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boards made available to them by the Congress. These boards, which are the statutory creatures of Congress, were properly designated to be in a position of influence in guiding and formulating the development of Reserve policy. Recent events indicate that these boards, particularly the Reserve Forces Policy Board of the Secretary of Defense, have become subordinated to a position of a mere official observer in the development of policy.

Despite the fact that the Reserve Forces Policy Boards of the Department of the Army and the Department of Defense strongly objected to the proposed Army reorganization plan, responsible officials within the departments neither accepted these criticisms as valid, nor made any effort to modify the plan to accommodate the objections.

The subcommittee wishes to take this opportunity to emphasize that the Department of Defense and the individual service departments should operate within the framework and intent of statutes passed by Congress. If the Department of Defense continues to refuse to consider Congress as a coequal partner in the national defense effort, it might become necessary for Congress to reinvest itself with certain of the authority now provided the Department.

SUBCOMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. That the Department of the Army go forward with that portion of its plan which would eliminate obsolete and unnecessary units and replace them with units necessary to meet military requirements.

According to the Army, it proposed to eliminate fire control repair detachments, 90 millimeter antiaircraft gun battalions, special service companies, separate laundry companies, air observation detachments, etc., all of which are no longer required in the Reserve components. New type units include corps and Army aviation companies, radio logical center detachments, armored medical companies, etc.

The subcommittee wishes to point out that modernization of the Reserve components is, and has always been, a continual process and this feature of the Army reorganization plan is neither new nor controversial.

2. That the Department of the Army modify the missions or functions of existing so-called surplus units to permit their retention or, in the alternative, retain its so-called surplus units for the purpose of utilizing these units as a source of "drilling fillers" in the event of a future

mobilization.

The Army proposes, for example, to eliminate the following-type units from the Reserve structure as being "excess" to requirements: Towed 155-millimeter howitzer battalions, transportation tactical carrier companies, engineer construction battalions, amphibious truck companies, etc.

The subcommittee believes that the "scrapping" of these units, along with their trained manpower resources, is completely shortsighted. Assuming that the functions performed by these units are no longer required in our mobilization planning, these units in the opinion of the subcommittee should either be given a new required mission or be retained and possibly modified to permit them to become training vehicles for filler personnel. Retention of these units as training vehicles would then provide a ready source of available drilling personnel who could be utilized by other activated units upon mobili

zation. New missions can easily be assigned to existing surplus or so-called obsolete units. For example, a 155-millimeter towed howitzer battalion can become a 155-millimeter self-propelled unit by the mere provision of such self-propelled equipment. The personnel attached to the unit are now trained and available.

In respect to the possibility of retaining these units as training vehicles, if the Army Reserve component structure had included drilling units which could have been utilized as a source of individual fillers, much of the current problem involving the mobilization of inactive reservists could have been avoided.

The reorganization of the Marine Corps Reserve, effected on July 1, 1962, incorporated this principle which was approved by both the Department of Defense and this subcommittee.

The subcommittee therefore urges the Department of Defense to give serious consideration to this possible modification of the Army Reserve structure.

3. That the Department of the Army not deactivate its eight Army Reserve and Guard divisions until it is prepared to implement its ROAD concept into the Reserve components.

The subcommittee has been advised by competent military authority that there is no assurance that implementation of the ROAD concept into the Army Reserve components will not require certain elements of the eight divisions now scheduled for elimination. Therefore, it is apparent to the subcommittee that elimination of these eight divisions would be premature at this time.

Furthermore, the subcommittee has serious reservations concerning the damaging effect elimination of these eight divisions will have on our future mobilization capability. Both the Army and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have indicated that these divisions are no longer considered necessary for mobilization planning. However, the fact remains that any general mobilization would not only require these division organizations, but many more. Consequently, the subcommittee is reluctant to accept the proposition that we can measure our mobilization requirements so precisely that we can afford to "scrap" these famous divisions.

The subcommittee believes that these division headquarters and command structures excess to present planned mobilization requirements should possibly be assigned additional missions as "combat force commands" to organize and supervise the corps, Army, and theater-type troops, and subsequently to organize such followup divisions as may be developed after M-day. Retention of these. divisions on the basis of this additional misson would then enhance our ultimate mobilization capability and our total defense structure. 4. That the Department of Defense submit to the Committee on Armed Services, prior to February 1, 1963, a legislative recommendation which(a) Will modify the present 6-month training program to permit the enlistment of personnel for periods of time sufficient to train them for the specialty for which enlisted;

(b) Will reduce the total Reserve military obligation for 6-month trainees to 6 years for all personnel from 17 to 26, all this Reserve obligation to be performed in a drilling capacity.

5. That the military departments: (a) utilize the statutory authority available to them to certify for induction by Selective Service those 6month trainees who fail to satisfactorily participate in the program, and (b) reduce to a minimum instances in which such trainees are relieved of

their drill requirements by transfer to a control group. In addition, that the memorandum of understanding be modified to require 51⁄2 years of drill participation by all 6-month trainees.

6. That the legislation be enacted to establish the Office of an Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. The multiplicity of responsibilities now vested in the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower precludes effective representation of Reserve problems at the Secretary of Defense level.

7. That the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments utilize the advisory boards on Reserve matters in the establishment of Reserve policy as originally intended by Congress. The subcommittee is convinced that the role and influence of these statutory boards in the establishment of Reserve Forces policy has steadily deteriorated by virtue of the failure of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the military departments to consult with them prior to the development of major changes in Reserve policy.

8. That the Department of the Army increase its annual procurement of equipment for the Active Army so as to provide the Reserve components with the operational and training equipment necessary to permit the Reserve components to become operationally ready within the time period established in mobilization plans. Implementation of this recommendation would provide an annual PEMA budget of $3.5 billion for the Army for the next 5 years instead of the current procurement level of $2.7 billion.

In view of the continuing failure of the Department of Defense to provide adequate quantities of combat-serviceable equipment to Army Reserve and Army National Guard units, it is the recommendation of the subcommittee that when the full committee next considers the annual authorization bill for missiles, aircraft, and naval vessels, that it consider the feasibility of amending existing law to require an authorization for those items of equipment which are currently in such short supply for Army Reserve and Army National Guard.

9. That the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Treasury initiate a joint study to determine the desirability of including in the annual Department of Defense appropriation request for Reserve support, funds necessary to properly maintain the U.S. Coast Guard Reserve. The results of such study to be made available to the Armed Services Committee when it is completed, but in no event later than February 1. 1963.

10. That the annual Department of Defense appropriation request for Reserve support be adequate to maintain a Reserve Force in each military department commensurate with its mobilization requirements and that the appropriation be made available to the military departments by the Department of Defense without the budgetary restrictions which now preclude the most effective use of these funds. Existing budgetary restrictions established by DOD prevent shifting of these funds between various Reserve training programs and frustrates the efforts of service planners to utilize most advantageously the funds provided by Congress for maximum support of the individual Reserve programs. In this connection. the availability of funds for the maintenance of a strength of 700,000 in the Army Reserve components should be observed or directed by the Con

gress.

SUBCOMMITTEE CONCLUSIONS

The criticisms contained in this report on the Reserve program are not intended to impugn in the slightest degree the motives or sincerity of officials in the executive branch whose responsibilities extend to the Reserve program. The subcommittee supports the desire of these responsible officials within the department to improve the readiness of our Reserve components and to provide our Nation with the maximum return for every tax dollar spent on the program. However, sincere and honest men can differ on the methods used to achieve these objectives.

The subcommittee now finds itself in such a position with respect to the proposal to reorganize the Army Reserve. It agrees entirely with the critical urgency of providing these components with increased readiness. Yet, it cannot accept the approach being recommended by the Department of the Army.

The basic objections of the subcommittee to this proposed reduction of total Reserve strength have been outlined in detail in the body of this report. These objections of the subcommittee are shared to a greater or lesser degree by many other responsible citizens equally dedicated to the proposition of developing increased readiness in our Reserve components. For example, the subcommittee shares with the Governors of the several States their serious concern over the failure of the Department of Defense to give appropriate consideration to State requirements for military forces in the event of local or national disaster.

The reluctance of the Secretary of Defense to take any concrete action in this regard is particularly difficult to comprehend now that significant portions of civil defense responsibility have actually been transferred to the Department of Defense.

Simple prudence would appear to dictate the desirability of providing local Army Reserve and Guard components with well-defined responsibilities in the event of possible nuclear attack which might require the retention of these forces within the State.

President Eisenhower, more than 7 years ago, in urging Congress to pass legislation designed to strengthen the Reserve Forces, said: There are before the Congress bills for establishing Reserves for our armed services. We must remember that in the kind of disaster of which I am now talking, one trained Reserve battalion in the proper place would be worth five divisions located a thousand miles away. Trained men will be needed on the spot at the time the disaster occurs to respond to the calls of the mayors, to respond to the call of the Governors, and to the Federal Government.

This matter is so important we cannot possibly allow any extraneous matter of any kind to impede progress of the bills through the Congress. This is no place to attach social, political, or any kind of legislation. This is a matter that is completely nonpartisan. It must be done for the security and safety of the United States and its 165 million people.

Yet, despite this impassioned plea to the Congress, which among other things requested an almost 100-percent increase in Reserve strength, no appreciable effort has been made by the Pentagon since that time to actually cope with this problem.

Thus, the subcommittee is confronted with the historical fact that although the possibility of nuclear war and general war have not diminished since 1955, the Pentagon now not only appears to be unconcerned with this problem on the State level, but recommends that we eliminate from our Reserve structure many of the units which

were so urgently required only a few years ago. The subcommittee is unaware of any change of circumstance during these past 7 years which would account for this remarkable change in defense policy. It is this type of inconsistency in Pentagon policy which necessarily raises skepticism in the Congress concerning recommendations to suddenly increase or decrease Reserve strength.

This year, as in previous years, the Congress has appropriated funds for the maintenance of 700,000 in the Army Reserve components. This expression of congressional desire cannot be ignored.

The subcommittee is aware that a successful Reserve program designed to satisfy our national security requirements can only be achieved by a proper combination of good administration, legislation, and supporting appropriations. It, therefore, wishes to emphasize its desire to lend its legislative efforts to support any proposal that will serve to meet this objective.

The machinery of our Government is based on the principle of cooperation between its responsible branches. Thus, we visualize the executive and legislative branches as coequal partners in the most important cooperative venture on earth-the U.S. Government.

Unfortunately, this principle has somehow became obscured in the relationship which now exists between the Congress and the Department of Defense.

We members of the subcommittee fully appreciate the enthusiasm and zeal with which ideas and plans for improvement of our military capabilities are conceived and developed within the Pentagon. We also recognize that this enthusiasm is perhaps responsible for the apparent inflexibility demonstrated by the proponents of these ideas. However, neither the Constitution nor our Creator has endowed these experts in the Pentagon with the cloak of infallibility and therefore we submit that constructive criticism of these ideas and plans by the Congress is entirely possible.

This subcommittee is seriously disturbed by the many deficiencies that now exist in our Reserve program. We believe that the extensive hearings conducted by the subcommittee have served to "uncover the stones" under which many of these deficiencies have gone undetected. It is our sincere desire that aggressive action will now be taken by the Department of Defense to correct these deficiencies in the national interest.

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The subcommittee in urging the Secretary of Defense to correct these deficiencies in the Reserve program also realizes that many these deficiencies are the result of lack of proper administration onthe local level and in individual units. There is room for improvement in the Reserve organizations by the reservists themselves, and the subcommittee hopes that the initiative will be taken by the reservists themselves to "plug up" the holes of inefficiency, where existent. This action on the part of the Reserves is of equal importance to the action urged on the Department of Defense to solve the problem.

In summary, the subcommittee urges the Secretary of Defense to review the entire Reserve problem in light of the many deficiencies which are of concern to this subcommittee. The subcommittee then believes that if this action is taken by the Secretary of Defense, appropriate corrective action acceptable to this subcommittee should undoubtedly follow.

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