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1 Military personnel costs not included.

2 Amount requested in President's budget. This amount has been reduced to $10,100,000 by House action and reclamaed to Senate.

3 Funded from DOD contingency fund, DOD emergency fund, and contributions from the military departments.

Fiscal year 1962 funds contained in Army appropriations.

Defense Communications Agency, authorized manpower (end strength)

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NOTE 1.--Authorized manpower end strength is based on approved joint tables of distribution.

NOTE 2.- Fiscal year 1962 manpower end strength above is greater than that approved in the "5-Year Force Structure and Financial Program" which is based on anticipated actual onboard strength.

NOTE 3.-Fiscal year 1963 end strength assumes no new missions or functions beyond those currently assigned.

Admiral Irvin. I have one apology to make. In the preparation of the movie, it was done at about the time that the movie industry had taken up all the good actors in making the movie “Advise and Consent.”

As a consequence, we were forced to use a ham. Mr. HARDY. The committee will reserve its judgment. (Movie shown.)

Mr. Hardy. Thank you very much, Admiral. That is a very interesting picture. I hope one day next week the committee may be able to pay a visit to your operation. We have, unfortunately, a quorum call on the floor. We are going to have to leave. I did appreciate the opportunity to see this film.

Admiral IRVIN. We will be happy to welcome you at the agency and display the control center.

Mr. HARDY. Tomorrow the committee will meet in executive session with the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Defense Atomic Energy Agency. It will be executive.

The committee stands adjourned until tomorrow. (Whereupon, at 12:47 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.)

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON
DEFENSE AGENCIES INVESTIGATION,

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,

Washington, D.C., Wednesday, June 6, 1962. The special subcommittee met at 10 a.m., the Honorable Porter Hardy (chairman of the subcommittee), presiding.

Mr. HARDY. Let the committee come to order.

The committee is meeting this morning in executive session, and we will start off with the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Mr. Blandford, have you checked the room to be sure that everybody who is in the room is entitled to be here?

Mr. BLANDFORD. We have security people here.
Colonel CARTER. It has been checked.
Mr. BLANDFORD. It has been checked, Colonel ?
Colonel CARTER. Yes.
Mr. HARDY. Thank you very much.

Now, General Carroll, I believe you have a prepared statement to open up the DIA picture for us.

STATEMENT OF LT. GEN. JOSEPH F. CARROLL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE

INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, ACCOMPANIED BY LT. GEN. WILLIAM W. QUINN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, AND ADM. SAMUEL B. FRANKEL, CHIEF OF STAFF

General CARROLL. Yes, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Hardy. Mr. Bates says that sometimes during the course of your presentation, if you haven't already considered this aspect of it, that you develop for the committee a sharper line of demarcation between DIA and National Security Agency and CIA.

General CARROLL. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. HARDY. Thank you very much.

Then, General, if you would proceed. I expect the simplest way would be to just permit you to go ahead with your statement without questions, if we can. We can't always control ourselves.

General CARROLL. I understand, sir.
Mr. HARDy. But we will try.

So thank you, General, and we are very pleased to have you; you may proceed.

General (ARROLL. Mr. Chairman, I am Lt. Gen. Joseph F. Carroll, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

With me this morning are Lt. Gen. William W. Quinn, the Deputy Director, and Adm. Samuel B. Frankel, the Chief of Staff.

We were appointed to our positions by the Secretary of Defense, having been nominated by our respective services and recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We were all designated to our assignments prior to the activation of the Agency and the activation plan was prepared under our supervision for submission through the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary. We are and have been responsible for the organization and subsequent activities of the Agency

We have brought with us several of our senior staff members who are experienced and knowledgeable in the specialized intelligence areas for which they are responsible.

I have been informed, Mr. Chairman, that you would like to have a briefing on the organization and functions of the DIA. I am prepared to present such a briefing at this time.

Mr. HARDY. Thank you. Fine, thank you.

General CARROLL. While the Agency itself is relatively new, the concept of integrating or centralizing Department of Defense intelligence activities is not. For example, in 1946 the joint congressional committee investigating the attack on Pearl Harbor recommended that there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies. Ways and means of obtaining more effective coordination of intelligence activities and of improving the adequacy and timeliness of the overall intelligence product has been the subject of a number of studies over the years culminating in a concentrated series of studies in late 1960 and 1961. These latter studies resulted in the establishment of DIA through promulgation on August 1, 1961, of DOD Directive 1505.21. This directive provided that DIA would be activated on October 1, 1961, and it set forth the responsibilities, functions, authority, and relationships of the Agency. It specified that the chain of command shall be from the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to DIA. DIA then is immediately responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With your permission I intend to present the briefing on DIA under two general headings: First, a brief review of our objectives and our assigned responsibilities and functions; and second, the approved organizational structure of the Agency.

The principal objectives described by the Secretary in the Department of Defense directive and in related memorandums are summarized on this first chart.

(Chart 1 on.)

Increased intelligence capabilities, as indicated in the first two objectives, were given top priority. Of lesser priority, but of no lesser importance, are the last three, designed to insure economy and efficiency.

Mr. Hardy. Among other things, we are going to want to develop who, if anybody, was performing the functions that are now to be performed by DIA.

Mr. BATES. The three services.

Mr. Hardy. I understand that. But obviously, there are supposed to be some additional functions in DIA, we would assume.

Mr. BLANDFORD. No. As a matter of fact, one of the intriguing things that I think General Carroll will reveal, or has revealed immediately, was that there wasn't anything comparable to DIA prior to the establishment of DIA. There were three separate intelligence agencies, and you had the J-2 in the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and you had the U.S. Intelligence Board and the National Security Council, and you had the ICA, the FBI, and the intelligence community.

But actually you had no Department of Defense or all-service coordinating agency in existence prior to the establishment of the DIA, which makes it unique in that respect.

Mr. HARDY. All-service coordinating; yes. Mr. BLANDFORD. There was nothing comparable. Mr. HARDY. Then you distinguish between the service intelligence from the mass of intelligence with which CIA is concerned?

Mr. BLANDFORD. Well, now, that is entirely different. There was an intelligence board for that purpose. But there was no agency to which all of the services responded for coordination of their intelligence effort-would that be correct, General ? General CARROLL. That is correct.

The Defense Intelligence Agency affects only the conduct of intelligence operations internal to the Department of Defense, as pre viously performed by the J-2 of the Joint Staff, and the Intelligence Chiefs of the Army, the Navy, Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

Mr. Hardy. Well, I have not supposed that there was any conflict or overlapping between DIA and National Security Agency. But I have had a little trouble understanding the separation from CIA. And maybe we will explore that.

Mr. BATES. We will go into that.
Mr. BLANDFORD. All right.
Mr. Bates. Well, they are all expanding here, General.

I think they are taking on different functions, or different roles, not only in this field but in the other fields that we are considering.

We are trying to determine just who is giving up what, and who is assuming what new role.

General CARROLL. I understand, sir.

Mr. Hardy. Of course, the CÍA was established at the time the Security Act was first passed. It was a part of the Unification Act.

(Mr. Blandford aside to Mr. Hardy.) Mr. Hardy. Anyway, a good many of us who participated in the handling of that particular legislation had a belief, at least, that at least some of the CIA's functions would be of the nature which we now apparently are assigning to DIA.

General CARROLL. If I may be permitted! No, sir, the National Security Act, in establishing the Central Intelligence Agency, provided, first of all, I believe, that the Director of CIA would be responsible for coordinating all intelligence activities engaged in by the executive departments of the Government.

That act specifically also provided that departmental intelligence would continue to be a responsibility of the respective departments of the Government.

Mr. Hardy. That, of course, is correct. But that intelligence also went into CIA, and the CIA was supposed to be a coordinating agency there.

General CARROLL. That is correct, sir. And we contribute very substantially to the Central Intelligence Agency's overall coordination of intelligence information; namely, military intelligence which is produced within the Department of Defense.

Mr. HARDY. General, I sat through the hearings on that bill. And I recall mighty well hearing some opposition to it by the individual services, because they were afraid that the CIA was going to absorb their intelligence functions.

Instead, it was represented to us as being a coordinating proposition, which now the DIA is proposing to be, among the military. General CARROLL. That is correct, sir, but

Mr. HARDY. CIA was supposed to coordinate the military intelligence, at least their product, if not their effort. Maybe that is where the thing fell down.

But we started out with military intelligence experts running the CIA. Vandenberg took over, I believe, immediately after the passage of that act.

General CARROLL. Yes, sir; he did.

Mr. HARDY. And then following him was Hillenkoetier, if my memory is correct.

General CARROLL. That is right.

Mr. BATEs. Since we are on the subject, General, why didn't we bring NSA and CIA into DIA, so that we have one agency, DIA?

General CARROLL. Why don't we? Was that your question, sir? Mr. Bates nods.)

General CARROLL. Well, because, first of all, in relationship to CIA, it has been given certain specific statutory responsibilities and is responsible for overall national intelligence in support of the President and national security and national planning policy.

As was reflected in the act and as referred to by the chairman, it was specifically provided at that time that CIA would not take overall intelligence activities engaged in by the various departments of the Government.

And in subsequent directives in pursuance to the act, this has been recognized.

The Department of Defense has a continuing responsibility to produce military intelligence in support of the Armed Forces and by way of contribution to the overall national defense posture of the United States and fulfillment of the requirement for national planning.

Mr. BATES. Well I can understand the legal aspect of this.

But my question was, regardless of what the present situation might be in law

(General Carroll nods:)

Mr. BATES. Why is it that we have the three separate ones? Why don't we put them all in DIA?

General CARROLL. First of all, of course, I think it would be utterly inappropriate. The Defense Intelligence Agency represents an integration, partly operationalwise and partly from a managerial standpoint, designed to achieve unity of effort and a better intelligence product internal to the Department of Defense.

In the establishment of DIA, it was approached with the objective of improving to the greatest extent possible the discharge of the intelligence responsibilities of the Department of Defense. And it had no direct relationship to responsibilities which are assigned elsewhere within the arrangement of functions among the executive departments.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Isn't it still true, General, that DIA, in a sense, is responsive to CIA, in view of the fact that the law says—I am

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