The hard core of the Ready Reserve of the Navy is identified as the "Selected Reserve." The Selected Reserve is made up of 124,000 reservists, all of whom are attached to drilling units as members of 1 of 5 components. These components include (1) The antisubmarine warfare and mine warfare components with 11,000 reservists. (2) The active fleet augmentation component with 86,000 reservists. (3) The fleet support component with 15,500 reservists. (4) The Shore Establishment component with 8,000 reservists. (5) The program support component with 4,000 reservists. All members of the Selected Reserve are aware of their liability for immediate recall to active duty since each reservist has been issued a precut individual set of active duty orders complete in every detail except for a reporting date. This arrangement enables the Navy to mobilize its Selected Reserve in a matter of hours and, thus, achieve a predictable responsiveness. Unlike the Army Reserve, within the Navy only those forces assigned to the antisubmarine warfare and mine warfare components of the Selected Reserve are organically equipped and report as fully operational units upon mobilization. These components are composed of Selected Reserve ships and air squadrons. Their respective Reserve crews are made up of paid drilling reservists who have been preordered to the specific units. In peacetime, the ships are manned by nucleus or skeleton crews of active duty personnel. Thus, 51 of the 88 ships presently attached to Reserve training units are being maintained in a condition of materiel readiness which will enable them to become operational units of the fleet upon mobilization. This is also true of the aircraft attached to 21 ASW air squadrons. The "filler" concept is not considered applicable to these ship units as the number of personnel authorized in the Reserve crew allowance, when added to active duty personnel assigned, is equivalent to the wartime complement of the unit. Further, in those cases where shortages of personnel exist with respect to the Reserve crew allowance, mobilization plans provide for the procurement of the required personnel from those in a paid drilling status in the fleet augmentation component of the Naval Selected Reserve. Similarly, the personnel allowances of Reserve air squadrons are organized in such a manner that they will combine to form air squadrons at wartime strength on mobilization, with the exception of a small number of personnel such as stewards and cooks who will be provided from active duty sources. Personnel shortages, if existing, will be met by personnel in a paid drilling status from the Air Fleet augmentation squadrons. The Navy, during the recent mobilization of a portion of its Selected Reserve, recalled 40 antisubmarine warfare ships and 190 aircraft attached to its ASW squadrons. All these units demonstrated their ability to meet the operational standards required of Regular Fleet units. Navy witnesses advised the subcommittee that its initial mobilization requirement for M-day was a minimum of 161,000 trained personnel. The subcommittee was further advised that the deficiency of approximately 37,000 personnel required for M-day, not presently assigned to drilling units (only 124,000 in a drill pay status) would be satisfied by issuing similar precut mobilization orders to selected members of the Ready Reserve not in a drilling status. Navy witnesses were unable to satisfactorily explain the rationale which established a minimum M-day requirement of 161,000 personnel and yet limited organized training in drilling units to 124,000 spaces. These witnesses acknowledged that an increase in drilling strength was most desirable but that "budgetary ceilings" established by the Department of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget prevented the Navy from requesting from Congress the additional funds required to support such a program. The subcommittee is not unaware or unappreciative of the Secretary of Defense's diligent efforts to avoid unnecessary expenditures of Federal funds. The subcommittee is in complete agreement with the Secretary in this effort. However, it simply is not logical to acknowledge an immediate M-day requirement for 161,000 reservists and then assume that approximately 37,000 of this number will maintain a condition of readiness and training without regular affiliation with a drilling unit. Another difficulty confronting the Naval Reserve program, as well as all other Reserve training programs, appears to be the increased inflexibility of administration caused by controls and ceilings placed on these programs by individuals in the executive branch outside of the respective service departments. For example, drill pay approppriations are provided the departments on a quarterly basis. Funds which are not used in a specific quarter, due to abnormal or seasonal fluctuation in personnel strength, must then be returned to OSD and cannot be shifted to other portions of the Reserve training program. This situation is further complicated by numerical strength limitations placed on the departments each quarter. The net result is an inability on the part of planning personnel in the Reserve program to efficiently utilize all the funds provided for support of the programs by the Congress. This circumstance then justified the budgeter to reduce the appropriations required for the support of the program for the next year by the amount of funds not expended since it appeared that these funds were not required. The ultimate effect of this progressive reduction and constriction of Reserve funds, if permitted to continue, might well be the destruction of the Reserve program. Marine Corps Reserve The Marine Corps Reserve strength is approximately 240,000, with slightly more than 200,000 in the Ready Reserve. The drilling strength of the Ready Reserve approximates 45,000 personnel and will meet about 50 percent of the initial mobilization requirement of the Active Forces. The balance of initial mobilization requirements will be satisfied from the Ready Reserve Force. The Marine Corps recognized certain deficiencies in its Reserve organizational structure and accordingly, after consultation with this subcommittee, approved for implementation on July 1, 1962, a plan to reorganize its Reserve component. This plan provided that the Organized Marine Corps Reserve be structured, equipped, and trained to provide the basic elements of the 4th Division/Wing Team and other supporting forces required to raise the Marine Corps to a four division/wing team level upon mobilization. An essential feature of the approved plan is the creation of organized Reserve units, as nearly identical to their Fleet Marine Force counterparts as possible, capable of unit mobilization and deployment within the shortest possible time. The former organized Reserve structure was designed primarily to furnish individuals, as opposed to units, to expand the Marine Corps to a four division/wing team level upon mobilization. These individuals were to be phased into existing units utilized in the activation of new units and to initially fill the replacement pipelines. The Marine Corps could have met its initial requirement in the numbers of personnel but this would not have given the combat team capability required. Due to this requirement for increased combat capability of the Fleet Marine Forces and with its reduced requirement for infantry type personnel in the Reserve, a reorientation was necessary to overcome the serious shortages in other occupational fields, especially various maintenance fields, many of which require more technical training. The reorganization of the Organized Marine Corps Reserve, executed on July 1, 1962, will provide the principal elements of an additional Division/Wing Team, plus other Fleet Marine Force combat support units needed within the first month of mobilization. The new troop list contains units organized, equipped, and trained to be capable of unit mobilization if required, and to be augmented by a minimum of 10 percent Regular Marine Corps personnel. It also contains units designed to serve as training vehicles to prepare personnel for duty with service elements of the Fleet Marine Force and for other billets which must be filled during the initial stages of mobilization. When completely reorganized and trained, units designed for unit mobilization and deployment will be identical to like Fleet Marine Force units in strength by rank and military occupational specialty. These units will have the same Tables of Equipment as their Regular counterparts, but only that portion of the equipment required for training will be issued to the units. The balance of the required equipment will be prepositioned for mobilization. Approximately 40 percent of the drill pay structure of the Marine Corps Reserve will retain an individual mobilization assignment, with emphasis on the proficiency of the individual marine's capability consistent with the specialty required for mobilization. In short, 40 percent of the drill pay strength of the Marine Corps Reserve will constitute personnel who will be fillers in the event of mobilization. The merits of this aspect of the Marine Corps plan were particularly evident to the subcommittee in view of the difficulties encountered by the Army in recalling nondrill pay reservists to act as fillers for activated units. The Marine Corps requires an objective drill strength of 55,000 to meet its most critical personnel requirements on M-day. One of the objectives of the proposed plan is to attempt to both increase drill strength and provide greater training opportunity by locating these units in areas capable of providing such support. Marine Corps representatives also advised the subcommittee that implementation of the plan was predicated on the desire to increase the strength of the Marine Corps Reserve rather than to effect personnel reductions. The subcommittee was very much impressed by the thoughtful and detailed planning reflected in the Marine Corps proposed reorganiza tion of its Reserve component. It is also significant to note that both the Marine Corps Reserve Policy Board and the Department of Defense approved this reorganization plan prior to its presentation to this subcommittee. Thus, despite the fact that this plan resulted in the deactivation of various Reserve units throughout the country, the advantages of reorganization were so evident that it received the unanimous endorsement of all concerned. Reserve components of the Air Force The Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve constitute the Reserve components of the Air Force. At the end of June 1961, Air Reserve strength totaled 570,907 officers and airmen-70,895 in the Air National Guard and 500,012 in the Air Force Reserve. All the Air National Guard personnel and 213,871 of the personnel of the Air Force Reserve were in the Ready Reserve. The remaining 286,141 officers and airmen were in the Standby or Retired Reserve. The Air Force points out, and quite properly, that the terms "Ready and Standby Reserve" are quite misleading in determining available reservists since many personnel are assigned to standby status because they did not occupy a mobilization position. On the other hand, many thousands of reservists are held in the Ready Reserve because of their statutory obligation even though they have no desire to participate actively in the Reserve program. The failure of many individuals to participate voluntarily in military training handicapped the Air Force Reserve. On June 30, 1961, for example, Air Force Reserve category A units (drilling units designated for active duty in the event of mobilization) had a requirement for 44,684 ready reservists, but only 35,881 had been assigned, and only 17,191 of these had volunteered. The remainder were either selective or mandatory assignees. Selective assignees are airmen released from active duty and assigned in the Air Force Reserve to complete their military service obligation; mandatory assignees are airmen granted draft deferment and assigned to the Air Force Reserve to obtain their military training. The ceiling on the number of personnel who could be paid for inactive duty training was fixed at 135,000 for fiscal year 1961-72,000 for the Air National Guard and 63,000 for the Air Force Reserve. It is interesting to note that the projected drill strength for fiscal year 1963 for the Air Force Reserve has been reduced 2,000 spaces to 61,000. This action was taken by the Air Force at the direction of the Office of the Secretary of Defense despite the fact that Air Force witnesses testified that this action would adversely affect their mobilization capability. In this connection, an Air Force witness in a prepared statement advised the subcommittee as follows: And we also have learned that we must man these units at a much higher percentage of authorized strength if they are to attain and maintain full operational readiness for immediate use. The best technically qualified and highly motivated filler in the world just can't stack up against the man who has been working as part of the team. Thus, despite the fact that experience and good military judgment indicate conclusively that manning levels of drilling units should be raised, the Air Force has in the interest of economy been directed to reduce their manning levels to accommodate a reduction of 2,000 drill pay spaces. These manning levels will therefore be approximately 80 percent or less whereas the Chief of Staff of the Air Force desires a 100 percent manning level. Prior to the recent mobilization of the Reserve components, the Air National Guard aircraft inventory included 1,711 jet aircraft, 1,289 fighters, 208 trainers, and 214 reconnaissance aircraft. The Air National Guard also operated 288 propeller-driven aircraft. The Air Force Reserve operated 800 aircraft, including 697 two-engine troop carriers; 47 four-engine troop carriers; 24 air sea rescue aircraft; and 32 TC-47's used for navigator training. The subcommittee was informed that a significant amount of the Reserve and Guard inventory of planes and related equipment would remain with the active Air Force upon release of the Reserve units. The subcommittee was also apprised of the fact that many of the pilots and support personnel had chosen to continue on active duty. Although these facts indicate a desirable strengthening of our Active Forces, it nevertheless results in destroying, for an appreciable period, the future mobilization potential of the Reserve and Guard units involved. This circumstance will also apply to many Army Reserve and Guard units and emphasizes one of the basic dangers inherent in a short or temporary mobilization of Reserve forces the fact that a recalled unit, upon deactivation, will probably require at least a year to return to its former mobilization posture. Coast Guard Reserve The Coast Guard Reserve, like its Regular counterpart, operates under the Treasury Department in time of peace and only receives its direction from the Secretary of the Navy in time of war. Under the limitation established by Congress of 2,900,000 in the Ready Reserve, the Secretary of Defense has allocated a Ready Reserve ceiling of 39,600 to the Coast Guard Reserve. As of June 30, 1962, the Coast Guard Reserve consisted of 31,800 personnel, 3,000 of whom were in the Standby Reserve and the balance of 28,800 in the Ready Reserve. Of the more than 28,000 reservists not on active duty, 15,000 are in a drill pay status. The minimum mobilization requirement for the Coast Guard Reserve has been established as 26,000 personnel. Therefore, Coast Guard representatives emphasized the total inadequacy of present drilling strengths. Congress has assigned the Reserve component of the Coast Guard the mission of providing trained units and qualified personnel for active duty during periods of emergency or at such other times as the national security requires. Current plans are to provide a trained Coast Guard Reserve with the capability (1) to immediately secure vital seaports and coastal areas against attack and/or subversive activities; (2) to augment Coast Guard vessels to their war comple 85066-62-No. 70-3 |