have any official ecclesiastical. declarations with regard to plebiscite or to the Austrian "Anschluss" and the declaration of the German-Austrian bishops become known? (Exact text is to be submitted).

4. Has any attitude been expressed towards the papal counterdeclaration which was broadcast by the Vatican radio and which rejected both the declaration of the Austrian bishops and the attitude of the "Schwarzen Korps"?

C. Protestantism.

Special attitude of the clergy is to be observed.


1. What official ecclesiastical declarations became known with regard to the Austrian Anschluss?

2. Was any attitude expressed about the Anschluss or the plebiscite during services?

3. What comment did the Church press make?

4. Has the "Bildblatt" der deutschen evangelischen Kirche zur Volksabstimmung am 10. 4. 1938 ("Feuilleton" of the German Protestant Church for the Plebiscite on 10. 4. 1938) (16 pages long) been distributed?

5. Were the bells of all religious communities rung on the evening of 9. 4. 1938, following the Fuehrer's speech in Vienna ?

6. Were any confirmations celebrated on 10. 4. 1938?

D. Freemasons.

1. What was the opinion about the Austrian Anschluss in the various Freemason circles?

2. Have any contacts of German Freemasons with Austria or journeys to Austria become known?

E. Jewry.

What is the attitude of Jewish circles towards the completed Austrian Anschluss and the impending plebiscite?

Special reports are to be submitted as soon as possible about points A-E.

It is suggested that the election officials are contacted in a suitable manner where necessary. The exertion of any kind of pressure must, however, be desisted from.

Furthermore, all observations which are made in various fields on the occasion of the plebiscite on 10. 4. 38 are to be reported in the form of special messages.

[(4a) (3)]

Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS.

Sub Sector Thuringia/Erfurt.

Branch Office Weissensee

To the Branch Office, Erfurt.

Gispersleben, 25. 4. 1938

Subject: "No"-voters in Weissensee. Election on 10. 4. 1938. Previous correspondence: See preceding report.

Enclosed are the data forms relating to the 7 "No"-voters. The following procedure was employed for finding them out:

Prior to the election, Party Member Paul Fritsche of Jakobstrasse, Weissensee, Thuringia completed a register of all persons

suspected of voting "No". On the election day every person included on this list received from a specially selected official a voting paper which was marked with a number imprinted by means of a colorless typewriter. The number of this voting paper was entered by the official in the above-mentioned register after the voter's name. After the conclusion of the election the voting papers were sorted and all slips with an imprinted number taken out. With the help of the register, the action of the watched persons could be examined accurately.

The names of the "No" voters have been reported to the local collaborator by the above-mentioned Party member Fritsche. [signed] R. WEINGART.

[(4a) (4)]

Gispersleben, 4. 5. 1938.

Security Service of the Reichsfuehrer SS.

Sub Sector Thuringia/Erfurt.

Branch Office Weissensee.

To the

Branch Office


Subject: Plebiscite on 10. 4. 1938

No previous correspondence.

The following incident occurred at Soemmerda on election day: The tax-consultant Otto Zobel of No. 6 Raemenstrasse, Soemmerda entered the voting center. He received a voting paper and envelope there and-contrary to the behavior of the other voters -took them into the voting booth. As Zobel is known as a fanatic Center Party adherent and as a man who is unfavorably inclined towards National Socialism, the election official, Albert Schumann of Dreyseplatz, Soemmerda, did not throw the envelope into the voting box immediately but tried to push it under the paper end which is situated on the voting box to cover the slit so as to be able to open the envelope later at an opportune moment. Zobel observed this procedure and drew the official's attention to the fact that the envelope had not been placed in the voting box at all. To avoid raising any suspicion the official Schumann then apologized saying that the envelope had got under the paper cover by mistake, and he then placed it unopened into the voting box.

Zobel's behavior indicates that he did not wish the nature of his vote to become known. This fact, together with the abovementioned political attitude gives rise to the well-founded suspicion that Zobel voted "No."

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