correctly and fully designated by the term ruler, governor, or judge. Far, very far, be it from me to deny the paternal element as constituting a part of that peculiar relation which must of necessity be sui generis, and to which nothing can be analogous. In a high and delightful sense God is the universal father, seeing he giveth to all life and breath and all things; his name is love, and his tender mercies are over all his works: but then we must dismiss from our minds many of the ideas which human paternity suggests; for he is a father that rules, and rules according to fixed and wisest principles, and no more shrinks from the maintenance of law, whatever it may involve, than if his sole character were that of lawgiver and judge. To deny, on the one hand, the paternal character altogether, affirming that the rectoral was all that existed; and, on the other, to deny the rectoral, and press the paternal exclusively; would be alike remote from truth. In fact no one word-perhaps no combination of epithets-can adequately set forth the relation in which God stands to the intelligences he has formed, and in whom he cannot but feel the interest of a Creator. He may be correctly said to sustain any relation which implies production, care, and rule; and may be termed the Master, Parent, Benefactor, Protector, Sovereign, Legislator, Governor, Judge, &c. But every one of these terms, when applied to him, must be greatly modified from their application to human beings. They are all only various aspects in which he is presented to our minds, when we look at him through the medium of human associations. The present point, then, is this: -that the facts which fill the world, as well as those contained in revelation, compel us in thinking of God to deny the exclusively paternal character, and to maintain that there is, to say the least, a very large proportion of the rectoral element in the peculiar relation that he sustains.

But a conclusion grows out of all this, which was intimated at the commencement of the chapter, where it was stated that much of our subsequent views necessarily arose from the idea we formed of the nature of the relation subsisting between God and man: a statement which was illustrated by saying that our views of sin would receive their color at this point. And so important is this to our present subject, and so palpably lying at the very founda

tion of a correct religious system, that it may be allowed to show the connection.

If for example (1.) we considered sin merely as an insult offered to God, an affront put upon his Glorious Majesty; awful as is the idea of a creature insulting the Infinite Jehovah, yet some might be ready to deem it but generous in such a being to pass by the affront. They might think it more becoming the dignity of Him whose throne never could be subverted, whose happiness never could be affected, to overlook, than to punish the misbehavior, though ever so criminal, of his creatures. And this notion is strongly rooted in many minds; for among the better class of men it is held a mark of a little spirit to be wrathful and resentful, while it is esteemed magnanimous to pass by offences and insults. And as, if one man put an affront however serious upon another, the offended party may forgive, without standing upon the reparation that he might claim; so it is thought by multitudes, that God would only be acting in a manner becoming his own dignity, if he were to pass by, without notice, the demeanor of men towards him. It is taken for granted that the Most High could if he pleased pardon all offences, without punishing them; and that this would be the most dignified and, if one might say so, magnanimous course to adopt. Whence it is very easy for such persons to conclude that he will do so; and to which idea vast numbers are secretly trusting. Hence, therefore, the intimate connection of this whole subject with the doctrine we have under review.

Or if (2.) we regarded God merely as the proprietor of the universe, and the Lord of all his creatures, to whose services he had a claim, so that to withhold these services was to defraud God of his right; or as the prophet speaks, to rob God, so that we become, as it were, indebted to him, as the scriptures sometimes speak of our trespasses as debts; then also some might be ready to imagine that (as any human creditor can, if he chooses to do so, excuse any debtor the sum he owes; and for the most part will do so if the latter have nothing to pay with), it would be but kind in God to forgive his creatures the debts they are utterly unable to discharge. At all events, it is alleged, there would be no impropriety in thus obliterating the demand; seeing that God himself could not in the faintest degree be wronged. And, certainly, if the scriptures had spoken of

sin in no other terms; and if this accommodated use of the word 'debt' to denote sins were understood literally, and correctly taken to be the exclusive notion to be formed of sin; it would not seem altogether unreasonable to adopt such a strain.

Again, if sin be regarded (3.) chiefly as to its own intrinsic evil, and a sinner be considered merely as one who has deformed his nature, and rendered himself vile and odious; then, upon reformation, all the consequences of sin might perhaps be expected to terminate. And thus one would think nothing necessary but reformation; upon which the creature, heretofore alienated, would as a matter of course be restored to the perfect favor of his Maker.

Thus we see how necessarily our views of sin, and therefore of what ought to be the consequences of sin, grow out of the conclusion we form touching the relation in which we stand to God.

Now we have seen that the character which God sustains is not merely the parental, but also to a very high degree the rectoral; that of a governor and lawgiver. And if this be so, of which I think every impartial observer of the facts of the case must be convinced, our views of sin must differ greatly from those that have been suggested. It is quite true that sin is an awful insult offered to the Majesty of Heaven: true that it is a withholding from God what he has a right to demand from his creatures: and true that, to an infinitely Holy Being who is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity, it is infinitely abhorrent, the abominable thing which he hateth. But all this is an exceedingly deficient statement of the evil of sin; which in addition to all these views is also to be regarded as (4.) a violation of the law given by the Supreme Being, as Governor of the universe; the criminality being not diminished, but heightened by the fact that the lawgiver sustains the parental as well as the rectoral character. In scripture phrase,' sin is the transgression of the law.' Whence it is not difficult, after a little further examination, to reach as a conclusion, the inevitableness of punishment.

CHAPTER THE THIRD.

Moral System-desirableness of-Excellency of law--seen in its nature--tendency--approved by conscience--exemplified by Christ --Propriety of punishment-Yet some not punished--why--Atonement--Bearing of on impenitent-Punishment inevitable

THE fact that sin, over and above all other views of it, is to be especially regarded as the violation of law, rendering the transgressor obnoxious to the displeasure of the Moral Governor, brings us to another branch of our subject, and constrains us to consider the nature of the system under which man is placed, and in which he stands toward his Creator in the relation of the governed to the governor.

It is most abundantly evident from all the circumstances of the case, to which we need not now refer—that God has adopted a plan of government for his intelligent creatures, that is admirably suited to their natures. He governs them not by mere force, as inanimate matter is blindly obedient to the physical impulses to which it is subjected; nor by instinctive impulses, as the brute creation is governed; but by an intelligent appeal to them; making known his will, expressing what he would have them to do, promising rewards to obedience, punishment to transgression. This is how God hath chosen to govern intelligent creatures; it is what is meant by the common phrase, the moral government of God,' which is a government of intelligent creatures, by an appeal to their sense of right, and by an address to their hopes and fears:-in other words, by the presentation of suitable motives; i. e. by rewards and punishments.

On this subject we must dwell a little, as it greatly assists

toward a right conclusion concerning future punishment, and indeed concerning other important doctrines. In fact it would be impossible for us to form correct ideas on our present subject without referring, though briefly, to the na ture of a system of moral government. We may however treat the matter historically, as fact, rather than abstractedly, as doctrine: for our religion is eminently one of facts. That God made man upright, we are assured by the highest authority. Man as a creature was perfect. Not, however, that we are to understand by this anything incompatible with the fact that he was of course devoid of all experience, and was placed only at the very starting point of his course. But there was no suitable endowment withheld; God looked upon him, and pronounced him good. Let us also look at him before sin entered, and while yet the groves of Eden echoed to his joyous tones. He had perceptive faculties, by which he could discern the nature and bearing of things about him he had appetites, the gratification of which would be one source of pleasure, while it would also sustain his being: he had a moral sense, a sense of right and wrong, which would dictate to him as to the proper exercise of both his intellectual and his lower faculties; and he was free to act as he might choose. Thus he had all the faculties we can deem at all desirable; and all his powers, as he came from the Creator's hand, were nicely balanced, or adjusted.

Now let us suppose the improvement, the elevation of this being, to be the benevolent object which his Maker proposes. How shall this be accomplished? In other words, how shall his character be improved, matured? What system shall be adopted with a view to the progressiveness of his character, and thus the increase of his happiness? We have admired him as constituted by his Maker, endowed as we have seen with certain faculties, But must not these faculties be exercised? Can there be growth in character without these faculties being called into exercise? Assuredly not. And if it be wise and good to endow man with moral and intellectual faculties, and with appetites, and with the power of volition, or will, implying choice, it must be wise and good to call into exercise the faculties bestowed: the only way, too, in which we can conceive of real growth in character and happiness. But how much this involves! In fact it involves the