9 Copies, this is copy No. 8. IMMEDIATE I Berlin, 27 Sept, 1939. Today, as ordered, I discussed with Admiral SCHNIEWIND the questions of sea warfare expounded by the Naval Operational Staff in their letter of the 26th September. Admiral SCHNIEWIND had called in Captain Fricke, Captain Neubauer, Senior Naval Judge Advocate Eckhardt, and Captain [?]. The Naval Ops Staff will draft a memorandum on the discussion. Agreement was reached on the following points: (1) Enemy and neutral merchant vessels which, on being stopped, transmit; those signalling and those blacked out, may be sunk without warning. All neutral states will receive notification to this effect. The text will be prepared at the Foreign Office and, after agreement with the Naval Ops Staff (Eckhardt), will be dispatched by telegraph to all our missions, not later than today. This notification should not forecast torpedoing, but should only be a warning that ships will expose themselves to danger by behaving in these ways. I did not discuss the question of limiting the use of these measures to certain zones, as is provided for in one case in inclosure (1) to the letter from the Naval Ops Staff. It appears desirable to include such a limitation so that the Americans cannot say we were doing such things off their shores. This could be considered when the notification is formulated. (2) As from a certain date, still to be determined, British and French merchant vessels may be torpedoed without warning, as it can be taken for granted that they will be armed. No notice will be given. First one should start with an intensive propaganda campaign about the arming of enemy merchant ships, lasting approximately four days. Before publishing final orders, the Naval Ops Staff will once more come to an agreement with the Foreign Office. Both the Naval Ops Staff and the Foreign Office will immediately examine the question whether, in view of the present legal situation in the USA, American citizens travelling on enemy vessels may do so only at their own risk or whether it is forbidden altogether. Should such laws not exist, I have put forward the wish of the Foreign Office to hold up these measures until the conclusion of American legislation; however I made no condition of this wish. (3) It has been agreed not to torpedo neutral merchant ves sels in the Baltic Ocean or in the eastern part of the North Sea whenever possible. Admiral Schniewind said that, in view of the employment of U-boats, no absolutely binding assurance could be given in this respect. (4) It has been agreed that food stuffs with the exception of fruits and vegetables are to be treated in practice as absolute contraband goods. This is done in the expectation that, before the decisions of the Prize Court are reached, more obvious details about the corresponding British and French attitude will have come to hand. (5) The question of Italian, Japanese, Spanish, and Russian merchant vessels was not raised. The notification in par. (1) is in any case to be sent also to the governments of these countries. I shall make certain, furthermore that, as has already been foreshadowed, further discussion shall take place with regard to this question. II The Naval Operational Staff indicated anew that the Fuehrer will probably order ruthless U-Boat warfare in the restricted area in the very near future. The previous participation of the Foreign Office remains guaranteed. In this connection I made special reference to the United States of America and demanded that this measure should not be put into effect until corresponding legislation by the United States had been assured. The following points were mentioned during the discussion of this question. In the course of Monday's discussion, Ministerialdirektor Wiehl reserved the right to make further exceptions for the Prosecution of economic warfare at sea in case of negotiated agreements, especially with the Northern Countries. Captain Neubauer pointed out-Admiral Schniewind agreeing-that these agreements could not be allowed to exercise a limiting effect on ruthless U-Boat warfare should the latter be introduced, so that it might perhaps be better not to make any agreements which would subsequently have to be broken. III With reference to the intended belt of 30-500 sea miles surrounding the American States, it was agreed to await first more detailed news of the American intention. Secretary of State Office of Reich Foreign Secretary. Dg.Pol. Dir.W. Director of Law Pol. I.M. TE U-Boat Construction 1920-1935 Details given below regarding German participation in U-Boat building between 1920-1935 have been extracted from a series of Essays on "The Operational and Tactical considerations of the German Navy and the consequent measures taken for its expansion between 1919-1939" contained among the files of Viceadmirals ASSMANN and GLADISCH, who were in the Historical Section of the German Admiralty. [Page 38] But although, as was stated, in nearly all spheres of armament where the Navy was concerned, the Treaty of Versailles was violated in the letter and all the more in the spirit, or at least its violation was prepared, a long time before the 16th March 1935, this probably took place in no other sphere on the one hand so early and on the other hand under such difficult circumstances as in the construction of a new submarine arm. The Treaty of Versailles had only been in force a few months (since the 10th January 1920), when it was already violated in this point. Already in the year 1920, the Germania shipyards and the Vulkan shipyards with the permission of the Naval Command sold plans of the German U-cruiser (U 142) and the mine U-cruiser (U 117) to Japan, which used these plans as a basis for the construction of their own U-cruisers under the supervision of German U-boat builders, partly under the personal direction of the former Chief builder of the Germania shipyard. In 1925-28 a former naval officer took part, with the permission of the Naval command in testing these submarines which were the first to be built after the war according to German plans (abroad) and was thus able to preserve and improve the valuable experience he had gained as a member of the former commission for taking over U-boats. In 1922 three German shipbuilding yards founded a German U-boat Construction Bureau in Holland under a Dutch covering name with about 30 engineers and builders. In 1925 a Dutch shipbuilding yard built two 500-ton U-boats for Turkey on the plans of this bureau which enjoyed the financial and personal support of the Naval Command. In the solution of this question too Captain Lohmann was concerned decisively. There followed the construction of three 500-ton and one 100-ton submarines for Finland which had a German naval adviser, according to plans of the "Dutch" bureau in Finnish shipyards. The trial cruises of these ships under German direction could be utilized for the first time for the practical training of a small number of active German naval and engineer officers in the submarine services. Three submarines for Sweden followed * * * finally the especially valuable and important relations to Spain. In Spain in 1927/28 the Navy made possible with the King and Primo de Rivera the construction of the first prototype ship of a submarine plan, corresponding entirely to the demands of the German Navy, of about 750 tons in the shipyard of Eche Varietta in Cadiz. Already in the autumn of 1927 the naval construction department was commissioned to carry out the construction in Spain by the Chief of the Naval Command, Admiral Zenker, who accepted the responsibility despite all the difficulties in the field of home politics. The working out of the project and the drawing up of the construction plans took place in the Dutch Bureau. After completion in 1931, the ship carried out trial runs and diving exercises from Cadiz and Cartagena, under German direction, and with German personnel consisting of officers, engineers, naval construction students, and foremen. The intended purchase by the Spanish Navy was thwarted by the political revolution in Spain. Only in 1934 did it become possible to move the ship from Spain to Turkey whose Navy purchased it. This boat, which is now the Turkish submarine "Guer" became the prototype for the "U 25" and "U 26". It had, in the meantime, been possible in 1930 to lay the basis in Finland also for the construction of a submarine of 250 tons which was to correspond to the military demands of the German Navy. The fundamental intention in this connection was to create a type of submarine which would permit the inconspicuous preparation of the greatest possible number of components that could be assembled at shortest imaginable notice * * The Finnish U-boat was the first U-boat plan to be worked out in Germany and to be executed; only for the working out of details was the Dutch bureau still called upon. The Finnish 250 ton vessel became the prototype for "U.1" to "U.24"; to be sure "U.7" to "U.24" were lengthened and improved in order to double the radius of action. The building and the thorough trial of the prototype vessel made it possible to obtain the parts for "U.1" to "U.24" in 1933/35 long before the order for assembling the vessels, to make preparations for this assembly to the extent possible while maintaining secrecy. Engines, gear, and accessories for 12 vessels were stored in Kiel and it was made possible to build 6 U-boats simultaneously. The individual parts for both the 712 ton vessels "U 25" and "U 26" were secretly built and stored before the order to assemble was issued. As a result the assembly of those largish vessels took only 9 to 10 months. [Page 156] * At the beginning of 1935 there were probably 6 250 ton boats ready for assembly and 6 275 ton and 2 750 ton boats on which preparatory work was being done; about four months were needed for assembling the small ships and about 10 for the big ones, dating from the 1.2.35, but everything else was still quite uncertain * * It is probably just in the sphere of submarine construction that Germany adhered the least to the restrictions of the GermanBritish Treaty. Considering the quantity of U-boats which had already been ordered, about 55 U-boats could have been provided for up to 1938. In reality 118 were ready or ordered. The preparations for the new U-boat arm were made so early, so thoroughly, and so secretly that already 11 days after the conclusion of the German-British Naval Treaty, which permitted the construction of U-boats, the first German U-boat could be commissioned on the 29th June 1935. PARTIAL TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-855 Information relating to German preparations for U-Boat construction and infringement of Clauses of the Versailles Treaty, prior to 1935 Lecture by THIELE The following information is taken from a lecture on "The Development of the Naval Budget_1930-1939" by Secretary (Flottenintendant) THIELE, OKM (E) (Budget Department of the German Admiralty) at the German Naval Training Center for Administrative Officers in Prague, 12th July, 1944. [Page 22] Ship Construction Plan The era of the very large development of the Navy had therefore come at the moment of the seizure of power. Already in the first year after this, in March 1935, the construction of battle cruisers with a displacement of 27,000 tons was proceeded to. Such a vessel was ordered to be constructed. Thus one of the classes of the Treaty of Versailles which were the most important for us was at once violated in the naval sphere in a manner which in a |