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centration camps was drawn to Frank's attention at this time, he merely directed that individual cases of resettlement should in future be discussed in the same manner as in the case of Zamosc. (2233-AA-PS)

(3) Encroachments and confiscations in the industries and in the field of private property.

Frank explained his policy in respect to Polish property to his Department Heads in the following terms in December 1939:

“Principally it can be said regarding the administration of the General Government: This territory in its entirety is booty of the German Reich, and it thus cannot be permitted that this territory shall be exploited in its individual parts but that the territory in its entirety shall be economically used and its entire economic worth redound to the benefit of

the German people.” (2233K-PS) Whatever encroachments there were on private property rights in the General Government fell squarely within the policy which Frank in an interview on 3 October 1939 stated he intended to administer as General Governor:

“Poland can only be administered by utilizing the country
through means of ruthless exploitation, deportation of all
supplies, raw materials, machines, factory installations etc.
which are important for the German war economy.
[It was Frank's opinion] that the war would be a short one
and that it was most important now to make available as
soon as possible raw materials, machines and workers to the
German industry, which was short in all of these. Most im-
portant, however, in Frank's opinion, was the fact that by
destroying Polish industry, its subsequent reconstruction
after the war would become more difficult, if not impossible,
so that Poland would be reduced to its proper position as an
agrarian country which would have to depend upon Ger-
many for importation of industrial products.” (EC-344-16

& 17) The basic decree under which property in the General Government was sequestered was promulgated by Frank on 24 January 1940. This decree authorized sequestration in connection with the "performance of tasks serving the public interest,” the seizure of "abandoned property," and the liquidation of “antisocial or financially unremunerative property.” It permitted the Higher S.S. and Police Chief to order sequestrations "with the object of increasing the striking power of the units of the uniformed police and armed S.S.” No legal recourse was granted

for losses arising from the enforcement of the decree, compensation being solely in the discretion of an official of the General Government. It is clear that the undefined criteria of this decree empowered Nazi officials in the General Government to engage in wholesale seizure of property. (2540-PS)

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(4) Principle of collective responsibility. It was no part of Frank's policy in administering the General Government that reprisals should be commensurate with the gravity of the offense. Frank was, on the contrary, an advocate of drastic measures in dealing with the Polish people. At a conference of Department Heads of the General Government on 19 January 1940, he explained:

"My relationship with the Poles is like the relationship between ant and plant louse. When I treat the Poles in a helpful way, so to speak tickle them in a friendly manner, then I do it in the expectation that their work performance redounds to my benefit. This is not a political but a purely tactical-technical problem.

In cases where in spite of all these measures the performance does not increase, or where the slightest act gives me occasion to step in, I would not even hesitate to take the most draconic action." (2233

L-PS) At a subsequent meeting of Department Heads on 8 March 1940 Frank became even more explicit:

“Whenever there is the least attempt by the Poles to start anything, an enormous campaign of destruction will follow. Then I would not mind starting a regime of terror, or fear

its consequences." (2233-M-PS) At a conference of District Standartenfuehrer at Cracow on 18 March 1942 Frank reiterated his policy:

"Incidentally, the struggle for the achievement of our aims will be pursued cold bloodedly. You see how the state agencies work. You see that we do not hesitate before anything, and stand whole dozens of people up against the wall. This is necessary because here simple consideration says that it cannot be our task at this period when the best German blood is being sacrificed, to show regard for the blood of another race. For out of this one of the greatest dangers may arise.

One already hears today in Germany that prisoners-of-war, for instance with us in Bavaria or in Thuringia, are administering large estates entirely independently, while all the men in a village fit for service are at the front. If this state of affairs continues then a gradual retrogression of Germanism will show itself. One should not underestimate this danger. Therefore, everything revealing itself as a Polish power of leadership must be destroyed again and again with ruthless energy. This does not have to be shouted abroad, it will happen silently."

(2233-R-PS) And on 15 January 1944 Frank assured the political leaders of the NSDAP at Cracow:

"I have not been hesitant in declaring that when a German is shot, up to 100 Poles shall be shot too." (2233-BB-PS)

(5) Rigorous methods of recruiting workers. Force, violence, and economic duress were all advocated by Frank as means for recruiting laborers for deportation to slave labor in Germany. Deportation of Polish laborers to Germany was an integral part of the program announced by Frank for his administration of the General Government (See EC344-16 & 17), and as Governor General he authorized whatever degree of force was required for the execution of his program.

Voluntary methods of recruitment soon proved inadequate. In the spring of 1940 the question of utilizing force came up, and the following discussion took place in the presence of SeyssInquart:

“The Governor-General stated that the fact that all means
in form of proclamations etc. did not bring success, leads to
the conclusion that the Poles out of malevolence, and guided
by the intention of harming Germany by not putting them-
selves at its disposal, refuse to enlist for working duty.
Therefore, he asks Dr. Frauendorfer, if there are any other
measures, not as yet employed, to win the Poles on a volun-
tary basis.
"Reichshauptamtsleiter Dr. Frauendorfer answered this
question negatively.
"The General Governor emphasized the fact that he now
will be asked to take a definite attitude toward this ques-
tion. Therefore the question will arise whether any form
of coercive measures should now be employed.
"The question put by the General Governor to SS Lieutenant
General [Obergruppenfuehrer] Krueger: does he see possi-
bilities of calling Polish workers by coercive means, is an-
swered in the affirmative by SS Lieutenant General Krueger."

(2233-N-PS) At the same conference Frank declared that he was willing to agree to any practical measures, and decreed that unemployment

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compensation should be discontinued on 1 May 1940 as a means of recruiting labor for Germany.

“The General Governor is willing to agree to any practical measure; however, he wishes to be informed personally about the measures to be taken. One measure, which no doubt would be successful, would be the discontinuance of unemployment compensation for unemployed workers and their transfer to public welfare. Therefore, he decrees that, beginning 1 May, claim for unemployment compensation will cease to exist and only public welfare may be granted. For the time being only men are to report and above those men living in cities. There might be a possibility of combining the moving of the 120,000 Poles from the Warthe district

with this measure.(2233--N-PS) In March 1940 Frank assured the authorities in Berlin that he was prepared to have villages surrounded and the people dragged forcibly out. He reported that, in the course of his negotiations in Berlin regarding the urgent demand for larger numbers of Polish farm workers, he had stated:

if it is demanded from him, [he] could naturally exercise force in such a manner, that he has the police surround a village and get the men and women in question out by force, and then send them to Germany. But one can also work differently, besides these police measures, by retaining the unemployment compensation of these workers in

question." (2233-B-PS) At a conference of Department Heads of the General Government on 10 May 1940 Frank laid down the following principles for dealing with the problem of conscription labor:

"Upon the demands from the Reich it has now been decreed that compulsion may be exercised in view of the fact that sufficient manpower was not voluntarily available for service inside the German Reich. This compulsion means the possibility of arrest of male and female Poles. ... The arrest of young Poles when leaving church services or the cinema would bring about an ever-increasing nervousness of the Poles. Generally speaking, he had no objection at all if the rubbish, capable of work yet often loitering about, would be snatched from the streets. The best method for this, however, would be the organization of a raid, and it would be absolutely justifiable to stop a Pole in the street and to question him what he was doing, where he was working, etc." (2233-A-PS)

Frank utilized starvation as a method of recruitment. At a conference on 20 November 1942 the following plan was agreed :

"Starting 1 February 1942 the food ration cards should not be issued to the individual Pole or Ukrainian by the Nutrition Office (Ernaehrungsamt], but to the establishments working for the German interest. 2,000,000 people would thus be eliminated from the non-German, normal rationconsuming contingent. Now, if those ration cards are only distributed by the factories, part of those people will naturally rush into the factories. Labor could then be either procured for Germany from them or they could be used for the most important work in the factories of the General

Government." (2233-Y-PS) On 18 August 1942 Frank informed Sauckel that the General Government had already supplied 800,000 laborers to Germany, and that a further 140,000 would be supplied by the end of the year. Regarding the quota for the next year he promised:

you can, however, next year reckon upon a higher number of workers from the General Government, for we

shall employ the Police to conscript them." (2233-W-PS) Six months after Frank promised Sauckel to resort to police action to round up labor for deportation to Germany, the Chairman of the Ukrainian Main Committee reported to Frank that the program was being carried out as follows:

“The wild and ruthless man-hunt carried on everywhere in towns and country, in streets, squares, stations, even in churches, at night in houses, has badly shaken the feeling of security of the inhabitants. Everybody is exposed to the danger of being seized anywhere and at any time by members of the police, suddenly and unexpectedly, and being brought into an assembly camp. None of his relatives knows what has happened to him, only weeks or months later, one or the other gives news of his fate by a postcard." (1526-PS)

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(6) Closing of schools. The program outlined by Frank on 3 October 1939 as the program he intended to administer as Governor General included:

"closing of all educational institutions, especially technical schools and colleges in order to prevent the growth of the

new Polish intelligentsia." (EC-344-16 & 17) This decision was taken by Frank before it was determined what schools, if any, might be closed because of failure of instructors to refrain from reference to politics, or refusal to submit to inspection by the occupying authorities. Moreover, the policy was

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