Mr. CHAPPELL. Please answer the rest of the questions on this subject for the record.

[CLERK'S NOTE.-Questions submitted by Mr. Chappell and the answers thereto follow:]

Question. I know there is disagreement amongst the Services over the need for JCS Reform, and also the direction to take in drafting the reform. Could you briefly explain, from your viewpoint, the pros and cons of the key changes in both the House and Senate versions of the JCS reform bill.

Answer. The Air Force is certainly supportive of improving the current DoD system; however, as stated previously, we believe any initiated change should be in response to specific problems. The preponderance of the proposed legislation which has surfaced over the past few months partially addresses problems which have been effectively solved. For example, the provision of rotating the Chairmanship, on a scheduled basis, among the Service Chiefs in the absence of the Chairman, has worked well and improved the system. Our efforts to enhance the involvement of the combatant CINCS in the budgeting process have also proven to be a significant step forward.

Regarding the House Bill 3622, the Service Chiefs are already on record as supporting most of its provisions. The changes deemed necessary enhanced the authority of the Chairman, but isolated him from the corporate JCS structure. We support the enhancement of the Chairman's authority, but believe he should act on behalf of the JCS. One man cannot be expected to possess all the knowledge available within the corporate Joint Chiefs, and this expertise must be available to the President, the National Security Council and the Secretary of Defense.

The SASC-proposed legislation is almost in the same category as the House Bill. The most recent draft is a signficant improvement over the first draft. However, clearer wording regarding the relationship of the Chairman to the Joint Chiefs of Staff is required. Again, it does not seem prudent to isolate the corporate expertise of the Joint Chiefs from the decision makers. Increasing the authority of the CINCS to organize their commands to accomplish their assigned missions makes good sense. On the other hand, is it wise to saddle the warfighters with a budgeting workload? Additional small evolutionary changes to the existing system should sufficiently enhance the voice of the CINCs in the budget process beyond that mentioned above. The Packard Commission recommendation to allow the Secretary of Defense to determine who acts as Chairman in his absence also makes more sense than arbitrarily establishing a Vice Chairman for that function. Like the CINCS, the Secretary of Defense should be allowed to organize to optimize the performance of his organization, and the Packard recommendation allows for this. Establishing a Vice Chairman is acceptable in this context. Finally, the existing statutory responsibilities of the Service Chiefs should be maintained. The Service Secretary and the Service Chief have distinct and separate roles. The Secretary provides direction and guidance over all matters pertaining to the formulation, review and execution of plans, policies and programs relative to those broad areas involved in the organization, equipping, and training of aerospace forces. It is the task of the Chief of

Staff to take that broad direction and guidance and develop combat aerospace forces, fully trained and equipped.

Question. We are most concerned with the reforms which will affect the budget process, acquisition process and contracting process, and management of resources. Do you foresee the proposed reforms improving on current procedures.

Answer. Generally, yes. There are details in each proposed reform we've seen that we think can be improved, and we've provided comments where appropriate. For example, we believe the proposed two-year budget is a move in the right direction. We believe that a shift to "milestone" authorizations and appropriations would be better. We believe anything we can do to improve the quality of the acquisition work force without creating an elite corps would be beneficial. For this reason, we support quality to force improvements such as bonuses and salary differentials in some cases, but do not support creating a Defense Acquisition Service. These are two examples of the many reforms proposed. As each new idea begins to take shape, we would be happy to provide inputs to help crystalize the final proposal.

Question. The Senate version calls for the unified commanders to obtain not only full operational control over all their forces, but they would also become responsible for the programming and budgeting of those forces. Do you view this as an advantage or disadvantage? If this particular change comes into being, won't it be possible to reduce the individual Service headquarters staff in each theater in order to consolidate operational authority with the unified commander? For example, won't any expansion in CINCEUR headquarters staff be more than offset by reductions to USAREUR, USAFE and NAVEUR?

Answer. We generally favor strengthening the CINCS, but we see programming and budgeting of Air Force component command forces by the unified commanders as disadvantageous. The current system provides the CINCs the ability to take issue with the Service POMS without going through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They participate personally at the beginning of the program review and may also present their concerns directly to the entire Defense Resources Board. This system provides the CINC with much greater impact than if they had responsibility for component command programming and budgeting.

Additionally, we do not want the CINCs distracted from their primary duty-warfighting-by becoming immersed in areas where they can be more efficiently and effectively supported by the Services. That is not to say that there might not be shared responsibility in programming and budeting for areas such as joint exercises; command and control; and joint training. In fact, some of these areas are shared since these issues are worked within the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Next, expansion of CINCEUR Headquarters would probably not be offset by reductions in the component command headquarters. For example, the Air Force Component Commander (AFFOR), in this case, CINCUSAFE, still has to provide programming and budgeting actions in support of the Department of Air Force's responsibility for training; operations; administration; logistics; maintenance; morale and welfare, preparedness, and research and devel

opment. Also, the AFFOR's staff, under the direction of the CINC, is responsible for wartime planning and execution of those portions of approved joint plans that relate to air forces. Personnel transferred to the CINCEUR Headquarters to increase the joint planning capability automatically and significantly decrease the AFFOR's wartime execution capability.

Finally, there may be an increased manpower cost because as we create programming and budgeting processes (POMs) in the seven unified CINC areas, we create seven small forces, Air Force, Army, Navy, Marine Corps-each group competing at the CINC level along with all ten unified and specified CINC competing at the OJCS level. This much decentralizing of the resource allocation process would cost manpower and has great potential to create unbalanced solutions.

[CLERK'S NOTE.-End of questions submitted by Mr. Chappell.]

Mr. CHAPPELL. Mr. Chairman, I think the record reflects that these gentlemen are opposed to the reorganization.

Mr. ADDABBO. The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murtha.

AIR FORCE FLYING HOURS

Mr. MURTHA. I went on a trip recently and stopped in Alaska where I asked the Air Force commander, General Nichols, how is Gramm-Rudman-Holling's affecting your outfit out here, and he talked about a number of things.

One, he said he has a lot of long-range strategic defense fighter aircraft there, and I asked him if the F-20 or the F-16 worked. He said, no, we need longer legs than either of those two, which surprised me.

He also said Gramm-Rudman-Holling's would affect him by having to stop building a runway on one of the crucial airfields out there, and there would be a 3 percent cut in flying hours.

We went to Tokyo and I talked to the commander there. He also has an airfield which is very important to him. He is going to have to cut back and have a 3 percent cut in flying hours in that command.

I went to the Philippines and talked to the commander at Clark. The same thing, cutting back on a crucial landing strip that he needs badly, cutting back 3 percent in flying hours.

Now, I read a letter from General Rees which says: "I am pleased to inform you 1985 was the safest year in history for the Air Force. Our flight mishap, which was the lowest on record, was approximately 1.5 Class "A" accidents per 100,000 flying hours, 14 percent below the 1984 rate. We experienced the lowest ever number of fatalities resulting from non-flight related mishaps such as private motor vehicle, recreational accidents."

I asked them all about the flying hours and I said, "Is this because of the additional time you have?"

For instance, I can remember this committee six or seven years ago, that we had 10 or 11 hours a month in the fighter aircraft, half our airplanes were deadlined because of lack of spare parts and all kinds of ammunition problems and everything else. Morale was at the lowest ebb possible, and we are going in that direction again. And the first thing the Air Force does is cut back on the

flying hours, which is such a safety and morale factor. We are going to start having accidents again and I am convinced that this is a disaster for the Air Force.

I was just down to the White House and I said to the President, "I agree with the defense buildup but there is no way we can get to that conclusion without increasing taxes." I hope the Defense Department will come to the same conclusion, because there is no way to get a budget through the House without some sort of increased revenue, and I think the present direction we are going will be disastrous to the security of the United States, and I see the results already.

It won't take long if we are at a 3 percent decrease in flying hours until the accident rates increase, spare parts and maintenance and supply-we will cut back on housing, et cetera, and of course, I am concerned to the point where I don't think there is any alternative, if we are going to keep a strong defense, but to raise taxes.

IMPACT OF SEQUESTRATION ON AIR FORCE PERSONNEL

The specific point that I am concerned about is if we were to go, let's say the Congress doesn't do its job and we have to go to sequestration. What happens to the personnel side of the Air Force next year with Gramm-Rudman-Holling's as it is structured now without any increase in taxes and if nothing is done by the Congress before that?

Secretary ROURKE. It depends on the degree of the sequestration and how much those deficit targets are missed by.

Mr. MURTHA. Say we miss them by more than $10 billion, which means that sequestration goes into effect and it is done by sequestration.

Secretary ROURKE. The question is how much more, do we miss it by? What is the level of hurt that is distributed across the board? But for the exemption that was provided for MILPERS in 1986 cycle, we would have suffered, as the Congress has been advised by Secretary Weinberger and through the White House, something on the order of 285,000 from the active force and additional scores of thousands from the reserve establishment. And that was on the mini portion for the first impact.

So we would have to witness, if there are no exemptions and if we get the kind of burden that you are addressing, the departure of a lot of active-duty personnel, it would do great damage, we think, to our national security establishment.

On the uplifting side, however, because of the threat of that, the message from the President, and we are not trying to place blame on the other fellow, this President and this administration and this presidential appointee have embraced Gramm-Rudman.

The message is, because of the prospect of the tragic kind of cuts that you are talking about, we are proud of the 1.49 accident rate. We are proud of everything we have done in terms of retention in enlistments, proud of the kind of progress we have made in the spare parts area, we are proud of all the progress the Congress in its wisdom has given us an opportunity to make. And we are scared stiff that that progress is going to be halted in its tracks.

Obviously, with respect to a tax increase, you have heard the President's views. I don't know how he reacted in the immediate instance today. I have been in his company when that proposal has been made before

Mr. MURTHA. He didn't comment. That is a start.

I said, "You don't need to comment, Mr. President, but there will have to be a tax increase because defense cannot sustain the cuts I have been hearing. It would be devastating to the defense establishment."

Secretary ROURKE. We have got to stay this side of sequestration and the activities that occur in the Congress, and that means cuts distributed, one might say, in a fair way.

We think based on the agreements made last year, 0-3-3 sounded like a tough bargain to us, we embraced it, the Chairman and I had a mild difference of view with respect to what is provided in this budget, and the base from which you move. We recognize it as a 3 percent real growth.

We also indicated before you came in, Mr. Murtha, the kinds of cuts that have already had to be taken as a result of the fiscal year 1986 impact of Gramm-Rudman, which is only a start, precursor to the kinds of suggestions you are making, and if we go down the other road again and are back to where we were, Republican or Democratic administration doesn't mean beans, we are in for a world of hurt unless we can avoid sequestration.

Mr. ADDABBO. The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Young.

101ST AIRBORNE ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION

Mr. YOUNG. General Gabriel, it is always nice to hear from you because you are always frank and we will miss you.

Mr. Secretary, I believe you are sort of historic. Of all the people I have recommended to the administration for appointment, I think you are the only one who got appointed.

In the recent weeks, I have attended the funerals of Private Scot Curtis and Sergeant James Douglas Phillips, who were among the 248 troopers of the 101st Airborne who were killed at Gander.

I know that you and I share the same compassion for them and their families, and want to do everything we can to make sure this doesn't happen again.

In discussing this with the Army when the Secretary and the Chief were here two days ago, they said that after that crash they had requested that any further travel to and from the Sinai be done by military aircraft rather than the CRAF fleet, and that that request was approved.

I imagine that had more of a public relations impact than anything else, but I am curious as to the status of the investigation of this tragedy and whether the alleged safety violations have been confirmed?

Secretary ROURKE. The investigation, to my knowledge, is not as yet complete. I do know that, as you are aware, the contractor did file for bankruptcy and that is rather a closed issue as far as Arrow Air is concerned.

We want to get to the bottom of that to determine the actual cause of the crash, and did the foreign spare parts play a role or