Изображения страниц
PDF
EPUB

and in which Italy could be certain of Germany's sympathetic assistance.

"But it seemed to us to be better not to touch on these problems for the time being, but to concentrate on the destruction of England with all our forces instead. Where Germany was concerned, she was interested in the northern German districts (Norway, etc.), and this was acknowiedged by the Duce." (1842–PS).

Several months later, in January 1941, at the meeting between Hitler and Mussolini in which Ribbentrop participated, the Greek operation was discussed. Hitler stated that the German troops in Rumania were for use in the planned campaign against Greece (C-134). Count Ciano, who attended that meeting as Italian Foreign Minister, recalls his impression of that meeting in his diary entry for 20/21 January:

"The Duce is pleased with the conversation on the whole. I am less pleased, particularly as Ribbentrop, who had always been so boastful in the past, told me, when I asked him outright how long the war would last, that he saw no possibility of its ending before 1942." (2987-PS)

Despite that somewhat pessimistic statement to Count Ciano, three weeks later, when it was a question of encouraging the Japanese to enter the war, Ribbentrop took a more optimistic line. On 13 February 1941 he saw Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador. In the course of their conversation Ribbentrop gave an optimistic account of the military situation and the position of Bulgaria and Turkey (1834-PS).

In the course of his efforts to get Yugoslavia to join the Axis, Ribbentrop addressed a note, (2450-PS) on 25 March 1941, to Prime Minister Cvetkovitch, which contained this assurance:

"The Axis-Power Governments during this war will not direct a demand to Yugoslavia to permit the march or transportation of troops through the Yugoslav state or territory." (2450-PS)

Shortly thereafter, there occurred the coup d'etat in Yugoslavia, when General Simovitch took over the Government. Two days after Ribbentrop's assurance (2450-PS), at a meeting on 27 March 1941 at which Ribbentrop was present, Hitler outlined the military campaign against Yugoslavia and promised the destruction of Yugoslavia and the demolition of Belgrade by the German Air Force (1746-PS).

After the invasion of Yugoslavia Ribbentrop was one of the persons directed by Hitler with the drawing of the boundaries

for the partition and division of Yugoslavia. The preliminary directive for that action provided:

66*

* If the drawing up of boundaries has not been laid down in the above Part I, it will be carried out by the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces in agreement with the Foreign Office [Ribbentrop], the Plenipotentiary for the Four Year Plan [Goering], and the Reich Minister of the Interior [Frick].” (1195-PS)

(8) The U. S. S. R. On 23 August 1939 Ribbentrop signed the German-Soviet non-aggression Pact (TC-25). The first point at which Ribbentrop seems to have considered special problems of aggression against the Soviet Union was just after 20 April 1941, when Rosenberg and Ribbentrop met or communicated to consider problems expected to arise in the Eastern occupied territory. Ribbentrop appointed his Counsellor, Grosskopf, to be his liaison man with Rosenberg and also assigned a Consul General, Brauetigam, who had many years experience in the USSR, as a collaborator with Rosenberg (1039-PS).

The following month, on 18 May 1941, the German Foreign Office prepared a declaration setting forth operational zones in the Arctic Ocean and the Baltic and Black Seas to be used by the German Navy and Air Force in the coming invasion of the Soviet Union:

"The Foreign Office has prepared for use in Barbarossa the attached draft of a declaration of operational zones. The Foreign Office has, however, reserved its decision as to the date when the declaration will be issued, as well as discussion of particulars." (C-77)

Thus, it is clear that Ribbentrop was again fully involved in the preparation for this act of aggression. Finally, on 22 June 1941, Ribbentrop announced to the world that the German armies were invading the USSR (3054-PS)..

How untrue were the reasons given by Ribbentrop is shown by the report of his own Ambassador in Moscow on 7 June 1941, who said that everything was being done by the Russians to avoid a conflict.

(9) Instigation of Japanese Aggression. On 25 November 1936, as a result of negotiations of Ribbentrop as Ambassador at Large, Germany and Japan signed the Anti-Comintern Pact (2508-PS). The recital states the purpose of the agreement as follows:

"The Government of the German Reich and the Imperial

Japanese Government, recognizing that the aim of the Communist Internationale known as the Comintern is to disintegrate and subdue existing States by all the means at its command; convinced that the toleration of interference by the Communist Internationale in the internal affairs of the nations not only endangers their internal peace and social well-being, but is also a menace to the peace of the world; desirous of cooperating in the defense against Communist subversive activities; having agreed as follows

(2508-PS)

There then follow the effective terms of the agreement under which Germany and Japan are to act together for five years. It is signed on behalf of Germany by Ribbentrop (2508-PS).

On 27 September 1940 Ribbentrop, as Foreign Minister, signed the Tripartite Pact with Japan and Italy, thereby bringing about a full-scale military and economic alliance for the creation of a new order in Europe and East Asia (2643–PS).

On 13 February 1941-some four months later-Ribbentrop was urging the Japanese to attack British possessions in the Far East (1834-PS).

Then, in April 1941, at a meeting between Hitler and Matsuoka, representing Japan, at which Ribbentrop was present; Hitler promised that Germany would declare war on the United States in the event of war occurring between Japan and the United States as a result of Japanese aggression in the Pacific (1881-PS). The development of Ribbentrop's views is indicated by the minutes of another conversation with the Japanese Foreign Minister (1882-PS):

[ocr errors]

* *

Matsuoka then spoke of the general high morale in Germany, referring to the happy faces he had seen everywhere among the workers during his recent visit to the Borsig Works. He expressed his regret that developments in Japan had not as yet advanced as far as in Germany and that in his country the intellectuals still exercised considerable influence.

"The Reich Foreign Minister replied that at best a nation which had realized its every ambition could afford the luxury of intellectuals, most of whom are parasites, anyway. A nation, however, which has to fight for a place in the sun must give them up. The intellectuals ruined France; in Germany they had already started their pernicious activities when National Socialism put a stop to these doings; they

[ocr errors]

will surely be the cause of the downfall of Britain, which is
to be expected with certainty
*." (1882-PS)

That was on 5 April 1941.

Within a month after the German armies invaded the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941, Ribbentrop was urging Ott, his ambassador in Tokyo, to do his utmost to cause the Japanese Government to attack the Soviet in Siberia (2896-PS; 2897-PS).

A message, intercepted, which was sent by the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin on 29 November 1941, a week before the attack on the United States at Pearl Harbor, reports the coaxings of Ribbentrop:

"Ribbentrop opened our meeting by again inquiring whether I had received any reports regarding the Japanese-United States negotiations. I replied that I had received no official word.

"Ribbentrop: 'It is essential that Japan effect the New Order in East Asia without losing this opportunity. There never has been and probably never will be a time when closer cooperation under the Tripartite Pact is so important. If Japan hesitates at this time, and Germany goes ahead and establishes her European New Order, all the military might of Britain and the United States will be concentrated against Japan.

"As Fuehrer Hitler said today, there are fundamental differences in the very right to exist between Germany and Japan, and the United States. We have received advice to the effect that there is practically no hope of the JapaneseUnited States negotiations being concluded successfully because of the fact that the United States is putting up a stiff front.

""If this is indeed the fact of the case, and if Japan reaches a decision to fight Britain and the United States, I am confident that that will not only be to the interest of Germany and Japan jointly, but would bring about favorable results for Japan and herself."" (D-656).

Then the Japanese Ambassador replied:

"I can make no definite statement as I am not aware of any concrete intentions of Japan. Is Your Excellency indicating that a state of actual war is to be established between Germany and the United States?'

"Ribbentrop: 'Roosevelt's a fanatic, so it is impossible to tell what he would do.'" (D-656).

The Japanese Ambassador thereupon concludes:

"Concerning this point, in view of the fact that Ribbentrop has said in the past that the United States would undoubtedly try to avoid meeting German troops, and from the tone of Hitler's recent speech, as well as that of Ribbentrop's, I feel that German attitude toward the United States is being considerably stiffened. There are indications at present that Germany would not refuse to fight the United States if necessary." (D-656).

Part 3 of the Japanese message quotes Ribbentrop as follows:

"In any event, Germany has absolutely no intention of entering into any peace with England. We are determined to remove all British influence from Europe. Therefore, at the end of this war, England will have no influence whatsoever in international affairs. The Island Empire of Britain may remain, but all of her other possessions throughout the world will probably be divided three ways by Germany, the United States, and Japan. In Africa, Germany will be satisfied with, roughly, those parts which were formerly German colonies. Italy will be given the greater share of the African Colonies. Germany desires, above all else, to control European Russia." (D-656)

In reply the Japanese Ambassador said:

"I am fully aware of the fact that Germany's war campaign is progressing according to schedule smoothly. However, suppose that Germany is faced with the situation of having not only Great Britain as an actual enemy, but also having all of those areas in which Britain has influence and those countries which have been aiding Britain as actual enemies as well. Under such circumstances, the war area will undergo considerable expansion, of course. What is your opinion of the outcome of the war under such an eventuality?'

"Ribbentrop: 'We would like to end this war during next year [1942]. However, under certain circumstances, it is possible that it will have to be continued on to the following year.

'Should Japan become engaged in war against the United States, Germany, of course, would join the war immediately. There is absolutely no possibility of Germany's entering into a separate peace with the United States under such circumstances. The Fuehrer is determined on that point.'" (D-656) Ribbentrop was thus associated in the closest possible way, with the aggression by Japan against the United States.

« ПредыдущаяПродолжить »