small portion; yet, as far as the eye can extend, we see it to be the same; and we believe it to have no bounds: what is it then? A globe of water! And even this similitude gives us but a faint conception of the Deity; because this globe is limited by its surface; whereas, God has no limits. Wherever he exists, therefore, (and there is no place where he is not,) he exists a God of LOVE.

Just so sure, therefore, as God is the God of the universe, he is love to the universe; and just so sure as he is the God of any individual creature which belongs to the universe, he is love to that individual. For if God be love to human nature, collectively, he is love to each individual which composes human nature. Because the whole of every thing is made up by a collection of all its parts; and unless God be love to the individuals, in their individual capacity, he is not love to the whole; because the whole embraces each individual. Of course, were it possible for God to cease to be love to any individual of the human race, that moment he did so, he would cease to be God to that individual; for God is love. If God loves a creature whom he has made for one moment, he loves that creature as long as it exists, let it be ever so long, as well as every moment of its existence; for God, every moment, is love. And if God has made beings who will exist eternally, God will love them eternally; for God is eternal, and God is love; or, God eternally is love.

All the above propositions appear to be self-evident, and grow out of the very nature of the Deity. Of course they need no proof. For the mind assents to them as soon as they are stated: for it seems a moral impossibility that one of them should be false. How is it possible to maintain the contrary? We might as well undertake to maintain that God can cease to exist, or that he can cease to be what he is LOVE!

God is also unchangeable. "I am the LORD, I change not," is the divine testimony. Of course, if there be a being in the universe whom God does not at this moment, or will not, at any future period, love, it is obvious God never did love that being.But, on the contrary, if God loved man when he created him, he loved him with a perfect knowledge of all that he was, and all that he ever would be. For all events must have been ever present with him who knoweth all things. Why not, then, look upon them with the same affection? or with the same indignation? They surely must have been thus viewed by the Deity. And, therefore, what he loves, he always loves; and what he hates, he always hated. But, it may be asked, how can LOVE exercise a spirit of hatred towards any thing whatever? Answer: Hatred is only a want (or the absence) of love; and love itself cannot love any thing opposite to its own nature, for this would be acting contrary to itself; and this want or absence of love is termed hatred; the same as the want or absence of light is termed darkness, or the absence of heat is termed cold. Sin, therefore, being opposed to the nature of God, he cannot love it, or behold it with the least allowance as an ultimate object, for this very reason, because he loves the sinner. And if he love the sinner, he must disapprove or hate whatever would, if perpetuated, essentially injure the object of his love. But it may be still asked, if God cannot love sin, or behold it with the least allowance, why does he suffer it to exist at all? why did he not prevent it altogether, as it was undoubtedly in his power? This will be more fully answered when we come to treat upon sin.Suffice it to say, for the present, "God meant it unto good;" and if sin can be overruled for good, then it was suffered, not for its own sake, but for the sake of the good which is brought about in the infinitude of the wisdom of the Deity, who superintends and go

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verns all events; so that not even a sparrow falls to the ground without his notice and permission. But it will be seen at once, that this hypothesis limits sin, both as to its nature and its consequences, otherwise no good could come of it. For how can God bring good out of an infinite evil, when he is no more than infinite himself? If sin and holiness are both infinite, both have existed from eternity, and both will exist to eternity; which is the old Manichean error of two eternal principles, good and evil.

2. Under this article, God is love, it will be proper, as I have proposed, to speak of the relation which exists between God and his rational offspring.

It must be obvious to every one who is capable of exercising any reason at all, that there is the same natural relation existing between God and all animated nature, man not excepted; and in this sense, as the wise man has expressed it, "a man has no pre-eminence above a beast-yea, they have all one breath-all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again." (Eccl. iii, 18-20.) But it is no less true that there is a moral relation existing between God and his offspring man; as St. Paul, appealing to the Grecian poets, has said, "We are also his offspring." For unless there be a moral relation between God and man, how could man be subject to a moral law, any more than other animals? The moral faculties given to man prove this moral relation; and it is the only principle on which man can be considered accountable to his Maker. Where there is no moral capacity, there is no moral accountability; and every man is accountable to his Maker exactly in proportion to the degrees of capacity which he hath given him to understand his moral law. But it is the height of absurdity to suppose that he who has but one degree of capacity to understand a divine or moral law, is equally accountable as the man who has ten degrees or more.

It will be seen, however, at once, that this limits the accountability of man; and if his accountability be limited, his criminality is limited, of course.But this subject will be more fully explained when we come to treat of sin.

If there be a moral relation between God and his offspring man, it is evident that this relation, in its nature, is exactly the same to each individual of the human race, notwithstanding the different degrees of capacity which may have been implanted in their moral nature. The father stands in the same relation to all his children, notwithstanding their different dispositions, or different degrees of capacity. As the relation does not depend at all on the capacity of the children, so different degrees of capacity, or even a total want of capacity, does not alter the relation.

This relation is immutable, and co-existent with the existence of the partics. If a child revolts from its parent, or the parent abandons the child, it does not destroy the relation. And it is on the principle of this relation, and this relation alone, that an obligation can be maintained on the part of the child, or a right to govern on the part of the parent.-Hence, if a parent be under the least obligation to a child, in consequence of having been the means of bringing it into the world, that obligation must continue as long as the child is dependant, and the parent is able to provide for its support. This obligation cannot be destroyed by the conduct of the child, let that be as it may; for, the obligation having existed previous to the child's having done either good or evil, the obligation cannot be either increased or diminished by the conduct of the child; and to argue otherwise would strike at the root of all civil society. It will be seen that I am not arguing on the principle of merit; but am speaking of that obligation which grows out of the common law of our moral na

ture, and the relation which exists between parents. and children. The argument, therefore, will hold equally good, and infinitely more forcible, when ap plied to the nature of the Deity, and the relation which exists, and ever will exist, between him and his rational offspring.

"If ye are without chastisement, whereof all are partakers," saith an apostle, "then ye are bastards and not sons." This shows that the apostle considered the relation between God and all mankind the same; for if any are not his children in a moral sense, (God forgive the inquiry,) on what principle, er by what right, does he chastise them?

When we see a person correcting a child, what do we naturally infer from it? Answer: 1. That the person correcting is the parent, master, or guardian of the child and, 2. that the correction is designed for the good of the child. And if we should be justified in making any other conclusion, we should certainly consider the correction not as disciplinary chastisement, but as abuse; and that there was something very wrong in the person correcting. "He that spareth the rod," saith Solomon, "hateth his Son." Hence, a man may use the rod of correction, and yet love his son whom he correcteth. A correction in love, however, is not unmerciful.

On this principle we may see that justice and mercy are not two opposite attributes of the Deity, as has been too often imagined; and hence it has been concluded that,

"A God all mercy is a God unjust."

YOUNG.

But if justice and mercy be opposite to each otherin their nature, neither of them can be infinite; and although this will not be admitted, in so many words, yet conclusions have been drawn which amount to about the same thing. For it has been supposed that