the remark that Hitler wanted to clear up the Russian question first, a campaign of three months being expected. Then the undertaking against England was to start. An undertaking against Gibraltar, which was to start in Spain, and the occupation of the Canaries were also operationally being prepared. German Intelligence officers were already in these islands and were preparing a strengthening of the coastal artillery by making German guns available for this purpose. For the undertaking against Russia, the thing was primarily to occupy the Ukraine rapidly and later do the same to the Caucasus area because of the oil wells. I learned from Rosenberg's assistant that the staffs required for the large scale exploitation of the oil fields had already been formed. I should also like to add that the torpedoing of the "Athenia" caused great excitement in the High Command. Raeder personally ordered the strictest secrecy. The composition of the notices for the press regarding the handling of this case was done by the press officer on the staff of the Supreme Commander, Lt. Cdr. Alfred Wolf. Lt. Cdr. Wolf worked fundamentally on Raeder's instructions and then issued to the Propaganda Ministry the notices that had been prepared in accordance therewith. Raeder's attitude to Hitler was very caustic, and he by no means recognized Himmler as a leader, and particularly not as a military leader. During the period when Heydrich was still Chief of the Gestapo, Raeder received reports on many current problems, mainly concerning disagreements in the church, naval questions, Pastor Niemoller, etc. Raeder had no sympathy for Goering either, as he hated him as a spendthrift, boastful, and gluttonous individual. I have written down the above statements from memory; as I have knowledge of the entire inward and outward correspondence in the Supreme Commander's office on the strength of the records and other documents, I have merely selected these few items. Naturally I could at all times give particulars of any questions that were discussed in the Supreme Commander's Office, insofar as they relate to the period previous to my dismissal on the 21st April 1942. My dismissal from my position as an official of the Armed Forces resulted from the following two reasons: (a) I was on several occasions strongly advised (by the Naval Administrative Department) to join the Party as soon as possible, as any further promotion to Regierungsrat [senior major] would depend on this. I refused to do so on principle. I must point out that in my parent's home I had been brought up in the spirit of the Social Democratic Party, and I have always remained loyal to this conviction. As a soldier and later as an official of the Armed Forces I always stuck to this conviction and frequently expressed this. (b) My marriage having been unhappy for many years led to my entering upon relations with another woman, whom I intended to marry, which fact became known officially. Being a uniformed official of the Armed Forces equivalent in rank to an officer, these relations with another woman were held to be a breach of the code of honor. Because of my irreproachable official qualifications I was granted a 50 percent pension. I then took an industrial position, and from the 1st July 1942 until the 28th February 1944 I worked as office manager at the Differdinger steelworks at Differdinger, Luxemburg. Here I had many quarrels with the Kreisleiter in Esch, as I had stood up for Luxembergers on several occasions and had several times shown people collating for the Party the door. On the basis of an order of the Kreisleiter, every Reich German had to have some kind of function in the party, otherwise he would be expelled from Luxemburg. I remained passive, and, in spite of being 42 was appointed by the Kreisleiter an Oberscharfuehrer [sergeant major] in the Hitler Youth. As I did not take any interest, and the Hitler Youth of Differdinger was opposed to anything German, I was relieved of my post again after three months without having performed any duties. On the occasion of a large meeting, the Kreisleiter referred to me as a "mutineer" and this settled the matter for me. As I expected further difficulties from the Kreisleiter, I kept on looking for another job, and on the 28th February left my position and took over a similar job with the "Gustloff" works in Hirtenberg, Lower Austria. I remained in this position until the 2nd of April 1945 when this area became a Russian war zone. Until the 15th of October 1945 I was in Pondorf, Upper Austria, as a refugee, and got to Lindenscheid via Dortmund in a refugee transport. I had selected this destination so as to seek here, in the British Zone, for the possibility of finding work in industry or in connection with the Navy. When, during this time, I followed the progress of the Nurnberg trials, I said to myself that my statements might possibly be of some use, and on the 10th of January 1946 I called on the Military Government. The writing down of my career results from this call, and I have written it voluntarily. I swear and confirm on oath that the above mentioned career N corresponds to the truth, and that it was drawn up to the best of E The Fuehrer's decision in connection Regarding the reception of the Reich Protector and Secretary of State Frank by the Fuehrer, I have learned the following from authentic sources: To begin with, the Minister of Justice, Guertner, gave a report on the Czech resistance movement, during the course of which he maintained that the first trial of the four chief ring leaders would shortly take place before the People's Court. The Fuehrer objected to this procedure and declared that execution squads were good enough for Czech insurgents and rebels. It was a mistake to create martyrs through legal sentences, as was proved in the case of Andreas Hofer and Schlageter. The Czechs would regard any sentence as an injustice. As this matter had already entered the path of legal procedure it was to be continued within this form. The trials were to be postponed until after the war, and then amidst the din of the victory celebrations the proceeding would pass unnoticed. Only death sentences could be pronounced, but would be commuted later on to life imprisonment or deportation. Regarding the question of the future of the Protectorate, the Fuehrer touched on the following three possibilities: 1. Continuation of Czech autonomy, in which the Germans would live in the Protectorate as co-citizens with equal rights. This possibility was however, out of the question, as one had always to reckon with Czech intrigues. 2. The deportation of the Czechs and the Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by German settlers. This possibility was out of the question too, as its execution would take a hundred years. 3. The Germanization of the Bohemian and Moravian area by germanizing the Czechs, i.e., by their assimilation. The latter would be possible with the greater part of the Czech people. Those Czechs against whom there were racial objections or who were anti-German were to be excepted from this assimilation. This category was to be weeded out. The Fuehrer decided in favor of the third possibility; he gave orders via Reich Minister Lammers, to put a stop to the multitude of plans regarding partition of the Protectorate. The Fuehrer further decided that, in the interests of a uniformed policy with regard to the Czechs, a central Reich authority for the whole of the Bohemian and Moravian area should remain at Prague. The present status of the Protectorate thus continues. The Fuehrer's decision followed the lines of the memoranda submitted by the Protector and Secretary of State Frank. [Signed] Dr. ZIEMKE. To the Foreign Office in Berlin. TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-747 AFFIDAVIT OF MAX PAULY, born on 1.6.1907 at WESSELBUREN at present at ALTONA. 1. At the time at which I took up my appointment as Commandant of the Concentration camp NEUENGAMME in November 1942, all personnel were Waffen SS. Later, in summer 1944, single men and small units came from the Army and Airforce, who were taken over by the Waffen SS. They were issued with new paybooks and clothed by the Waffen SS. In summer 1944 the camp also got SS auxiliaries and female warders [Aufseherinnen], who did not belong to the SS. 2. In cases where camp inmates worked for the Navy, the guards were provided by the Navy, if they worked on the removal of debris in the City of Hamburg, the guards were provided by the police. Likewise the Airforce provided guards for the outposts at Porta, Helmsted and Hanover which worked for the SS Sonderinspektion I. 3. The total strength of the SS in NEUENGAMME amounted to approximately 500-600 men in November 1942. In summer 1944 this figure had increased to approximately 2500 and at the time of the capitulation the number of SS troops employed in NEUENGAMME and its outposts [Aussenkommandos] may have been 2500-3000. 4. Replacements for NEUENGAMME came from all units of the Waffen SS, from 1944 onwards a great number were Volksdeutsche from Slovakia, the Banat, Danzig-West-Prussia, etc. Personnel were posted from all Trainings and Holding units of the Waffen SS; to name any specific unit is, therefore, impossible. 5. Due to the increasing demands of the field units of the Waffen SS an exchange of personnel took place, younger age groups were replaced by older ones. The replacement affected approximately 500-1000 men. During my term of duty from November 1942 to April 1945 approximately 4000 SS men have served at one time or another at NEUENGAMME and its outposts. 6. There was no difference in the employment of personnel, be it in the camp or as guard. A man could be transferred from the Camp staff to guard battalion at any time and vice versa, which occurred continuously. [sgd.] Max Pauly. Sworn before me this 15th day of March 1946 at the Mil. Gov. Prison at ALTONA. [sgd.] A. R. Frisby, Major, RCASC, SO II, Fin/Int, HQ Mil. Gov., Hansestadt Hamburg. TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-788 "DER STURMER" No. 8, 24th February 1944. [Extract from an article signed by Streicher.] Whoever does what a Jew does is a scoundrel, a criminal. And he who repeats and wishes to copy him deserves the same fate, annihilation, death. TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-789 "DER STURMER" No. 9, 2nd March 1944. [Extract from an article signed by Ernst Hiemer.] We do not know whether the Jew Steinbeck is right when he phophesied to the Jewish people that for them the moon has gone |