[No. 75] HEARINGS BEFORE SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMPOSITION OF THE FLEET AND BLOCK OBSOLESCENCE OF NAVAL VESSELS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, SPECIAL SUBCOMMITTEE ON COMPOSITION OF FLEET AND BLOCK OBSOLESCENCE OF U.S. NAVAL SHIPS, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, The special subcommittee met at 10:10 a.m., Hon. L. Mendel Rivers, chairman of the subcommittee, presiding. Mr. RIVERS. We are beginning today hearings on a matter of most vital and major importance to our Department of Defense and particularly the Navy. The obsolescence of our naval ships has been a matter of great concern to the Navy for many years and has been, similarly, a matter of concern to the Armed Services Committee and particularly to the membership of this subcommittee. By letter, dated February 28, 1962, the chairman of the full committee, Mr. Vinson, appointed this subcommittee. In that letter he stated, and I quote: It will be the responsibility of the subcommittee to study the current composition of the fleet, the age and remaining useful life of the vessels therein, and to suggest a course of action which would prevent block obsolescence of the fleet. In connection with the foregoing, full consideration will be given to the extent of fleet modernization which can be accomplished by the rehabilitation of existing vessels as well as new construction. The points raised by Chairman Vinson are precisely the ones we are going to examine into today and on succeeding days. The statements by the various witnesses are in themselves reasonably comprehensive, but I would like to draw the attention of the subcommittee members to the large documents which have been also furnished and which are at the side of each member's desk. These documents contain a mass of highly detailed information which will be referred to from time to time by the various witnesses. The Navy was requested to modify their statements so as to insert, whenever such reference is made, the document and page number referred to. This will permit a ready reference by each member to the more detailed information. If it is the wish of any member at such time to stop the proceedings so that a closer study can be made of this backup material, of course, I will be happy to follow this course. We are fortunate in having as our first witness the Honorable Fred Korth, Secretary of the Navy, and Adm. C. V. Ricketts, Vice Chief of Naval Operations, and I will ask them to come forward now. (7149) Mr. Secretary, we will be very glad to have your statement in connection with this very momentous and vital subject. And you can proceed any way you want, Mr. Secretary. STATEMENT OF HON. FRED KORTH, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY Secretary KORTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate very much the preliminary remarks which the chairman has made, and the interest of this subcommittee, as well as the full committee, in a problem which is very real to us. It is a privilege to appear before you to discuss a problem which is so important to the Navy, to our country, and to the free world. Our Navy must be fully prepared at all times, to carry out its role for effective use of the seas, to project the right degree of power, and to keep the sealanes open while denying them to a potential enemy. Today, there is no doubt that we are capable of fulfilling our mission. Regrettably, however, we will not be able to make that statement 10 years from now, if the commitments we have today remain at basically the same level during that decade. We must take prompt measures to replace those ships that have served so well for so many years, but which will soon be unable to carry out their assignments in a modern Navy. We have seen, in recent years, a tremendous growth of deterrent power in the United States and in the entire free world. It will continue to increase. I am confident that you believe, as I do, that we are capable either unilaterally or in consort with our allies, to wreak utter and complete devastation upon any potential enemy who might be so imprudent as to initiate a major conflict. Yet, despite the fact that we do possess such overwhelming power, and despite our avowed intention to maintain it, the Communist bloc has yet to alter, in any fashion, its announced goal of world domination. It continues to do everything possible, short of all-out military effort, to achieve that result. Therefore, we must continue to be militarily powerful in all respects. We must be able to prevent all-out war, and yet be prepared to win, if it is forced upon us. We must cope with limited war, and insure that the Communists do not take control of any more nations. We must prevent aggression, while assisting our allies in defending their homelands. To do these things, all our armed services the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force-must be strong. To retain that might, they must be modern. If any one component of this vastly powerful military organization becomes a weak link by virtue of obsolescence, the entire capability of our country-offensively and defensively-will suffer immeasurably. We must take every advantage of the vast technological gains of the past 20 years, as well as those coming to the fore each day. We must insure that these accomplishments are utilized more effectively by our planners and builders than by those of any possible foe. In recent years we have made major efforts to lengthen the effective lives of our older ships. We continue to be highly successful, and plan to utilize this program so long as it pays dividends. However, as we face requirements for better communications, complicated missile systems, improved sonars, and new types of weapons, we find that the old ships simply cannot do the job. Just a few weeks ago, three destroyer types from the Destroyer Force, U.S. Atlantic Fleet, paid a visit here in Washington. These three ships vividly demonstrated the very essence of our problem. U.S.S. King, a DDG, is one of our newest ships with the very best and latest equipment aboard. Her ASW capabilities are significant. She has the ASROC and the latest operational sonar. Additionally, her antiair warfare capability is great, as surface-to-air missiles form a part of her armament. This is a fine example of a modern Navy ship. U.S.S. Stribling also visited. She has a good ASW capability, with the same sonar as King, with ASROC and DASH. However, this ship is nearly 20 years old, and has been through our economical modernization program, the FRAM program. This rejuvenation is not practical for all ships, however, and at best the life of the ship is extended only about 8 years. It is a deterrent, a stopgap that cannot halt the inevitable. The modernization only made her a firstline ASW ship against today's submarine threat. It could not increase her AAW capability, hence her performance is limited. The third visitor was U.S.S. Weeks, a World War II destroyer, about the same age as Stribling, which does not have the potential to warrant inclusion in the FRAM program. She has received incremental modernization throughout the years but is still a World War II ship, effective against World War II diesel-electric submarines and piston-driven aircraft. This is a category of ship of which we have too many, both in destroyer forces and among other types. There are a number of reasons why it has been found impractical to modernize all ships. For example, should we install completely modern communications in one ship, it is possible that we would be unable to add the various other systems because of space and weight limitations, and the tremendous power requirements for their operation. We could, perhaps, effectively add a missile system to a ship, only to find a lack of sufficient range and speed prevents the ship from keeping up with the task force, whose antiair warfare capability it was designed to augment. The old hulls and engineering plants simply are not capable of meeting the demands of complete modernization. Eventually, we will find, that our returns from conversion and overhaul are diminishing rapidly. We also have a need for ships of higher speed, particularly in our amphibious forces. The 10-knot LST of World War II, effective though it was in that conflict, has little place in the Navy of tomorrow. Indeed, it is almost too slow for the Navy of today. No amount of conversion is going to increase the capabilities of these ships. And no amount of maintenance is going to keep them up on the line as long as we would need them there under combat conditions. These are but a random sampling of the problems we face in our attempt to make the best of our resources. The only answer, if the Navy is to be in a position to continue to carry out its mission, is to replace those ships which are rapidly approaching the end of their useful lives. Our shipbuilding programs in recent years have not been nearly large enough, in our estimation, to provide an orderly replacement program. As a consequence, the problem of obsolescence has become more acute. We now find ourselves in a position where significantly larger annual shipbuilding increments must be provided, for the next few years, in order to compensate for the lean average programs in past years. The Navy has developed such a shipbuilding and conversion program on the basis of a 7-year projection. This program, which does not yet have the approval of the Secretary of Defense, is essentially, however, an extension of the OSD approved program. It contains some differences, primarily in the combatant categories. A comparison of the two will be provided subsequently, during the presentation. We have been continually studying and improving the development of our future force structure which determines our shipbuilding program. This program is determined by two basic factors—the kind and number of ships we will need 10 years from now in light of the projected threat and the present assets which can be modernized and used in the 1973 period. The difference between the 1973 minimum rquirement goal of ships, and those 1963 present assets which have been evaluated as effective against the threat of the 1970's, establishes a total of about 518 ships that should be programed and delivered to the fleet by 1973. I shall not go into specific details as to the precise numbers and types we believe are required. However, the data will be provided clearly in the statements to follow. We believe we have reached a position where we must take immediate action to bolster the Navy's force structure or else accept a gradual, increasingly swift reduction in overall size and capability. I am confident that the information developed during these hearings will be of great assistance to you in arriving at a clear understanding of the present and projected capabilities of today's Navy and of the decisions involved in effecting the transition from its largely World War II character to an effective instrument of national policy under foreseeable future conditions. It has been a pleasure, gentlemen, for me to be here, and I thank you very much. I would be happy to answer any questions which you may have at this time. Mr. RIVERS. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I observe from your statement that the things to which you made particular reference will be implemented in those witnesses' testimony who are to follow. Secretary KORTH. Yes, sir. Mr. RIVERS. Admiral Ricketts, and particularly Admiral Griffin. Secretary KORTH. That is right, sir. Mr. RIVERS. I just want to ask you one question. Secretary KORTH. Yes, sir. Mr. RIVERS. Because I know you have another engagement, and we want to accommodate you to meet-what is that, 11 o'clock? Secretary KORTH. Yes, sir. But let that not disturb you. I am here at your pleasure. Mr. RIVERS. I take it from your statement that you presented to the Secretary of Defense a program which you thought would keep abreast of your commitments with a modern Navy? Secretary KORTH. That is right, sir. But I should qualify this, sir, so that it might be clear. Actually, the projections which the Secretary of Defense has are 5-year projections. So that, quite properly, he has not yet considered those projections beyond this 5-year span. Actually, he has not yet considered the fifth year, because we are just adding on that year in this submission of the budget this time. Mr. RIVERS. Well, now, just exactly what is your concern? Secretary KORTH. My concern, sir, is with the modernization of the fleet; yes. Mr. RIVERS. All right, the numbers which he permits you to commit, to become obligated to construct? Secretary KORTH. That is correct, sir. Mr. RIVERS. So, my question is this: What percentage of your requirements have thus far been approved by the top echelon of the Defense Department, 5 percent, 10 percent, 20 percent, 30 percent, or what percentage? Secretary KORTH. Much larger than the percentage that you have named, Mr. Chairman. Fully, in the 5-year projections, that is the 5-year projections which were submitted last year, there is not a great deal of variance between those projections and the first 4 years in the program which we are to present to you. The difference arises perhaps more significantly in the latter few years of this 10-year period. Mr. RIVERS. Well, now, what is contained in that period that is so disturbing? Secretary KORTH. Well, I can't say it is disturbing yet because I do not know what the Secretary of Defense's attitude will be upon those later projections. As to the differences between what we have submitted and what has been approved, I would have to ask Admiral Griffin if he can give me an approximation as to percentage. Admiral GRIFFIN. The percentage, I think, Mr. Chairman, would be a very high percentage. I might say in connection with this, that the action of the Secretary of Defense and of the Congress during consideration of the 1963 shipbuilding program was of great assistance to us and was a very significant step in the right direction in this whole matter. One of our basic difficulties has been the very lean years prior to this last year, sir. Mr. RIVERS. Well, of course, we are only now in the first year of the present administration's program. Secretary KORTH. That is correct, sir. Mr. RIVERS. When you came here, you took the preceding administration's |