Defense then turned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff individually and said, "I would like you now to give your views." Each Service Chief, because each Service did participate and rightfully so, then gave his views, and his assessment of the plan and any risks and hazards to that plan, and its probability of success.

I ask you, would you rather have that or would you rather have one individual who can't conceivably know that much about all four Services come and brief you if you were the President of the United States?

On the issue of the chairman and giving him more authority, you are saying that it means that that authority comes from somewhere else. It comes from the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Admiral Watkins and I both go to three JCS meetings each and every week— Tuesday, Wednesday, and Friday-and they usually run three to four hours. We normally have two to three hours each day of preparation time, which means somewhere between 20 and 30 hours of our working week is devoted to matters of national interest: arms control, strategy, or whatever. We do that willingly. We do it because it is our job; but also because we are full-time players and full-time participants in the process.

The day you take away my authority, my right to participate, and put me on the back bench, is the day that I am not going to be a player. I am only human. So what I am saying is, you are going to destroy the corporate nature that has served this country so well for 40 years. Interestingly enough, the people who seem to complain about the JCS are the same people who in their careers in public service were-I will be kind and say their performances were lackluster. These people seem to be the ones criticizing the system.

CIVILIAN AUTHORITY

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Secretary, you say you have like feelings. Did you want to respond?

What concerns me a little bit, and I would like you to talk of it for a moment, is the fact that we have always put the civilians in charge ahead of our military. Doesn't this change that situation a little bit?

Secretary LEHMAN. It very fundamentally changes the balance. It eliminates real decision making from the civilian part of the structure in a very fundamental way. It stifles dissent.

In World War II, President Roosevelt wanted to hear Admiral Nimitz argue with General MacArthur about whether to pass the Philippines or invade them. He wanted to hear Admiral King argue with General Marshall about whether to give Europe priority for shipping. That was true civilian control.

Nobody is worried about a coup d'etat from the military; it is whether civilians, the elected officials of the people, the President and his presidential appointees reporting and responsive_to_the Congress, have the right to make the key decisions with the best advice from all the service chiefs who are the best people those services have to offer.

That whole system that has grown up over 200 years through hard experience in war is being thrown out, based on some think

tank, arm-chair strategists and some retired officials. You have set, against that, the united and complete opposition of the Secretary of Defense, all three service secretaries, all four service chiefs and the chairman, and you have an administration where most of us are in our sixth year, so we haven't just arrived on a cart of pumpkins. We have all had experience in this business. When you set that against where the recommendations are coming from, it is hard to see how this thing is proceeding without any slowdown.

Admiral WATKINS. May I add, you may recall that in April 1983 Congress asked the President to come forward with his position on how we were going to base the MX. Was closely spaced basing the real option? We debated that for some maybe 16 or 17 sessions within the Joint Chiefs of Staff, just the chiefs alone, no staff, because it was such an important question at the time.

We came together as a body and unanimously addressed this issue in a non-parochial way and said that we had a real problem with that option. After deliberation it leaked out in the press-I don't like that kind of leak-since it was given in a classified hearing on the Hill, but nevertheless it got out. The Chiefs voted three to two against closely spaced basing and, alternatively, strongly influenced the President in the direction of strategic defense.

Because of proposed legislation Congress in the future on a similar debate like closely spaced basing, would get a one to zero vote from us. In my opinion I think that is the great danger here. We should always have the corporate body of the most knowledgeable people in the Services coming together to keep the balance.

There has been virtually no interservice rivalry that I have seen at all in the past four years. I did see it before, and it comes from a lot of things. I think it derives from the last decade's flawed national military policy which was not in sync with the real world. The American people believed it was flawed and put in a new concept and a new administration which changed that philosophy and brought us a more harmonious approach of pulling together on the same set of oars, within budget constraints, to give us the most "bang for the buck."

We think we have done that well, but we just haven't blown our horn about it. We came over and testified on Capitol Hill five times about what we have done and we got no credit. They say consensus has generally been obtained here, we have rounded off some "glads to happy," and should be pleased with the bill. We are not pleased with the bill and it has not accommodated our interests. You can see how strongly we feel about it. I believe we need help from other committees to look into this legislation and try to understand what damage we are doing to national security.

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, I believe we can let the record show that these gentlemen are opposed.

IMPACT ON C3I

Mr. LIVINGSTON. Would the gentleman yield?

Perhaps another thought not discussed is the need for a centralized command control, communications and intelligence network that operates efficiently under the OSD now. There is a centralized coordination of intelligence and communications now.

If in fact we adopt legislation to decentralize our commands at various levels, C3I would be de-emphasized and in my opinion could be crippled at all the service levels, am I correct? Secretary LEHMAN. Absolutely. Yes, indeed. Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Mr. ADDABBO. The gentleman from Florida.

DAMAGE ASSESSMENT OF WALKER SPY CASE

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, General, Admiral, it is nice to see you again. I would like to talk with you a minute about intelligence, espionage and counter-espionage and the Walker spy case. Could you give an update on damage assessments you might have since the last time we were here.

Secretary LEHMAN. Congressman, we think we have a very clear view of the damage that has been done. Of course, it will be years before the specifics, what happened in each year, that might have been compromised will be fully known.

For instance, Mr. Walker was aboard a ship off Vietnam during the bombing campaign there and he was reporting to the Soviets at the_time. Just how much was compromised has to be more thoroughly researched, but we know it was very damaging.

We think we have a clear handle on it. I would like to get the CNO's view of the record of that. But we think that we have learned the appropriate lessons. Thanks to some very prompt Congressional action last year, we have been given new authority to correct those problems, for example, additional polygraphing authority, I think that the case demonstrated to us and brought home in a dramatic, way that Navy security was inadequate to the threat.

The threat is massive. The Soviets and the Eastern bloc countries operate with far too much freedom in this country. There are too many of them. We have allowed them to have many more people in this country than we have in the Soviet Union. We have allowed people in the UN to go about masquerading as UN employees when they are espionage agents allowed to have without restriction.

We have made a massive change in the way we do our security. We have cut our security clearances by more than 40 percent. Coupled with the drastic reductions in security clearances, there have been tremendous increases in security measures taken aboard ship. That causes problems but we certainly must do that.

I think we have learned the right lessons. We are implementing a very different kind of security today to bring effectiveness back to background investigations and to make a security clearance mean something. Unfortunately, a clearance had decreasingly become routine.

So I would like to ask Admiral Watkins to address it as well. Admiral WATKINS. We have not uncovered new information other than that which we have provided publicly a few months following the exposure of Walker. Those areas are now compensated for in our budget submission, and within our budget. In a variety of line items you will see moneys ramping up in areas to improve our

security posture throughout the world. As a matter of fact, we have gone from tens of millions up to over $100 million in this budget alone to address physical security worldwide, with focus primarily overseas. That is where our real problem is in the context of the Walker case.

We have awareness we have not had since World War II. We have help from the Congress on a variety of bills and we continue our aggressive action in the Navy. We have withdrawn 200,000 clearances and lowered another 150,000 for over a 40-percent reduction. We have changed COMSFC custodians. Without questioning loyalty we moved them so that we could break any claims that might have been established. We have set up a rotation scheme to disallow the subsequent assignments of people with access to highly classified cryptographic information. We have changed our entire set of procedures. I think that is why we have flushed a few more of these villains out of the woodwork.

So, I believe our program is working well now. We are clearly in the vanguard of actions to pick ourselves up and move out from this setback. All the budget dollars are now adjusted in lines where hardware clearly compromised, is properly compensated for. I have a task force doing nothing but working together on tactical aspects to ensure that we take advantage of the exposure of some of the information. This would confuse the Soviets if we ever engaged them, or any other force and provide a necessary cloud of dust around our procedures making it difficult for them to capitalize on divulged tactical information.

We have changed our procedures. If you want a detailed briefing in a classified hearing, I think you would get a very impressive report. Too bad we didn't do it before. We should have. We needed an incentive that we didn't have and didn't want, such as a Whitehat turning on his own family. That was very unusual, and that is driving us toward concepts like codes of ethics and other programs we have had to put into effect. Within another year, I would say we have walked away from Walker in terms of the potential for damage in wartime.

POLYGRAPH

Mr. YOUNG. Have you been able to increase the use of the polygraph yet?

Admiral WATKINS. Yes, sir, we have started. The Navy alone I believe has 1200 authorizations this year, out of defense pot of 3500 and next year DOD has another 3500 authorized by Congress.

We desperately need those. They are a strong deterrent to espionage. We know that because the Soviets tell us by a variety of means. Responsible use of polygraphs will go a long way for the best interest of the country.

Mr. YOUNG. I am glad the Secretary mentioned the help from Congress because when that polygraph legislation was before the House, with your help, Mr. Secretary, we were able to get a very strong statement on polygraph.

Unfortunately, the other body didn't see it in the same way and watered it down. If we had not had the support from you and the CNO

Secretary LEHMAN. You are far too modest, because it was your personal leadership that brought that about, that has given us the strongest single tool to deter wider spread infiltration by the Soviets. Of all the things we have done.

Mr. YOUNG. Let me change the subject for a couple of minutes here.

AIRCRAFT PROCUREMENT

P-3 AIRCRAFT

Your budget request for aircraft procurement this year totals $11.3 billion and includes money for 271 aircraft. In the past OSD has increased your request for P-3 aircraft over your original request.

Did that happen again this year?

Secretary LEHMAN. Well, of course I support the President's budget, as you know. We think the P-3 is a superb aircraft and we can always use more of them. However, there are wider considerations brought to bear than narrow service interests when budgets move on up for approval. However, let no one have the impression that the Navy does not support the P-3.

My problem with the P-3 has been the acquisition strategy of sole source procurement at low production rates which has driven the unit cost well beyond what it should be. So we have now proposed, and we will be outlining to you in more detail, a procurement strategy to buy 125 more P-3s, but to buy them competitively, the Update IV configuration with the new JVX/V-22 engines. We want to do a fixed price competition for five years at an efficient production rate of 25 per year. We expect that we will have at least two other competitors bidding against Lockheed for that five-year buy.

The P-3 is a superb airplane. We looked carefully at moving to a new derivative of a commercial airplane, but didn't see the payoff there compared to re-engining the P-3 and so forth at this time. Perhaps towards the middle or end of the next decade when the new prop fan, unducted fan technologies are proven in commercial derivatives, that may be the time to shift to a new airframe. But, now we believe we should procure 125 more P-3s competitively.

Mr. YOUNG. Do you have a feeling for a time frame as to when you might move into the new program?

Secretary LEHMAN. Yes, we do. We want to do that competition for the Update IV in 1989. We expect to go out with invitations for bid this year on that package, assuming we get approval for the concept of this kind of competitive procurement of P-3s.

We have data rights and we own most of the tooling for the P-3s, that would be provided to whichever company wins the winnertake-all fixed-price competition.

A-6 AND F-14 AIRCRAFT

Mr. YOUNG. You are requesting 11 A-6s and 15 F-14 aircraft. Will these be A-6Fs and F-14Ds?

Secretary LEHMAN. The F-14s will be what we are calling Apluses. Basically, they will be basic upgraded F-14As with the F110 engine, and will not have the full upgraded weapon suit of the