in themselves confidered, that recommends any one of all the fixty-four, more than another: in this cafe, my mind determines to give itself up to what is vulgarly called accident,* by determining to touch that fquare which happens to be most in view, which my eye is especially upon at that moment, or which happens to be then most in my mind, or which I fhall be directed to by fome other fuch-like accident. Here are feveral fteps of the mind's proceeding (tho' all may be done as it were in a moment) the firft ftep is its general determination that it will touch one of the fquares. The next step is another general determination to give itself up to accident, in fome certain way; as to touch that which shall be most in the eye or mind at that time, or to fome other fuchlike accident. The third and last step is a particular determination to touch a certain individual spot, even that square, which, by that fort of accident the mind has pitched upon, has actually offered itself beyond others. Now it is apparent that in none of these several steps does the mind proceed in absolute indifference, but in each of them is influenced by a preponderating inducement. So it is in the first ftep; the mind's general determination to touch one of the fixty-four spots: the mind is not obfolutely indifferent whether it does fo or no; it is induced to it, for the fake of making fome experiment, or by the defire of a friend, or fome other motive that prevails. So it is in the fecond step, the mind's determining to give itself up to accident, by touching that which fhall be moft in the eye, or the idea of

* I have elsewhere obferved what that is which is vulgarly called accident; that it is nothing akin to the Arminian metaphyfical notion of contingence, fomething not connected with) any thing foregoing; but that it is fomething that comes to pafs in the course of things, in fome affair that men are concerned in, unforeseen, and not owing to their defign.

which shall be most prevalent in the mind, &c. The mind is not abfolutely indifferent whether it proceeds by this rule or no; but chooses it because it appears at that time a convenient and requifite expedient in order to fulfil the general purpose aforesaid. And fo it is in the third and laft ftep, it is determining to touch that individual fpot which actually does prevail in the mind's view. The mind is not indifferent concerning this; but is influenced by a prevailing inducement and reafon; which is, that this is a prosecution of the preceding determination, which appeared requifite, and was fixed before in the second step.

Accident will ever ferve a man, without hindering him a moment, in fuch a cafe. It will always be fo among a number of objects in view, one will prevail in the eye, or in idea beyond others. When we have our eyes open in the clear fun-fhine, many objects ftrike the eye at once, and innumerable images may be at once painted in it by the rays of light; but the attention of the mind is not equal to feveral of them at once; or if it be, it does not continue fo for any time. And fo it is with refpect to the ideas of the mind in general: feveral ideas are not in equal ftrength in the mind's view and notice at once; or at leaft, does not remain fo for any fenfible continuance. There is nothing in the world more conftantly varying, than the ideas of the mind: they do not remain precisely in the fame ftate for the least perceivable space of time as is evident by this, that all perceivable time is judged and perceived by the mind only by the fucceffion or the fucceffive changes of its own ideas: Therefore while the views or perceptions of the mind remain precisely in the same state, there is no perceivable space or length of time, because no fenfible fucceffion at all.

As the acts of the Will, in each step of the fore

mentioned procedure, does not come to pafs without a particular caufe, every act is owing to a prevailing inducement: fo the accident, as I have called it, or that which happens in the unfearchable courfe of things, to which the mind yields itself, and by which it is guided, is not any thing that comes to pals without a caufe; and the mind in determining to be guided by it, is not determined by fomething that has no caufe; any more than if it determined to be guided by a lot, or the cafting of a die. For though the die's falling in fuch a manner be accidental to him that cafts it, yet none will fuppofe that there is no caufe why it falls as it does. The involuntary changes in the fucceffion of our ideas, though the caufes may not be observed, have as much a caufe, as the changeable motions of the motes that float in the air, or the continual infinitely various, fucceffive changes of the unevennesses on the furface of the water.

There are two things efpecially, which are proba bly the occafions of confufion in the minds of them who infift upon it, that the Will acts in a proper indifference, and without being moved by any inducement, in its determination in fuch cafes as have been mentioned.

1. They seem to mistake the point in question, or at least not to keep it diftinctly in view. The queltion they difpute about, is, Whether the mind be indifferent about the objects presented, one of which is to be taken, touched, pointed to, &c. as two eggs, two cakes, which appear equally good. Whereas the question to be confidered, is, Whether the perfon be indifferent with refpect to his own actions ; whether he does not, on some confideration or other, prefer one act with refpect to thefe objects before another. The mind in its determination and choice, in these cases, is not most immediately and directly

converfant about the objects prefented; but the acts to be done concerning these objects. The objects may appear equal, and the mind may never properly make any choice between them: but the next act of the Will being about the external actions to be performed, taking, touching, &c. these may not appear equal, and one action may properly be chofen before another. In each step of the mind's progrefs, the determination is not about the objects, unless indirectly and improperly, but about the actions, which it chooses for other reasons than any preference of the objects, and for reasons not taken at all from the objects.

There is no neceffity of fuppofing, that the mind does ever at all properly choose one of the objects before another; either before it has taken, or afterwards. Indeed the man chooses to take or touch one rather than another; but not because it chooses the thing taken, or touched; but from foreign confidera-` tions. The cafe may be fo, that of two things offered, a man may, for certain reasons, choose and prefer the taking of that which he undervalues, and choose to neglect to take that which his mind prefers. In fuch a cafe, choosing the thing taken, and choofing to take, are diverfe and fo they are in a cafe where the things prefented are equal in the mind's efteem, and neither of them preferred. All that fact and experience makes evident, is, that the mind chooses one action rather than another. And therefore the arguments which they bring, in order to be to their purpose, ought to be to prove that the mind chooses the action in perfect indifference, with respect to that action; and not to prove that the mind chooses the action in perfe& indifference with refpe&t to the object; which is very poffible, and yet the Will not act at all without prevalent inducement, and proper preponderation.

N

2. Another reafon of confufion and difficulty in this matter, seems to be, not diftinguishing between a general indifference, or an indifference with respect to what is to be done in a more distant and general view of it, and a particular indifference, or an indifference with refpect to the next immediate act, viewed with its particular and prefent circumftances. A man may be perfectly indifferent with respect to his own actions, in the former refpect; and yet not in the latter. Thus, in the foregoing inftance of touching one of the squares of a chefsboard; when it is firft proposed that I fhould touch one of them, I may be perfectly indifferent which I touch; because as yet I view the matter remotely and generally, being but in the first step of the mind's progrefs in the affair. But yet, when I am actually come to the laft ftep, and the very next thing to be determined is which is to be touched, having already determined that I will touch that which happens to be most in my eye or mind, and my mind being now fixed on a particular one, the act of touching that, confidered thus immediately, and in these particular present circumftances, is not what my mind is abfolutely indifferent about.

SECTION VII.

Concerning the notion of Liberty of Will, confifting in Indifference.

WHAT has been faid in the foregoing fection, has a tendency in fome measure to evince the abfurdity of the opinion of fuch as place Liberty in Indifference, or in that equilibrium whereby the Will is without all antecedent determination or bias, and