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This report to the subcommittee also indicates that a rather substantial number of individuals received a two-grade promotion upon transfer to these agencies, or will receive two promotions following their transfer. To what effect these promotions will offset anticipated savings cannot be determined by the subcommittee at this time.

There is an inherent danger in the Defense Supply Agency that cannot be overlooked. It is an independent Agency responsible only to the Secretary of Defense. It could well be the forerunner of a fourth service of supply. When supply is separated from command most military advisers will agree that danger threatens.

Who supervises the Defense Supply Agency in its status as an independent agency? Obviously the Secretary of Defense cannot devote all of his time to this agency, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installation and Logistics testified that he spends not more than 3 hours a week with this agency.

Logistical support is essential to the Armed Forces and it must be immediately_responsive to the command activity that requires this support. Who will the Congress look to if this logistical support fails? An independent agency-supervising itself.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMENDATION CONCERNING THE DEFENSE SUPPLY

AGENCY

It is the subcommittee's recommendation that the Committee on Armed Services from time to time make inquiry into the operations of the Defense Supply Agency to determine

1. The extent to which it may contemplate expanding;

2. The extent to which it is fulfilling its mission; and

3. The extent to which the military services are obtaining timely delivery of supplies when requested.

It is the further recommendation of the subcommittee that the National Security Act be amended so as to preclude any possibility of the expansion of the Defense Supply Agency to the distribution of supplies to the military services beyond the wholesale level. Responsibility of command must contain within it the responsibility to demand and control logistical support within the command. It will be too late to assess the blame for logistical failure if supplies are not in the hands of the using services when they are needed in the event of hostilities.

Finally, the subcommittee would express another word of caution concerning the Defense Supply Agency. It is not a part of the Office of the Secretary of Defense; it is not within a military department; it is an independent Agency. By the stroke of a pen it might well become a completely nonmilitary organization. Such an organization, completely independent of the military services, could become the most powerful civilian procurement organization in the world.

Under present plans, the Defense Supply Agency will procure some $2,900 million worth of items during this fiscal year.

However, the Deputy Secretary of Defense is quoted as having said that this is an organization

that is going to be running a $20 billion inventory, with procurement under its cognizance of some $4 to $5 billion a year. That does not include some threequarters of a billion dollars of common-use items that we will be contracting for through GSA.

Nothing contained in this report is intended as a criticism of the present military leadership of the Defense Supply Agency, nor the civilian employees of this Agency.

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

The Defense Intelligence Agency was established as a result of a study conducted in 1960. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Lemnitzer, stated that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested by the then Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gates, to consider ways and means of consolidating our intelligence functions, particularly in the strategic field. General Lemnitzer said:

He asked our opinion with respect to the proposed Agency, and the Chiefs submitted their views to the Secretary of Defense on the 8th of February 1961, and we recommended that the Agency be established under the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We recommended that the Director be a military officer of three-star rank. We suggested that the Agency coordinate and integrate the military intelligence activities of the military departments of DOD and we recommended that the development of this Agency be evolutionary in nature to avoid disruption in the continuity or the quality of intelligence support afforded to the military services. The alleged legal basis for the Defense Intelligence Agency is again section 202 (c) (6) of the National Security Act; that is, the McCormack-Curtis amendment, together with the catchall section referred to by Defense witnesses that the Secretary of Defense shall take appropriate steps (including the transfer, reassignment, abolition, and consolidation of functions) to provide in the Department of Defense for more effective, efficient, and economical administration and operation, and to eliminate duplication.

While almost all of the debate on the floor of the House with regard to the McCormack-Curtis amendment centered about the procurement of common-use items and the single manager system, nevertheless as a result of this amendment, the Defense Intelligence Agency has been established.

Evaluating military intelligence is a vital part of the effectiveness of a military organization. The subcommittee is unaware of any complaints concerning the operation of this Agency. If it has a present weakness, it is the thin reed upon which it stands for its legal justification. Integrating intelligence activities appears to the subcommittee to be a far cry from the procurement of common-use items or carrying out of "any supply or service activity common to more than one military department."

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Integrating intelligence activities certainly cannot be called a supply activity and could hardly be called a service activity. However, if the word "service" means doing something, then there is no activity conducted by the military departments or the four military services that is not subject to integration, centralization, or transfer to an independent agency under the McCormack-Curtis amendment.

If the Defense Intelligence Agency is a legally constituted agency, separate from the military departments, and reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, then practically every function of the military departments can be placed in a comparable agency. There would be little left except for those few restrictions contained in the general roles and missions assigned to each of the services.

It will be remembered that the Army is to be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.

The former General Counsel of the Department of Defense implied that basic training of Army personnel could not be taken from the Army and placed in a separate agency, but he was careful to point out that this meant "basic" training. Specialized training, in his opinion, was something else.

The Secretary of Defense referred to the Army roles and missions. and said that the Army was "responsible for the preparation for land forces for the effective prosecution of war." He further said:

I interpret that to mean that the responsibility for the preparation includes the responsibility for such significant contributions to the preparation of the research and development of major weapons systems.

However, it should also be pointed out that the Secretary of Defense has the legal authority to assign or reassign weapons systems developed after the 1958 amendments to the National Security Act, to any military department, and in addition has the authority to centralize research and engineering activities. The subcommittee appreciates this statement of the present Secretary of Defense, but the precedent established by the Defense Intelligence Agency and the interpretation of a future General Counsel, might well bring about a further merger of activities that are now reserved to the military departments and the military services.

The subcommittee is of the opinion that the Defense Intelligence Agency can be a highly effective activity under the Joint Chiefs of Staff and may do much to bring about integrated intelligence estimates.

But there is a potential danger in the Defense Intelligence Agency: namely, that in an effort to bring about an integrated intelligence estimate the minority views of another service may be disregarded. The adoption of a single intelligence estimate does not assure its accuracy. There are other matters of grave concern in connection with the Defense Intelligence Agency that cannot be overlooked. At present, the collection and evaluation of technical data remains with the military services and there appears to be no present intent to remove this responsibility from the military services. But, as the Defense Intelligence Agency grows in size, the evaluators for the military services will decrease in number. The Army Chief of Staff, General Decker, stated to the subcommittee:

Well, I believe that when DIA is fully organized and operating that we will not have the capability of evaluating intelligence in the various departments. Mr. Hardy then stated:

So that if there is a mistake overall, your people will have to put their own evaluation on it.

General Decker replied:

Our people will have no way of knowing whether it is valid or not because their evaluation capability is being removed.

General Decker summarized the subcommittee's concern with regard to the Defense Intelligence Agency by stating:

It is in the evaluation of intelligence that we may find some difficulties in a single agency. Intelligence is like research and development, if you approach it from several different angles, you may come up with the right answer. If you get only one answer in the intelligence field, it may be right or it may be wrong. To that extent there is a possible weakness in this organization.

The former Deputy Chief of Staff of the Air Force was asked for his comment on the Air Force's ability to evaluate intelligence information under the Defense Intelligence Agency. General Smith replied:

There is no question, in my opinion, that the capacity to evaluate raw data is now going to DIA and there will not be any strong capability remaining in the individual services.

The subcommittee does not question the ability of the personnel of the Defense Intelligence Agency. We point out the potential dangers mentioned above of a single intelligence estimate and the reduced ability for separate evaluation by the military services.

However, the subcommittee recognizes that varying intelligence estimates without an ultimate military decision can be confusing and misleading. We can only express the hope that this Agency will continue to be operated by highly skilled, extremely capable military officers who will consider the roles and missions of the separate services and at no time hesitate to forward to the Joint Chiefs of Staff any conflicting opinions concerning the evaluation of intelligence that has been submitted to them.

The Defense Intelligence Agency is now functioning, and will continue to expand as it takes over many of the activities of the military departments at the headquarters level. At present intelligence activities at the field level are still conducted by the separate services. We hope they will remain there.

The subcommittee finds no fault with the Defense Intelligence Agency at this time, but is aware of the danger of a single intelligence estimate. The subcommittee, however, does object to the establishment of this Agency under the authority of the McCormack amendment. It could be the forerunner of a further merging of the essential activities of the separate services.

DEFENSE ATOMIC SUPPORT AGENCY AND NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

The Defense Atomic Support Agency was established in 1947 as the Armed Forces special weapons project. It was renamed the Defense Atomic Support Agency on May 1, 1959, and the Department of Defense states that it was established under the broad powers of the Secretary of Defense and the McCormack-Curtis amendment.

The subcommittee finds no fault with the Defense Atomic Suport Agency, but again questions the legality of an agency of this nature, when it points to the McCormack-Curtis amendment as its legal reason for existence.

The National Security Agency was established by the President in 1952. The subcommittee does not question its legal authority, since it goes beyond the missions of the services, but the Director of the National Security Agency, Vice Adm. L. H. Frost, has his reserva

tions concerning its statutory authority for he testified before the subcommittee that "When I took over the Agency, the first thing I did was recommend statutory authority be established for it."

DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY

The Defense Communications Agency was established on May 12, 1960, under the McCormack-Curtis amendment and the general authority of the Secretary of Defense. It is the single manager for all Department of Defense long-haul, point-to-point, Government-owned and leased communications.

The subcommittee has received no publicly stated complaints concerning the functioning of this Agency. It is under the direction of very capable leadership and the officers and personnel assigned to it from the separate services are enthusiastic in their approach toward this Agency and are thoroughly convinced that it will improve our communication capability.

The subcommittee has one word of caution in connection with this Agency. It appears to be well organized to manage and direct communications in time of peace. It is intended, of course, to make full use of our worldwide communications network and one of its main functions is to plan the orderly conversion of these facilities into an integrated Department of Defense communications system, owned and operated by the military departments. But the subcommittee would point out that communications lanes that appear to be duplicative or used infrequently or considerably less than capacity in time of peace can become vastly inadequate in time of war. Communications is absolutely vital to combat forces and to the direction of those forces. It is doubtful whether any commander in time of war has ever felt that he had adequate communication facilities. The Defense Communications Agency will undoubtedly bring about better utilization of existing communication facilities, but the subcommittee would express the hope that those responsible for this Agency continue to test these facilities under maximum use conditions, simulated or otherwise, to determine their effectiveness in the event of conflict.

A communication network for the strategic direction of our Armed Forces is an essential part of our national security. Its nonutilization in time of peace is no measure of its importance in time of war. The subcommittee would add that the opinion expressed above is also that of a highly respected former senior officer of the Armed Forces who volunteered this statement in an informal discussion with the subcommittee.

CUSTODIAL AND MAINTENANCE SERVICE OF DEFENSE AGENCIES

The subcommittee was directed to determine the extent to which the defense agencies are dependent upon a military department for custodial and maintenance services. In view of the enactment of section 610 (a) and (b) of Public Law 87-554 (July 27, 1962) there appears to be no need to further discuss this question. This section provides as follows:

SEC. 610. (a) Any maintenance, rehabilitation, repair, alteration, addition, expansion, or extension of real property facilities required incident to the operation of activities and agencies of the Department of Defense (other than the

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