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ical and wicked disregard of the rights of others and of the very elements of civilization. Militarism destroys the moral character of the nation that practices it and, because it can be overthrown only by its own weapons, undermines the character of nations that are forced to combat it.

The well-spring of German militarism through the years has been the group of professional military leaders who have become known to the world as the “German General Staff." That is why the exposure and discrediting of this group through the declaration of criminality is far more important than the fate of the uniformed individuals in the box, or of other members of this group as individuals. Keitel and Raeder and Rundstedt and Kesselring and Manstein have shot their bolt. They will not lead the legions of the Wehrmacht again.

What is really at stake now is not the lives of these particular men, but the future influence of the German General Staff within Germany, and, consequently, on the lives of people in all countries. That is why it was declared at Yalta : 126

“It is our inflexible purpose to destroy German militarism and Nazism and to insure that Germany will never again be able to disturb the peace of the world. We are determined to disarm and disband all German armed forces; break up for all time the German General Staff that has repeatedly contrived the resurgence of German militarism."

The first steps toward the revival of German militarism have been taken right here in this court room. The German General Staff has had plenty of time to think since the spring of 1945, and it well knows what is at stake here. The German militarists know that their future strength depends on reestablishing the faith of the German people in their military prowess and in disassociating themselves from the atrocities which they committed in the service of the Third Reich. Why did the Wehrmacht meet with defeat? Hitler interfered too much in military affairs, says Manstein.127 What about the atrocities? The Wehrmacht committed none. Hitler's criminal orders were discarded and disregarded by the generals. Any atrocities which did occur were committed by other men such as Himmler and other agencies such as the SS. Could not the generals have taken any steps to prevent Germany's engulfment in war and eventual destruction? No; the generals were bound by their oath of obedience to the chief of state. Did not an SS general say that the Field Marshals could have prevented many of the excesses and atrocities ? 128 The reaction is one of superiority and scorn: "I think it is impertinent for an SS man to make such statements about a Field Marshal," says Rundstedt.129 The documents and testimony show that these are transparent fabrications. But here, in embryo, are the myths and legends which the German militarists will seek to propagate in the German mind. These lies must be stamped and labeled for what they are now while the proof is fresh.

This is as important within our own countries as it is here in Germany. Militarism has flourished far more widely and obsti

. nately in Germany than elsewhere, but it is a plant which knows no national boundaries; it grows everywhere. It lifts its voice to say that war between East and West, or Left and Right, or White and Yellow is inevitable. It whispers that newly devised weapons are so terrible that they should be hurled now lest some other country use them first. It makes the whole world walk under the shadow of death.

German militarism, if it comes again, will not necessarily reappear under the aegis of Nazism. The German militarists will tie themselves to any man or party that offers expectation of a revival of German armed might.130 They will calculate deliberately and coldly. They will not be deterred by fanatical ideologies or hideous practices; they will take crime in their stride to reach the goal of German power and terror. We have seen them do it before.

The truth is spread on the record before us, and all we have to do is state the truth plainly. The German militarists joined forces with Hitler and with him created the Third Reich; with him they deliberately made a world in which might was all that mattered; with him they plunged the world into war and spread terror and devastation over the continent of Europe. They dealt a blow at all mankind; a blow so savage and foul that the conscience of the world will reel for years to come. This was not war; it was crime. This was not soldiering; it was savagery. These things need to be said. We cannot here make history over again, but we can see that it is written true.


NOTES 14060-PS, USA 928, p. 4: "Politics and the officer in the Third Reich. Rise -result of the cooperation of the soldiery and politics and the results of political leadership with a definite aim * * * Two pillars: Party and the Armed Forces. They are forms of expression for the same philosophy of life * * * Tasks of the Party and the Armed Forces in indissoluble unity of common responsibility *** Both sections thrown back onto the success or downfall of the other * * * ".

2Transcript, p. 2121. The distinction between the group defined in the Indictment and the “Grosse General Stab" of the first world war was also made plain at the outset. Transcript, p. 2106. [Transcript references are to the original mimeographed record prepared for trial purposes.]

*Transcript, p. 7180.
3702-PS, USA 531; 3703-PS, USA 532; 8706-PS, USA 537.

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"It is, for instance, true that the chain of command ran directly from the Supreme Commander of the Army to the Commanders-in-Chief of Army groups and Armies, and not through the Chief of the General Staff of the Army. But the Chief of the General Staff of the Army was the central figure in developing plans and writing orders which were issued from OKH to the field Commanders-in-Chief.

Under the decree of 4 February 1938, Keitel, as the representative of Hitler, exercised the functions theretofore exercised by the Reich War Minister. Transcript, pp. 2108–09.

'Except for the denial that the office of Deputy Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW (held first by Warlimont and later by Winter) should have been included. As to this, see the affidavit by Halder, 3707-PS, USA 533.

SUSA 778. This list is not part of the Indictment, and is in no way necessary to the prosecution's case. It was compiled as carefully as possible from information then available but, as the covering affidavit stated, it probably contains errors and omissions.

"Transcript, pp. 5265–5266.
10 Transcript, p. 5247
"Transcript, p. 15410.

12This is precisely what General Halder intended as the meaning of "gruppe" in his affidavit. USA 531. Under cross-examination he stated that "group" meant "The number of generals who may be designated as the leading generals.” Commission Transcript, p. 3682.

13Transcript, p. 5155.
143702-PS, USA 531; 3703-PS, USA 532.

15 Under cross-examination Halder testified that, while the phrase "General Staff" in the German army technically means the assistants and adjutants (General Staff Corps), he nonetheless adopted the phrase in his affidavit as most descriptive (to non-Germans) of the "actual military leadership" of Germany, which had always been known outside Germany as the “General Staff.” Commission Transcript, pp. 3683–84.

10Transcript, p. 15410.

17See, for instance, Jodl's diary for the period 1 February to 26 May 1940. 1809-PS, GB 88.

183707-PS, USA 533.
193705-PS, USA 535; 3706-PS, USA 537.
203705-PS, USA 535; 3706-PS, USA 537.
* Commission Transcript, p. 1700.
2C–142, USA 538; 2327-PS, USA 539.
2447-PS, USA 135.

1780-PS, USA 72, entry for 10 August 1938; 798-PS, USA 29; 789-PS, USA 23; C-78, USA 139.

25The prosecution has stated its view that membership in a group or organization must be basically voluntary in order to support a declaration under Article 9. Transcript, p. 5155.

Transcript, p. 5248.
Transcript, p. 15458.
*Transcript, p. 15460.
% Commissioner's Report, p. 114. See also pp. 183, 189.

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SoTranscript, p. 15458. The record does not in all cases show the reasons for retirement or resignation, but the Field Marshals and Colonel Generals mentioned by Mannstein no doubt included the following: Bock, Brauchitsch, Leist, Kuechler, Leeb, List, Manstein, Rundstedt, Witzleben (Field Marshals), and Friessner, Halder, Hoeppner, Hoth, Jaennecke, Machensen, Ruoff, Strauss, Schmidt, Zeitzler (Colonel Generals).

31 Transcript, p. 5155.
*Transcript, p. 5155–5166.

*The eight positions were the Commanders-in-Chief and Chiefs of Staff of the OKH, OKL, and OKM, the Chief of OKW, and the Chief of the Operations Staff of OKW. Four of these positions were filled throughout the prewar period by the defendants, Goering, Raeder, Keitel, and Jodl. The other four positions were held by six individuals; Brauchitsch, Beck, Halder, Schmiewind, Stumpff, and Jeschonnek, of whom two (Beck and Jeschonnek) are dead.

"EC 450, USA 629.
*Transcript, p. 2139; 1780–PS, USA 72, entry for 10 March 1938.
*Transcript, p. 15432–33.

*However, the testimony of Manstein (Transcript, pp. 15433–34) that previous plans for the invasion of Austria did not exist under the cover name "Otto" is in flat contradition of the documents. "Otto" was originally a plan for the invasion of Austria to prevent a restoration of the monarchy. C-175, USA 69. But the actual invasion in March 1936, was under the same cover name. C-182, USA 77; C-102, USA 74. And apparently the old draft plans were used, 1780-PS, USA 72, entry for 10 March 1938.

Transcript, p. 15432. Brauchitsch was absent at the time. Transcript, p. 15387.

*Keitel, Goering, Jodl. Transcript, pp. 566–569 and 2138–39.

Reichenau, Sperrle, von Schobert, and, of course, Manstein. Transcript, p. 2138; 1780-PS, USA 72, entry for 10 March 1938.

“Transcript, pp. 15387–89.

"1780-PS, USA 72, entry for 30 May 1938. See also the entry for 10 August 1938, which makes it clear that the doubts expressed to Hitler by the military leaders as a group related primarily to "defects of our preparation" and inadequate western fortifications.

“Transcript, pp. 15387-89. 4388-PS, USA 26.

Transcript, pp. 743–804. See especially items 11, 15, 17, 18, 19, 26, 31, 33, and 54 of the “Fall Gruen” file. The Navy's role was secondary, but OKM was kept informed and laid its plans. See Item 11.

41780-PS, USA 72, entries for 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25-26, 27, 28, and 29 September.

"Goering and Stumpff. Jeschonnek and Stulpnagel.

"Transcript, pp. 808-810, 910, and 2144; C-136, USA 104; C-138, USA 105, 2802-PS, USA 117; 2798-PS, USA 118.

603704_PS, USA 536.
513706_PS, USA 537.
*Commission transcript, p. 1630.



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53For the attack on Poland, there were two army groups (Bock and Rundstedt), five armies (Blaskowitz, Kluge, Kuechler, List, and Reichenau), and two air fleets (Kesselring and Loehr). The west was held by an army group (Leeb), an army (Dollmann) and two air fleets (Sperrle and Felmy). A naval group command west (Saalwachter) was also created. During the early part of the war, accordingly, the group consisted of about 22 members. 3739-PS, USA 778.

5 Transcript, p. 15436.
Transcript, pp. 15389-93; 15515-16; Commissioner's Report, p. 155.
60L-79, USA 27, p. 2.
57L-79, USA 27, p. 3.
68Transcript, pp. 15390, 15392, 15515; Commissioner's Report, p. 155.
603704_PS, USA 536; 3706–PS, USA 537; Commissioner's Report p. 155.
603705-PS, USA 535. See also C-120, GB 41.
013706–PS, USA 537.
02C–142, USA 538; 2327-PS, USA 539.
*Transcript, p. 15435.
64798-PS, USA 29.
eSTranscript, pp. 1060–1100, and 2159-2162.

Members of the group included Keitel, Jodl, Raeder, Schniewind, Goering, and Jeschonnek, as well as the following who later became members: Doenitz, Warlimont, Carls, Fricke, Kranke, and Falkenhorst.

67Transcript, pp. 15397, 15437, 15516.
& Transcript, pp. 15394–97.

Transcript, 15438. Jodl's diary indicates that during the first half of 1940, Hitler was practically living with the military leaders, and that consultation with the field commanders (Manstein, Reinhardt, Rommel, Kesselring, Student, Sperrle, Richthoffen, Falkenhorst and others) was frequent. 1809-PS, GB 88, especially the entries for 17 February, 5, 7 and 15 March, and 2 May 1940.

70Brauchitsch claims to have opposed the western offensive on the ground that a diplomatic settlement of the war was preferable. Transcript, pp. 15394–97; Commission transcript, p. 1353; Commissioner's report, p. 155. One can imagine what kind of a settlement this would have been. And there is no evidence that OKH ever drew up any plan for a western offensive which did not contemplate violation of the Low Countries' neutrality.

*444-PS, GB 116. See also the Naval War Diary. C-170, USA 136, Transcript p. 1178. A perusal of this diary makes abundantly clear the preoccupation of the naval leaders with political questions, and great initiative in making recommendations to Hitler. See especially the entries for 9 March, 5 and 15 June, 20 August, 26 September, 14 November, and 20 and 27 December 1940, and 6 and 20 April, 22 and 30 May, 6 and 14 June, 1941.

72 Commission transcript, p. 3250.

78Five generals from the Austrian army became commanders-in-chief (de Angelis, Boehme, Loehr, Rauss, Rendulic).

**Dietrich, Hausser, Himmler, and Steiner. USA 778. Hausser had been a regular army officer until 1932, and held the rank of general-major when he resigned. Both Steiner and Dietrich were also in the Reichswehr until 1933 though neither attained high rank.

75C-41, GB-96; Transcript, pp. 1097-1100.

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