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Memorandum of conversation be-
tween Hitler and Oshima, 3 Janu-
ary 1942. (GB 197).....

Citation on promotion of Doenitz
to Vice Admiral, published in The
Archive, 27 September 1940.
p. 550. (GB 183).....

Speech by Doenitz to Naval offi-
cers at Weimar, 17 December 1943.
(GB 185).

Order of day and speech of Doe-
nitz on death of Hitler, 1 May
1945. (GB 188)...

Extract from B.d.U. War Diary,
16 September 1942. (GB 198).... VII
Affidavit by Peter-Joseph Heisig,
27 November 1945. (GB 201).. VII
Extracts from Bd.U. War Diary
and Order to all U-boat com-
manders; telegram from Schacht
and in reply to Schacht. (GB 199). VII
Affidavit of Doenitz concerning
sinking of Athenia, 17 November
1945. (GB 220)....

Speech by C-in-C of Navy to Com-
manders in Chief, 15 February
1944. (GB 186)...

Extracts from official reports con-
cerning German attacks on mer-
chant shipping, 3 September 1939
to September 1940. (GB 191)... VII
Extracts from official reports con-
cerning German attacks on mer-
chant shipping, 1 September 1940
to 28 February 1941. (GB 191)... VII
Sinkings by U-boats during the
war, 1939–1945. (GB 191).

Extract from Befehlshaber der
U-bootes; Secret Standing Order











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Vol. Page

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No. 154 signed by Doenitz. (GB
Report of sinking of "Sheaf Mead”.
(GB 192)....
Report on sinking of "Noreen
Mary”; affidavit by survivor. (GB
Wireless talk by German naval
reporter concerning Windjammer
sunk by U-boat. (GB 205)...
Extract from War Diary of U-105,
12 January 1943.....
Statement on sinking of SS "An-
tonico", which was torpedoed, set
afire and sunk, 28 September 1942.
(GB 204)...
List of Hitler-Doenitz meetings.
(GB 207)....
Affidavit by Judge Advocate, 28
December 1945. (GB 208)..
Orders issued by Doenitz, 11 April
1945. (GB 212)...
Operation Order "Atlantic" No. 56
for U-boats in Atlantic, 7 October
1943. (GB 200).....
The Laconia Case and German
Submarine Warfare, by Karl Doe-
nitz, Nurnberg, 7 and 19 October
My Relationship to Adolf Hitler
and to the Party, by Erich Raeder,
Moscow, fall 1945..


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Erich Raeder was born in 1876 and joined the German Navy in 1896. By 1915 he had become commander of the Cruiser Koeln. In 1928 he became an admiral, Chief of Naval Command, and head of the German Navy. In 1935 he became Commanderin-Chief of the Navy. In 1936 he became General Admiral, a creation of Hitler's, on his forty-seventh birthday. In 1937 he received the golden badge of honor of the Nazi Party. In 1938 he became a member of the Secret Cabinet Council. In 1939 he was made Grand Admiral, a rank created by Hitler, who presented Raeder with a marshal's baton. In 1943 he became Admiral Inspector of the German Navy, which was a kind of retirement into oblivion, since after January 1943 Doenitz was the effective commander of the German Navy. (2888-PS)


During the years of Raeder's command of the German Navy, from 1928 to 1943, he played a vital role in building up the Navy as an instrument of war, to implement the Nazis' general plan of aggression.

(1) Concealed rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles. In successive and secret steps, the small Navy permitted to Germany under the Treaty of Versailles was enormously expanded under the guidance of Raeder.

The story of Germany's secret rearmament in violation of the Treaty of Versailles is told in a history of the fight of the German Navy against Versailles, 1919 to 1935, which was published secretly by the German Admiralty in 1937 (C-156). This history shows that before the Nazis came to power the German Admiralty was deceiving not only the governments of other countries, but its own legislature and at one stage its own government, regarding the secret measures of rearmament ranging from experimental U-Boat and E-Boat building to the creation of secret intelligence and finance organizations. Raeder's role in these developments are described as follows:

"The Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Admiral Raeder, had received hereby a far-reaching independence in the building and development of the Navy. This was only hampered insofar as the previous concealment of rearmament had to be continued in consideration of the Versailles Treaty."

(C-156) An illustration of Raeder's concealment of rearmament is contained in his statement that:

"In view of Germany's treaty obligations and the disarmament conference, steps must be taken to prevent the first E-boat Half-Flotilla from appearing openly as a formation of torpedo-carrying boats, as it was not intended to count these E-boats against the number of torpedo-carrying boats

allowed them." (C-141) It appears that even in 1930 the intention ultimately to attack Poland was already current in German military circles. An extract from the History of War Organization and of the Scheme for Mobilization (C-135) which is headed “All 850/38", suggesting that the document was written in 1938, reads:

"Since under the Treaty of Versailles all preparations for
mobilization were forbidden, these were at first confined to
a very small body of collaborators and were at first only
of a theoretical nature. Nevertheless, there existed at that
time an 'Establishment Order' and 'Instructions for Estab-
lishment, the forerunners of the present-day scheme for
"An 'establishment organization' and 'adaptable instruc-
tions for establishment' were drawn up for each A-year, the
cover name for a mobilization year.
"As stated, the 'Establishment Organizations of that time
were to be judged purely theoretically, for they had no
positive basis in the form of men and materials. They pro-
vided, nevertheless, a valuable foundation for the establish-
ment of a War Organization as our ultimate aim."

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"The crises between Germany and Poland, which were be-
coming increasingly acute, compelled us, instead of making
theoretical preparations for war, to prepare in a practical
manner for a purely German-Polish conflict.
“The strategic idea of a rapid forcing of the Polish base of
Gdynia was made a basis, and the fleet on active service was
to be reinforced by the auxiliary forces which would be
indispensable to attain this strategic end, and the essential
coastal and flak batteries, especially those in Pillau and
Swinemuende were to be taken over. Thus in 1930 the

Reinforcement Plan was evolved.” (C--135) The extract further shows that Hitler had made a clear political request to build up for him in five years, that is, by April 1938, armed forces which he could place in the balance as an instrument of political power. (C-135)

The Nazi seizure of power in 1933 was a signal to Raeder to go full speed ahead on rearmament. In June 1934 Raeder told Hitler that the German fleet must be developed to oppose England, and that therefore from 1936 on, the big ships must be armed with big guns to match the British “King George" class of battleship. Raeder also went along with Hitler's demand that the construction of U-Boats should be kept completely secret, especially in view of the Saar plebiscite (C-189). In November 1934 Raeder had a further talk with Hitler on the financing of naval rearmament, and on that occasion Hitler told him that in case of need he would get Doctor Ley to put 120,000,000 to 150,000,000 RM. from the Labor Front at the disposal of the Navy. (C-190)

Another example of the deceit used by Raeder in building up the German Navy is the fact that the true displacement of certain German battleships exceeded by twenty percent the displacement which the Nazis had reported to the British (C-23). In similar vein, it was ordered that auxiliary cruisers, which were being secretly constructed, should be referred to as “transport ships 0." (C-166)

The support given by the German Navy to the German Armament Industry illustrates Raeder's concern with the broader aspects of Nazi policy and of the close link between Nazi politicians, German Service Chiefs, and German armament manufacturers. (C-29)

A commentary on post-1939 naval rearmament is contained in a a letter from Raeder to the German Navy, dated 11 June 1940. This letter was given extensive distribution; in fact there is provision in the distribution list for 467 copies. This letter of Raeder's, which is marked with both self-justification and apology, reads:

"The most outstanding of the numerous subjects of discus-
sion in the Officer Corps are the Torpedo position and the
problem whether the naval building program, up to Autumn
1939, envisaged the possibility of the outbreak of war as
early as 1939, or whether the emphasis ought not to have
been laid, from the first, on the construction of U-boats.
“If the opinion is voiced in the Officer Corps that the entire
naval building program has been wrongly directed, and that,
from the first, the emphasis should have been on the U-boat
weapon and, after its consolidation, on the large ships, I must
emphasize the following matters:

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