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dealing now with the law with regard to the CIA—that "the purpose of coordinating the intelligence activities of the several Government departments and agencies"—in the interest of national security, it shall be the duty of the agency—that is, the CIA—"under the direction of the National Security Council”-and then it lists their functions.
And as the chairman has pointed out, it also provides in this law that the "departments and other agencies of the Government shall continue to collect, evaluate, correlate, and disseminate, departmental intelligence."
General CARROLL. That is correct, Mr. Blandford.
Mr. Bates. Well, how do you separate and divorce the military aspects of these from other things of an intelligence nature?
Now, let's get to the specifics. Let's take the economy of a certain country. We find out all of a sudden that the budgets of these countries are putting more money into certain things. It may not be missiles, et cetera, but it could be oil, and it could be transportation, all of which would lead up to a military development eventually, as it did in Germany.
Now, you would be interested in that.
As Mr. Blandford mentioned, what we are responsible for primarily is the production of military intelligence.
Mr. Bates. Now, take your folks overseas. They don't isolate them there.
They are thinking merely of the military aspects of the problembut they can't ignore the economic aspect, which might be a buildup for a wartime situation.
General CarroLL. Of course they can't.
Mr. Bates. Sometimes I get a little concerned about how these things are correlated and coordinated.
I don't think that when you have separate compartments, that they blend together as well and as quickly on many occasions as they should.
Are there any other countries that have these fractionalized intelligence services?
General CARROLL. I believe just about all countries have intelligence being addressed by various agencies of the Government which have responsibilities that depend upon the production of intelligence, and then are pulled together through some medium similar to the U.S. Intelligence Board.
Mr. BATEs. But they are broken down into compartments as is ours? General CARROLL. That is right, sir.
Mr. Hardy. I think we probably ought to get back where we left off. But before we do, I would like to ask a question as to what is the principal intelligence requirement of the Office of Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs?
Is that military intelligence, political intelligence, or what?
General CARROLL. It would have to meld all military intelligence, political intelligence, sociological, economic.
Mr. ILardy. I was afraid I would get that kind of answer. I am afraid that that office is trying to assume all of the functions of the military and the diplomats and politicians, and international polities. all together.
General CARROLL. He would have to take into consideration all of these facets of intelligence in relationship to the particular problems with which he was confronted. But we supply the Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA, with the intelligence that he requires, in support of his mission.
Mr. Hardy. Well, that being the case, you are supplying him with political intelligence as well as military intelligence?
General CARROLL. Yes, sir.
Mr. BLANDFORD. You report, General, then, through the JCS to the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs, or do you report directly to the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs?
General CARROLL. The chain of command runs from the Secretary of Defense to the Joint Chiefs of Staff to me, and on matters that have any substantial policy implication or tasking implications, that chain of command is followed. Naturally I have working relationships at all elements of the Department of Defense, in rendering a service to these people or in working out coordinations as required.
Mr. HARDY. Well, do you know to what extent the Assistant Secretary for International Security Affairs depends on the intelligence which you supply him, and to what extent he may depend on the Department of State for his intelligence evaluation?
General CARROLL. The Department of State evaluation is normally integrated with that of the rest of the intelligence community, so that it is a finished and overall considered product which is presented for consideration by such as the Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA.
Now, on a day-to-day working basis, I am sure that the Assistant Secretary, ISA, has to have a considerable communication with the Department of State.
Mr. HARDY. Maybe I am getting far afield. I want to get back. But I have a question in my mind as to whether the Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs is anything more than a branch office of the Secretary of State. You don't need to comment on that, General. [Laughter.]
Mr. BLANDFORD. General Carroll, to follow that one step further, though, you report through the Assistant Secretary when he requests information, or do you report through the JCS to the International Affairs Secretary?
General CARROLL. On matters that are of such a nature as to involve substantial policy considerations or substantial tasking aspects, the referral would be through the Joint Chiefs of Staff'.
On a working day relationship, naturally we have direct association with many elements of the Department of Defense, including Mr. Nitze's office.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Let me ask
General CARROLL. But I am not directly responsible to Mr. Nitze. I am directly responsible to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Can Mr. Nitze request a priority in an intelligence requirement directly to you?
General CARROLL. He can refer the intelligence requirement to me, and we will establish the priority which we feel it should have within the framework of priority of national intelligence objectives.
Mr. BLANDFORD. He can refer to you through-
General CARROLL. It would normally be referred directly to me, on a normal matter. If it were a matter of special significance, as frequently occurs, the request comes in writing to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to the Joint Chiefs of Staff or to me through the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Mr. Hardy. Well, we got sidetracked, General. Let's get back to where we left off.
General Carroll. All right. Thank you, sir.
Responsibilities that are specifically assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency are shown on this chart.
These are specifically set forth in the directive which established the Defense Intelligence Agency.
You will note that these responsibilities are dual in nature and they translate into two broad functional areas-managerial and operational.
And for clarity, I would like to break those down.
As you can see, the assigned managerial functions range from the provisions of plans, procedures, and guidance for intelligence activities through the review of resulting programs and budgets.
(Chart 3 off.)
I should like to mention, Mr. Chairman, that I intend to discuss these in considerable detail under organization.
Based on these specifically assigned responsibilities and functions, General Quinn, Admiral Frankel, and I, assisted by a small planning group of Army, Navy, and Air Force officers, prepared an activation plan which was submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and was forwarded by them to the Secretary of Defense who approved it on September 29, 1961.
And 2 days later we activated the Defense Intelligence Agency.
Pursuant to this approved plan, the DIA headquarters staff was organized as indicated on this chart to discharge our managerial type functions.
(Chart 5 on-Headquarters staff.)
I believe this is a conventional staff organization and requires no elaboration. To date most of our managerial effort has been devoted to developing the DIA organizations, establishing internal policies, standards, and procedures, obtaining and indoctrinating personnel, acquiring space, obtaining fiscal support and so on. We have surveyed intelligence activities in the services, inventoried resources, and established relationships. In particular, considerable effort has been devoted to developing detailed plans and procedures associated with originally assigned or newly assigned responsibilities.
Simultaneous with all of this, the headquarters staff has managed to keep reasonably abreast of the heavy volume of day-to-day business which flows into the Agency from all intelligence interested elements of the DOD and the Washington community.
(Chart 5 off.)
(Chart 6 on-Operating organization.)
To discharge assigned operating functions, two directorates have been organized : Acquisition and processing.
As to the basis for this organizational concept, we used the classic intelligence cycle ranging from receipt of requirements for intelligence information through collection to the production and dissemination of finished intelligence which forms the base for significant intelligence estimates.
Since it is in this overall area that the establishment of DIA has had the greatest impact on the conduct of intelligence activities in DOD, I should like to dwell at some length on the status of each of these particular functions.
Mr. Hardy. Well, are there any requirements in the different services for a variation ?
General CARROLL. Yes, sir.
Mr. HARDY. Then this manual has to take into account the specialized needs of the separate services?
General CARROLL. Yes, Mr. Chairman, it certainly does. And it was for that reason that it was not published until it was fully coordinated with the services and was responsive to the suggestions that they made in order to satisfy their needs.
So much for the acquisition directorate.
Next, the directorate for processing intelligence data obtained through the requirements and collection functions.
Mr. BLANDFORD. General Carroll, may I interrupt you?
Mr. BLANDFORD. And ask you if organization of DIA is similar to the organization of ONI previously, or Air Force Security or Army Intelligence? I mean, is this comparable to what they now have and what is being
phased out? General CARROLL. From a substantive approach, I believe so, Mr. Blandford.
From an exact organizational approach, no. Because each of the three services was organized differently to discharge its intelligence responsibilities.
What we did was review the organizational structures in the three services, inject into that review some of our own considerations as to organizational concepts, and then select what we considered to be the best approach out of the total in developing the organizational structure of DIA.
Mr. BLANDFORD. Now, am I correct that all three of the officers here today have previously been in the intelligence business, either as chiefs of their services or of the branches; is that correct?
General CARROLL. Yes.
Mr. BLANDFORD. And that this represents—and all three of the general officers here worked together in setting up this organizational structure?
General CARROLL. Most assuredly.
Mr. BLANDFORD. What you have done is to bring to this organization, bring into this organization your composite view of what you
considered to be the best type of an intelligence organization; would that be a fair summary?
General CARROLL. Å very accurate one, sir.
General CARROLL. Well, this is the organizational structure that we devised in DIA, and it was encompassed within the activation plan we submitted to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thence to the Secretary of Defense.
The services had an opportunity to comment at that time.
I might mention that this organizational structure was devised by a composite planning group, comprised of Army, Navy, and Air Force officers. And this represented our best thinking on how to go about doing the job to which we had been assigned.
Mr. BATEs. Well, specifically, then, what were the comments of the individual services when they had this opportunity to express their individual views?
General CARROLL. I don't recall any at the moment relative to the organizational structure itself.
Mr. Bates. They all fell in line?
This pattern of things encompasses all of the functions of all of the three services in a little different format, in the sense of placing this alongside of any individual service.
That satisfies the requirement function wise.
As far as I can recall, there was no comment when this was explained to them what the functions of requirement, collection management, production or processing
Mr. BLANDFORD. That is the point, General. In other words, if suddenly the DIA was disestablished and you had to reestablish Army intelligence, could you take this organizational structure and produce the type of intelligence that the Army needs in order to do the proper job?
General Quinn. Yes.
Admiral FRANKEL. Yes, because all the functions of the Navy are incorporated here.
Mr. BLANDFORD. And the Air Force can do the same thing?
Mr. Hardy. Now, what is happening to the organizational setup in each of the services which will no longer be required with DIA in operation ?
General CARROLL. All of the intelligence organizations of the services are undergoing a substantial reorganization, Mr. Chairman, to accommodate the changes in the assignments of responsibilities.
Mr. HARDY. Well
General CARROLL. However, this is in process of being developed since DIA as yet has not become fully operational and many of the functions which it is contemplated under present plans that DIA will assume are still being performed in the services.
There will be a substantial readjustment period.
Mr. HARDY. Each of the services had to perform for itself essentially the kind of thing which DIA will do for all of the services ?