But if you are going to be responsible-you say "support" up here, but in the statement you say "guidance."

General CARROLL. (Nods.)

Mr. BLANDFORD. So it is support and guidance.

So as a result, you are going to direct the intelligence activities of the unified command, is that correct?

General CARROLL. We are not going to direct them, no, sir. The intelligence activities of the unified command will be directed by the commander in chief of the unified command.

Under the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I will render intelligence and counterintelligence support to the unified command.

Mr. BLANDFORD. That is what I am trying to distinguish

General CARROLL. And broad policy guidance in certain areas where it is required.

I think it should be made clear-and I am sure you understand it, Mr. Blandford that DIA is assuming responsibility only in the Washington level.

All intelligence responsibilities in the field will continue to be conducted by the respective commands in which they are presently being conducted.

Mr. BLANDFORD. I noticed this portion of your statement which said the production activities in the Washington area-I understood that, with regard to the production activities. Because actuallythen you talked about raw intelligence.

Well, there is very little raw intelligence in the Washington area, except what you pick up at cocktail parties at the Embassies, and things of that nature.

Mr. BATES. And there you find little intelligence. [Laughter.] Mr. BLANDFORD. So when you say-raw intelligence is your lifeblood.

General CARROLL. That is correct.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Now, do you plan to have a DIA liaison officer with each unified commander?

General CARROLL. No, sir: at least not at this stage of the game. We haven't contemplated that. We have close relationships with them.

We held a conference here in Washington a couple of weeks ago, at which we had representation in from the commands.

We are developing relations through the medium of publishing guidance letters and criteria and formats.

If it should ever be necessary, we would. But I don't contemplate at this present stage of the game that it is.

Mr. BLANDFORD. You are going to have a DIA Intelligence School which will supersede the Army-Air Force School and the Navy School?

General CARROLL. Only in the areas that I mentioned, Mr. Blandford.

Mr. BLANDFORD. No, I am not talking

General CARROLL. All combat intelligence training, for example, will continue to be handled by the respective services.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Previously under the department intelligence level. General CARROLL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BLANDFORD. You are now going to have a DIA School.

Now, you propose to take over the assignment of attachés?
General CARROLL. No, sir, not at all.

Mr. BLANDFORD. You propose to run an attaché school?
General CARROLL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Do you propose to assign one attaché to an area and in this way bring about what I would consider foolish savings. General CARROLL. The assignment of attachés is the responsibility of the individual services.

Mr. BLANDFORD. You are not going to attempt then-I have been told that you were at least planning or had been directed to study the feasibility of taking over the assignment of attachés, where you would have one attaché instead of the three we now have, or four in

some areas.

General CARROLL. Well

Mr. BLANDFORD. Is this still being considered?

General CARROLL. You were not quite accurately informed, Mr. Blandford. I had not been directed to make such a study, but such a study had been made and consideration was given

Mr. BLANDFORD. That has been rejected, then?

General CARROLL. It is my understanding that the Secretary of Defense has decided not to take any action in that respect.

Mr. BLANDFORD. All right.

Who will mark the efficiency reports or fitness reports for attachés? General CARROLL. The Army, Navy, and the Air Force, just as it is at present, unless they see fit to change it.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Who makes your efficiency report?

General CARROLL. I haven't yet found out, sir.

Mr. BLANDFORD. You don't know yet?

General CARROLL. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, I would assume.

Mr. BLANDFORD. The Chairman, probably.

Mr. HARDY. Thank you, General.

Proceed.

General CARROLL. The most recent directive we have received assigned us management, coordination, and review responsibilities in regard to technical intelligence. The actual production of technical intelligence will continue to be performed by the military departments in support of their mission.

Mr. BATES. General, what if you disagree with these services? Now, you are supposed to coordinate and make certain that we have a pretty good and effective show on the road. So you formed this organization here in Washington.

Now, they have all the people throughout the world. Maybe they are not doing too good a job. What are you going to do about it? What can you do about it?

General CARROLL. In the event that I, through studies, come to that conclusion, I would take it up with the particular service.

In the event that I felt that there was duplication of action, for example, as between the respective services, I would take it up with the particular services.

In the event that we were able to work out whatever corrective action appeared to be required in a mutually agreeable manner, it would be accomplished.

In the event that there was no agreement on that point and I still felt that certain actions ought to be taken to improve the effectiveness of the utilization of intelligence resources, I would then prepare a plan or a program, or whatever I thought was required for submission through the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense for their consideration and decision.

Mr. BATES. Have you run into any situations yet?

General CARROLL. No; sir.

Mr. BATES. And you are not going to have new men out in the field yourself.

So all you know is what they send back to you.

General CARROLL. I have

Mr. BATES. How are you going to get at duplication and effectiveness and all that if you don't have your own people?

General CARROLL. Through a dual medium, Mr. Bates.

One, I have been given the responsibility of consolidating intelligence budgets as submitted by the individual services and by DIA

itself.

This entails not only my participating then in a budget review, but in the preceding program review.

In addition to that, I have been authorized in the furtherance of my mission to request information from or to have direct relations with any element or activity within the Department of Defense.

And to the extent that I deem it necessary to do that in the furtherance of my mission, I shall do it.

Mr. BATES. I just wondered now, with all these agencies located throughout the world-they send back all their reports. Of course you can compare one service with another if they happen to have more than one service in a particular place. If they don't, they just shoot stuff in to you, and you don't know how valid and effective the information is.

Now, are you going to send any people out there to check on these things, or what?

General CARROLL. I will have people from my staff making visits around the world from time to time. I will, too.

In the main, we will be dealing with related staff activities in the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force.

I think the main point I should make, Mr. Congressman, is this: With DIA having been established as having a supervisory responsibility with reference to all facets of intelligence activities within the Department of Defense, there has been established a mechanism whereby the elimination of duplication and the improvements internal to overall Department of Defense operations can be accomplished.

In the absence of having any overview focal point, no such mechanism did exist.

Mr. BATES. I am not as concerned in intelligence with duplication, because I think that is pretty good.

Then you get to look at both sides of the pancake.

General CARROLL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BATES. But I am interested in effectiveness.

And the only information really you are going to get is what they send in to you.

And how are you really going to determine the effectiveness ahead of time?

General CARROLL. Well, in one way, of course, by reviewing the adequacy of what is coming in.

We certainly can't determine it ahead of time. Anything we determine in that respect would be after the fact.

Mr. HARDY. Suppose it is inadequate, what are you going to do?
General CARROLL. Supposing what, sir?

Mr. HARDY. Supposing it is inadequate when it comes in.

General CARROLL. We will get together with the services and try to determine what is required to make it adequate.

Mr. BATES. Well, first you would have to know what is adequate, in the first place.

General CARROLL. Beg your pardon?

Mr. BATES. You would have to know what is adequate, in the first place.

These are expressions of judgment and hard work, and it is difficult for you to determine that in Washington, isn't it?

General CARROLL. Well, that will come about, first of all, by a determination as to whether or not we are being responsive to the requirements that are laid on us in support of the planners and the decision makers.

Secondly, of course, in the final analysis any such determination has got to come about through the experience of the personnel that are addressing themselves to the problem and the capabilities that they are able to bring to bear in determining what is correct-what is required to correct the problem.

Mr. BATES. Well, of course basically your job is information, to get information. I am talking about intelligence, generallyGeneral CARROLL. Yes, sir.

Mr. BATES (continuing). To get information-good, valid information-and have it given to the right people so they can act on it. That is the essence of your job.

But if you are not out in the field, really, how can you determine whether you are getting good information?

General CARROLL. That is what I have a staff for, Mr. Bates, in which we are concentrating supervisory type attention on the various facets of intelligence which go to produce the end product.

Mr. BATES. Now, of the many are going to be traveling?

people you are going to have, how

General CARROLL. From time to time, maybe 200 would be making staff visits.

I also have established within my organization an inspector general, whose primary function, of course, will be the conduct of inspections with reference to our own performance of our functional responsibilities that I described during the presentation.

I also do feel that in collaboration with the services we are going to have to make surveys of various areas which we feel warrant some specialized attention.

Mr. BATES. Well, you supervise, but you don't really mean supervise, I guess, do you? You take a little look at something. But you can't tell them to do anything. You can't get them to change a thing. All you might do is write a memorandum upstairs and have somebody, maybe

General CARROLL. If that should become necessary, that certainly would be done.

Mr. BLANDFORD. General Carroll, isn't this basically, however, what the Army, Navy, and the Air Force have historically had?

General CARROLL. Having what?

Mr. BLANDFORD. ONI, itself, never went out in the field to determine whether the information it was getting was adequate. Intelligence has always been a staff operation.

General CARROLL. In the Washington area.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Yes.

What I am getting at is that no one in Washington was charged under the previous system in the Army, Navy, and Air Force-no one was charged with the actual collection of information. This was always the responsibility of the various commands scattered throughout the world insofar as the service was concerned; is that correct? General CARROLL. That is correct.

Of course, each individual service has an inspector general who will conduct inspections throughout his particular service to determine the responsiveness to the mission of the service.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Well, I don't mean it in that respect.

What I am trying to determine is whether you had a previous system where anybody in Washington, regardless of whether it was Army, Navy, or Air Force, would go out into the field to determine whether the information that they were getting, that is, the intelligence they were getting, was in their opinion adequate.

General CARROLL. Well, really, I don't think you have to go out in the field to make that determination. You can make that determination by reviewing and analyzing the information which comes back here.

Mr. HARDY. Suppose it is inadequate, then what do you do?

Mr. BATES. Or incorrect. Maybe somebody just doesn't work as hard as he ought to work.

Mr. BLANDFORD. That is the point.

General CARROLL. Well, this, Mr. Bates, is what we would have to determine through the medium of evaluating the intelligence value of the various collection resources that were being used to respond to collection requirements.

Mr. HARDY. But your inspector general wouldn't have any authority in that area.

General CARROLL. No, sir. This would be a pure staff supervisory approach in the course of which areas requiring concentrated attention would be pinpointed. And in the event I thought

Mr. HARDY. You have to go upstairs and get it to come back down through the services.

General CARROLL. If necessary, we would prepare a study and submit it to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and thence to the Secretary for the promulgation of any directives that might be required.

Mr. BLANDFORD. Let's assume that CINCLANT, in the opinion of your inspector general, was falling down on the information that was coming in through their indications center and coming in through the various methods that information comes in to you. You take it up with CINCLANT. CINCLANT says, "I am perfectly satisfied with my intelligence officer, leave me alone."

85066-62-No. 71-8