The Army

In this regard, research and development (R&D) is an investment that enables us not only to develop and capitalize on the "tiger of technology" but also to keep pace with a rapidly changing and sophisticated threat. We are driven by advances in technology, to a certain extent, and thus we can expect some continued turbulence in the weapons acquisition process. We must "product improve" our systems or risk defeat on future battlefields. depends largely on superior equipment in the hands of well-trained and motivated soldiers to overcome a numerical disadvantage on the modern battlefield. R&D provides leverage for the future and is vital to the development of equipment that will allow us to capitalize on our AirLand Battle Doctrine.

As you can see, we are modernizing our force structure, giving it better balance, and increasing its combat power, all without an increase in the end strength of our Active Component. The following chart shows the major combat components of the Total Army. Our heavier forces remain oriented towards Central Europe and the NATO commitment. Our lighter forces increase our strategic flexibility and deployability; and, thus, they enhance our ability to deter war. Deployability is deterrence. These light forces, along with our improved Special Operations Forces, give the National Command Authorities the options needed to handle the challenges of low intensity conflict, the most likely we expect to face in the future. Army light and Special Operations Forces will also play an important role in a high intensity war. For example, by holding heavily forested or urban areas, our rapidly deployable light infantry divisions can free up our tank and mechanized forces for offensive operations.

You can see that the Reserve Components continue to play an important role in our force structure (10 of 28 divisions; they constitute 49 percent of our total strength, 50 percent of our combat battalions, 70 percent of our deploying forces, and 69 percent of our combat service support). They have substantially more equipment and simulators, take part in exercises with active forces overseas and in the U.S., train at the National Training Center, and have sustained steady growth in full-time manning. The Reserve Components have come a long way in improved readiness and capabilities.

Twenty-five percent of our total Army divisions are configured as lighter forces, including the newly organized light divisions. This chart shows the advantages of the light infantry division. Getting to the "right place, at the right time, with the right stuff," is a capability that enhances the deterrent power of the United States and adds to its strategic, non-nuclear capabilities.

We remain vitally concerned about the adequacy of airlift and sealift resources, and we continue to support fully the Air Force and Navy in their efforts to improve our strategic mobility.

Within the overall composition of the Total Army, we have increased our combat capability as this chart shows. For the Active Army, we have created 29 additional battalions through FY87, with 21 more programmed between now and FY91. This increase has been accomplished essentially within the confines of a constant end strength for the Active Component. Also shown here is the increase in RC end strength and the growth in combat power in the Reserve Component..

We have chosen to keep the end strength constant for Active Component forces, in order to protect our readiness, sustainability, essential modernization, and people programs. We have disciplined our appetite for active end strength increases so that we can maintain the overall quality of our forces and capitalize on productivity enhancing technology. But we are increasing our Reserve and National Guard strengths to permit more qualified citizens to serve their country and to improve our deterrent posture. This fundamental choice has been a key part of our strategy for building and equipping today's Army.

The substantial increase in our deterrent and combat capability shown on the last chart was accomplished through several initiatives: productivity enhancing technology, organizational modernization, headquarters reductions, Reserve Components' growth, civilian substitution and contracting, and Host Nation Support and contingency contracting. Technology is especially important to our efforts to conserve manpower and convert it to combat power. This chart provides a good example of how technology will help us to improve our support bridging capability in the early 1990s. With acquisition costs equal to the older model, the new bridge saves manpower, transportation, weight, and time. The crew will be reduced by 75 percent, the vehicles by 60 percent, and erection time by 75 percent.

In the areas of training and sustaining, the chart below shows some of the improvements made to enhance our readiness. National Training Center (NTC) rotations, range modernization, and Reserve Components overseas deployment training provide superb training experiences for our soldiers and units. The improved status of POMCUS (Prepositioning of Materiel Configured to Unit Sets), Host Nation Support, and War Reserve Stock will enhance our reinforcement capability and will help sustain our forces once they are committed to combat. This latter area, although less glamorous, has not been neglected in the course of building a renewed posture of readiness for the Army.

JOINTNESS

"Jointness" is vital to success in combat. If we had to go to war tomorrow, we would go jointly. I can tell you that the Army, by virtue of its business, has to be the most joint of the services. General Gabriel, the Air Force Chief of Staff, and I instituted the Joint Force Development Process in May 1984 by Memorandum of Agreement. The objective remains to develop complementary rather than duplicative capabilities, to fill voids in our warfighting capabilities, and to increase total force effectiveness in direct support of the warfighting commanders in chief. We have broadened participation in the process to include the other services.

JOINT FORCE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS

• ORIGINAL 31 JOINT INITIATIVES

NOW 35-OVER 50% IMPLEMENTED

• ARMY, NAVY AND AIR FORCE PARTICIPATE

• DIRECT SUPPORT TO THE COMBATANT CINCS

• COMPLEMENT RATHER THAN DUPLICATE
CAPABILITIES

• INCREASE TOTAL FORCE EFFECTIVENESS

$1 BILLION COST AVOIDANCE

[Chart 14]

We have implemented over half of the original thirty-one Air Force-Army initiatives and have added four new ones. The initiatives have resulted in roughly a billion dollars of near-term cost avoidance as we have reduced or eliminated duplicative programs. Furthermore, they are helping the Army and the Air Force to develop doctrinal and procedural agreements that lead to better operations on the battlefield. Similar agreements with the Navy are helping to improve our strategic sealift and logistics-over-the-shore capabilities.

This chart shows several systems, comprising the Joint Interdiction Program, that are particularly important to our joint efforts: Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System, Joint Tactical Fusion Program, and the Joint Tactical Cruise Missile System. These three joint programs are

critical to the future success of our AirLand Battle Doctrine and are essential to NATO's FOFA strategy.