CHARTS, FIGURES, TABLES, AND EXHIBITS Page Chart 4.-Scientists and engineers, 1940-63. 2653 Chart 5.-Scientists, engineers, and technicians, by type of work, 1960.. 2655 2656 2658 2681 2726 Figure II.-Potential AGC sales, assuming new strategic and space systems Figure III.-Potential AGC sales, assuming no new strategic and space Figure IV. Potential AGC sales, assuming new strategic and space Table 1.-Military service status of male population, June 30, 1963. Table 2.-Percent distribution by educational level of Armed Forces 2728 2730 2732 Table 4.-Educational level of enlisted personnel, December 31, 1963. Table 5.-Scientists and engineers and number with doctorates, by field, Table 11.-Scientists and engineers, 1963, and projection to 1970___ Table 12.-Full-time equivalents of employed scientists and engineers in all colleges and universities, by organizational unit and function, March 1, 1961. Table 13.-Full-time equivalent of scientists and engineers employed in colleges and universities granting graduate degrees in science and engineering, by function and type of personnel, March 1, 1961- Table 14.-Requirements for scientists and engineers within NASA.. Table 15.-Total NASA requirements for scientists and engineers... Table 16.-Total NASA requirements compared to national requirements 2661 Table 20.-Comparison of plant investment to earnings and depreciation.. Table 21.-Comparison of Aerojet Sacramento plants with Sacramento Table 22.-35 firms, universities or university associated groups with the largest volume of AEC prime contracts in fiscal year 1962.. Table 23. Results of preinduction examinations of draftees, by Army CHARTS, FIGURES, TABLES, AND EXHIBITS-Continued Table 27.-Percent of registrants found not qualified upon preinduction examination at Armed Forces examining stations by nonqualifying Page Table 29.-Induction not-qualified rates for registrants for induction to Armed Forces induction stations during September 1963, and accumula- Table 30.-Number of induction examinations given registrants at Armed Forces induction stations, by result and cause of nonqualification------ Exhibit A.-Influence of selective service calls on original new male 2789 2798 NATION'S MANPOWER REVOLUTION TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 12, 1963 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMPLOYMENT AND MANPOWER OF THE Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 11:10 a.m., pursuant to recess, in room 4232, New Senate Office Building, Senator Joseph S. Clark (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Senators Clark, Pell, Kennedy, and Javits. Committee staff members present: Stewart E. McClure, chief clerk, Edward D. Friedman, counsel, and Dr. Garth L. Mangum, research director of the subcommittee; and John Stringer, minority associate counsel. Senator CLARK. The subcommittee will resume its hearing, and our final witness today is the Honorable Norman S. Paul, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. Mr. Paul, I have read your very interesting statement which will be placed in the record in full at this point. (The prepared statement of Mr. Paul follows:) PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN S. PAUL, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (MANPOWER) Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee; I welcome the opportunity to appear before your subcommittee to discuss some of the military aspects of what you have so aptly referred to as the manpower revolution underway in this Nation. As a very substantial employer of manpower during peacetime, and as a major claimant upon manpower resources during periods of national emergency, the Department of Defense shares a common interest in the effective education and training of our youth and in combating the wastage of human skills resulting from unemployment. In responding to the specific areas of interest in military manpower which you have indicated, Mr. Chairman, my direct presentation will deal broadly with the following subjects: (1) military manpower requirements; (2) manpower procurement policies; (3) military technical training programs; and (4) impacts of military manpower programs upon the civilian labor force. In addition, I am submitting with this statement a number of charts and tables, covering some of these subjects in more detail. We will, of course, be pleased to supplement these with such other materials as you may require. MILITARY MANPOWER REQUIREMENTS At the present time, we have on active duty in the four armed services a total of 2.7 million officers and enlisted personnel. This total is about 200,000 higher than in 1961, as a result of the buildup in military strengths of both our conventional and strategic forces, initiated by the present administration. We expect no significant change in this strength level during fiscal year 1964. The projected military manpower requirements beyond the current fiscal year are currently under review as part of our established budget and programing cycle. However, on the basis of our latest completed force structure and financial plans, we can expect this general strength level to be maintained, with some fluctuations for individual services, during the next several years. In addition to our regular forces on active duty, the Military Establishment includes nearly 1 million personnel actively participating in training in the Reserves and National Guard. These men, although also following regular civilian pursuits, are an integral element in our military force structure. Including our Reserve personnel, we thus have a total of 3.7 million personnel in either full-time or part-time military employment—a total which corresponds to nearly 5 percent of the Nation's labor force. Although the overall strengths of our military forces are well known, the full range and diversity of our military skill requirements are not always fully appreciated. Our military services today have been compelled by the facts of modern military technology to organize their military personnel and jobs on the basis of a highly refined and specialized system of occupational classification. By last count, we have cataloged a total of 1,500 enlisted occupational specialty titles currently in use in the four services. The greatest specialization in our enlisted job structure exists within the "electronics" group of skills. This group includes the highly trained technicians responsible for maintaining and operating military electronic equipment such as radio, radar, fire control, and missile guidance systems, automatic computers, and the like. The very complexity of modern electronic equipment and the long training periods required have imposed the need for narrow specialization. For example, the Air Force alone has a total of nearly 70 separate job ladders in electronics maintenance, many of which are further "shredded out" by specific weapons systems. The trend in enlisted occupational requirements since World War II, which is summarized in an attached chart, provides striking evidence of the increasing extent to which our armed services have come to rely upon the military specialist. At the end of World War II, only one out of three enlisted jobs, in all services, were classified in the "electronics," "technical" or in the "mechanics" groups of skills. In 1963, these groups accounted for 46.9 percent of all enlisted jobs. The specialties in these occupational groups, as well as many of our administrative specialties, generally require relatively long periods of training and higher-than-average mental aptitudes. In contrast, the less technical occupational categories-ground combat, crafts and services-now comprise only onethird of our total enlisted strengths as compared to one-half in World War II. The most dramatic growth in occupational requirements over this period has occurred in the electronics specialties. At the end of World War II, only 6 out of each 100 enlisted jobs were related to electronics equipment. By the early 1950's, this ratio had increased to about 10 per 100. In 1963, it was 14.4 per 100, and-based on current projections-this growth is still continuing. For all services combined, our enlisted force now requires more electronic technicians than infantrymen; more aircraft mechanics than cooks and drivers. These trends are the net result of many influences, including the changes in force structurés associated with the shift from full mobilization in World War II to partial mobilization during the Korean period, and to the lower strengths of more recent years. The most important single influence, however, has been the revolutionary changes in military technology during the past decade and a half, as we moved into the missiles age and to increased reliance on extremely complex electronics equipment. These military occupational trends parallel, although in more extreme form, the trends in occupational requirements of our civilian economy, which have been presented to your committee in recent months. In comparing skill demands in the armed services with those in civilian life, I would however like to call your attention to certain unique features of the military job structure: First, military personnel must, because of the very nature of the military mission, be capable of fulfilling a variety of duties at all times. A tactical military unit, whether deployed at sea or on land, must be self-sufficent to a high degree. Personnel assigned to specialized tasks must be capable of performing other duties either of a strictly military or a supporting type. They must, moreover, be capable of performing these duties under many types of adverse conditions only rarely found in civilian pursuits. As a result, individuals with certain physical or mental limitations, who can readily perform some specialized or routine duties in civilan life, may not be capable of being used in military service. Secondly, unlike the civilian labor force, the peacetime military job structure makes little or no provisions for the unskilled worker as such. The types of duties performed by the laborer or unskilled service worker are normally performed by personnel in their first years of service, including recent recruits and trainees. These men are, at the same time, serving an apprenticeship or acquiring on-the-job training in a particular military occupation. There is no room in our peacetime force structure for the untrained filler or the career private. Finally, statistics on our enlisted occupational requirements, which have been presented to you, describe the overall job structure of the armed services rather than their current replacement needs or job vacancies. Civilian industry turnover rates are typically highest among the unskilled and semiskilled occupations, and lowest in the skilled, white-collar, and professional groups. The enlisted personnel turnover experience of the armed services unfortunately has been precisely the opposite. The very occupational groups which require the greatest training investment and the highest mental aptitude standards have, in recent years, experienced the poorest reenlistment rates. As a result, our replacement needs are relatively greater in the most technical specialties than in the less technical skills. The Department of Defense has undertaken a variety of programs designed to encourage higher reenlistment rates in the most technical specialties. In addition to other incentives, such as special training and promotional opportunities, we have recently increased the rates of differential proficiency pay to specialists in the most technical shortage skills to as much as $100 per month above the basic rates in other specialties. It is clear, however, that unless, or until these imbalances are corrected, a major portion of our military personnel effort must be concentrated in recruitment and retention of personnel with the capabilities of being trained and utilized in our high turnover occupational areas. MANPOWER PROCUREMENT POLICIES In turning, next, to a discussion of our manpower procurement programs, I would like to address myself initially to the basic policy of the Department of Defense on the respective roles played by voluntary procurement and inductions, in meeting our military strength goals. In my testimony before the Armed Services Committee, early this year, in support of the extension of the induction authority, I reaffirmed, on behalf of Secretary McNamara, the standing policy of the Department of Defense of relying upon voluntary manpower sources, to the maximum extent, during peacetime. This policy is most compatible with the American tradition. Clearly, too, it is in the best interest of the military services. The volunteer is likely to be a better motivated soldier than the conscript. He is also available for a longer term of service, since initial enlistments are for 3- or 4-year terms, as compared to a 2-year draft tour. Perhaps the most significant single indicator of the emphasis placed upon voluntary recruitment by the services is the wide range of choices available to young men of this country for volunteering into military service. There are more than 50 different programs under which young men can volunteer either in the Regular Forces or the Reserve components for enlisted or officer service. Although we have not made a statistical analysis of this point. I believe I am safe in saying that no country in the world today offers as wide a range of options and opportunities for voluntary military service as does the United States. Our voluntary procurement programs have met with a substantial measure of success. All services, except the Army, have been able to meet their requirements in recent years without direct recourse to the draft. In the Army, too, the trend has been toward an increased proportion of volunteers. Although its total strength has increased the ratio of draftees has declined from 30 percent of total Army enlisted strength in 1958 to 23 percent at present. Despite this generally favorable trend, our experience has indicated that the draft will continue to be essential to maintain our military strength in the years immediately ahead. On the average, we expect an annual requirement for about 90,000 draftees during the next 4 years, higher in some years, such as 1964; lower, in others. In addition, the existence of a draft liability has been a major factor influencing many young men to volunteer for enlistment or officer programs. In the absence of a military service obligation, our studies indicate that the enlistment and officer procurement programs of all services would be seriously impaired. |