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with the completed draft of an agreement, which met with his full approval. This draft of an agreement was the basis for a final discussion between Wagner and Heydrich towards the end of May 1941. “The contents of this agreement, as far as I remember, were substantially as follows. Its basis was the Fuehrer's command, mentioned at the very beginning of the agreement, that the SIPO and SD should operate within the combat elements of the Field Army, with the mission of utterly smashing all resistance in conquered front-line areas as well as in conquered rear supply zones by every means and as quickly as possible. The various areas were then set down in which the SIPO and SD were to be active and operating. The individual Combat Groups were then assigned to the army groups which were to take part in the campaign and the individual Combat Commandos to the respective armies which were to take part in the campaign. "The Combat Groups and Combat Commandos were to operate in detail : "1. In front-line areas: in complete subordination to the Field Army, tactically, functionally and administratively; "2. In rear operational areas: in merely administrative subordination to the Field Army, but under command and functional control of the RSHA; "3. In rear Army areas: arrangement as in 2; “4. In areas of the civil administration in the East: same as in the Reich. “The tactical and functional authority and responsibility of front-line headquarters of the Field Army over the Combat Commandos found no limitation in the agreement and therefore needed no further clarification. “The agreement made it clear that the administrative subordination embraced not only disciplinary subordination but also the obligation for rear headquarters of the Field Army to support the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos in matters of supply (gasoline, rations, etc.) as well as in the use of the communications network. “This agreement was signed by Heydrich and Wagner in my presence. Wagner signed it either ‘acting for' or 'by order of' the OKH. "After Wagner and Heydrich had affixed their signatures, both of them asked me to leave the room for half an hour. Just while leaving I heard how they both wanted to discuss in complete privacy the Fuehrer's command, which was apparently known in advance by each of them personally, and its far-reaching implications. After the half hour was over I was called in once more just to say goodbye. "Today I read the 'Operational and Situational Report No. 6 of the Combat Groups of the SIPO and SD in the USSR (covering the period from 1 to 31 October 1941),' as well as the 'Comprehensive Report of Combat Group A up to 15 October 1941.' The whole substance of these reports shows that the prime mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD was to undertake and carry out mass executions of Jews, Communists and other elements of resistance. It is also clear from the above-cited 'Comprehensive Report,' which embraces no more than the first four months of these operations, that the cooperation of the respective Oberbefehlshabers with Combat Group A was 'in general good and in individual instances, for instance that of Panzergruppe 4 under Colonel General Hoeppner, very close, in fact almost cordial (page 1). From an inclosure to this same report, bearing the title 'Summary of the Number of Executed Persons,' particularly from the figures arranged according to the successively conquered areas, it is evident that the SIPO and SD operated in front-line areas so as fully to carry out their prime function of conducting mass executions of all elements of resistance even from the very beginning of the advance against Russia. I acknowledge the reliability and authenticity of both of the above cited reports. Therefore I must today express my firm conviction that the Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups and armies which were to take part in the Russian campaign were accurately informed through the normal OKH channels of communication about the extensive future mission of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD as including planned mass executions of Jews, Communists and all other elements of resistance. "In the beginning of June 1941 all of the Ic counter-intelligence officers, and, as far as I remember, all of the Ic officers of all army groups, armies, army corps and some of the divisions which were to take part in the coming Russian campaign were called in by Wagner, together with Heydrich and the Chief of the Amt for Counter-Intelligence Abroad in the OKW (Admiral Canaris) for a general conference in the OKW Building at Berlin. The responsible leaders of the Combat Groups and Combat Commandos of the SIPO and SD were for the most part likewise present. I was also there.

The essential substance and purpose of this meeting was to
outline the military strategy against Russia and to announce
the above-mentioned details of the written agreement reached
by Wagner and Heydrich.
“This group of Ic counter-intelligence officers and Ic officers
remained at Berlin a few days longer and was carefully in-
structed in several additional conferences, at which I was
not present, about further details of the coming Russian cam-
paign. I assume that these discussions were concerned with
the exact delineation of the Fuehrer's command 'to smash ut-
terly all resistance in occupied areas by every means and as
quickly as possible, including even planned mass executions
of all elements of resistance. Otherwise the cooperation be-
tween the Field Army and the Combat Groups, which in the
above-cited documents is clearly revealed as existing but a
few weeks thereafter, could not in my opinion have been
forthcoming. In any event there is hardly any reason to
doubt that these Ic counter-intelligence officers, immediately
upon their return from Berlin, accurately informed their own
superiors, including all Oberbefehlshabers of the army groups
and armies which were to march against Russia, about the
full extent of the agreement."

(signed) Walter Schellenberg

“26. XI. 45" (3710-PS) Another affidavit which sheds light on the relations between the Wehrmacht and the SS at the top level with respect to antipartisan warfare (3711-PS) is sworn to by Wilhelm Scheidt, a retired captain of the German Army who worked in the War History Section of OKW from 1941 to 1945:

"I, Wilhelm Scheidt, belonged to the War History Section
of the OKW from the year 1941 to 1945.
“Concerning the question of partisan warfare I state that I
remember the following from my knowledge of the documents
of the Operations Staff of the OKW as well as from my con-
versations in the Fuehrer's headquarters with Generalmajor
Walter Scherff, the Fuehrer's appointee for the compilation
of the history of the war.
“Counterpartisan warfare was originally a responsibility of
Reichsfuehrer-SS Heinrich Himmler, who sent police forces
to handle this matter.
“In the years 1942 and 1943 however counter-partisan war-
fare developed to such an extent that the Operations Staff of
the OKW had to give it particular attention. In the Army
Operations Section of the Operations Staff of the OKW a
specific officer was assigned the development of counter-parti-
san warfare as his special job. It proved necessary to conduct
extensive operations against the partisans with Wehrmacht
troops in Russian as well as Yugoslavian territory. Partisan
operations for a long while threatened to cut off the lines
of communication and transport routes that were necessary
to support the German Wehrmacht. For instance, a monthly
report concerning the attacks on the railroad lines in occu-
pied Russia revealed that in the Russian area alone from 800
to 1,000 attacks occurred each month during that period, caus-
ing among other things, the loss of from 200 to 300 locomo-
tives.
"It was a well-known fact that partisan warfare was con-
ducted with cruelty on both sides. It was also well-known
that reprisals were inflicted on hostages and communities
whose inhabitants were suspected of being partisans or of
supporting them. It is beyond question that these facts must
have been known to the leading officers in the Operations
Staff of the OKW and in the Army's General Staff. It was
further well-known that Hitler believed that the only suc-
cessful method of conducting counter-partisan warfare was
to employ cruel punishments as deterrents.
"I remember that at the time of the Polish revolt in Warsaw,
SS-Gruppenfuehrer Fegelein reported to Generaloberst
Guderian and Jodl about the atrocities of the Russian SS-
Brigade Kaminski, which fought on the German side."

“(Signed) Wilhelm Scheidt

"Retired Captain of the Reserve" (3711-PS) The foregoing documents show the arrangements which were made between the OKW, OKH and Himmler's headquarters with respect to anti-partisan warfare. They show conclusively that the plans and arrangements were made jointly, and that the High Command of the Armed Forces was not only fully aware of but an active participant in these plans. The same is true of the field commanders. General Roettiger, who attained the rank of General of Panzer Troops (the equivalent of a Lt. General in the American Army), has made three statements (3713-PS, 3714-PS). Roettiger was Chief of Staff of the German 4th Army, and later of Army Group Center, on the Eastern Front during the period of which he speaks:

“As Chief of Staff of the 4th Army from May 1942 to June 1943, to which was later added the area of the 9th Army, I often had occasion to concern myself officially with antipartisan warfare. During these operations the troops received orders from the highest authority, as for example even the OKH, to use the harshest methods. These operations were carried out by troops of the Army Group and of the Army, as for example security battalions. "At the beginning, in accordance with orders which were issued through official channels, only a few prisoners were taken. In accordance with orders, Jews, political commissars and agents were delivered up to the SD. "The number of enemy dead mentioned in official reports was very high in comparison with our own losses. From the documents which have been shown to me I have now come to realize that the order from highest authorities for the harshest conduct of the antipartisan war can have been intended to make possible a ruthless liquidation of Jews and other undesirable elements by using for this purpose the mili

tary struggle of the army against the partisans.” (3713-PS) Roettiger's second statement reads:

“Supplementary to my above declaration I declare: “As I stated orally on 28 November, my then Commanderin-Chief of the Fourth Army instructed his troops many times not to wage war against the partisans more severely than was required at the time by the position. This struggle should only be pushed to the annihilation of the enemy after all attempts to bring about a surrender failed. Apart from humanitarian reasons we necessarily had an interest in taking prisoners since very many of them could very well be used as members of native volunteer units against the partisans. "Alongside the necessary active combatting of partisans there was propaganda directed at the partisans and also at the population with the object, by peaceful means, of causing them to give up partisan activities. For instance, in this way the women too were continually urged to get their men back from the forests or to keep them by other means from joining the partisans. And this propaganda had good results. In the spring of 1943 the area of the 4th Army was as good as cleared of partisans. Only on its boundaries and then from time to time were partisans in evidence at times when they crossed into the area of the 4th Army from neighboring areas. The army was obliged on this account on the orders of the Army Group to give up security forces to the neighboring army to the south.

“(signed) Roettiger" (3713-PS)

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