itual) and then at a racial assimilation of the Czech people, in order finally to attain a real national transformation. This process will have to continue both in the Protectorate area itself and also on a wide scale in Germany proper. Well planned methods sure of their goal are to be employed in all spheres of national life in an elastic manner and in a great variety of different ways. Only some of these methods can be pointed to here in their general lines: WORKERS: Raising of the standard of living-participation in the social achievements of National Socialism (German Labor Front, Strength through Joy)-granting of obvious advantages on declaring in favor of Germanism (elimination of every defamation)-large scale exchange of places of work with the Reich proper including transfer of families (at present 95,000 Czech workers voluntarily work in the Reich proper after having been recruited)-a certain differential scale of wages between the Reich proper and the Protectorate to be maintained as an inducement-transfer of female domestic servants into the Reich proper ditto waiters, menservants, musicians, etc. FARMERS: Participation of Czech farmers in the advantages of the German agricultural policy favorable to farmers-good policy of markets and prices-inheritability of farms only for German peasants-German defensive farm settlements along the Eastern frontier. MIDDLE CLASSES: Materially promote trade and commerce-offer social advantages to officials-open up personal prospects-promotionsaward of honors. YOUTH: Fundamental change in education-extermination of the Czech historical myth-education towards the Reich idea-no getting on without perfect knowledge of the German language-first doing away with the secondary schools, later also with the elementary schools-never again any Czech universities, only transitionally the "Collegium Bohemicus" at the German university in Prague 2 years compulsory labor service. * * Large scale land policy, creation of German strongpoints and German bridges of land, in particular pushing forward of the German national soil from the north as far as the suburbs of Prague. Campaign against the Czech language, which is to become merely a dialect as in the 17th and 18th centuries, and which is to disappear completely as an official language. Marriage policy after previous racial examination. In attempts at assimilation in the Reich proper, the frontier Gaus must be excluded. Apart from continuous propaganda for Germanism and the granting of advantages as an inducement, severest police methods, with exile and "special treatment" for all saboteurs. Principle: "Pastry and whip"! The employment of all these methods has a chance of success only if a single central Reich authority with one man at its head controls its planning, guiding, and carrying out. The direct subordination of the "master in Bohemia" to the Fuehrer clarifies the political character of the office and the task, and prevents the political problem from sinking down to an administrative problem. Only thus can the task be withheld from the departmental jealousies and the multiplicity of the Ministries and other Reich and Party offices. The Czech is always impressed only by the direct use of Reich authority. With his political skill and his tactics, trained throughout centuries, he can easily deal with three or four different provincialisms, particularly since for the time being "mother Prague" [pencil note: Head Office in Russia] will in any event remain the political brain of the Czech nation. Any division of the Protectorate area violates this principle. Until suitable successes have been achieved in the intended process of national transformation, I therefore recommend the following: (1) The maintenance of the territorial unity of the present Protectorate area. Frontier adjustments on a small scale in favor of the adjoining Gaus, or for technical reasons, are always possible. (Pilsen, Morava, Ostrava, Neuhaus, etc.). (2) The maintenance of one central Reich authority in Prague, with one man at its head, who is directly subordinated to the Fuehrer and equipped with all the necessary powers for Germanizing. (3) The step by step elimination of the autonomy of the Czechs, and the careful, gradual elimination of the Czech machinery of state connected therewith, commencing with the highest authorities, but retaining a body of Czech officials and employees. I recommend paragraph (3) for the reason that (a) Owing to lack of officials we are not in a position to appoint German functionaries for the 7,950 urban and rural administra tion offices, the 92 county administration offices, and 2 Provincial authorities, and because, owing to the enormous tasks which will face us in the future Reich we have to make use of Czechs on a large scale. (b) Because-thanks to the German hand which guided itthe Czech administrative machine did function on the wholeduring the war too-will continue to work in the future too and -in its own interests-will maintain quiet and order on the Czech's own responsibility. (c) Because it is quite sufficient if we occupy all the important key positions in the higher administrative offices with a comparatively small but well trained body of German officials, and, instead of ourselves administrating every little detail, issue directives and lead, i.e. rule. This memorandum takes for granted the intention of wishing to Germanize the area of population of the Protectorate. It therefore does not deal with the problem of an absolute "degradation" of the Czech people to a purely auxiliary race [Hilfsvolk] on racial grounds (Askari viewpoint!), a race to be outlawed socially and intermarriage with which would have to be forbidden. The practical carrying out of a complete degradation is rather considered as impracticable, and only an individual degradation is visualized as a special method of "special treatment" [Sonderbehandlung] in accordance with D II/2. And according to the explanations contained in this memorandum, this degradation does not seem to be necessary, because the solution of the Czech question, and with it the final pacification of the centuries-old Bohemian-Moravian center of unrest [Brandherd] in Europe, can be attained in the manner proposed. At the end of a certain period of transition, during which the process of Germanization must be brought into full operation in a uniform manner, nothing any longer stands in the way of a partition of the present territory of the Protectorate and its allocation to the Reich, or of the creation of new Reich Gaus. Prague, 28 August 1940. (Signed) Secretary of State K. H. FRANK. Prague, 27th June 1941 The Reichs Protector for Bohemia and Moravia [Stamp:] Office of the State Secretary Reichs Protectorate for Bo hemia and Moravia. Recd. 16/7/1941 Confidential! (a) The Office of the Reichs Protector (b) The Office of the State Secretary (c) The Office of the Under State Secretary (d) The Central Administration (e) Sections I to IV (f) All groups (g) The Office for Moravia at Bruenn (h) The Plenipotentiary of the Armed Forces (j) The Commander of the Public Police (n) The Bohemian and Moravian Oberlandraete (0) The Curator, German Scientific High School, Prague (p) The Curator, German Technical High School, Bruenn (q) The higher Finance President (r) The Chief District Judge (s) The Attorney General (t) Head Office, German Reichspost. Re: Handling of the German-Czech problem. For the motive stated, I order that in future, when arrangements and publications of any kind concerning the GermanCzech problem are made, the views of the whole population are more than ever to be directed to the war and its requirements, while the duty of the Czech nation to carry out the war tasks imposed on it jointly with the Greater Reich is to be stressed. Other questions concerning the German-Czech problem are not suitable subjects for public discussion at the present time. I wish to point out that, without detriment to my orders, administrative handling and treatment of all questions about the German-Czech problem are to be in no way alluded to. What is decisive for my order is the necessity for seeing that quiet and order reign in the Protectorate during the war and that the working population, both in the country and in towns, especially in the armaments industry, are allowed to perform their tasks, so important to the war, without hindrance. Public explanations or expressions cannot be allowed to disturb the arrangements I have made for maintaining peace and order. Any disturbance of the public by untimely discussion of the GermanCzech problem gives to enemy broadcasters, enemy agents, and opposition-circles the occasion for stirring up the Czech popula tion. Requisite public statements about the political questions of the Protectorate, and in particular those addressed to the Czech population, are my business and mine alone and will be published in due time. [signed] Freiherr von Neurath [page 17] Witnessed: PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT 3876-PS Berlin, 27 February 1942. The Chief of the Security Police and the SD IV A 1-B. No. 24 B/41 gRs. SECRET [rubber stamp] Re: Report No. 9 concerning the activity of the "Einsatzgruppen" of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR. Encl: 1 I herewith enclose the ninth summary report concerning the activity of the "Einsatzgruppen" of the Security Police and the SD in the USSR. The reports will be sent out periodically in future. Filed 7 March [Office rubber stamp] Distribution: To the Chiefs of the "Einsatzgruppen" A, B, C, and D (with extra copies for the "Einsatzkommandos" and commanders of the Security Police and the SD). |