von Gienanth for delivering lectures throughout the United States.

A. I didn't know that.

Q. Did you have any funds at your disposal for propaganda purposes?

A. In July or August 1939, Blankenhorn left the Embassy-he was in charge of the political and press departments-and I was his successor.

Q. Did the Embassy have a political or press fund?

A. Yes, a press fund.

Q. How much was in the fund when you took it over?

A. I don't remember the exact amount.

Q. Approximately how much?

A. I don't recall. But I think in October 1939, we received for the "Kriegskostensonderfonds" [War Funds] $50,000 a

Q. What were these funds used for?

A. Mainly to finance the propaganda of the German Library of Information and Flanders Hall.

(Off the record discussion)

Q. I want you to describe briefly the origin, nature, functions, sponsors, and chief employees of the German Library of Information.

A. Yes. The German Library of Information was in 1937 founded by von Gienanth as representative of the Propaganda Ministry on order from Berlin. I was not in the United States at that time. After his trip to Germany in 1938/1939, Mr. Viereck was engaged as public relations counsellor of the Library.

Q. Is this George Sylvester Viereck?

A. Yes, the well known author.

Q. What was Viereck's salary as public relations counsellor? A. At the beginning $500. Later more.

Q. Did the German Library of Information remain under the control of the Propaganda Ministry?

A. No. It was somewhat confused. From 1939 on, the Library was controlled and financed by both the Ministry of Propaganda and the Department of Information in the Foreign Office. You see, in 1939, Hitler issued an order that from that time on, foreign propaganda would be handled by the Foreign Office.

Q. That would seem to indicate that the Foreign Office superseded the Propaganda Ministry in the Library of Information?

A. Well, not completely. The Library was under the control of Dr. Hans Borchers, Consul General of New York, and under the immediate direction of Professor Mathias Schmitz. Both of these people were part of the Foreign Office. Actually, Schmitz was paid a salary by both the Foreign Office and the Propaganda Ministry, but accepted only the salary from the Foreign Office.

Q. Where did the Propaganda Ministry come in?

A. Gienanth had chosen Schmitz in 1940, and had also appointed many of the lesser employees. Naturally, as a representative of the Propaganda Ministry, he selected only such people as were agreeable to it.

Q. Did the Propaganda Ministry issue instructions to the German Library of Information?

A. I believe so.

Q. Have you ever seen any such instructions?

A. Yes, they related to expanding their activities and issue more books.

Q. What was your relation to the German Library of Information?

A. Maybe I can best explain it by an example. The Foreign Office would request us to edit the American edition of some books, and then we asked the Library of Information how much it would cost to do that. The Library of Information would tell us, and then we would cable back to Berlin for approval of the amount. After approval, I would pay over the money to the Library of Information to bring out the book.

Q. The Library of Information also published a magazine entitled "Facts in Review" didn't it?

A. Yes.

Q. What kind of a magazine was it?

A. Its propagandistic aim was to criticize British policy and to counteract British propaganda.

Q. How often did it come out?

A. Since 1940, regularly ever week.

Q. That is, until the outbreak of the war against the United States?

A. Yes.

Q. How large was its circulation?

A. About 40,000 copies were issued every week, which were read by approximately 200,000 Americans every week, I believe.

Q. Did you exercise any supervision over the "Facts in Review"?

A. I had a kind of political supervision over it.

Q. How much money did you advance to the German Library of Information?

A. As far as I can estimate, the Library received about $600,000 from the Embassy from 1939-1941.

Q. That's considerably more than you had in your "Kriegskostensonderfonds", isn't it?

A. Yes. It worked this way, Captain Harris. When we received an order from Berlin to pay the Library of Information from the Kriegskostensonderfonds a certain amount more than was available in that fund, the amount was especially authorized.

Q. How did you get these extra funds?

A. The Embassy had at its disposal very large sums of dollars which came to it from dollar legacies for German heirs. Q. Do you mean that when a person residing in Germany inherited money from a relative or someone else in the United States, the Embassy would collect the dollar amounts and put it in the Kriegskostensonderfonds?

A. Yes, thats it. The heirs in Germany would receive the equivalent in German marks from the Reichsbank.

Q. Then, if I understand it, the Kriegskostensonderfonds consisted of sums greatly in excess of the $50,000 a year mentioned earlier?

A. Yes. I'm sorry I didn't make that clearer before. The $50,000 a year was merely the press fund, which also came out of the larger "Kriegskostensonderfonds".

Q. It's my fault; I didn't completely understand your previous What was the total amount in the "Kriegskosten

A. I don't know, but it was very large.

Q. Did the Consulates have separate "Kriegskostensonderfonds" of their own, apart from the one in the Embassy? A. Yes, but I never knew the amounts in them. The consular officials didn't discuss that matter with me. They tried to minimize the funds at their disposal, because they came to the Embassy for funds from time to time.

Q. But you know for a fact that they did have "Kriegskostensonderfonds" of their own?

Q. It is now after 1730 which is your dinner time. We shall resume late tomorrow afternoon, if that is agreeable to you. A. Yes, sir.

15 February 1946

Continuation of interrogation of Dr. von Strempel by Capt. Sam Harris.

Reporter: Miss Joan Wakefield.

Present: Mr. Robert M. W. Kempner of OUSCC.

Dr. Strempel: May I make a preliminary statement?
Capt. Harris: Yes, certainly.

Dr. Strempel: When I was in the United States, especially in 1940-41, I observed two political trends: First, the wish to crush Germany entirely with the help of American troops and to occupy Germany, because that was the only way too to abolish the Nazi regime. Second, the other political trend was the policy, short of war, called the Arsenal of Democracy, to deliver war materials to England and Russia.

This second tendency of American foreign policy was that the Nazis and the Soviets should, through a war of many years, exhaust each other. After a certain time naturally the German people would want to get rid of Hitler, e.g. 20 July 1944. The United States, under the second policy would have stepped in as a decisive international factor, without entering the war in a military sense. This policy would have had the following advantage at the end of the war. You would see in the international field a very exhausted Soviet Russia, an exhausted Germany, a feeble England and a very powerful United States. And it would have saved the United States many soldiers that were used in the European Theater. The policy of myself was to avoid the first type of policy, because I thought as a German it would save my country from total defeat. Certainly many more would be killed when the United States would join the war, so I thought it was the smaller evil and it would weaken the Bolshevistic ideology too. So I think it would have been of benefit to my own country and to the benefit of the United States too.

Q. If I understand you correctly, you favored what you called the "second policy", which involved keeping the United States out of war while it was delivering war materials to England and Russia. Did you favor that aspect of the policy which involved sending materials to England and Russia?

A. I was not in a position to be much concerned with that point. It was up to the U-boats to take care of any materials that were sent to England and Russia.

Q. Am I right in assuming, therefore, that your aim was identical with that of the Nazi Government in Berlin- in other

words, to keep the United States out of the war-but your reasons were different?

Q. Did you actually believe in 1940-41 that the war would develop into a stalemate? Hitler was having one overwhelming success after another on the Battlefield at that time.

A. Yes, and especially after the war started with Russia I was convinced there would be a long drawn out war, in which the German people would want to get rid of Hitler.

Q. Did you think that Hitler intended to wage war on the United States?

A. No. For instance the reports in which we drew the attention of Berlin to avoid incidents and provocations were not rebuffed. We advised against submarines coming too close to American waters, and we had the impression that competent quarters in Berlin agreed with us.

Q. There are certain documents in our possession in Nurnberg -in fact, they have already been introduced in evidencewhich show that Hitler did, in fact, intend to wage war upon the United States. Weren't you advised of that fact? A. No-definitely not. Let me point out that the policy of the Embassy as well as of the Foreign Office was to avoid anything that might harm the political relations between Berlin and Washington. As it was, to my great dismay, relations were deteriorating rapidly; the diplomatic thread was becoming thinner and thinner.

Q. I'd now like to return to the role which Viereck played in this studied program, which the Nazi government had worked out to keep the United States out of the war. You mentioned yesterday that Viereck was appointed public relations counsellor of the German Library of Information.

Q. Did he also have any connection with the Flanders Hall enterprise which you mentioned yesterday?

Q. Please explain to us the precise details of that connection. A. I believe I have already mentioned that during his sojourn in Berlin in 1938/39, where Viereck was chosen for these anti-British propagandistic activities because he was considered an experienced American author who could manage efficiently and rather independently this anti-British propaganda without interfering in the internal affairs of the United States.