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I can give you further details, addresses, etc., concerning the witnesses, further witnesses and the accused, after I had access to my luggage, which at the moment is in Nuemauenster.

[signed] Kurt Dietmann. Sworn by the said Deponent WALTER KURT DIETMANN, voluntarily at Kiel, on 3rd May 1946, before me Frederick Michael Warner, Captain, detailed by C.inC. British Army of the Rhine.

[signed] F. M. Warner, Capt.

Investigating Officer.

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-843

Telegram (Secret Code V)
Oslo, 28th March 1940, 24.00 hours.
Arrived: 29th March, 1940, 5.45 hours.
No.410 of 28th March.

Most urgent!

For the Reich Minister and Secretary of State, with reference to Telegram No. 406 of 28th March.

1. When I charged Foreign Minister Koht, in today's discussion about submarine "U 21”, with last week's operations of British warships in Norwegian territorial waters, he declared that the Norwegian navy had in every case succeeded in preventing the carrying out and conclusions of warlike actions even if one could assume that an attempt was made in that direction. He also believed that the Norwegian navy would in future succeed in protecting and maintaining shipping in Norwegian territorial waters. He added, in confidence, that the British behaviour seemed to him to be intended [Marginal Note: Group Missing) and to provoke Germany into starting warlike operations herself, which would give the British a free hand in Norwegian waters. The British apparently did not want to take upon themselves the responsibility for openly violating Norwegian territory and Norwegian territorial waters without cause, and for carrying out warlike operations in them.

2. The future will show whether Foreign Minister Koht sees things quite right. It definitely appears, however, as I have frequently pointed out, that the British have no intentions of landing, but that they want to disturb shipping in Norwegian territorial waters, perhaps, as Koht thinks, in order to provoke Germany. Of course, it is also possible that the British behaviour last week, which I have pointed out as well, will grow into more or less regular and increasing interference in territorial waters in order to strike a blow at our iron ore shipments along the Norwegian coasts.

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3. The firm intention of Norway to maintain her neutrality and to insure that Norway's neutrality rules are respected can be accepted as a fact. The internment of the submarine “U 21” can be traced back to these fearful endeavours to prevent any doubts arising as to this intention of Norway's; this does not of course affect all our criticism of Norway's attitude.

To this belongs also the order to fire given to Norwegian antiaircraft units and the navy, of which the English were notified too, on the occasion of the Norwegian protest against the British trespass on Norwegian territorial waters.

4. As seen from here, the attempt to fortify Norway further in her desire to keep neutral and thus prejudice her gradually more and more against England would seem worth while. While doing this, we might state that any deviation from this, harmful to our interests, or the inability to maintain this line, would confront us with serious decisions.

Braeuer.

[graphic]

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-844

TELEGRAM

(Secret Code V)
Stockholm, 4.4.1940.
Received, 5.4.1940
No. 383 of the 4.4.1940

taken down by telephone

MOST URGENT TO BE KEPT SECRET. Foreign Minister Gunther today asked me to call on him in order to discuss the political situation. He started by saying that lately much had been written and said about threatened action against Scandinavia by the Western powers. On the other hand, the Swedish government had information that in Northern Germany, particularly in Stettin and other Baltic ports, large numbers of troops were concentrated. He attached value to the German government receiving complete clarity about the real situation which the Swedish government considers to exist, and had caused the Swedish ambassador in Berlin to make an explanation to this effect to Secretary of State Weizsacker. The Swedish government had no reason at all to believe in an impending action by the Western powers against Scandinavia. On the contrary, on the strength of all official reports and other information, it considered the situation lately to be much calmer. In par

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ticular, Gunther did not at all believe in the possibility of the carrying out of a British coup against the Swedish ore area via Narvik. Sweden had at this moment a very strong armed force in the north which could frustrate any such attempt, and Sweden was determined, now as ever, to repel by force of arms any violation of her territory. Without being a prophet, Gunther did not believe in a British act of violence against Norway either, though of course he could not speak of this with as much certainty as with regard to Sweden; at any rate, however, the Norwegian government, with which he was in close contact, was of the same opinion. Ore transports from Narvik were too small in relation to Sweden's total deliveries of ore to Germany, which would soon be possible again in the Baltic also, to counterbalance the great risk for Britain. In this respect Gunther thought the threatening elaborations in the allied press were more likely an attempt to provoke Germany.

Where Russia was concerned, also, the Swedish government had no fears. Gunther mentioned in this connection that the project of a Nordic defense pact was not a subject for speedy development and any threatening attitude towards Russia was out of the question. Moreover the Finnish government's matter regarding the project which it had put forward during the closing stage of the peace negotiations was not even known in detail to the Swedish government.

In conclusion, Gunther requested me to report his statements to my government, and repeated that the Swedish government attached the greatest value to the German government not erroneously getting the impression of the existence of circumstances which might evoke the possibility-he would not use the word necessity at all—of special measures by Germany with regard to Scandinavia.

Gunther's carefulness in expressing himself gave me the impression that he was filled with a certain anxiety about a possibly impending German move in a northerly direction. Possibly, today's announcement of the "Aftonbladet" on the report by the journalist Steer to the “Daily Telegraph" played a part in this (I refer you to today's D.N.B. [German News Bureau] report Stockholm). A remark by the cabinet secretary Boheman points to this, who jokingly asked me before I entered the minister's room whether I had read the terrible news in "Aftonbladet" too.

[graphic]

Telegram

(Secret Code V) Stockholm 5 April 1940 14.40 hours Received: 5 April 1940 18.35 hours No. 386 dated 5. 4.

Most urgent! Info for O.K.H.

Serious anxiety exists in Swedish military and government circles regarding possible German military preventive measures in Scandinavia against the announced intensification of war measures by the Western Powers. Swedish and Norwegian military government authorities consider it unlikely that military measures will be taken against Scandinavia by the Western Powers. Press reports on this subject by the Western Powers are attempting to provoke Germany. Millitary Attache.

BELOW.
Produced in 5 copies, of which have been delivered:
No. 1 to Pol. I g with 3 copies.

2 to Reich Minister for Foreign Affairs.
3 to St. S.
4 to B.R.A.M.

5 to U.St.Pol. This is No. 5

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-846

Telegram

(Secret Code V) Copenhagen, the 26th Sept 1939 19,36 hrs Received: the 26th Sept 1939 20,45 hrs No. 168 of the 26.9.

With reference to Ministerialdirektor Wiehl's telephonic directive of the 21st Sept. and to the telegraphic report of the 25th Sept. No. 167.

Sinking of Swedish and Finnish ships by our submarines have caused great worry here owing to Danish food transports to England. If Government circles here only make reports containing reservations, this reserve by no means represents the real feeling, but rests on directives from the governments dictated by repercussion in foreign politics. The Foreign Minister expressed serious disquiet to me. In accordance with orders I again pointed out that we must reserve the right to use such measures at all times against imports to England as the British for their part use with regard to our imports from neutral countries. But

I think that our interests would, at least at the present stage, suffer political damages here which it will be difficult to repair if normal Danish transports were in fact to be sunk by German naval units.

RENTHE FINK.
Prepared in 13 copies of which
No. 1 has gone to W (working staff)

2 has gone to the Reich Foreign Minister
3 has gone to St.S.
4 has gone to Head of the Organization abroad (AD)
5 has gone to B.R.A.M.
6 has gone to Dir Pass
7 has gone to Dir.Pol.
8 has gone to Dg. Pg.
9 has gone to Dir. W.
10 has gone to Dir. Legal.
11 has gone to Dir. Press.
12 has gone to Dir. [?]
13 has gone to Personal staff (Hewel)

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-847

Telegram (Secret Code V) Copenhagen 26 March 1940 9.00 hours Received 26 March 1940 11.35 hours No. 216 dated 25-3

The King of Denmark to-day summoned me to his presence in order to tell me what a deep impression the sinking of six Danish ships last week, apparently without warning, had made on him and on the whole country. Sorrow at material losses could always be got over finally, but the heaviest burden was the loss of life of so many Danish seamen, who were only sailing in the service of their country. He asked me whether it was not possible to arrange for sufficient time for the saving of lives if of nothing else. I replied that the reason why the ship sank had not yet been elucidated. In any case, our naval units always kept strictly to the Prize regulations, but vessels sailing in enemy convoy or in the vicinity of the same took upon themselves all the risks of war; insofar as any sinkings had been carried out without warning, it seemed that they could be traced back to the German notifications made to date. At the same time I pointed out the dangers of the waters around the British coast, where neutral shipping is inevitably involved in compromising situations on account of measures taken by the British. The King assured me emphatically 744400—47–63

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