aims. His statements were obviously made in full consciousness of serious responsibility. His estimation of the affairs and personalities that came under review was clear and definite.

Herr v. Waechter drew up for me too a picture of the situation in Austria which was in some of its colors, even darker and more serious than it had appeared to us here up till now. The extremist tendencies of the National Socialists in Austria were constantly on the increase. Terrorist acts were multiplying. Irrespective of who actually undertook the demolitions and other terrorist acts in individual cases, each such act provoked a new wave of extremism and also of desperate acts. As Herr v. Waechter repeatedly and sadly stressed, uniformity of leadership was lacking. The SA did what it wanted and what it, for its part, considered necessary. The political leadership at the same time introduced measures which sometimes meant the exact opposite. Thus, the great terrorist action as the result of which the railway lines leading to Vienna were blown up was by no means committed by Marxists, but by the Austrian SA, and indeed against the wishes of the political leadership which, as he believed, did not participate in any way either in the act or in its preparations. Such is the picture as a whole. In detail, in individual provinces and districts, the confusion was, if possible, even greater. One main seat of unrest and therefore a particular source of danger for sudden outbursts of mob passions was and still remained Carinthia, the country where the mismanagement and want under the Dollfuss regime were most felt and where National Socialism was, therefore, most successful. Herr v. Waechter thought that here improvements must be introduced most speedily, and namely by means of centralization of all forces active in the interests of National Socialism both in Austria itself and outside Austria. Personal questions should play no part here. The decisive word in this connection could of course be given only by the Fuehrer himself. He, Waechter, was in full agreement with Herr Habicht on all these matters. As far as he knew, Herr Habicht had already succeeded in having a brief conversation with the Reich Chancellor today. Baron Waechter himself had, on the contrary, so far been unable during his present visit to put forward his views and suggestions, which were at the same time those of the authoritative party leaders in Austria. For a while peace and order reigned within the party in Austria, when after the February events the Reich Chancellor prohibited any propaganda activities and issued an order for a truce to be observed along the whole line. This was naturally obeyed by all departments. But everyone supposed that a solution was being prepared and that,

by his basic orders, the Fuehrer desired to create the necessary
peaceful and favorable atmosphere for forthcoming negotiations.
But when nothing followed in the meantime, and on the other
hand the counter measures of the Austrian administration grew
more and more brutal and incisive from day to day, the radical
elements moved afresh and came forward with the statement
that the Chancellor had issued his order only for tactical rea-
sons, but was inwardly in agreement with every manly act of
opposition and had in view, as the true political aim, merely the
weakening of Dollfuss' hateful system, though in a way which
was as unobtrusive as possible. They were now working on this
principle. In the course of the discussions, this idea, which goes
on secretly smouldering, was met with again and again. A change
must soon be made and a uniform leadership
[illegible]
otherwise Herr v. Waechter concluded his impressive description,
any day a disaster might occur which would have the worst con-
sequences from the point of view of foreign policy, not for Austria
alone, but above all for Germany.

* *

During the conversation, the visitor was called to the telephone on urgent business. Herr v. Waechter received a telephone warning from Munich not to return to Vienna, because he would be faced with arrest on the frontier already. An impressive illustration of what he has just told me about the intensification of Austrian police measures.

To my question as to what he intended to do now, Herr v. Waechter shrugged his shoulders and confined himself to remarking that he would first have to discuss it with his party friends. I told Herr v. Waechter that in view of the importance of his report and the dangers which arose from it, I would make a suitable report to the Reich Minister and to the State Secretary. Herr v. Waechter asked me to do so.

[sgd] Koepke

TRANSLATION OF DOCUMENT D-872

Extracts from the War Diary of the German Naval Attache in
Tokyo (PG/32145)

3.12.41.

1800. The Naval Attache extended an invitation to several officers of the Japanese Naval Ministry. It transpires from the conversation that the negotiations in Washington must be deemed to have broken down completely and that, quite obviously, speedy military action to the South by the Japanese armed forces is to be counted on.

6.12.41.

Conversation with Commander Shiba The outcome of the conversation is reported to Berlin in the following signal:

Naval Attache 1251 Top Secret.

1. Last week, America proposed a nonaggression pact between the United States, Britain, Russia, and Japan. In view of the Tripartite Pact and the high compensatory demands, Japan rejected this offer. Negotiations have therefore completely broken down,

2. The Japanese Armed Forces foresaw this development and consented to Kurusu's being sent only to impress the people with the fact that no stone had been left unturned.

3. The Japanese Armed Forces have already decided (three weeks ago) that war is inevitable, even if the United States, at the last minute, should make still greater concessions. sponding measures are under way.

Corre

4. Oshima is authorized to conduct negotiations in Berlin in accordance with Naval Attache's 214/15 paragraph 5.

5. Addition. Naval Attache: No exact details are available as to the zero hour for the commencement of the Southern Offensive. All the evidence, however, indicates that it may be expected to start within three weeks and simultaneously attacks on Siam, the Philippines, and Borneo will be launched.

6. The ambassador has no knowledge of the transmission of the telegram, but is acquainted with its contents.

7. The contents of paragraph six will be abbreviated in future to the codeword "Switch-off" ["Ausschaltung"]. In which case, please do not pass to Foreign Office.

Shiba said that the outbreak of hostilities was definitely to be expected this year. He could not, however, give me an exact zero hour in view of the necessity for surprise. A state of war with Britain and America would certainly be established by Christmas. From this I got the impression: in three weeks.

12.15

Document 1014-PS

Prosecution comparison of documents 1014-PS and Raeder 27.

F. Everybody must make a point of it that we were determined from the beginning to fight the West

No.

P. 156, line 4: We have to show that we had always reckoned with England and France.