T that it was only possible for us to follow the right way at that time because we were with the Fuehrer on 16 July, and heard from him what he wants. In the most difficult moments I always tried to remember: “What did the Fuehrer say?" I cannot and I must not deviate from it. This attitude was right. At that time we made political progress. Schuschnigg soon demonstrated that he only intended to be a chiseler. Leopold saw that a compromise would not work. The "Seven Committee" also did not progress very far. A number of gentlemen tried to find a platform; Wolsegger and Hasslacher worked on it. Only in cooperating with us–Jury and a number of co-workers of Leopold-and also with Leopold's consent it was possible to achieve Seyss-Inquart's appointment to the post of State Council [Staatsrat], July 1937. More and more Seyss turned out to be the clever negotiator. We knew that he was the one who would best represent the interests of the movement in the political forefield. He also unconditionally subordinated himself always to Klausner's leadership. He always conducted himself as Klausner's deputy and conscienciously followed Klausner's instructions. With Seyss' appointment to the post of Staatsrat we found a new possibility to enter into further negotiations. At that time there were a number of very grotesque situations. We were informed on events in the Schuschnigg camp by the political apparatus, our own connection to Ribbentrop, Goering and Himmler we have via Kepler. In a cafe in the Ringstrasse negotiations between us and Reich German representatives took place. We again had conferences with our people in the government or at another key point in the Austrian system to an extent that we were able to penetrate into the Ministry. And, when the commission was formed, the Reich German commission on the one side and the Austrian on the other, it was always the following game; the Reich German Commission was informed up to the last detail and these conferences always ended with a hundred percent victory for the German Reich. We got more and more opportunities to make our wishes felt in the Reich. With regard to exterior conditions the developments between the government and the LS-population became constantly more critical. The Neurath visit led to demonstrations; a new wave of arrests came. In November 1937 the situation was such that a break or further violations of the relation between Germany and Austria were inevitable. It was Globus who first had the idea: "A Schuschnigg visit to the Fuehrer must take place." 744400-47-46 He told me that it was necessary. I was against it; it would be impossible and too dangerous. We cautiously considered the idea in Berlin and Kepler presented it to Ribbentrop. Papen was commissioned to make preparations for this conference. Papen had been expressly told to handle preparations for the conference confidentially. In Austria only Schuschnigg, Schmidt, and Zernatto knew about it. They believed that on our side only Papen was informed. [Page 9] Papen too, thought that only he knew about it but we too were informed and had had conversations with Seyss about the subject. Now Schuschnigg still wanted to speak with Seyss and make some concessions before he went to Berchtesgaden, which he would announce to the Fuehrer at the Obersalzberg. We were invited by Tschammer to the Olympic Games to Garmisch and when we found out, Zernatto said: "I see you go with mixed feelings." We then had a meeting with Papen and with Seyss. Tschammer and Papen went through some negotiations. Globus and I then went to Berlin and made there a number of demands of the party. All July putschists should be released, as well as all "explosive matter-criminals" [Sprengstoff-Verbrecher] and given total amnesty, a further ministry formed which was to be given as ministry of the interior and of safety into Seyss' hand, etc., readmission of swastika armband, etc. It was just before our departure from Berlin. We had continued working during the night and made plans with our Berlin friends. In the morning we had the feeling: What will happen if Schuschnigg accepts the demands, then there would be the danger that he was legal, that we would have to reckon with him. In all haste we composed a report declaring that the party needed these conditions, but if possible without Schuschnigg; he would never be a partner. Then we threw Ribbentrop's adjutant out of bed and asked him to pass the report on to Ribbentrop. Then we were in Berlin and Schuschnigg asked Seyss again for a conversation at his place. Seyss had been negotiating for months the so-called Klausner program. Schuschnigg wanted to accept this and Seyss told him that in the meantime the situation had changed. The situation has stiffened. The two separated without a result, after Schuschnigg had dragged out the conversation long enough as to just have time to drive to the station to catch the train to Salzburg. Zernatto wrote a book about these days and said: "We are realizing, more and more, that Seyss was a stooge and that behind him were to be found a number of SS T officers among whom are Klausner, Globotschnig, and Rainer and that these people are the real wire-pullers. We had always thought that nobody knew about this visit to Berchtesgaden except Papen, the queer behavior of Seyss made the Austrian Chancellor very apprehensive. One knew that Seyss must have known about it. (Au revoir in Salzburg.) Schuschnigg's opinion was that the Reich in view to the foreign policy situation (Paris and London) needed again to make an agreement in the style of 1936. It would be sufficient if Schuschnigg made a number of concessions. They would separate, the Fuehrer would be enthusiastic, the matter would be settled. We had already prepared the following: The last result of the conversation Seyss communicated to me in a place in the Kaertnerstrasse. I called the telephone number where Globus [Globocnik] was to be reached in Berlin, and told him about the negative result of the conversation. I could speak with Globus entirely freely. We had a secret code for each name, and besides we both spoke a terrible dialect so that not a soul would have understood us. Globus immediately wrote down this report, and communicated it immediately via the security office by teletype to Munich, where it was written down. In the meantime Kepler had gone to Munich by sleeping-car. When he left the train the Statepolice Munich handed him the letter with the latest Vienna report, with which he left for Berchtesgaden. I then forwarded instructions by Party member Muehlmann who proved to be an excellent liaison man to party and government offices in the Reich. He left for Salzburg on the same train as Schuschnigg. While Schuschnigg had his car taken off at Salzburg and spent the night there and continued by auto to the Obersalzberg on the following day, Muehlmann continued on and was in Berchtesgaden. Kepler and he went to the Fuehrer before Schuschnigg and could tell him everything. Schuschnigg arrived in the morning, was received, and lived to see the boundless surprise that the Fuehrer took up the negotiations where they had broken off without results the day before between Seyss and him. The Fuehrer did not conduct the negotiations as Schuschnigg expected. He went the whole hog. Schuschnigg was finished off that time. The Fuehrer got hold of him, insulted him [beleidiste] and shouted at him and reproached him for all the dirty tricks Schuschnigg had committed during the years past. Schuschnigg had become a heavy smoker. We had connections even into his bedroom. We knew about his way of life. Now he was smoking 50, now 60 cigarettes. Now at the Fuehrer's he was not allowed to smoke. [Page 10] Ribbentrop told me he really pitied Schuschnigg. He only stood at attention before the Fuehrer, had his hands against the seams, and all he said was "Yes Sir" [jawohl]. Schuschnigg tried to object to something but got so terribly shouted at that he fell back into silence. Then the meal was taken. Then the Fuehrer called Sperle who had just relinquished the Command in Spain. The Fuehrer asked him to speak about the air force [Luftwaffe]. Schuschnigg was given a very impressive picture of the German Army. Keitel too was present. After the meal the Fuehrer asked Ribbentrop to continue conversations with Schuschnigg. Before the conversation with Schuschnigg began, Schmidt went to Ribbentrop and said: "Please permit that the Austrian chancellor smokes one single cigarette," which was allowed. Ribbentrop then talked to him: “Now look at the situation as it is the Fuehrer is not a man to joke with. There are chances for you; the Fuehrer wants to conclude the treaty with you, if you concede." The development leads to National Socialism. He developed before him how Hitler saw the future Reich, how the Anschluss was. Ribbentrop had the feeling of having mollified Schuschnigg by his kind words. So it was possible to draft a number of regulations in the final conversations. Schuschnigg had taken it onto himself to obtain President Miklas's consent. During this conversation, which lasted for quite a while, Zernatto in Vienna was hanging nervously on the telephone. He called up the security director, who is still in the CC [KZ] to day, in Salzburg and asked about Schuschnigg, and when Schuschnigg did not come back, he understood that the conversations were not developing as desired, as Schuschnigg was being delayed at the Obersalzberg. Preparations were made to liberate the Federal Chancellor; the Salzburg garrison was mobilized but not put into action, but it was ready. In the meantime Schuschnigg was back and had spent the night in Salzburg. Zernatto wanted to learn something from him and tried to speak to him over the telephone but Schuschnigg was finished. We were in Vienna and got our news. Zernatto was in greatest anxiety. He was at the station the following day to meet Schuschnigg, spoke with him and got the following description: "The Fuehrer is a devil, he is a Beserk, a lunatic. It was terrible, the way he treated me." Schuschnigg was so much under the weight of the events that he was completely without a will of his own. He was simply k. o. Guido Schmidt too confirmed that it had been terrible. Ribbentrop had been kind, he had been the only one. Now the treaty had to be ratified by Miklas. The good old catholic Miklas, who was under the influence of the Pope, was not easy to fell. We had to fight for 3 days with the result that even the threat of an invasion was made, that Miklas's confessor finally was informed by us. Finally Miklas signed the contract but with greatest repugnance. You know the result. A Ministry was formed with Seyss, Schuschnigg took the opportunity of not only taking in Seyss but also other people who were to counterbalance him. Also a possibility for activity of the National Socialists was allowed, not for the NSDAP, a considerable enlargement of the demographic department [volkspolitisches Referat]. These demographic departments had already been set up before with consent of the Reich. Their purpose was to form an outlet for the spokesmen of the nationalistic part of the population. I must state here, that these demographic experts worked very well and the men were all decent without exception. The most difficult case at the time seemed to be in Carinthia. The chief of section Perkonig was described to us in a biased way. In Maier-Kaibitsch's office-room Perkonig sided unconditionally with the party and he kept his promise. In that way we had the possibility through this man in whom Zernatto as well as Schuschnigg confided, to have news brought to both these men. And besides these demographic departments were organized with Seyss as chief and Jury as his deputy. The leadership of the party the Fuehrer had transferred to party member Klausner who in the meantime had had a conversation with the Fuehrer at the Reich Chancery at Berlin where he had made a report to the Fuehrer about the development in the last years. So shortly before the decisive actions, the complete unity of the NSDAP was reestablished. Klausner re-established the old construction, which had been formed for the first time at the Kaertner Hof in 1935 which had been renewed in 1936 and which then had to struggle with difficulties for a long while. Now came a period during which we had to be ever so careful and had to be clever politicians. [Page 11] It was therefore difficult, as it was clear that Schuschnigg looked for possibilities to get out of the Berchtesgaden agreement. Schuschnigg wanted to bring the party into opposition to the policies of the Reich. Schuschnigg figured that the German Reich |