[No. 70] REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 3 ON MILITARY RESERVE POSTURE BASIS FOR HEARINGS In accordance with the established rules of the House, the Committee on Armed Services has legislative responsibility for all matters concerned with the "Common defense generally." This legislative responsibility therefore embraces, among other things, all matters affecting the size and composition of our Armed Forces and the Reserve components. As a consequence of this legislative responsibility, a subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee normally conducts an annual review of the military posture of our Reserve components. The desirability of conducting such a review during the current session of the 87th Congress was significantly heightened by virtue. of the recent partial mobilization of our Reserve components pursuant to the authority provided the President by the Congress in Public Law 87-117. Advocates of such a review pointed out that the experience gained by this partial mobilization, if subjected to proper critical scrutiny, might reveal deficiencies requiring corrective legislative action. In view of these considerations, the chairman of the Committee on Armed Services, by letter dated January 25, 1962, formally delegated to Subcommittee No. 3, responsibility for conducting an appropriate review of the military posture of our Reserve components. SCOPE OF HEARINGS The authority vested in the subcommittee by the chairman's letter of January 25, 1962, identified, in some detail, areas which required particular review. However, the authority provided the subcommittee was by no means circumscribed by this directive as is evidenced by the broad authority implicit in the letter which is reproduced below: DEAR MR. HÉBERT: In accordance with authority previously vested in me by the full Committee on Armed Services, I am hereby delegating to Subcommittee No. 3, with you as chairman, the responsibility for conducting a comprehensive inquiry into the defense posture of the Reserve components of our Armed Forces. The cope of your inquiry shall include, but not be limited to, the following pertinent considerations: (a) Review of alleged deficiencies resulting from the recent limited mobilization of the Reserve components. (b) National defense requirements for a Reserve component program. (d) Ability of the Reserve components to fulfill mobilization requirements. (e) Review of the application of the statutory Reserve military obligation on individuals who have completed 2 or more years of active duty. (6637) In view of the importance of this inquiry, I would urge that you attempt to complete subcommittee action for report to the full committee prior to the conclusion of this session of the Congress. Sincerely, CARL VINSON, Chairman. The printed hearings and this report will reflect the fact that the subcommittee attempted to fully develop testimony and information which is not only responsive to the areas of concern identified in the chairman's letter, but which is also responsive to other areas of concern deemed pertinent by the subcommittee. Any discussion of the present status of the Reserve components presupposes a general familiarity with the various laws which provide the statutory basis for these components and their respective programs. Composition The Reserve Forces today, except in name, bear little resemblance to the Reserve Forces of the era prior to World War II and the Korean conflict. In terms of strength, organization, and status of training, our Reserve components have experienced significant progress since the enactment of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952. The Reserve components as identified in section 261 of title 10, U.S.C., are seven in number, namely Mission (1) The Army National Guard of the United States. (2) The Army Reserve. (3) The Naval Reserve. (4) The Marine Corps Reserve. (5) The Air National Guard of the United States. (6) The Air Force Reserve. (7) The Coast Guard Reserve. While the mission of the Reserve Forces over the years has been considered that of reinforcing the military strength of this country in time of war or the threat of war, it was not until the enactment of the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 that the mission of the Reserves was completely defined. This statutory expression of the mission of the Reserve Forces is now found in section 262 of title 10, U.S.C., and reads as follows: The purpose of the reserve components is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency and at such other times as the national security requires, to fill the need of the armed forces whenever, during, and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components. Reserve component objectives The Secretary of Defense in his annual report to the Congress, submitted in conformance with section 279 of title 10, identifies the objectives of the Reserve components as follows: (1) To maintain trained Reserve Forces capable of fulfilling rapid mobilization requirements. (2) To provide units complete with trained personnel and suitable equipment, capable and ready for immediate use as augmentation to the Active Forces for either selective expansion or for limited or general war. (3) To provide trained individuals to fill specific needs of the Active Forces. (4) To provide additional trained units and individuals required for the phased expansion of the Active Forces. Congressional responsibility As provided by article I. section 8 of the Constitution, the Congress has the primary responsibility in our Government "to raise and support armies" and "to provide and maintain a Navy." This responsibility necessarily embraces both the Active Military Establishment and its Reserve components. Congress has met this responsibility with various legislative enactments that have, as previously indicated, identified the various Reserve components and defined their basic mission. In addition, the Congress has taken other action to insure that these components will be adequately supplied with manpower, equipment, and facilities so as to enable them to satisfy their mission requirements. Perhaps the most significant action taken by the Congress in this regard was the enactment of the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 which amended the Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952 and provided for mandatory participation in Reserve training. This action assured the Reserve components that if they were unable to meet their personnel requirements through voluntary participation, they could utilize the statutes to require individual participation in Reserve training. Presumably, this action satisfied the most critical requirement for the Reserve program, namely, manpower, and consequently this subcommittee and the Congress had reason to believe that the Reserve components would achieve higher levels of readiness than ever before. The recent mobilization of certain Reserve units has now provided the Congress with an opportunity to assess the responsiveness and readiness of these Reserve units and, in short, permit the executive branch an opportunity to give an accounting of its stewardship of the Reserve program. Congressional policy The Congress has also passed many laws spelling out detailed policy guidance under which the Reserve programs are administered. These laws include provisions which (a) Establish a 6-year Reserve obligation for all individuals who enter the armed services (with the exception of certain 6-month trainees who have an 8-year obligation). (b) Provide that all Reserves be placed in categories indicating their vulnerability for recall; i.e., Ready and Standby Reserves. (c) Establish a limitation on the number of individuals who may be maintained in the Ready Reserve (2,900,000). (d) Limit to 1 million the number of ready reservists who can be recalled to active duty during a presidentially declared emergency. (e) Prescribe the manner in which obligated reservists may discharge their obligation to participate in the Reserve program while in a ready or standby status. (f) Establish at 5 years the maximum period of obligation for Ready Reserve participation (other than certain 6-month trainees). (g) Require an annual screening of the Ready Reserve to determine the availability of personnel for recall to active duty in a national emergency. (h) Provide that whenever the authorized strength of the Reserve components are not prescribed by law, they shall be prescribed by the President. (i) Establish a Reserve Forces Policy Board for the Army, Navy, and Air Force, respectively, and the Department of Defense to act as the principal policy adviser to the respective Secretaries on matters relating to the Reserve components. (j)In the case of National Guard components, acknowledges the dual Federal and State mission of these components, and therefore provides in section 104, of title 32, United States Code, that "*** no change in the branch, organization, or allotment of a unit located entirely within a State may be made without the approval of its Governor." Executive responsibility for the Reserve program Management responsibility for the manpower portion of the Reserve program is vested in the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. In testimony before the subcommittee, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower acknowledged that the manifold duties of his office made it difficult to measure what portion of his time was spent on Reserve matters. The Secretary pointed out that Reserve matters represented only a small portion of his total responsibilities. His duties include all personnel policy matters relating to 2,750,000 military personnel and 1 million civilian personnel; responsibility for information and education programs, including international radio and television; determination of military and civilian force levels; security policy and the industrial security program; all matters relating to health and medicine, including medical care for dependents; civil rights; industrial relations; the Federal voting program; and various other related functions. The subcommittee believes that the multiplicity of responsibilities vested in the office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower makes it virtually impossible for an executive in this position to satisfactorily discharge all the responsibilities of his office. Thus, those responsibilities that appear less critical and urgent receive correspondingly less attention. The subcommittee is convinced that Reserve policy matters have been treated in this fashion and been permitted to rock and stumble along without any imaginative or aggressive effort to resolve them. Many of the personr el problems affecting the Reserve components today, such as the critical shortage of "hard skill" personnel, might have been avoided if the problems had been recognized by individuals at the Secretarial level and appropriate emphasis placed on their possible solutions. The subcommittee wishes to emphasize that establishment of this office will, however, not accomplish the desires of the subcommittee if the Secretary of Defense does not accord this office with an opportunity to function properly. For example, by a memorandum dated May 31, 1962, the Secretary of Defense designated a civilian (Dr. M. Peck) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) as the OSD officer who would be responsible for review of proposed program changes affecting Army National Guard battalions. Obviously, this function should be a basic responsibility of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower. It is for this reason that the subcommittee urges that consideration be given to the establishment of an Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs with appropriate authority. Creation of such an Office would permit the incumbent to give fulltime attention to Reserve matters and insure that Reserve problems will be both "recognized" and "understood" at the Secretary of Defense level. National defense requirements for a Reserve Force The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower provided the subcommittee with a most persuasive response to the fundamental question confronting the subcommittee: Do we require a Reserve Force? The subcommittee wholeheartedly endorses the excellent analysis provided by the departmental witness, Assistant Secretary of Defense Carlisle P. Runge, and, therefore, has incorporated this response into this report in its entirety: I should like to next discuss the views of the Department of Defense with respect to the requirements for a Reserve component program. I think that it is rather important to understand that so long as this Nation exists there will probably be a requirement for Reserve components of the military departments. Historically, we have depended upon the citizen soldier to maintain our freedom. In our type of society, the active Military Establishment should be only so large as is required to support the aims of the Nation. Unfortunately, there have been times when the Active Forces have been allowed to decline in strength beyond that point of safety. But looking ahead, no longer will we have the time which we enjoyed in World Wars I and II to prepare for warfare in some foreign land. With aircraft which can span the oceans in 2 hours and missiles which, from launch to impact, require only 30 minutes to traverse half of the earth, we must be better prepared than in the past. Balance of forces: There are three elements to our military capability to defend ourselves and then strike back. These elements are the Active Forces, the Reserve components of the military departments, and the mobilization capability of the Nation as a whole. Achievement of the maximum in security at the minimum expense requires these three elements to be in proper balance. The most expensive of the three is the Active Force. The least expensive is the mobilization capability of the Nation. The Reserve Forces are between, being less expensive than the Active Force but, of course, much more expensive than the unrealized mobilization capability of the Nation as a whole. I should like to depart for a moment and discuss the problem of balance in an unclassified fashion. Given time, the mobilization capabilities of this Nation are almost unlimited. We know that we can produce an unbelievable quantity of food and machinery of war. This we can do with a relatively small portion of our population. From our population of 180 million, we can mobilize and train large military forces as rapidly as we can produce the weapons of war. The key element in production of both the manpower and weapons of war is time, time to put production lines into operation and manufacture or train. Knowing that we can produce any reasonable amount of equipment and any size force if we have time, then the problem is one of gaining that time. How do we gain time? There must be in the Active Force sufficient strength to insure that a quick, knockout blow by a would-be aggressor could not be successful. This force must be capable of absorbing a first blow and striking back or, at the minimum, holding its own until other forces can be mobilized. The callup and readying for combat of Reserve components units, at best, takes some time, regardless of their state of readiness in inactive status. The next question is the mission of the Reserve Forces. How large should they be? We know that it takes a relatively long time to activate completely new units, train, and become combat ready. Therefore, we need a Reserve Force which is capable of satisfying three requirements) |