Mr. McCormack replied:

In relation to supply and services in some limited respects, it probably could be done, but certainly in the field in which this amendment is confined, I think everyone recognizes we should make progress because this is the field where we can eliminate unnecessary duplication on common-use items and thereby save countless hundreds of millions of dollars each year to the taxpayer ***.

Further on during the debate there appears a complete explanation of the amendment by Mr. McCormack, which among other things, said-and this is incomplete, so that it seems to conflict a little with some of the other statements-but among other things he said:

The purpose of this amendment is to obtain greater effectiveness in economy, and efficiency in supply and service activities in the Department of Defense. These activities are commonly known as support activities or noncombatant activities. * * *

It will be recalled that General Eisenhower, in September 1952, in a speech at Baltimore protested at great length at the expense and extravagance that had been built into the three departments contrary to the express promises to the Congress. The General also stated that he was going to take vigorous action to stop this needless waste. Unfortunately, he has not done so and the reorganization bill which he sent to the Congress failed to take into consideration the supply and service activities.

These activities

So stated Mr. McCormack

include procurement, warehousing, distribution, cataloging, and other supply activities, surplus disposal, financial management, budgeting, disbursing, accounting, and so forth, medical and hospital services, transportation-land, sea, and air-intelligence, legal, public relations, recruiting, military policy, training, liaison activities, and so forth, and use an estimated 66% percent of the military budget.

It is also estimated that procurement activities alone utilize 50 percent of the budget.

Mr. McCormack further stated-and I am quoting:

The language is intended to permit the Secretary, that is, to permit one department, to operate for the benefit of all if this is considered advisable as in the present situation with the Army handling chemical and biological functions for the Department of Defense. Under the language it might be considered advisable that the Secretary have a joint staff represent the Department before regulatory bodies on transportation matters or utility services generally. Such activities as weapons evaluation could be handled as now in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. I shall repeat that the facts and circumstances with respect to the individual supply and service activity should govern and that the amendment is not intended to establish a fixed pattern. That is the end of that quote.

It is interesting to note that those who supported Mr. McCormack's amendment during the debate generally confined their remarks to common-use items. Mr. Curtis of Missouri said-and I quote him:

I think the gentleman from Massachusetts has stated it accurately when he said that this was worked out over a period of many years and a study was made of the difficulties in enforcing the O'Mahoney amendment in the commonuse supply area of the Military Establishment. I certainly am strongly behind this amendment, and I think it will go a long way toward clearing up a cloudiness and uncertainty in this area.

Mr. Riehlman of New York said, and I quote:

I rise in support of the amendment offered by my distinguished colleague and majority leader of the House, the Honorable John McCormack. I am not going to dwell on the provisions of this amendment as they have been amply covered by the gentleman from Massachusetts.

I know of his keen interest in the field of military procurement and supply system. I also know of his profound interest in the field of research and develop

ment and the outstanding support he gave me as chairman of the Subcommittee on Military Affairs of the House Committee on Government Operations while we were holding hearings in the 83d Congress on this important subject.

That is the end of the quote.

Mr. Bray, a member of the Armed Services Committee, was concerned about the intent of the amendment because, and he said:

This amendment says that you cannot call a matter a major function if it has to do with supplies.

Mr. Bray, of course, was referring to that part of the amendment which provides that

any supply or service activity common to more than one military department shall not be considered "a major combatant function."

Mr. Bray went on to say:

If this amendment carries, and the Army, Navy, Air, or Marines say this is a major function it could cause it to come back to Congress. If it is a supply matter, they can bring about this reform or this change without any consideration of Congress. Otherwise, if it is a major function, it would have to come to Congress. This merely eliminates that roadblock.

So said Mr. Bray.

Mr. McCormack replied

The gentleman is correct in that respect.

From the foregoing, it is apparent that those who endorsed the amendment did so under the impression that it would bring about substantial savings in the procurement of common-use items. On the other hand, Mr. McCormack's printed explanation is far more inclusive in its coverage than the general discussion indicates.

One of the main concerns of many members of the Committee on Armed Services, and of others throughout the Nation, is the danger inherent in a single defense concept. It is for this reason that the Committee on Armed Services has always insisted upon the maintenance of the Joint Chiefs of Staff system and has consistently refused to authorized the Joint Chiefs to be separated from their responsibility to the services they lead. We have permitted a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to delegate his authority, but we have refused to grant him the authority to delegate his responsibility.

In addition, the Congress has consistently expressed its opposition to the creation of a general staff-again, undoubtedly because of the danger of a unilateral defense concept.

However, I would call attention to the fact that the functions of these Defense agencies, and the staff organization of a general staff, appear to have a great deal in common.

The Defense Supply Agency, in effect, could become the J-4 for the Department of Defense.

The Defense Intelligence Agency could become the J-2 for the Department of Defense; and in fact, it may be it probably is.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, if divorced from their service responsibilities, could become the J-3.

The special staff, in some respects, already exists in the Defense Communications Agency, and the Defense Atomic Support Agency. One more new agency is about all that is needed to have a readymade general staff-namely a "Defense Personnel Agency." That is about all it needs.

Our defense structure has undergone continuous changes since the end of World War II. First, we created a separate Air Force, a National Military Establishment, and a Secretary of Defense.

The Secretary of Defense, under the original National Security Act, was directed to exercise general direction, authority and control over the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, take appropriate steps to eliminate unnecessary duplication or overlapping in the fields of procurement, supply, transportation, storage, health, and research, and supervise and coordinate the preparation of the budget estimates under the departments comprising the National Military Establishment.

In 1949, the three military departments were eliminated as executive departments and the Department of Defense was created to encompass the three military departments. Under the 1949 amendments the Secretary of Defense became the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to the Department of Defense.

This amendment further provided that "under the direction of the President, and subject to the provisions of this act, he [the Secretary of Defense] shall have direction, authority, and control over the Department of Defense." However, the 1949 amendment also provided that the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force would be separately administered by their respective Secretaries under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense.

And in 1958, the law was further amended to provide that each military department would be separately organized under its own Secretary and would function under the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The word "administered" was eliminated from the law in 1958.

In addition, these amendments also established a procedure for transferring, reassigning, abolishing, or consolidating functions which had been established by law to be performed by the Department of Defense.

Since the enactment of the original National Security Act of 1947, the operational commands of the Military Establishment have, in many areas, been formed into unified or specified commands. The military departments each lost one Assistant Secretary in 1958 amendments, and from time to time the secretarial structure of the Department of Defense has been augmented by statute, as has the Joint Staff and the functions of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Thus, the trend toward what could ultimately be a unilateral defense concept is apparent. Nevertheless, the Congress has insisted that the services not be merged; that a general staff not be created; and that each military department be separately organized.

The objective of the Congress is clear, and the trend toward increased centralization is equally clear.

Our task here is to determine whether the Defense agencies that have been created or planned for the future have a statutory basis in fact, and further and more important, whether there has been increased efficiency and increased combat effectiveness as a result of the creation of these agencies.

We recognize at the outset that we are in an area of speculation. As legislators, we recognize that some may contend that we are not competent to make pure military decisions. If this allegation is

made, we would answer that other civilians engaged in the same problem areas are confronted with the same limitations.

Most of the efforts of the Committee on Armed Services and its members are devoted to defense matters; therefore, we are not unprepared or ill informed in defense matters.

However, we will attempt to exercise our judgment, based upon the military and civilian advice we receive during these hearings.

At the conclusion of these hearings, I am hopeful that we can make a report to the full committee which will be objective and factual to the extent that the information we receive is objective and factual. That concludes the statement that I had wanted to submit in order to get some committee perspective before we began with the witnesses. I don't know whether Mr. Bates may have something he would like

to say.

Mr. BATES. Mr. Chairman, I would like to say, first, that this is the first occasion I have had to read this statement, but nevertheless, I concur with the background that you have established here.

I have now been on this committee some 13 years, Mr. Secretary, and I think we have gone over this general problem many times. First, I think, probably in the universal military training bill back

around 1951 or 1952.

The question of the direction of the Department of Defense was fully evaluated by the committee and many comparisons were made to the so-called Prussian or Guderian system which most of us thought failed in Germany. So, as we went into the 1958 act, I think we were very careful to remember that the Department of Defense, in our judgment, was established as a supervisory organization over the operating forces of the individual services. And the general language which was in the McCormack amendment and the outgrowth of it seems to be in sharp contrast to what the chairman has read in his statement in reference to the report of the committee, which said that it was never intended and is not now intended that the Office of Secretary of Defense would become a fourth department within the Defense Department delving into operational details on a daily basis. We also considered it was vitally important that the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their position of responsibility also have the authority commensurate with it. We have always expressed our fear that these two-authority and responsibility-would be divorced, and it was our judgment that it was not in the best interests of our country to do so.

But we started with this R. & D. authority a little while ago, granting that to the Department of Defense, and now this year we got the $50 million management construction request and, of course, the request also for DSA.

We have considered the question of a DSA or many of these other functions for many years, starting with World War I, when Bernard Baruch recommended a common, centralized procurement section for both of the Armed Forces, and later the Army and Navy Munitions Board was created as a coordinating agency, but never one given complete operational authority.

So it is in this vein that I raised the question during earlier hearings to try to find out not only where we are going, but just where are we today, as far as DOD is concerned, and whether or not it is expected to expand, whether or not it is going to be an operating agency,

whether it is no longer to be merely a supervisory organization as was the intention when DOD was established, and if this is to be an operating agency, can we expect that the sequel to this will be another supervisory organization over DOD monitoring its operations?

So those, Mr. Chairman, are the thoughts that are in the back of my mind as we open this hearing. I sincerely trust that the Secretary will address himself to the questions that both of us have raised. Mr. HARDY. Thank you, Mr. Bates.

I am glad to have had this additional background which you presented and I think it is now entirely appropriate that we hear Secretary McNamara.

Mr. Secretary, the committee is particularly happy that you can start this hearing off from the departmental point of view. I want to express my appreciation right at the beginning for the cooperation which you have evidenced to the subcommittee since its first appointment. And the committee is very pleased.

I am sorry I haven't had an opportunity to look at your statement, but the committee will be awfully pleased to have your presentation

now.

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MCNAMARA, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACCOMPANIED BY CYRUS R. VANCE, GENERAL COUNSEL

Secretary MCNAMARA. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

With your permission, then, I will read this somewhat brief statement and then respond to your questions.

Mr. HARDY. Thank you.

Secretary MCNAMARA. I welcome the opportunity to appear before your committee to discuss the Defense agencies. So that I might be better able to explain the roles and missions of the five Defense agencies your committee is studying, let me put these agencies into their proper context within the overall organization of the Department of Defense.

The current organization of the Department of Defense, as it has evolved since 1947, is, I think, based on two major assumptions.

First, that separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever. Secondly, that the best way to provide and support the forces for the unified effort required under today's conditions is the pattern of the three military departments augmented as needed by other support organizations.

In accordance with these two assumptions, the Secretary of Defense is empowered to exercise, within the law, full direction, authority, and control over the entire Defense Establishment. He exercises his power through two command lines.

One, for the operational command of our combatant forces running through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the unified and specified commands; and the other, for the direction of support activities to the military departments and the other Defense agencies.

Operating on the principle that an organization as vast as the Department of Defense can be effectively managed only by the centralization of policy formulation and the decentralization of opera