b. The military and civil service participation in WSEG be limited to not more than two officers from each service (grade of major or equivalent, to act in a liaison capacity only. These officers should remain assigned to an ap propriate office in their own departments. c. All security should be the responsibility of the contractor. Enclosure: a/s cc: Joint Chiefs of Staff 1-Chairman 1-Director, Joint Staff 1-Each Service Chief WM. P. ENNIS, Jr., Lieutenant General, USA, Director. While the subcommittee has received assurances from the Director of Defense Research and Engineering that detailed implementing instructions will, to a considerable degree, alleviate any feeling that the July 11 memorandum was intended to reduce the effectiveness of the Weapons Systems Evaluation Group or the military participation in its military evaluations, nevertheless, the issuance of the memorandum and the reaction of those familiar with the organization and functioning of this office speak for themselves. Nor can the subcommittee overlook the fact that when the Defense Supply Agency was established the Secretary of Defense decided that the Director of the Agency would report directly to the Secretary of Defense rather than through a Defense Supply Council. This Council, instead of being in the chain of command with direct representation of the military departments and the military services, is now advisory only. The subcommittee cannot disregard the fact that in many Department of Defense projects involving program changes civilian personnel with relatively little military background are given the responsibility for the review and preparation of coordinated recommendations, as indicated by the following memorandum: THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WASHINGTON 31 May 1962 Memorandum for the Secretaries of the Military Departments the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff the Assistant Secretaries of Defense the General Counsel the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense the Assistants to the Secretary of Defense the Chief, Defense Atomic Support Agency the Director, Defense Communications Agency the Director, Defense Supply Agency Subject: Designation of OSD Offices as Points of Contact for the Selective Re view of Major Proposed Program Changes I hereby designate the following personnel of my office as responsible for the review and the preparation of coordinated recommendations on the major pro posed program changes as itemized in my classified memorandum of 18 May 1962, Subject: "Selective Review of Major Proposed Program Changes". Item No. 1. Consolidated Cryptologic Program. 2. Mission Support and Training Aircraft_. 3. Military Housing--- 4. Hound Dog 5. Skybolt-‒‒‒‒ 6. Minuteman Missile Improvement...--- 7. Minuteman Force Level_____ 8. KC-135 Tanker Force Adjustment---. 9. Polaris (Increased funding for support, etc.). 10. Caesar System---- 11. Advanced Manned Interceptor_ 12. Army National Guard Battalions__ 13. Nike Hercules____ OSD Contact (Hon. John H. (Mr. Paul H. Riley) ASD (I&L) (Mr. John J. Reed) DDR&E (Mr. Fred A. Payne) Mr. Fred A. Payne) Mr. Fred A. Payne) (Dr. A. Enthoven) (Dr. A. Enthoven) DDR&E (Mr. Burton P. Brown) ASD (COMP) (Dr. A. Enthoven) DDR&E (Mr. John Klotz) ASD (COMP) (Dr. M. J. Peck) ASD (COMP) (Dr. A. Enthoven) 21. Combat Consumables and Support for Tactical Aircraft.. ASD (COMP) The subcommittee requested and received from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International and Security Affairs, information concerning a study recommended by the Department of State. In the opinion of the subcommittee this study encroaches upon one of the major functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since it involves long range national security planning. The information in the possession of the subcommittee is classified and cannot be publicly discussed, but the subcommittee views with alarm the obvious domination of this study by civilian participants. The subcommittee revealed the fact that in at least one area an Assistant Secretary of Defense was not informed of a study project in his own office of the transportation facilities of the Department of Defense. The subcommittee was assured by several witnesses that no study was being conducted with regard to the Military Air Transport Service nor the Military Sea Transport Service with respect to placing these single-manager operations under the Defense Supply Agency or a transportation agency. But on December 1, 1961, Mr. Vincent F. Caputo, Director for Transportation and Warehousing, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics, directed an officer in his office to make a thorough analysis, on an individual basis, of all pertinent statistical data in the transportation area-organization, alinement, and functions—and submit them to me, pointing up the areas where improvements in responsiveness may be Eindicated. Mr. Hardy asked Mr. Caputo: "Doesn't that take in about anything you want." Mr. Caputo answered: "It takes in the entire transportation field." The study, in fact, refers to a Defense Transportation Agency. The subcommittee does not wish to overstress this relatively minor study. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Installations and Logistics obviously cannot be fully aware of the activities of all personnel in his Office. Nor does the subcommittee claim that there was anything inherently wrong in pursuing such a study. But the subcommittee does suggest that there may be other studies being carried out in the Office of the Secretary of Defense about which the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, or the Assistant Secretaries of Defense may not be aware. Studies of this nature cannot be conducted anonymously, and eventually information will leak out. This leads to rumors that additional functions of the military departments are about to be absorbed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, or a new agency is about to be created. It could also lead to the actual establishment of a new agency or the transfer of functions to an existing agency if it were approved. The Congress would then be told that it is a "service activity" and thus within the unlimited purview of the McCormack amendment. CONCLUSIONS On the basis of the testimony and other sources of information, the subcommittee can reach no other conclusion but that there has been a vastly increased centralization of decisionmaking, directly or indirectly, in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and a resultant diminution of the responsibilities of the military departments and the separate services. There remains the question then as to what this increased centralization of decision making in the Office of the Secretary of Defense will eventually produce with regard to the organization of our military forces for our national security. In the opinion of the subcommittee, decision making in a military organization consists of a carefully tailored chain of command or series of command levels leading to the top, giving the appearance of a highly centralized system. Within this apparently rigid structure, however, is the authority, coupled with the responsibility, to make decisions at each level of command. This system was born and nurtured by long experience which has proven that a military commander, regardless of his echelon of command, squad, or field army, is faced with decisions which are his and his alone. In combat there is often no one to turn to for advice and counsel. Decisions must be made, and must be made immediately. Americans have traditionally been decisive individuals, ready to accept responsibility for their own actions. This has been particularly true of the American military man. Today, however, the subcommittee is convinced of the rapid growth of a system which moves the decisionmaking process higher and higher on the scale of centralized authority and into the hands of a few people. The new Department of Defense agencies, although perhaps conceived as coordinating agencies, are in fact operational and directional in nature. As time goes on, with all decisions being made at the Secretary of Defense level, lower echelons will develop a "no decision" or indecisive philosophy. Individuals who once made decisions will be gone and replaced by individuals who, having been raised under the new system, will never have been required to make decisions. We believe that this situation already exists, and that the testimony-or in some instances the lack of testimony, establishes this conclusion. Thus, the systematic authority and responsibility for decisionmaking at appropriate levels is eroding. Those entrusted to make decisions with the accompanying authority and responsibility will increasingly turn to the next higher authority until ultimately all decisions, large and small, will be crowding in at the top and awaiting resolution. Obviously such a system is ponderous and slow and unresponsive to the immediate needs of subordinate levels. Therefore, in time of emergencies requiring flexibility, responsiveness, and speedy resolution of issues at hand, the overcentralized system will be largely ineffectual, perhaps to the point of endangering our national security. The imposition and operation of an overcentralized system will eventually also result in breeding mediocrity of its members except for the very top few. Such a system will no longer attract the aggressive. decisive, quick-thinking men of action and will degrade the ability of those now serving in our Armed Forces. To the contrary, it will attract those who prefer to shun authority and responsibility and prefer to rely on others to do their thinking and deciding for them. The elimination of conflicting views, the consolidation of functions, and the downgrading of military departments, may also eventually lead to the adoption of a single defense concept. It is the opinion of the subcommittee that such a concept could be disastrous if carried to its ultimate conclusion. We are not an aggressor nation; we must maintain versatility and flexibility. The four military services have statutory missions. They are well organized for these purposes; they have learned to become masters of their own trades. The Congress and the Committee on Armed Services have repeatedly stated that there is no intent to merge the services, nor to establish a single Chief of Staff nor a General Staff. But it is the opinion of the subcommittee that the groundwork is being laid for the very thing that the Congress has repeatedly expressed concern about and attempted to prevent. This subcommittee has been unable to thoroughly cover a subject matter as vast as the defense agencies and their relationship to the Department of Defense in this time period. We would urge that in each succeeding Congress a subcommittee be established so that the Committee on Armed Services may be kept constantly informed with regard to the evolutionary process to which Mr. Gilpatric referred insofar as the organization of the Department of Defense is concerned. Since it is not the function of the Congress to pass upon the legality of public laws, we cannot state that what has been done is illegal, but certainly we believe that it is contrary to the intent of the Congress. But more important, perhaps, is that these independent agencies could lead to dangerous results. No one questions the patriotism nor the ability of the Secretary of Defense and his staff. No one questions the need to eliminate unnecessary duplication; everyone applauds intelligent savings. But we must never overlook the fact that our Armed Forces are organized to fight wars. The Armed Forces is not a business corporation. Since 1775 the Armed Forces have never declared a dividend, unless our continued existence as a free nation can be considered a dividend. Duplication and competition are two different things. Finally, we emphasize that national defense is not a sole responsibility of the executive branch of Government; Congress has a role, and a very important role to play in our national security. For that reason, the subcommittee is convinced that the Congress, through the Armed Services Committees must take an ever-increasing interest in the changes that are now taking place in the Department of Defense. The subcommittee is concerned about the organization as it exists today, but even more concerned about the organization that could emerge from the changes now being affected. And unfortunately, the genesis of these changes is an amendment which was adopted on the floor of the House with most of its supporters believing that it was intended for one thing and with its interpretation being viewed by defense officials from an entirely different viewpoint. Therefore the subcommittee urges that the McCormack amendment be amended and be restricted to the purpose which, in our opinion, the Congress intended. Since it would obviously be impractical to eliminate the present Defense Supply Agency or the Defense Intelligence Agency, we would suggest that the existing agencies be clearly legalized, but that no other agencies be established nor existing agencies expanded without review by the Congress. In the opinion of the subcommittee there was no generally understood intent to authorize the establishment of independent agencies which can do indirectly what the Congress had specifically denied that the Secretary of Defense can do directly. To accomplish this objective, the subcommittee recommends a legislative proposal which, if enacted, would legalize the agencies now in existence but will set into motion the provisions of |